diff --git a/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz.go b/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz.go
index 97fbb83ed..04e2a483b 100644
--- a/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz.go
+++ b/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz.go
@@ -366,9 +366,7 @@ var ServerOperationsMap = map[string]*OperationPolicy{
 	// There are no policies for the download endpoint, we do a manual check in the service layer
 	// to differentiate between upload and download requests
 	"/controlplane.v1.CASCredentialsService/Get": {},
-	// We have an endpoint to generate a download URL
-	"/controlplane.v1.CASRedirectService/DownloadRedirect": {Policies: []*Policy{PolicyArtifactDownload}},
-	// Or to retrieve a download url
+	// We have an endpoint to retrieve a download URL
 	"/controlplane.v1.CASRedirectService/GetDownloadURL": {Policies: []*Policy{PolicyArtifactDownload}},
 	// CAS Backend listing
 	"/controlplane.v1.CASBackendService/List":       {Policies: []*Policy{PolicyCASBackendList}},
diff --git a/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz_consistency_test.go b/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz_consistency_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..437126256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/controlplane/pkg/authz/authz_consistency_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+//
+// Copyright 2026 The Chainloop Authors.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package authz
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoregistry"
+
+	// Blank import so every controlplane.v1 file descriptor registers in the global
+	// registry before wireProcedures() enumerates them.
+	_ "github.com/chainloop-dev/chainloop/app/controlplane/api/controlplane/v1"
+)
+
+// TestServerOperationsMapKeysMatchWireProcedures asserts that every ServerOperationsMap key matches
+// a real controlplane.v1 wire procedure ("/controlplane.v1.Service/Method"). A typo'd or stale key
+// is silently unenforced: the authz middleware derives the same operation string from the request,
+// so the procedure the key was meant to gate never matches and falls through to policiesLookup's
+// "operation not allowed" deny. That denies a legitimate endpoint to every non-admin role while the
+// stale key protects nothing — exactly how CASRedirectService/DownloadRedirect (renamed to
+// GetDownloadURL) lingered as dead weight.
+func TestServerOperationsMapKeysMatchWireProcedures(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := wireProcedures(t)
+
+	for key := range ServerOperationsMap {
+		assert.Containsf(t, valid, key,
+			"ServerOperationsMap key %q does not match any controlplane.v1 Service/Method — fix the key to the "+
+				"real wire procedure or remove it. An unmatched key is silently unenforced, and the procedure it "+
+				"was meant to gate falls through to the policiesLookup deny.", key)
+	}
+}
+
+// authzExemptProcedures lists controlplane.v1 procedures that never reach the authorization
+// middleware (WithAuthzMiddleware) because the selector matchers in internal/server/grpc.go skip
+// them: currentUserSkipRegexp exempts the attestation/robot-account and public surfaces, which
+// carry their own auth. These procedures are therefore neither role-gated via ServerOperationsMap
+// nor admin-only. Keep this in sync with currentUserSkipRegexp in
+// app/controlplane/internal/server/grpc.go.
+var authzExemptProcedures = map[string]struct{}{
+	// AttestationService — robot-account / API-token authenticated, gated by requireRobotAccountMatcher.
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/Cancel":               {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/FindOrCreateWorkflow": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/GetContract":          {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/GetPolicy":            {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/GetPolicyGroup":       {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/GetUploadCreds":       {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/Init":                 {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationService/Store":                {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationStateService/Initialized":     {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationStateService/Read":            {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationStateService/Reset":           {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.AttestationStateService/Save":            {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.SigningService/GenerateSigningCert":      {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.SigningService/GetTrustedRoot":           {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.StatusService/Infoz":                     {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.StatusService/Statusz":                   {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.ReferrerService/DiscoverPublicShared":    {},
+}
+
+// adminOnlyProcedures lists controlplane.v1 procedures that reach the authorization middleware but
+// are intentionally absent from ServerOperationsMap. An unmapped operation fails policiesLookup and
+// is denied for every non-admin role, so these are reachable only by org admins via the global
+// IsAdmin() bypass in middleware.go (the TODO there). Listing a procedure here is an explicit
+// acknowledgement that it is admin-only today; if a procedure should be reachable by a non-admin
+// role, move it into ServerOperationsMap instead of adding it here.
+var adminOnlyProcedures = map[string]struct{}{
+	// CAS backend mutations (Create/List/Revalidate are role-gated in ServerOperationsMap).
