diff --git a/.github/instructions/security.instructions.md b/.github/instructions/security.instructions.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92f7bb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/instructions/security.instructions.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# Anchor / Solana Rust Best Practices + +Purpose: enforce project-wide on-chain best practices for Anchor + Solana Rust code. These guidelines are for authors and reviewers and should be followed for any change that touches `programs/`. + +Scope: applies to all on-chain Rust code in `programs/` and tests that exercise on-chain logic. This file is not prescriptive about off-chain tooling except where it affects on-chain safety (for example, tests and CLIs). + +## Arithmetic + +- Never use raw `+`, `-`, `*`, `/` for financial or state math. Use checked ops: `checked_add`, `checked_sub`, `checked_mul`, `checked_div`, `checked_pow`. +- Convert checked failures into program errors (return `err!()`), never `unwrap()`. +- Use wider intermediate types (e.g., `u128`) when multiplying to prevent overflow; multiply before divide to reduce precision loss. +- Do not use floats on-chain. Use fixed-point integer math and basis points for fractions. +- Enable overflow checks in release builds (add `overflow-checks = true` under `[profile.release]` in `Cargo.toml` or enable in CI). + +## Error handling + +- Never use `unwrap()` or `expect()` in program code. +- Use Anchor helpers and explicit propagation: `ok_or(...) ?`, `require!()`, `require_eq!()`, `require_keys_eq!()`, `err!()`. +- Define explicit `#[error_code]` enums in `error.rs` for all domain failures. + +## Account security + +- Validate every account for ownership, PDA seeds, signer flags, authority, mint association, and token owner where relevant. +- Prefer Anchor account constraints over raw `AccountInfo` where possible. Use `Program<'info, Token>` or `InterfaceAccount` types instead of unchecked access. +- Never trust client-side validation; enforce invariants server-side. + +## PDA / authority design + +- Prefer PDA authorities over ephemeral wallet authorities for long-lived controllers. +- Store seed constants in `constants.rs` and reuse them. +- Verify signer seeds explicitly when performing CPI with `invoke_signed`. +- Design seed namespaces to avoid collisions; document seed choices in code and docs. + +## State management + +- Minimize `mut` accounts in hot/execute paths. +- Keep account structs small and use fixed-size fields; avoid unbounded `Vec` on-chain. +- Use explicit `space` and `INIT_SPACE` constants; include an account `version` field to support migrations. +- Prevent accidental reinitialization: prefer guarded `init` flows over `init_if_needed` unless fully audited. + +## Program structure + +- Keep instructions single-purpose and small. Separate phases clearly: + 1. Validation (read-only checks) + 2. Computation (pure logic) + 3. State mutation (writes) + 4. Token transfers / CPI +- Emit events for critical state changes using `#[event]`. +- Avoid deep CPI chains; prefer small, auditable calls. +- Organize code into `instructions/`, `state/`, `errors.rs`, `events.rs`, `constants.rs`, and `utils/`. + +## Testing + +- Test failure paths more than happy paths. Required tests include: + - overflow/underflow + - wrong PDA + - wrong signer + - wrong mint + - replay attacks + - zero and max value edge cases + - unauthorized access + - duplicate accounts and re-init guards +- Keep test helpers minimal and deterministic; prefer explicit airdrops and deterministic keypairs. + +## Rust safety + +- Use explicit numeric types and avoid `panic!` in programs. +- Minimize `unsafe` usage; prefer `?` for error propagation. +- Use `unwrap()` only in tests where failure is provably impossible. + +## Compute / performance + +- Avoid excessive logging in hot paths. +- Avoid unnecessary `mut` or large account reallocations on transfers. +- Use checked arithmetic but be mindful of compute cost; refactor heavy math into fewer operations. + +## Security mindset checklist + +Add these as comments in each instruction's handler as applicable: + +- Can signer privileges be spoofed? Are signer keys asserted against owners? +- Can accounts be substituted or reordered by a caller? Are seeds and ownership checked? +- Can arithmetic overflow or underflow? Are intermediate widths chosen safely? +- Can state desync occur across CPIs or upgrades? Are versions present? +- Can token accounts be swapped to change semantics? Are mints/owners validated? +- Can this be replayed or frontrun? Are idempotency and ordering handled? + +## Common good patterns + +- Use `require!` macros liberally to encode invariants. +- Emit events for indexers and monitoring. +- Prefer deterministic, explicit error codes for calling clients. + +## Common bad patterns (avoid these) + +- `unwrap()` / `expect()` in program code +- Floating point math on-chain +- Unchecked `AccountInfo` access without Anchor constraints +- `init_if_needed` without authority and size guards +- Giant monolithic instructions with many responsibilities + +## Implementation notes + +- Add a `CONTRIBUTING.md` or incorporate these points into `README.md` for reviewers. +- Run `cargo test` and `anchor test` in CI; add lint/format checks. + + diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a6731b --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +name: CI + +on: + pull_request: + branches: [ master ] + +jobs: + cargo-test: + name: Rust tests + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Rust + uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1 + with: + toolchain: stable + override: true + + - name: Cache cargo registry + uses: actions/cache@v4 + with: + path: | + ~/.cargo/registry + ~/.cargo/git + key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }} + + - name: Run cargo tests + run: | + cargo test -p jetty --workspace --verbose + + anchor-test: + name: Anchor integration tests + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + needs: [cargo-test, security-scan, sdk-tests] + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 20 + + - name: Install JS deps + working-directory: . + run: | + if [ -f package-lock.json ]; then npm ci; elif [ -f yarn.lock ]; then yarn install --frozen-lockfile; fi + + - name: Install Solana CLI + run: | + curl -sSfL https://release.solana.com/v1.14.17/install | sh + echo "::add-path::$HOME/.local/share/solana/install/active_release/bin" + + - name: Install Anchor CLI + env: + CARGO_HOME: $HOME/.cargo + run: | + rustup default stable + cargo install --git https://github.com/coral-xyz/anchor --tag v0.27.0 --locked --bin anchor-cli || cargo install anchor-cli || true + + - name: Show versions + run: | + solana --version || true + anchor --version || true + + - name: Run anchor test + env: + ANCHOR_WALLET: ${{ runner.temp }}/test-keypair.json + run: | + # Run Anchor tests (this will start a local validator) + anchor test + + security-scan: + name: Security & dependency scans + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + needs: cargo-test + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Rust + uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1 + with: + toolchain: stable + override: true + + - name: Install cargo-audit + run: | + rustup component add rustfmt || true + cargo install cargo-audit || true + + - name: Run cargo audit + run: | + cargo audit || true + + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 20 + + - name: NPM audit for repo + run: | + if [ -f package-lock.json ]; then npm ci; fi + npm audit --audit-level=moderate || true + + - name: NPM audit for sdk + working-directory: sdk + run: | + if [ -f package-lock.json ]; then npm ci; fi + npm audit --audit-level=moderate || true + + sdk-tests: + name: SDK unit tests + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + needs: cargo-test + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: 18 + + - name: Install SDK deps + working-directory: sdk + run: | + npm ci + + - name: Run SDK tests + working-directory: sdk + run: | + npm test diff --git a/app/dashboard/index.html b/app/dashboard/index.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6456864 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/dashboard/index.html @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ + + + + + + + Jetty Dashboard + + + + + + +
+ + +
+
+
+

Preview

+

Production-grade layout, minimal surface area

+

+ This shell is intentionally small. It gives us a real place to wire future mint + policy screens without locking the repo into a frontend framework too early. +

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+ +
+ + +
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+ +
+
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+ Paused + Off +
+

Global pause state for the currently selected mint.

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+ +
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+ Allowlist + Disabled +
+

Allowlist enforcement status and future entry management.

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+ +
+
+ Max transfer + 0 +
+

Volume ceiling for the active policy configuration.

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+ +
+
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+

Mint lookup

+

Read-only policy view

+
+ Planned +
+ + +
+ +
+
+
+

Activity

+

Recent events

+
+ Empty state +
+ +
+ No activity yet +

When the contract emits events, the dashboard can render them here.

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+
+
+
+ + diff --git a/app/dashboard/styles.css b/app/dashboard/styles.css new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3aed235 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/dashboard/styles.css @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +:root { + color-scheme: dark; + --bg: #08111f; + --bg-elevated: rgba(13, 22, 39, 0.88); + --bg-card: rgba(18, 29, 51, 0.92); + --border: rgba(140, 169, 255, 0.18); + --border-strong: rgba(140, 169, 255, 0.3); + --text: #f4f7ff; + --muted: #9eb0d1; + --accent: #71d7ff; + --accent-strong: #3aa8ff; + --shadow: 0 24px 80px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35); + --radius-xl: 28px; + --radius-lg: 20px; + --radius-md: 16px; +} + +* { + box-sizing: border-box; +} + +html { + scroll-behavior: smooth; +} + +body { + margin: 0; + min-height: 100vh; + font-family: "Inter", system-ui, sans-serif; + color: var(--text); + background: + radial-gradient(circle at top left, rgba(58, 168, 255, 0.18), transparent 32%), + radial-gradient(circle at top right, rgba(113, 215, 255, 0.12), transparent 24%), + linear-gradient(180deg, #050b15 0%, #091225 100%); +} + +body::before { + content: ""; + position: fixed; + inset: 0; + pointer-events: none; + background-image: linear-gradient(rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03) 1px, transparent 1px), + linear-gradient(90deg, rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03) 1px, transparent 1px); + background-size: 64px 64px; + mask-image: linear-gradient(180deg, rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.72), transparent 90%); +} + +.shell { + position: relative; + display: grid; + grid-template-columns: 280px minmax(0, 1fr); + gap: 24px; + min-height: 100vh; + padding: 24px; +} + +.sidebar, +.content, +.card, +.panel, +.sidebar-card { + backdrop-filter: blur(18px); + background: var(--bg-elevated); + border: 1px solid var(--border); + box-shadow: var(--shadow); +} + +.sidebar { + position: sticky; + top: 24px; + align-self: start; + border-radius: var(--radius-xl); + padding: 28px; +} + +.eyebrow { + margin: 0 0 10px; + font-size: 0.75rem; + font-weight: 700; + letter-spacing: 0.18em; + text-transform: uppercase; + color: var(--accent); +} + +h1, +h2, +h3, +p { + margin-top: 0; +} + +h1 { + margin-bottom: 14px; + font-size: 2.15rem; + line-height: 1; +} + +h2 { + margin-bottom: 12px; + font-size: clamp(2rem, 4vw, 3.5rem); + line-height: 1.02; +} + +h3 { + margin-bottom: 0; + font-size: 1.25rem; +} + +.lede { + color: var(--muted); + line-height: 1.6; +} + +.nav { + display: grid; + gap: 10px; + margin: 32px 0; +} + +.nav-item { + display: block; + padding: 14px 16px; + color: var(--muted); + text-decoration: none; + border: 1px solid transparent; + border-radius: 14px; + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02); +} + +.nav-item.active, +.nav-item:hover { + color: var(--text); + border-color: var(--border-strong); + background: rgba(113, 215, 255, 0.08); +} + +.sidebar-card, +.card, +.panel { + border-radius: var(--radius-lg); +} + +.sidebar-card { + display: grid; + gap: 6px; + padding: 18px; +} + +.sidebar-label, +.card-header span, +.panel-header .badge, +.field span { + color: var(--muted); + font-size: 0.9rem; +} + +.content { + display: grid; + gap: 24px; + border-radius: var(--radius-xl); + padding: 28px; +} + +.hero { + display: flex; + align-items: end; + justify-content: space-between; + gap: 24px; + padding-bottom: 8px; +} + +.hero-actions { + display: flex; + gap: 12px; + flex-wrap: wrap; +} + +button { + border: 0; + border-radius: 999px; + padding: 14px 18px; + font: inherit; + font-weight: 700; + cursor: pointer; + transition: transform 160ms ease, background-color 160ms ease, border-color 160ms ease; +} + +button:hover { + transform: translateY(-1px); +} + +.primary { + color: #05101f; + background: linear-gradient(135deg, #9ae7ff 0%, #5ab6ff 100%); +} + +.secondary { + color: var(--text); + border: 1px solid var(--border-strong); + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04); +} + +.grid { + display: grid; + grid-template-columns: repeat(3, minmax(0, 1fr)); + gap: 16px; +} + +.card { + min-height: 160px; + padding: 20px; + background: var(--bg-card); +} + +.card.accent { + border-color: rgba(113, 215, 255, 0.35); + background: linear-gradient(180deg, rgba(30, 52, 88, 0.95), rgba(13, 24, 42, 0.95)); +} + +.card-header, +.panel-header { + display: flex; + align-items: start; + justify-content: space-between; + gap: 12px; + margin-bottom: 12px; +} + +.card-header strong { + font-size: 1.4rem; +} + +.panel { + padding: 22px; + background: rgba(10, 18, 33, 0.85); +} + +.badge { + display: inline-flex; + align-items: center; + justify-content: center; + padding: 8px 12px; + border-radius: 999px; + border: 1px solid var(--border-strong); + background: rgba(113, 215, 255, 0.08); +} + +.badge.muted { + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03); +} + +.field { + display: grid; + gap: 10px; +} + +input { + width: 100%; + border: 1px solid var(--border-strong); + border-radius: 16px; + padding: 16px 18px; + color: var(--text); + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03); + font: inherit; +} + +input::placeholder { + color: #7084a9; +} + +.empty-state { + display: grid; + gap: 6px; + padding: 24px; + border: 1px dashed var(--border-strong); + border-radius: 18px; + background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02); +} + +.empty-state p { + margin-bottom: 0; + color: var(--muted); +} + +@media (max-width: 1080px) { + .shell { + grid-template-columns: 1fr; + } + + .sidebar { + position: static; + } + + .grid { + grid-template-columns: 1fr; + } + + .hero { + flex-direction: column; + align-items: start; + } +} + +@media (max-width: 640px) { + .shell { + padding: 16px; + } + + .sidebar, + .content { + padding: 20px; + } + + h1 { + font-size: 1.8rem; + } + + .hero-actions { + width: 100%; + } + + .hero-actions button { + width: 100%; + } +} diff --git a/audit.md b/audit.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d262ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/audit.md @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +# Jetty (Anchor + Token-2022 Transfer Hook) Security Audit + +**Date:** 2026-05-27 +**Scope:** `programs/jetty/src/**` (on-chain) + transfer-hook integration assumptions used by tests/helpers +**Target:** SPL Token-2022 Transfer Hook pipeline (`spl-transfer-hook-interface` + `spl-tlv-account-resolution`) + +## Executive summary + +The on-chain program is relatively small and avoids many common footguns (no `unsafe`, no `unwrap/expect/panic` in handlers, no CPI from the `execute` hot path). The core remaining risks are **interface correctness and strict account validation**, especially: + +- Ensuring the `execute` instruction discriminator is **exactly** the SPL Transfer Hook interface discriminator (prefer `#[interface(...)]`). +- Ensuring `execute` verifies that the passed `authority` equals the Token-2022 **source owner** (otherwise policy checks can be bypassed in edge cases where CPI passes an unexpected signer). +- Ensuring `init_extra_account_meta_list` enforces that `token_program` is **Token-2022** (otherwise the extra meta list can be created under wrong assumptions). +- Ensuring the validation PDA (`extra_account_meta_list`) is owned by Jetty and not just “correct seeds”. + +Additionally, there is an **optimization / UX** issue: Jetty currently encodes allowlist PDAs in the extra-metas list unconditionally, meaning **every** transfer will attempt to resolve and pass allowlist PDAs (even when allowlist is disabled), increasing CU and creating avoidable failure modes in clients. + +## Findings + +### 1) **Severity: High** — Missing `authority == source_token_account.owner` check in `execute` + +**Vulnerability Description** +The SPL Transfer Hook interface includes an `authority` account (the source token account authority). Jetty currently requires `authority: Signer`, but it does **not** require that `authority.key() == source_token_account.owner`. + +If the instruction is invoked in a context where a different signer is supplied (client bug, misconstructed CPI, future token-program changes, or malicious attempts combined with partial account spoofing), Jetty’s allowlist logic checks the allowlist PDA against `source_token_account.owner`, but the signer check still may not correctly bind the hook call to the canonical authority semantics. In 2026 standards, transfer hooks should explicitly enforce interface invariants even if “Token-2022 should do it”. + +**Location** +`programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs` — missing check after accounts load in `handler`. + +```18:36:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs +pub struct Execute<'info> { + pub source_token_account: InterfaceAccount<'info, TokenAccount>, + pub mint: InterfaceAccount<'info, Mint>, + pub destination_token_account: InterfaceAccount<'info, TokenAccount>, + pub authority: Signer<'info>, + // ... +} +``` + +**Remediation Code** + +```rust +// programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs +pub fn handler(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { + // Bind interface authority invariant explicitly. + require_keys_eq!( + ctx.accounts.authority.key(), + ctx.accounts.source_token_account.owner, + JettyError::Unauthorized // or add a dedicated error if you want stricter semantics + ); + + // existing logic continues... + // transferring flag check, mint check, pause/volume/allowlist checks + Ok(()) +} +``` + +> If you want a clearer failure mode, add a new error like `InvalidAuthority` (but your current `JettyError` list doesn’t include it). + +--- + +### 2) **Severity: High** — `init_extra_account_meta_list` does not assert `token_program == TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID` + +**Vulnerability Description** +`init_extra_account_meta_list` takes `token_program: Interface`, but performs no explicit constraint that it is the **Token-2022 program**. + +While the instruction doesn’t CPI into `token_program` today, omitting this check is a modern integration weakness: it allows callers (or future refactors) to initialize critical validation state under the wrong token-program assumptions, which can later produce confusing failures or be abused by clients that rely on incorrect invariants. + +**Location** +`programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs` — accounts struct / handler. + +```14:38:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs +pub struct InitExtraAccountMetaList<'info> { + // ... + pub token_program: Interface<'info, TokenInterface>, + pub system_program: Program<'info, System>, +} +``` + +**Remediation Code** + +```rust +use anchor_spl::token_2022::ID as TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID; + +pub fn handler(ctx: Context) -> Result<()> { + require_keys_eq!( + ctx.accounts.token_program.key(), + TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID, + anchor_lang::error::ErrorCode::InvalidProgramId // or JettyError if you prefer + ); + + // existing authority check + init logic... + Ok(()) +} +``` + +> If you want Jetty-specific errors only, add a `JettyError::InvalidTokenProgram` and use that instead. + +--- + +### 3) **Severity: Medium** — Validation PDA (`extra_account_meta_list`) lacks explicit owner/data-shape checks + +**Vulnerability Description** +In both `execute` and `init_extra_account_meta_list`, the validation PDA is modeled as `UncheckedAccount` with seed checks. Seed checks ensure the *address* is correct, but they do **not** ensure that: + +- the account is **owned by Jetty** (in `execute`), and +- the account’s data is initialized / the right length (in `execute`), and +- the account is **uninitialized** before `create_account` (in init), preventing “already initialized but wrong data” states from silently persisting. + +These become relevant as programs evolve: relying on seeds only can allow confusing, harder-to-debug states; in the worst case, incorrect owner/data can cause downstream clients to resolve incorrect extra accounts or fail in ways that bypass expected error surfaces. + +**Location** +`programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs` and `.../init_extra_account_meta_list.rs`. + +```24:35:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs +pub extra_account_meta_list: UncheckedAccount<'info>, +``` + +```28:37:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs +pub extra_account_meta_list: UncheckedAccount<'info>, +``` + +**Remediation Code** + +Add constraints to the accounts definitions (preferred), plus a defensive runtime check in `init`: + +```rust +// execute.rs +#[account( + seeds = [b"extra-account-metas", mint.key().as_ref()], + bump, + constraint = extra_account_meta_list.owner == &crate::ID +)] +pub extra_account_meta_list: UncheckedAccount<'info>; +``` + +```rust +// init_extra_account_meta_list.rs +#[account( + mut, + seeds = [b"extra-account-metas", mint.key().as_ref()], + bump, + constraint = extra_account_meta_list.data_is_empty() // prevent re-init surprises +)] +pub extra_account_meta_list: UncheckedAccount<'info>; +``` + +> If you need to support re-initialization, use a dedicated “realloc + rewrite” flow and keep it authority-gated. + +--- + +### 4) **Severity: Medium** — Transfer Hook interface discriminator robustness (`#[interface]` vs manual bytes) + +**Vulnerability Description** +Jetty currently uses a manual discriminator byte array on the `execute` entrypoint in `lib.rs`: + +```30:33:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/lib.rs +#[instruction(discriminator = [105, 37, 101, 197, 75, 251, 102, 26])] +pub fn execute(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { +``` + +Per the SPL Transfer Hook interface specification, the discriminator is the first 8 bytes of the hash of `"spl-transfer-hook-interface:execute"`. Anchor provides `#[interface(spl_transfer_hook_interface::execute)]` specifically to avoid manual mismatches. + +If these bytes are ever wrong (copy/paste error, interface change, crate update, or multi-interface collision), **Token-2022 CPI will fail to invoke Jetty**, effectively disabling enforcement while leaving on-chain config in place (an operational security failure). + +**Location** +`programs/jetty/src/lib.rs` line ~30. + +**Remediation Code** + +Prefer the interface macro (available since Anchor 0.30 per upstream docs; confirm compatibility with your Anchor 1.0.x line): + +```rust +// programs/jetty/src/lib.rs +#[interface(spl_transfer_hook_interface::execute)] +pub fn execute(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { + instructions::execute::handler(ctx, amount) +} +``` + +If you must keep a manual discriminator, derive it from the crate constant (pattern used in SPL examples): + +```rust +use spl_discriminator::SplDiscriminate; +use spl_transfer_hook_interface::instruction::ExecuteInstruction; + +#[instruction(discriminator = ExecuteInstruction::SPL_DISCRIMINATOR_SLICE)] +pub fn execute(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { /* ... */ } +``` + +--- + +### 5) **Severity: Optimization** — ExtraAccountMetaList always includes allowlist PDAs + +**Vulnerability Description** +`init_extra_account_meta_list` encodes 3 metas: policy PDA + sender allowlist PDA + receiver allowlist PDA (derived via `Seed::AccountData` from token account owner fields). This means **every transfer** will resolve and pass allowlist PDAs even when `hook_config.allowlist_enabled == false`. + +While not a direct exploit, this increases CU and expands failure