diff --git a/concepts/security.md b/concepts/security.md
index 10f5720..6cdb81e 100644
--- a/concepts/security.md
+++ b/concepts/security.md
@@ -13,9 +13,12 @@ While encryption protects confidentiality, it doesn't inherently prevent undetec
 *   **Purpose:** To allow recipients to verify that the encrypted payload has not been altered since its creation. This is especially critical for streamed data.
 *   **Mechanism:**
     1.  **Segmentation:** The plaintext payload is processed in chunks (segments).
-    2.  **Segment Hashing/Tagging:** As each segment is encrypted (using AES-GCM, for example), a cryptographic integrity tag (like a GMAC) is generated for that encrypted segment using the *payload encryption key*. This tag is stored (as `hash`) in the corresponding [Segment Object](../schema/OpenTDF/integrity_information.md#encryptioninformationintegrityinformationsegment).
-    3.  **Root Signature:** All the individual segment tags/hashes are concatenated in order. A final HMAC (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) is calculated over this concatenated string of hashes, again using the *payload encryption key*. This result is stored as the `rootSignature.sig`.
-*   **Result:** Any modification to even a single bit of the encrypted payload will invalidate the integrity tag of the affected segment *and* consequently invalidate the final `rootSignature`. During decryption, the receiving client MUST verify the integrity tag of each segment and the overall `rootSignature`. Failure indicates tampering.
+    2.  **Segment Tagging (GMAC for AES-GCM):** For `method.algorithm = AES-256-GCM`, the segment `hash` is the AEAD authentication tag (GMAC) produced during encryption of that segment. It is computed with the payload key, the per-segment nonce, and any AAD, and stored as Base64 in the Segment Object.
+    3.  **Root Signature (HS256):** Concatenate the raw bytes of each segment tag in order (Base64-decode each `segments[i].hash` and concatenate). Compute `HMAC-SHA256` over that byte stream using the payload key, then Base64-encode the result as `rootSignature.sig`.
+    4.  **Nonce Requirement:** For streamable AES-GCM, each segment MUST use a unique nonce. The derivation and encoding MUST be specified by the encryption method. Reuse is catastrophic.
+*   **Result:** Any modification to even a single bit of the encrypted payload will invalidate the integrity tag of the affected segment *and* consequently invalidate the final `rootSignature`. During decryption, the receiving client MUST verify each segment's AEAD tag and the overall `rootSignature`. Failure indicates tampering.
+
+**Note on plaintext payloads:** `payload.isEncrypted=false` is reserved for future use; integrity rules for plaintext payloads are out of scope.
 
 ## 3. Policy Binding
 
@@ -53,4 +56,4 @@ These mechanisms work together:
 *   **Policy Binding** ensures the access policy cannot be decoupled from the key access grant for a specific KAS.
 *   **Key Splitting** enforces multi-party authorization, preventing single points of failure or compromise for key access.
 
-This layered approach provides robust, data-centric security and tamper evidence for data protected by OpenTDF.
\ No newline at end of file
+This layered approach provides robust, data-centric security and tamper evidence for data protected by OpenTDF.
diff --git a/schema/OpenTDF/integrity_information.md b/schema/OpenTDF/integrity_information.md
index e7cfb13..0a576e9 100644
--- a/schema/OpenTDF/integrity_information.md
+++ b/schema/OpenTDF/integrity_information.md
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ The `integrityInformation` object, nested within [`encryptionInformation`](./enc
 
