diff --git a/.github/workflows/quality-gate.yml b/.github/workflows/quality-gate.yml
index 3317e8d..81764c9 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/quality-gate.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/quality-gate.yml
@@ -16,11 +16,18 @@ on:
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
-  # administration: read — the self-verifying mount canary (below) reads the
-  # default branch's protection to confirm THIS gate is a required, non-bypassable
-  # check. This is a CEILING; the effective grant comes from the caller's token, so
-  # the caller stub must also grant administration:read (templates/quality.caller.yml).
-  administration: read
+  # NOTE: `administration` is NOT a grantable GITHUB_TOKEN scope — a workflow
+  # `permissions:` block can only request the 15 documented automatic-token
+  # scopes (actions, attestations, checks, contents, deployments, discussions,
+  # id-token, issues, models, packages, pages, pull-requests, repository-projects,
+  # security-events, statuses), and declaring `administration:` here makes the
+  # workflow YAML invalid (the job dies at 0s and never emits a status check).
+  # So the in-band mount canary (below) reads the default branch's protection via
+  # an OPTIONAL `CI_KIT_TOKEN` secret — a fine-grained PAT / GitHub App
+  # installation token carrying repo Administration:read — forwarded by the
+  # caller's `secrets: inherit`. Absent that secret the canary is skipped with a
+  # warning and the required-check mount is enforced out-of-band (Constable sweep
+  # + templates/check-required-mount.sh).
 
 jobs:
   gate:
@@ -204,15 +211,27 @@ jobs:
         # procedure (DESIGN §4.8, verdict PARTIAL) into mechanism — the missing
         # in-band leg of the out-of-band Constable canary. It reuses the audit
         # script verbatim (DRY) against the calling repo's default branch; the
-        # context is `gate / gate`. Needs administration:read (see permissions +
-        # the caller stub); a token that cannot read protection is treated as
-        # an unmounted gate, not waved through.
+        # context is `gate / gate`.
+        #
+        # Reading branch protection needs repo Administration:read, which the
+        # automatic GITHUB_TOKEN CANNOT be granted (it is not a grantable token
+        # scope — see the permissions block above). So the canary's TEETH are
+        # active ONLY when an admin-scoped CI_KIT_TOKEN (fine-grained PAT /
+        # GitHub App installation token) is provisioned and forwarded via the
+        # caller's `secrets: inherit`. Without it the leg DEGRADES to a warning
+        # (so the gate is not bricked for un-provisioned consumers) and the mount
+        # stays enforced out-of-band (Constable sweep + check-required-mount.sh).
         env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CI_KIT_TOKEN || github.token }}
+          KIT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CI_KIT_TOKEN }}
         run: |
+          if [ -z "$KIT_TOKEN" ]; then
+            echo "::warning::quality-gate: in-band mount self-verification SKIPPED — no CI_KIT_TOKEN (admin:read) secret is provisioned, so the canary cannot read branch protection (the automatic GITHUB_TOKEN cannot be granted Administration:read). The out-of-band Constable sweep + templates/check-required-mount.sh remain the enforcement; provision a CI_KIT_TOKEN repo/org secret to give this leg teeth."
+            exit 0
+          fi
           script="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.cf-quality/templates/check-required-mount.sh"
           if ! bash "$script" "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"; then
-            echo "::error::quality-gate refused: this gate is not a required, non-bypassable status check on the default branch — OR the token lacks 'administration: read' to confirm it. A gate that cannot prove it is the law is treated as unmounted. Mount it (templates/mount-required.sh · docs/enforcement-runbook.md) and grant the caller administration:read."
+            echo "::error::quality-gate refused: this gate is not a required, non-bypassable status check on the default branch — OR the provisioned CI_KIT_TOKEN lacks Administration:read to confirm it. A gate that cannot prove it is the law is treated as unmounted. Mount it (templates/mount-required.sh · docs/enforcement-runbook.md)."
             exit 1
           fi
 
diff --git a/templates/quality.caller.yml b/templates/quality.caller.yml
index cac5ebd..f6589d1 100644
--- a/templates/quality.caller.yml
+++ b/templates/quality.caller.yml
@@ -13,10 +13,14 @@
 #     anyway. The status-check context is `gate / gate` (caller job `gate` over
 #     the reusable workflow's `gate` job). One-shot mount: templates/mount-required.sh;
 #     procedure + audit: docs/enforcement-runbook.md (also check-required-mount.sh)
-#   - grant `administration: read` below — the gate's in-band canary reads this
-#     repo's branch protection to self-verify it is mounted as required, and
-#     REFUSES to pass when it cannot confirm it (a gate that can't prove it is
-#     the law is treated as unmounted)
+#   - the gate's in-band mount canary is OPTIONAL: it reads this repo's branch
+#     protection to self-verify the gate is mounted as required, which needs repo
+#     Administration:read — a scope the automatic GITHUB_TOKEN cannot be granted.
+#     Enable it by providing a `CI_KIT_TOKEN` repo/org secret (a fine-grained PAT
+#     or GitHub App installation token with repo Administration: read); the
+#     `secrets: inherit` below forwards it to the reusable workflow. Without that
+#     secret the gate still runs and the required-check mount is enforced
+#     out-of-band (Constable sweep + templates/check-required-mount.sh)
 name: quality-gate
 on:
   push:
@@ -25,7 +29,7 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
 jobs:
   gate:
-    permissions: { contents: read, administration: read }
+    permissions: { contents: read }
     # Replace the placeholder with a real full commit SHA of the kit repo:
     uses: BonfireAI/candyfactory-quality/.github/workflows/quality-gate.yml@0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     secrets: inherit
diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py
index 963ca05..fcc4d69 100644
--- a/tests/test_workflows.py
+++ b/tests/test_workflows.py
@@ -29,6 +29,29 @@
 