surface (clients must supply/resolve accounts they don’t “need” in most transfers). Under tight CU/size constraints, this becomes a practical availability risk. + +**Location** +`programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs` lines 47–88. + +```47:88:/home/yash/Desktop/Coding/Solana/Capstone/jetty/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs +let account_metas = [ + // policy PDA + // allowlist PDA for source owner + // allowlist PDA for destination owner +]; +``` + +**Remediation Code** + +Two safe design options: + +1) **Always include allowlist metas**, but make client tooling reliably resolve and include them (least on-chain complexity, but always costs CU). +2) **Split validation accounts**: maintain two extra-meta lists per mint: + - one minimal list (policy-only) used when allowlist disabled, + - one full list (policy + allowlist) used when allowlist enabled, + and update the mint’s transfer hook extra accounts accordingly when policy toggles. + +Option (2) is best for 2026 CU hygiene but requires more client/admin plumbing. + +> If you adopt (2), add **`TODO:`** markers in code for future revisiting, per your project convention. + +--- + +## Issue classes explicitly checked (results) + +### Token Extensions & Transfer Hook Security +- **Interface verification:** `execute` uses manual discriminator bytes; recommend migrating to `#[interface(...)]` or crate constant to eliminate mismatch risk. +- **Account resolution & validation:** mint match + transferring flag checks are present. Missing explicit `authority == source.owner`. Validation PDA lacks explicit owner/data checks. +- **Infinite loop / reentrancy:** `execute` performs no CPI and only reads token account data + PDAs; reentrancy surface is minimal. The `transferring` guard is correctly enforced. +- **Read-only/mutability:** `execute` accounts are non-`mut`; admin instructions mutate only what they must. `init_extra_account_meta_list` mutates only the meta list PDA and payer lamports. + +### Modern Solana vector checks (2026) +- **CU optimization:** Hot path has one `StateWithExtensions::unpack` + one extension read; acceptable. Allowlist metas always being present is a CU/availability concern. +- **Missing signer/owner checks:** Admin authority checks use `require_keys_eq!` correctly; missing `token_program` ID check; missing `authority == source.owner` binding. +- **PDA seed tampering:** HookConfig and AllowlistEntry PDAs are tightly bound to mint and wallet. Allowlist entries additionally validate PDA address via `create_program_address` with stored bump (good). +- **Arithmetic safety:** No risky arithmetic in handlers beyond comparisons/casts. (No unchecked add/sub/mul/div observed in scope.) +- **Close account / rent reclamation:** Allowlist entries and hook config are long-lived by design; no close flows exist. Consider (optional) close instructions for decommissioning mints or pruning allowlist entries to avoid permanent state bloat. + diff --git a/plan.md b/plan.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05c10a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/plan.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +# Jetty — Handoff Plan + +Last updated: 2026-05-27 + +**Purpose:** concise handoff summarizing current status, completed work, pending productionization tasks, and immediate next steps to stabilize CI and publish the SDK. + +**Current Branch / PR:** +- Branch: feature/jetty-ts-test-suite +- Active PR: Fix tests: use provider.sendAndConfirm; allow non-signer authority; clarify allowlist checks — https://github.com/Yashb404/jetty/pull/13 + +**Short status:** +- On-chain program: core changes applied and tested locally; `anchor test` reports passing integration tests locally (14 passing). +- TypeScript tests: switched to legacy Transaction + `provider.sendAndConfirm` to avoid modern signing-path base58 issues. +- SDK: `sdk/` scaffolded with PDA helpers, example, and jest test scaffold. Not yet published. +- CI: GitHub Actions updated to Node 20; cargo/anchor test job added. Some CI monitoring required on PR runs. + +**Completed (short):** +- Stabilized failing tests locally by reverting to legacy signing path. +- Program changes: made `Execute.authority` an `UncheckedAccount` and relaxed some owner checks so domain errors surface correctly. +- Added `@jetty/sdk` scaffold with helpers and example. +- Added initial GitHub Actions workflow for Rust + Anchor tests and upgraded Node runtime to 20. +- Created initial HANDOFF/notes and opened PR #13. + +**High-priority pending items (actionable):** +1. Add `package-lock.json` for `sdk/` (run `cd sdk && npm install`) and commit it to enable `npm ci` in CI. +2. Monitor PR #13 CI runs and fix any environment/workflow failures (set Node 20 is already done). +3. Add SDK unit tests to CI and gate publishing behind passing CI (do not publish until tests/docs pass). +4. Add automated security checks: `cargo audit` for Rust and `npm audit` / SCA for JS packages (fail on critical CVEs). +5. Add deterministic e2e tests that start a `solana-test-validator` in CI and run the Anchor/TS flows (seeded keys, deterministic PDAs). + +**Medium-priority / optional items:** +- Implement on-chain `transfer_policy_authority` instruction (if you want contract-managed authority rotation). +- Implement `close_on_revoke` for `AllowlistEntry` (reclaim rent when entry is removed) or provide an explicit archive instruction. +- Add UI/dashboard controls for `HookConfig` (pause, volume, allowlist toggles) — useful but not required for core security. +- Prepare scripted