 | Parameter                   | Type   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                        | Required? |
 | --------------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
-| rootSignature               | Object | Contains a cryptographic signature or HMAC over the combined integrity hashes of all segments, providing overall payload integrity.                                                                | Yes       |
+| rootSignature               | Object | Contains a cryptographic integrity value over the combined segment hashes/tags, providing overall payload integrity. For `alg=HS256`, this is an HMAC.                                            | Yes       |
 | rootSignature.alg           | String | Algorithm used for the rootSignature.sig. HS256 (HMAC-SHA256 using the payload key) is commonly used.                                                                                              | Yes       |
-| rootSignature.sig           | String | The Base64 encoded signature or HMAC value. Calculated over the concatenation of all segment hashes/tags in order. E.g., Base64(HMAC-SHA256(PayloadKey, Concat(SegmentHash1, SegmentHash2, ...))). | Yes       |
-| segmentHashAlg              | String | The algorithm used to generate the hash for each segment in the segments array. GMAC (using the AES-GCM payload key) is commonly used when method.algorithm is AES-256-GCM.                        | Yes       |
+| rootSignature.sig           | String | The Base64-encoded integrity value. For `alg=HS256`, this is `Base64(HMAC-SHA256(PayloadKey, Concat(bytes(Hash1), bytes(Hash2), ...)))`, where `bytes(HashN)` are the Base64-decoded segment hashes in order. | Yes |
+| segmentHashAlg              | String | The algorithm used to generate the hash for each segment in the segments array. For `AES-256-GCM`, `GMAC` (the AEAD tag) is used. | Yes       |
 | segments                    | Array  | An array of [Segment Objects](#encryptionInformation.integrityInformation.segment), one for each chunk of the payload if method.isStreamable is true. Order MUST match payload order.                 | Yes       |
 | segmentSizeDefault          | Number | The default size (in bytes) of the plaintext payload segments. Allows omitting segmentSize in individual segment objects if they match this default.                                               | Yes       |
 | encryptedSegmentSizeDefault | Number | The default size (in bytes) of the encrypted payload segments (including any authentication tag overhead, like from AES-GCM). Allows omitting encryptedSegmentSize in segments.                    |           |
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ Object containing integrity information about a segment of the payload, includin
 
 |Parameter|Type|Description|
 |---|---|---|
-|`hash`|String|A hash generated using the specified `segmentHashAlg`.<br/><br/> `Base64.encode(HMAC(segment, payloadKey))`|
+|`hash`|String|A Base64-encoded authentication tag generated using the specified `segmentHashAlg`. For `GMAC`, this is the AES-GCM tag produced during encryption of the segment with the payload key, the per-segment nonce, and any AAD.|
+
+**Nonce derivation (AES-GCM, streamable):** Each segment must use a unique nonce; the derivation and encoding MUST be specified by the encryption method. Without a defined nonce scheme, GMAC verification is undefined.
 |`segmentSize`|Number|The size of the segment. This field is optional. The size of the segment is inferred from 'segmentSizeDefault' defined above, but in the event that a segment were modified and re-encrypted, the segment size would change.|
-|`encryptedSegmentSize`|Number|The size of the segment (in bytes) after the payload segment has been encrypted.|
\ No newline at end of file
+|`encryptedSegmentSize`|Number|The size of the segment (in bytes) after the payload segment has been encrypted.|
diff --git a/schema/OpenTDF/json-schema/schema.json b/schema/OpenTDF/json-schema/schema.json
index b2929ba..441462b 100644
--- a/schema/OpenTDF/json-schema/schema.json
+++ b/schema/OpenTDF/json-schema/schema.json
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
                 "type": "number"
               },
               "segmentHashAlg": {
-                "description": "Algorithm used to generate segment hashes",
+                "description": "Algorithm used to generate segment hashes (e.g., GMAC for AES-GCM AEAD tags)",
                 "type": "string"
               },
               "segments": {
diff --git a/schema/OpenTDF/method.md b/schema/OpenTDF/method.md
index 61737ca..c52abf7 100644
--- a/schema/OpenTDF/method.md
+++ b/schema/OpenTDF/method.md
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ The `method` object, nested within [`encryptionInformation`](./encryption_inform
 | ------------ | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
 | algorithm    | String  | The symmetric encryption algorithm used. AES-256-GCM is the recommended and commonly implemented algorithm.                                                                                                         | Yes       |
 | isStreamable | Boolean | Indicates if the payload was encrypted in segments suitable for streaming decryption. If true, [integrityInformation](./integrity_information.md) MUST contain segment details. | Yes       |
-| iv           | String  | The Base64 encoded Initialization Vector (IV) used with the symmetric algorithm. MUST be unique for each TDF encrypted with the same key. For AES-GCM, typically 12 bytes (96 bits).                                | Yes       |
+| iv           | String  | The Base64 encoded Initialization Vector (IV) used with the symmetric algorithm. MUST be unique for each TDF encrypted with the same key. For AES-GCM, MUST be 12 bytes (96 bits).                                | Yes       |