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Registry supply-chain: signed releases, checksums, source pinning, permission inspection #8

Description

@scttfrdmn

Problem

spawn plugin install github:org/repo/tool and registry installs execute third-party code locally and as root on the instance. There is currently no signing, checksumming, or pinning story documented, and questions the review raised are unanswered: does a version resolve to a git tag/release/branch/manifest? are files checksummed? can a tag be moved? are transitive downloads verified? is the resolved source recorded on the instance?

Proposed shape

  • Signed registry releases + checksums for plugin artifacts
  • Source pinning (resolve + record the exact commit on the instance)
  • Permission inspection surfaced pre-install (pairs with spawn#387 plugin inspect and spawn#388 permissions: block)

Also: strategic registry expansion

The current four plugins (tailscale, rstudio-server, globus-personal-endpoint, spore-sync) prove the model across four shapes. Strong next candidates that demonstrate reusable strengths: JupyterLab, code-server, Docker/Podman, NVIDIA container toolkit, DCV, SSM setup, CloudWatch agent, Mountpoint-for-S3 / rclone, VS Code tunnel, Slurm client, GitHub Actions runner.

Raised by an external security/architecture review. See spawn#387/#388.

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