diff --git a/artifacts/_template.yml b/artifacts/_template.yml
index 5094d20..8cf61be 100644
--- a/artifacts/_template.yml
+++ b/artifacts/_template.yml
@@ -129,4 +129,4 @@ contribution:
   date_added: "2025-01-15"
   last_updated: "2025-01-15"
   version: "1.0"
-  reviewed_by: "Reviewer Name" # Optional
+  reviewed_by: "Reviewer Name" # Optional
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/artifacts/persistence-methods/Dsrm_Admin_Logon_Behaviour.yml b/artifacts/persistence-methods/Dsrm_Admin_Logon_Behaviour.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9147af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/artifacts/persistence-methods/Dsrm_Admin_Logon_Behaviour.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+title: "DSRM Admin Logon Behavior Registry Key"
+category: "persistence-methods"
+
+description: "Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator account logon configuration - values of 1 or 2 indicate guaranteed compromise and persistence over Active Directory forest"
+
+paths:
+  - "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior"
+
+details:
+  what: |
+    The DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry key controls the behavior of the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator account.
+    Normally (and almost always) this key is either non-existent OR set to 0. This means the DSRM admin account cannot 
+    logon locally OR over the network. If the key is set to 1, the DSRM admin account can logon locally, and if set to 2,
+    network authentication is allowed. This configuration is extremely rare in normal environments and indicates compromise.
+
+  forensic_value: |
+    This artifact proves that someone had the privileges to edit the Domain Controller registry and alter critical security settings. 
+    The DSRM account functions as a local administrator, enabling DC sync attacks, hash/key/secret extraction, DPAPI backup master key access, 
+    domain controller policy modification, and ultimately complete forest compromise. This includes compromising RODCs and lateral movement.
+
+  structure: |
+    The DsrmAdminLogonBehavior key is a DWORD value located at:
+    HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior
+    
+    Values:
+    - 0: DSRM admin account cannot log on locally or over the network (default/secure)
+    - 1: DSRM admin account can log on locally
+    - 2: DSRM admin account can log on over the network
+
+  examples:
+    - "reg query HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa /v DsrmAdminLogonBehavior"
+    - "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa"
+    - "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior    REG_DWORD    0x1"
+
+  tools:
+    - name: "reg query"
+      description: "Windows Registry query command - currently no forensic tools specifically detect this artifact"
+    - name: "Registry Explorer"
+      description: "Manual registry analysis tool"
+
+limitations:
+  - "Does not indicate when the original compromise occurred"
+  - "No known false positives - presence of value 1 or 2 indicates compromise"
+  - "Cannot identify who performed the change without additional logging"
+
+correlation:
+  required_for_definitive_conclusions:
+    - "Windows Event Logs analysis for registry modification events"
+    - "Sysmon logs for registry change detection"
+    - "Timeline analysis with other persistence artifacts"
+  
+  strengthens_evidence:
+    - "Search for DsrmAdminLogonBehavior in Windows Event Logs for timestamp/user attribution"
+    - "Sysmon Event ID 13 (registry value set) for detailed modification tracking"
+    - "Correlation with other Active Directory persistence techniques"
+
+metadata:
+  windows_versions:
+    - "Windows Server 2008 R2"
+    - "Windows Server 2012"
+    - "Windows Server 2012 R2"
+    - "Windows Server 2016"
+    - "Windows Server 2019"
+    - "Windows Server 2022"
+
+  introduced: "Windows Server 2008"
+  criticality: "high"
+
+  investigation_types:
+    - "incident-response"
+    - "behavioral-analysis"
+    - "insider-threat"
+    - "persistence-analysis"
+    - "privilege-escalation"
+    - "credential-theft"
+    - "lateral-movement"
+    - "remote-access"
+
+  tags:
+    - "active-directory"
+    - "domain-controller"
+    - "dsrm-persistence"
+    - "registry-forensics"
+    - "high-severity"
+
+  references:
+    - title: "Beyond The MCSE: Active Directory For The Security Professional"
+      url: "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Metcalf-Beyond-The-MCSE-Active-Directory-For-The-Security-Professional.pdf"
+      type: "research"
+
+  retention:
+    default_location: "System Registry"
+    persistence: "Survives reboots and system cleaning"
+    volatility: "Persistent until explicitly deleted"
+
+author:
+  name: "Abdul Mhanni"
+  github: "ThatTotallyRealMyth"
+  linkedin: "https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdulmhanni/"
+  email: "abdul.mhanni@gmail.com"
+
+contribution:
+  date_added: "2025-01-15"
+  last_updated: "2025-01-15"
+  version: "1.0"