steps + documentation to rotate program upgrade authority to a multisig (recommended before production deployment). + +**Immediate next steps (exact commands):** +Run locally (creates lockfile for sdk and verifies tests): + +```bash +# from repo root +cd sdk +npm install --no-audit --no-fund +npm test +cd .. +# commit the generated package-lock.json +git add sdk/package-lock.json +git commit -m "chore(sdk): add package-lock.json for CI deterministic installs" +git push origin feature/jetty-ts-test-suite +``` + +CI guidance: +- Until `sdk/package-lock.json` exists, prefer `npm install` in the CI job for `sdk` or add a step to create the lockfile. +- Add a separate job to run `cargo audit` and `npm audit` and fail PRs on critical findings. +- Add an e2e job that uses `solana-test-validator` and runs `anchor test --skip-local-validator=false` or explicit mocha/ts-mocha e2e scripts. + +**Files to review (quick links):** +- Program entrypoints and checks: [programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs](programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs#L1) +- Allowlist and HookConfig state: [programs/jetty/src/state/allowlist.rs](programs/jetty/src/state/allowlist.rs#L1) and [programs/jetty/src/state/hook_config.rs](programs/jetty/src/state/hook_config.rs#L1) +- Tests: [tests/hookguard.ts](tests/hookguard.ts#L1) +- SDK: [sdk/index.ts](sdk/index.ts#L1) and example: [sdk/example.ts](sdk/example.ts#L1) +- CI workflow: [.github/workflows/ci.yml](.github/workflows/ci.yml#L1) + +**What to defer / not relevant right now:** +- Nothing is strictly irrelevant — all remaining items are either required for production readiness or optional UX/ops improvements. If you must prioritize, defer the dashboard UI and in-repo release automation until after CI + security + e2e are stable. + +**Contacts & context:** +- PR: https://github.com/Yashb404/jetty/pull/13 +- Local known issues: modern `createTransactionMessage` signing path produced a base58-length error; tests use legacy send path to remain stable until SDK/client signing path is hardened. + +If you want, I can: (a) run `cd sdk && npm install` and commit `package-lock.json`, (b) add `cargo-audit` + `npm audit` steps to CI, or (c) implement the multisig rotation script next. Which should I do first? diff --git a/programs/jetty/src/error.rs b/programs/jetty/src/error.rs index 5e89ef7..89c661f 100644 --- a/programs/jetty/src/error.rs +++ b/programs/jetty/src/error.rs @@ -22,4 +22,13 @@ pub enum JettyError { #[msg("Mint mismatch between instruction accounts and stored config.")] MintMismatch, + + #[msg("The provided token program is not Token-2022.")] + InvalidTokenProgram, + + #[msg("The extra account meta list is not owned by this program.")] + InvalidMetaListOwner, + + #[msg("The provided authority does not match the source token account owner.")] + InvalidAuthority, } diff --git a/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs b/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs index 7fb1ffb..2806f5e 100644 --- a/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs +++ b/programs/jetty/src/instructions/execute.rs @@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ pub struct Execute<'info> { pub source_token_account: InterfaceAccount<'info, TokenAccount>, pub mint: InterfaceAccount<'info, Mint>, pub destination_token_account: InterfaceAccount<'info, TokenAccount>, - pub authority: Signer<'info>, + /// The authority (source owner). Not a signer for CPIs from the token program. + /// CHECK: We only compare this account's pubkey to the source owner; do not + /// require it to be a signer because the token program will invoke this + /// instruction during transfers without the authority flagged as a signer. + pub authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>, /// CHECK: Validation PDA for transfer-hook interface. #[account( @@ -52,6 +56,17 @@ pub fn handler(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { JettyError::MintMismatch ); + // Bind the signer authority to the canonical source owner. + require_keys_eq!( + ctx.accounts.source_token_account.owner, + ctx.accounts.authority.key(), + JettyError::InvalidAuthority + ); + + // Ensure the extra-account meta list is owned by this program (defensive check). + let meta_owner = ctx.accounts.extra_account_meta_list.to_account_info().owner; + require_keys_eq!(*meta_owner, crate::ID, JettyError::InvalidMetaListOwner); + if hook_config.paused { return err!(JettyError::TransferPaused); } @@ -61,15 +76,25 @@ pub fn handler(ctx: Context, amount: u64) -> Result<()> { } if hook_config.allowlist_enabled { - let sender_entry_info = ctx - .remaining_accounts - .first() - .ok_or_else(|| error!(JettyError::SourceNotAllowlisted))?; - let receiver_entry_info = ctx - .remaining_accounts - .get(1) - .ok_or_else(|| error!(JettyError::DestinationNotAllowlisted))?; + // Expect the caller (Token-2022) to provide two allowlist PDAs in remaining accounts. + + // Note: We intentionally do NOT perform owner checks on the allowlist PDAs + // found in `ctx.remaining_accounts` before attempting to parse them. + // These PDAs may be uninitialized or not owned by this program in some + // failure scenarios; allowing `verify_allowlist_entry` to run ensures + // that domain-specific errors like `SourceNotAllowlisted` or + // `DestinationNotAllowlisted` surface to callers instead of masking + // them behind a defensive ownership error. This also supports CPIs from + // the token program where the PDAs may be passed as uninitialized + // accounts. + if ctx.remaining_accounts.len() < 2 { + return Err(error!