+	"/controlplane.v1.CASBackendService/Delete": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.CASBackendService/Update": {},
+
+	// Group catalog mutations (List/Get and membership ops are role-open in ServerOperationsMap).
+	"/controlplane.v1.GroupService/Create": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.GroupService/Delete": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.GroupService/Update": {},
+
+	// Integration deregistration (Register/Attach/Detach are role-gated in ServerOperationsMap).
+	"/controlplane.v1.IntegrationsService/Deregister": {},
+
+	// Org invitation management (Create is role-gated in ServerOperationsMap).
+	"/controlplane.v1.OrgInvitationService/ListSent": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.OrgInvitationService/Revoke":   {},
+
+	// Organization and membership mutations (Create/Delete/ListMemberships are handled separately).
+	"/controlplane.v1.OrganizationService/DeleteMembership": {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.OrganizationService/Update":           {},
+	"/controlplane.v1.OrganizationService/UpdateMembership": {},
+
+	// Robot account revocation (List/Create are role-gated in ServerOperationsMap).
+	"/controlplane.v1.RobotAccountService/Revoke": {},
+}
+
+// TestEveryProcedureIsClassified asserts that every controlplane.v1 wire procedure is explicitly
+// classified — mapped in ServerOperationsMap (role-gated), listed in adminOnlyProcedures
+// (intentionally admin-only by omission), or listed in authzExemptProcedures (skips the
+// authorization middleware). An unclassified procedure silently defaults to admin-only (non-admins
+// denied by policiesLookup), so a newly added RPC cannot quietly become inaccessible to the roles
+// that should reach it without someone making — and a reviewer seeing — an explicit decision here.
+func TestEveryProcedureIsClassified(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := wireProcedures(t)
+
+	for proc := range valid {
+		_, mapped := ServerOperationsMap[proc]
+		_, adminOnly := adminOnlyProcedures[proc]
+		_, exempt := authzExemptProcedures[proc]
+		assert.Truef(t, mapped || adminOnly || exempt,
+			"procedure %q is unclassified: add it to ServerOperationsMap to make it reachable by non-admin "+
+				"roles, to adminOnlyProcedures to confirm it is intentionally admin-only, or to "+
+				"authzExemptProcedures if it bypasses the authorization middleware. Unclassified procedures "+
+				"default to admin-only (non-admins denied).", proc)
+	}
+
+	// Guard against stale list entries and against a procedure being classified in more than one bucket.
+	for proc := range adminOnlyProcedures {
+		assert.Containsf(t, valid, proc, "adminOnlyProcedures entry %q matches no controlplane.v1 procedure; remove it", proc)
+		_, mapped := ServerOperationsMap[proc]
+		assert.Falsef(t, mapped, "procedure %q is in both ServerOperationsMap and adminOnlyProcedures; keep it in one bucket", proc)
+	}
+
+	for proc := range authzExemptProcedures {
+		assert.Containsf(t, valid, proc, "authzExemptProcedures entry %q matches no controlplane.v1 procedure; remove it", proc)
+		_, mapped := ServerOperationsMap[proc]
+		assert.Falsef(t, mapped, "procedure %q is in both ServerOperationsMap and authzExemptProcedures; keep it in one bucket", proc)
+		_, adminOnly := adminOnlyProcedures[proc]
+		assert.Falsef(t, adminOnly, "procedure %q is in both authzExemptProcedures and adminOnlyProcedures; keep it in one bucket", proc)
+	}
+}
+
+// wireProcedures returns the set of "/controlplane.v1.Service/Method" identifiers for every service
+// in the controlplane.v1 proto package, mirroring both the operation string the authz middleware
+// derives at runtime and the key shape used in ServerOperationsMap.
+func wireProcedures(t *testing.T) map[string]struct{} {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	procedures := make(map[string]struct{})
+	protoregistry.GlobalFiles.RangeFiles(func(fd protoreflect.FileDescriptor) bool {
+		if fd.Package() != "controlplane.v1" {
+			return true
+		}
+		services := fd.Services()
+		for i := 0; i < services.Len(); i++ {
+			svc := services.Get(i)
+			methods := svc.Methods()
+			for j := 0; j < methods.Len(); j++ {
+				procedures["/controlplane.v1."+string(svc.Name())+"/"+string(methods.Get(j).Name())] = struct{}{}
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	})
+
+	require.NotEmpty(t, procedures, "no controlplane.v1 wire procedures registered — is the generated package imported?")
+	return procedures
+}