diff --git a/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.test.ts b/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.test.ts
index 9517d7a..9685e64 100644
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.test.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.test.ts
@@ -130,4 +130,52 @@ describe("csrfMiddleware", () => {
     });
     expect(res.status).toBe(403);
   });
+
+  it("allows POST when Origin matches the proxied X-Forwarded-Host", async () => {
+    const app = buildApp();
+    const res = await app.request("/api/projects/x/mcp-tokens", {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: "https://archmax.example.com",
+        "x-forwarded-host": "archmax.example.com",
+        "x-forwarded-proto": "https",
+        host: "127.0.0.1:3000",
+      },
+      body: "{}",
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects POST when only Host (no X-Forwarded-Host) matches Origin", async () => {
+    // The bare Host header is not trusted: direct deployments are expected
+    // to set APP_BASE_URL (which populates corsOrigins). Only X-Forwarded-*
+    // headers from a reverse proxy unlock the same-origin shortcut.
+    const app = buildApp();
+    const res = await app.request("http://archmax.example.com/api/projects/x/mcp-tokens", {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: "http://archmax.example.com",
+        host: "archmax.example.com",
+      },
+      body: "{}",
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects foreign Origin even when X-Forwarded-Host matches the foreign origin", async () => {
+    const app = buildApp();
+    const res = await app.request("/api/projects/x/mcp-tokens", {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: "https://evil.example.com",
+        "x-forwarded-host": "archmax.example.com",
+        "x-forwarded-proto": "https",
+      },
+      body: "{}",
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
 });
diff --git a/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts b/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts
index 97b195b..8a7df37 100644
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts
@@ -13,18 +13,54 @@ function originFromHeader(value: string): string | null {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Compute the public origin the browser sees when the API sits behind a
+ * reverse proxy (nginx, Cloudflare, etc.) — derived from the standard
+ * `X-Forwarded-Proto` + `X-Forwarded-Host` headers the proxy sets.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when those headers are absent. In that case the request
+ * is not proxied (or the proxy is misconfigured), and the caller falls
+ * back to the explicit `corsOrigins` allow-list — which is what
+ * `APP_BASE_URL` / `CORS_ORIGINS` already configures for direct
+ * deployments.
+ */
+function proxiedSelfOrigin(c: Context): string | null {
+  const forwardedHost = c.req
+    .header("x-forwarded-host")
+    ?.split(",")[0]
+    ?.trim();
+  if (!forwardedHost) return null;
+
+  const forwardedProto =
+    c.req.header("x-forwarded-proto")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() || "https";
+
+  return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`;
+}
+
 /**
  * CSRF / origin enforcement for cookie-authenticated mutation routes.
  *
  * Every state-changing `/api/*` request (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) is required
- * to carry an `Origin` (or `Referer`) header that resolves to one of
- * `corsOrigins`. Real browsers always attach `Origin` on credentialed
- * non-GET requests, so this stops browser-driven CSRF without needing a
- * separate token round-trip. Missing both headers is *also* rejected: the
- * routes below this middleware are session-cookie authenticated, so a
- * caller that suppresses Origin/Referer would otherwise drive cookie
- * mutations unprotected. Non-browser API clients should authenticate via
- * the dedicated bearer-token MCP surface (`/mcp/:slug/mcp`) instead.
+ * to carry an `Origin` (or `Referer`) header. The header is accepted when
+ * either:
+ *   1. it matches one of the configured `corsOrigins` (driven by
+ *      `APP_BASE_URL` / `CORS_ORIGINS` — the canonical config for direct
+ *      deployments and local dev), OR
+ *   2. it matches the public origin derived from `X-Forwarded-Proto` +
+ *      `X-Forwarded-Host` headers set by the upstream reverse proxy.
+ *
+ * Case (2) lets deployments behind nginx / Cloudflare / a tunnel work
+ * out of the box without the operator having to keep `APP_BASE_URL` in
+ * sync with the public URL: a same-origin request from the browser to its
+ * own server is, by definition, not CSRF. Real browsers always attach
+ * `Origin` on credentialed non-GET requests, so an attacker on a foreign
+ * origin cannot forge a same-origin `Origin` header.
+ *
+ * Missing both `Origin` and `Referer` is also rejected: the routes below
+ * this middleware are session-cookie authenticated, so a caller that
+ * suppresses both headers would otherwise drive cookie mutations
+ * unprotected. Non-browser API clients should authenticate via the
+ * dedicated bearer-token MCP surface (`/mcp/:slug/mcp`) instead.
  *
  * `/api/auth/*` is exempted because Better Auth runs before this middleware
  * in app.ts and applies its own CSRF protection.
@@ -43,13 +79,22 @@ export async function csrfMiddleware(c: Context, next: Next) {
     );
   }
 
-  const trusted = new Set(getEnv().corsOrigins);
   const candidate = originHeader ?? refererHeader!;
   const origin = originFromHeader(candidate);
 
-  if (!origin || !trusted.has(origin)) {
+  if (!origin) {
     return c.json({ error: "Forbidden: invalid request origin" }, 403);
   }
 
-  await next();
+  const trusted = new Set(getEnv().corsOrigins);
+  if (trusted.has(origin)) {
+    return next();
+  }
+
+  const selfOrigin = proxiedSelfOrigin(c);
+  if (selfOrigin && origin === selfOrigin) {
+    return next();
+  }
+
+  return c.json({ error: "Forbidden: invalid request origin" }, 403);
 }