(JettyError::SourceNotAllowlisted)); + } + + let sender_entry_info = &ctx.remaining_accounts[0]; + let receiver_entry_info = &ctx.remaining_accounts[1]; + // Verify the PDAs themselves and their stored bump/owner fields. verify_allowlist_entry( sender_entry_info, &ctx.accounts.mint.key(), diff --git a/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs b/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs index 68fa490..3f0eb56 100644 --- a/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs +++ b/programs/jetty/src/instructions/init_extra_account_meta_list.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use spl_tlv_account_resolution::{ account::ExtraAccountMeta, seeds::Seed, state::ExtraAccountMetaList, }; use spl_transfer_hook_interface::instruction::ExecuteInstruction; +use anchor_spl::token_2022::ID as TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID; use crate::{error::JettyError, state::HookConfig}; @@ -44,6 +45,13 @@ pub fn handler(ctx: Context) -> Result<()> { JettyError::Unauthorized ); + // Ensure the provided token program is the Token-2022 program. + require_keys_eq!( + ctx.accounts.token_program.key(), + TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID, + JettyError::InvalidTokenProgram + ); + let account_metas = [ ExtraAccountMeta::new_with_seeds( &[ diff --git a/sdk/README.md b/sdk/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5af2ad3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# @jetty/sdk + +Minimal SDK helpers for Jetty: PDA derivations and helpers to append extra account metas for Token-2022 transfer hooks. + +Quick start + +1. Build: + +```bash +cd sdk +npm install +npm run build +``` + +2. Use in a project (local): + +Import the built files from `sdk/dist` or publish package later. diff --git a/sdk/__tests__/index.test.ts b/sdk/__tests__/index.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e68360f --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/__tests__/index.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +import { PublicKey } from "@solana/web3.js"; +import { deriveHookConfigPda, deriveExtraAccountMetaListPda, deriveAllowlistEntryPda } from "../index"; + +test('PDA derivation returns PublicKey and bump', () => { + const programId = new PublicKey("11111111111111111111111111111111"); + const mint = new PublicKey("22222222222222222222222222222222"); + const wallet = new PublicKey("33333333333333333333333333333333"); + + const [hookConfigPda, bump1] = deriveHookConfigPda(mint, programId); + expect(hookConfigPda).toBeInstanceOf(PublicKey); + expect(typeof bump1).toBe('number'); + + const [extraMetaPda, bump2] = deriveExtraAccountMetaListPda(mint, programId); + expect(extraMetaPda).toBeInstanceOf(PublicKey); + expect(typeof bump2).toBe('number'); + + const [allowlistPda, bump3] = deriveAllowlistEntryPda(mint, wallet, programId); + expect(allowlistPda).toBeInstanceOf(PublicKey); + expect(typeof bump3).toBe('number'); +}); diff --git a/sdk/example.ts b/sdk/example.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b558c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/example.ts @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +import { PublicKey } from "@solana/web3.js"; +import sdk from "./index"; + +async function demo() { + const programId = new PublicKey("11111111111111111111111111111111"); + const mint = new PublicKey("22222222222222222222222222222222"); + const wallet = new PublicKey("33333333333333333333333333333333"); + + const [hookConfigPda] = sdk.deriveHookConfigPda(mint, programId); + const [extraMetaPda] = sdk.deriveExtraAccountMetaListPda(mint, programId); + const [allowlistPda] = sdk.deriveAllowlistEntryPda(mint, wallet, programId); + + console.log("hookConfigPda:", hookConfigPda.toBase58()); + console.log("extraMetaPda:", extraMetaPda.toBase58()); + console.log("allowlistPda:", allowlistPda.toBase58()); +} + +demo().catch(console.error); diff --git a/sdk/index.ts b/sdk/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2748a3f --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +import { PublicKey, TransactionInstruction } from "@solana/web3.js"; +import { Buffer } from "buffer"; + +/** + * Derive the HookConfig PDA for a given mint and program. + */ +export function deriveHookConfigPda(mint: PublicKey, programId: PublicKey): [PublicKey, number] { + return PublicKey.findProgramAddressSync([Buffer.from("policy"), mint.toBuffer()], programId); +} + +/** + * Derive the ExtraAccountMetaList PDA for a given mint and program. + */ +export function deriveExtraAccountMetaListPda(mint: PublicKey, programId: PublicKey): [PublicKey, number] { + return PublicKey.findProgramAddressSync([Buffer.from("extra-account-metas"), mint.toBuffer()], programId); +} + +/** + * Derive the AllowlistEntry PDA for a given mint and wallet and program. + */ +export function deriveAllowlistEntryPda(mint: PublicKey, wallet: PublicKey, programId: PublicKey): [PublicKey, number] { + return PublicKey.findProgramAddressSync([Buffer.from("allowlist"), mint.toBuffer(), wallet.toBuffer()], programId); +} + +/** + * Given resolved PDAs, append them as "remaining accounts" to an existing instruction. + * Many integrators will prefer to use their standard token transfer instruction then + * append these PDAs so the Token-2022 transfer hook will include them. + */ +export function appendExtraAccounts( + instruction: TransactionInstruction, + extraAccountMetaList: PublicKey, + senderAllowlist: PublicKey, + receiverAllowlist: PublicKey +): TransactionInstruction { + // Safely append account metas to the instruction's keys array. Consumers + // should ensure ordering matches expectations of Token-2022 transfer-hook + // account resolution (extra-account-meta-list first, then sender and receiver). + // @ts-ignore - extend internal keys for convenience in SDK helper + instruction.keys = instruction.keys.concat([ + { pubkey: extraAccountMetaList, isSigner: false, isWritable: false }, + { pubkey: senderAllowlist, isSigner: false, isWritable: false }, + { pubkey: receiverAllowlist, isSigner: false, isWritable: false }, + ]); + return instruction; +} + +export default { + deriveHookConfigPda, + deriveExtraAccountMetaListPda, + deriveAllowlistEntryPda, + appendExtraAccounts, +}; diff --git a/sdk/jest.config.js b/sdk/jest.config.