 SHA_PINNED = re.compile(r"@[0-9a-f]{40}$")
 
+# The exact set of scopes a workflow `permissions:` block may request for the
+# automatic GITHUB_TOKEN. `administration` is NOT among them (it is valid only
+# for fine-grained PATs / GitHub Apps), so declaring it makes the YAML invalid.
+VALID_GITHUB_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "actions",
+        "attestations",
+        "checks",
+        "contents",
+        "deployments",
+        "discussions",
+        "id-token",
+        "issues",
+        "models",
+        "packages",
+        "pages",
+        "pull-requests",
+        "repository-projects",
+        "security-events",
+        "statuses",
+    }
+)
+
 
 def _load(path: Path) -> dict[Any, Any]:
     # dict[Any, Any]: YAML 1.1 parses the bare trigger key ``on`` as the
@@ -69,6 +92,23 @@ def _walk_keys(node: Any) -> list[str]:
     return keys
 
 
+# recursion: bounded by the finite depth of a yaml.safe_load tree (acyclic by construction)
+def _permissions_keys(node: Any) -> set[str]:
+    """Union of the keys of every ``permissions:`` mapping anywhere in the tree
+    (top-level and per-job). A ``permissions`` value that is a bare string
+    (e.g. ``read-all``) contributes no scope keys."""
+    keys: set[str] = set()
+    if isinstance(node, dict):
+        for key, value in node.items():
+            if str(key) == "permissions" and isinstance(value, dict):
+                keys.update(str(k) for k in value)
+            keys.update(_permissions_keys(value))
+    elif isinstance(node, list):
+        for item in node:
+            keys.update(_permissions_keys(item))
+    return keys
+
+
 def _uses_refs(data: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
     refs: list[str] = []
     for job in data["jobs"].values():
@@ -335,9 +375,42 @@ def test_gate_self_verifies_required_mount_in_band() -> None:
     assert canary[0]["env"]["GH_TOKEN"], "the canary needs a token to read protection"
 
 
-def test_gate_declares_administration_read_permission() -> None:
+def _mount_canary() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    canary = [
+        s for s in _steps(_load(GATE_PATH), "gate") if "check-required-mount.sh" in s.get("run", "")
+    ]
+    assert len(canary) == 1, "exactly one in-band mount canary"
+    return canary[0]
+
+
+def test_mount_canary_reads_optional_ci_kit_token() -> None:
+    # The canary reads branch protection (Administration:read) via an OPTIONAL
+    # CI_KIT_TOKEN secret, falling back to the automatic token for the API host;
+    # KIT_TOKEN carries the secret alone so the run can test its presence.
+    env = _mount_canary()["env"]
+    gh_token = env["GH_TOKEN"]
+    assert "CI_KIT_TOKEN" in gh_token and "github.token" in gh_token
+    assert "secrets.CI_KIT_TOKEN" in env["KIT_TOKEN"]
+
+
+def test_mount_canary_degrades_without_admin_token() -> None:
+    # No admin token → skip-with-warning (degrade, never brick); token present →
+    # the strict proof reuses check-required-mount.sh and refuses on failure.
+    run = _mount_canary()["run"]
+    assert "::warning::" in run and '-z "$KIT_TOKEN"' in run
+    assert "check-required-mount.sh" in run and "exit 1" in run
+
+
+def test_gate_permissions_only_grant_valid_github_token_scopes() -> None:
+    # `administration` is not a grantable GITHUB_TOKEN scope; declaring it makes
+    # the workflow YAML invalid and the gate job dies at 0s without a status
+    # check. The gate's top-level permissions must stay within the valid set.
     perms = _load(GATE_PATH).get("permissions")
-    assert isinstance(perms, dict) and perms.get("administration") == "read"
+    assert isinstance(perms, dict)
+    keys = {str(k) for k in perms}
+    invalid = keys - VALID_GITHUB_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS
+    assert not invalid, f"non-grantable scope(s): {invalid}"
+    assert "administration" not in keys
 
 
 def test_still_exactly_one_aggregating_cf_gate_step_after_additions() -> None:
@@ -350,9 +423,21 @@ def test_still_exactly_one_aggregating_cf_gate_step_after_additions() -> None:
 # --- caller stub + the apply/audit mount scripts -----------------------------
 
 
-def test_caller_grants_administration_read() -> None:
+def test_caller_permissions_only_grant_valid_github_token_scopes() -> None:
     gate = _load(TEMPLATE_PATH)["jobs"]["gate"]
-    assert gate["permissions"]["administration"] == "read"
+    keys = {str(k) for k in gate["permissions"]}
+    invalid = keys - VALID_GITHUB_TOKEN_PERMISSIONS
+    assert not invalid, f"non-grantable scope(s): {invalid}"
+    assert "administration" not in keys
+
+
+def test_no_workflow_declares_administration_token_scope() -> None:
+    # Regression guard: `administration` is not a grantable GITHUB_TOKEN scope, so
+    # it must appear in NO permissions mapping (top-level or per-job) of any of
+    # our workflow surfaces. This FAILS on the pre-fix files and PASSES after.
+    for path in (GATE_PATH, SELF_CI_PATH, TEMPLATE_PATH):
+        keys = _permissions_keys(_load(path))
+        assert "administration" not in keys, f"{path.name} declares non-grantable 'administration'"
 
 
 def test_mount_apply_script_present_and_proves_via_audit() -> None: