Problem
Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol, Microsoft AutoGen, and Anthropic's own multi-agent patterns all use MCP for inter-agent communication. When agents communicate through shared MCP tools, a new attack class emerges: Agent A can poison Agent B's context through a tool they both use, even if neither agent's individual tool list looks malicious.
This maps to OWASP Agentic ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication — cross-protocol downgrade and relay-abuse attacks are documented in arXiv:2602.11327.
fuzzd currently models a single client ↔ server session. It has no model of multi-agent topologies.
Research questions
- What does a minimal A2A topology look like that fuzzd could probe? (two agents, one shared MCP server)
- What attack payloads are specific to inter-agent relay (as opposed to single-agent attacks)?
- Does fuzzd need a new transport layer to speak A2A, or can existing MCP transport suffice?
- What would a
--attacks inter-agent module look like architecturally?
Known attack patterns (from arXiv:2602.11327)
- Downgrade attack: a malicious MCP server presents itself as an A2A endpoint, causing the client to use a weaker authentication model
- Relay-abuse: Agent A's OAuth token is forwarded transparently to Agent B's tool calls, granting unintended permissions
- Orchestrator manipulation: a rogue agent presents an inflated capability description to bias the orchestrator's LLM-based agent-selection logic
- C2 via MCP: MCP used as command-and-control infrastructure for offensive agent swarms (traffic semantically indistinguishable from legitimate enterprise AI use)
Acceptance criteria (research phase)
References
Problem
Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol, Microsoft AutoGen, and Anthropic's own multi-agent patterns all use MCP for inter-agent communication. When agents communicate through shared MCP tools, a new attack class emerges: Agent A can poison Agent B's context through a tool they both use, even if neither agent's individual tool list looks malicious.
This maps to OWASP Agentic ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication — cross-protocol downgrade and relay-abuse attacks are documented in arXiv:2602.11327.
fuzzd currently models a single client ↔ server session. It has no model of multi-agent topologies.
Research questions
--attacks inter-agentmodule look like architecturally?Known attack patterns (from arXiv:2602.11327)
Acceptance criteria (research phase)
--attacks inter-agentintegrate with fuzzd's current session model?References