Summary
Two lower-severity hardening gaps in the Electron shell:
sandbox: false (electron/main.ts:365) - disabling the Chromium sandbox removes OS-level process isolation and gives the preload full Node access, enlarging the blast radius of any renderer/preload compromise. (contextIsolation/nodeIntegration:false are correct; the sandbox is the load-bearing layer and there's no comment justifying its removal.)LD_LIBRARY_PATH leak (electron/main.ts:115-118) - the bundled python/runtime/lib (glibc-locked python-build-standalone libs) is prepended to LD_LIBRARY_PATH and inherited by every process the backend spawns. For a tool that shells out to proton/steam/mangohud/vulkan helpers, this can make host binaries dlopen mismatched shared libraries and crash/misbehave.
Fix
Enable the sandbox (or document why not); scope LD_LIBRARY_PATH to the Python child only, not the inherited env of downstream tools.
Summary
Two lower-severity hardening gaps in the Electron shell:
sandbox: false(electron/main.ts:365) - disabling the Chromium sandbox removes OS-level process isolation and gives the preload full Node access, enlarging the blast radius of any renderer/preload compromise. (contextIsolation/nodeIntegration:falseare correct; the sandbox is the load-bearing layer and there's no comment justifying its removal.)LD_LIBRARY_PATHleak (electron/main.ts:115-118) - the bundledpython/runtime/lib(glibc-locked python-build-standalone libs) is prepended toLD_LIBRARY_PATHand inherited by every process the backend spawns. For a tool that shells out to proton/steam/mangohud/vulkan helpers, this can make host binariesdlopenmismatched shared libraries and crash/misbehave.Fix
Enable the sandbox (or document why not); scope
LD_LIBRARY_PATHto the Python child only, not the inherited env of downstream tools.