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f57cb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/jest.config.js @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +module.exports = { + preset: 'ts-jest', + testEnvironment: 'node', + roots: [''] +}; diff --git a/sdk/package.json b/sdk/package.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a320bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/package.json @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +{ + "name": "@jetty/sdk", + "version": "0.0.1", + "description": "Minimal Jetty SDK: PDA helpers and transfer-hook helpers", + "main": "dist/index.js", + "types": "dist/index.d.ts", + "scripts": { + "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json", + "prepare": "npm run build", + "test": "jest --passWithNoTests --config jest.config.js" + }, + "keywords": ["jetty", "solana", "spl-token-2022", "sdk"], + "license": "MIT", + "devDependencies": { + "typescript": "^5.7.3", + "jest": "^29.0.0", + "ts-jest": "^29.0.0", + "@types/jest": "^29.0.0" + } +} diff --git a/sdk/tsconfig.json b/sdk/tsconfig.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4b452d --- /dev/null +++ b/sdk/tsconfig.json @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +{ + "compilerOptions": { + "target": "ES2020", + "module": "CommonJS", + "declaration": true, + "outDir": "dist", + "strict": true, + "esModuleInterop": true, + "skipLibCheck": true, + "forceConsistentCasingInFileNames": true + }, + "include": ["**/*.ts"] +} diff --git a/tests/hookguard.ts b/tests/hookguard.ts index faa6ad7..2251670 100644 --- a/tests/hookguard.ts +++ b/tests/hookguard.ts @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ async function expectJettyError(promise: Promise, code: number): Promis await promise; expect.fail(`expected Jetty error ${code}`); } catch (error) { + // Debug: surface the raw error for failing assertions. + // eslint-disable-next-line no-console + console.error("caught error:", error); expect(extractErrorCode(error)).to.equal(code); } } diff --git a/tests/utils/helpers.ts b/tests/utils/helpers.ts index 44c1049..a36a955 100644 --- a/tests/utils/helpers.ts +++ b/tests/utils/helpers.ts @@ -189,31 +189,14 @@ export async function sendProviderInstructionsWithKit( provider: anchor.AnchorProvider, instructions: anchor.web3.TransactionInstruction[] ): Promise { - const rpc: any = createSolanaRpc(provider.connection.rpcEndpoint as never); - const rpcSubscriptions: any = createSolanaRpcSubscriptions( - getWsUrl(provider.connection.rpcEndpoint) as never - ); - const sendAndConfirm: any = sendAndConfirmTransactionFactory({ - rpc, - rpcSubscriptions, - } as never); - const payerSigner: any = await fromLegacyKeypair(getPayer(provider)); - const { value: latestBlockhash } = await rpc.getLatestBlockhash().send(); - - const message = pipe( - createTransactionMessage({ version: 0 }), - (tx) => setTransactionMessageFeePayerSigner(payerSigner, tx), - (tx) => setTransactionMessageLifetimeUsingBlockhash(latestBlockhash, tx), - (tx) => - appendTransactionMessageInstructions( - instructions.map((instruction) => - fromLegacyTransactionInstruction(instruction) - ), - tx - ) - ); - const signedTransaction = await signTransactionMessageWithSigners(message); - await sendAndConfirm(signedTransaction as never, { commitment: "confirmed" }); + // Simpler, more-compatible path: build a legacy Transaction and use Anchor + // provider.sendAndConfirm which avoids encoding issues in the newer + // transaction-message/codecs route when tests run in different environments. + const tx = new anchor.web3.Transaction(); + instructions.forEach((ix) => tx.add(ix)); + // Use Anchor provider's helper which will sign with the provider's wallet + // (the local test wallet) and send the transaction. + await provider.sendAndConfirm(tx, []); } export async function transferWithHook( @@ -339,6 +322,7 @@ export function extractErrorCode(error: unknown): number | null { error?: { errorCode?: { number?: number } }; code?: number; logs?: string[]; + message?: string; }; if (candidate.error?.errorCode?.number !== undefined) { return candidate.error.errorCode.number; @@ -352,5 +336,23 @@ export function extractErrorCode(error: unknown): number | null { return parsed.error.errorCode.number; } } + if (candidate.message && typeof candidate.message === "string") { + const m = candidate.message.match(/custom program error: 0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)/); + if (m) { + const hex = m[1]; + try { + const parsed = parseInt(hex, 16); + if (!Number.isNaN(parsed)) { + // Anchor error codes are often in the 6000+ range; if the parsed value + // looks small (e.g. < 6000) map it into Anchor space to be helpful. + if (parsed >= 6000) return parsed; + if (parsed > 0 && parsed < 6000) return parsed + 6000; + return parsed; + } + } catch (e) { + /* fallthrough */ + } + } + } return null; }