diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 866f2c04..c0be4cc7 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -231,9 +231,9 @@ checksum = "57c0d7b74b563b49d38dae00a0c37d4d6de9b432382b2892f0574ddcae73fd0a" [[package]] name = "prepyrus" -version = "0.3.1" +version = "0.4.0" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" -checksum = "d4750c288aafa3eb853a573409ac414b51e95784beb45c271af1af2a093db15e" +checksum = "560515b5d27be12e27bc06c5e8433b7ba5b9889f4fb39e9dc3a8ca6cf4c39844" dependencies = [ "biblatex", "clap", diff --git a/absolute_bibliography.bib b/absolute_bibliography.bib index a3111d90..1f84dd29 100644 --- a/absolute_bibliography.bib +++ b/absolute_bibliography.bib @@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ @book{hegel1991logic address = {Atlantic Highlands, N.J.} } +@book{hegel1991enclogic, + title = {The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the + Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences + with the Zusatze}, + author = {Hegel, G.W.F.}, + translator = {Harris, H.S. and Suchting, W.A. and Geraets, T.F.}, + year = {1991}, + address = {Indianapolis/Cambridge}, + publisher = {Hackett Publishing Company Inc.}, + isbn = {0-87220-070-1} +} + @book{houlgate2022hegel, title = {Hegel on Being}, author = {Houlgate, S.}, diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph.mdx index 317c228c..a24b28ac 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph.mdx @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ conceptual structure that presents itself at the beginning of Mechanism. The first determination is described in the following terms: > The object is, as we have seen, the syllogism, whose mediation has been -> sublated and has therefore become an immediate identity (Hegel 1991, 711). +> sublated and has therefore become an immediate identity (@hegel1991logic, +> 711). Let's unpack this initial thought, without trying to unpack the reference to the `syllogism`. @@ -55,15 +56,15 @@ perceived. Now, obviously, the moments of the `mechanical object` do not perceive each other but they do relate to each other, and they relate to each other immediately and, as such, they relate to each other as identical moments. It is for these reasons that Hegel begins his account of the `mechanical object` -by stating that its moments have “become an immediate identity” (Hegel 1991, -711). +by stating that its moments have “become an immediate identity” +(@hegel1991logic, 711). What exactly are these moments of the `mechanical object` that have become an immediate identity? Hegel clarifies this in the following sentence: > It is therefore in and for itself a universal - universality not in the sense > of a community of properties, but a universality that pervades the -> particularity and in it is immediate individuality (Hegel 1991, 711). +> particularity and in it is immediate individuality (@hegel1991logic, 711). The moments of the `mechanical object` are the determinations of the `Concept` : `universal`, `particular`, and `individual`. It is these moments that are @@ -74,11 +75,11 @@ finds its essence instantiated in particular and individual objects. It is not, for example, like the universal concept of a chair that states that a chair must be "so and so" and that serves as the essence of armchairs and swivel chairs, alike. It is not, as Hegel writes, a universal “in the sense of a community of -properties” (Hegel 1991, 711). Rather, it is a universal that is immediately -identical to the particular and the individual. In other words, the general -concept of a chair is identical to all particular and individual chairs - there -are not some chairs that are short and some that are long, or some chairs that -offer good lumbar support and others that do not, rather, all chairs are -identical to each other. The moments of the `mechanical object`, then, are -treated as identical to each other, there is no distinction in conceiving of the -`mechanical object` as universal or as individual. +properties” (@hegel1991logic, 711). Rather, it is a universal that is +immediately identical to the particular and the individual. In other words, the +general concept of a chair is identical to all particular and individual +chairs - there are not some chairs that are short and some that are long, or +some chairs that offer good lumbar support and others that do not, rather, all +chairs are identical to each other. The moments of the `mechanical object`, +then, are treated as identical to each other, there is no distinction in +conceiving of the `mechanical object` as universal or as individual. diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-1.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-1.mdx index 06228c8f..eb93d341 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-1.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-1.mdx @@ -31,26 +31,27 @@ This unity of form and matter is what constitutes the rock as a critiquing the form-matter distinction, he writes, “such an abstract difference of individuality and universality is excluded by the Notion of object” (Hegel 1991, 712). The difference between form (universality) and matter -(individuality) is a kind of difference that is “excluded” (Hegel 1991, 712) by -the very concept of a `mechanical object`. Why is that? To answer this question -we need only to cast our minds back to the first paragraph of Mechanism, where -the `mechanical object` is explained to be an “immediate identity” (Hegel -1991, 711) such that it is a “universality that pervades the particularity and -in it is immediate individuality” (Hegel 1991, 711). In other words, it is -incongruent with the concept of the `mechanical object` to conceive of it as -having the difference of anything as the foundation for its being. What it is -for it to be a `mechanical object` to be is for it to be an immediate identity. -What is an immediate identity? The determinations of the `Concept` that -constitute the `mechanical object`. One cannot conceptually distinguish the -universal moment from the individual moment of the `mechanical object` because -they are taken as identical to each other. The first sentence of the second -paragraph of Section 1 attests to this clearly: “The object is therefore in the -first instance _indeterminate_, in so far as it has no determinate opposition in -it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed into immediate identity” (Hegel -1991, 712). The fact that the determinations of the `Concept` are immediately -identical to each other and not mediated means that the `mechanical object` is -indeterminate. In other words, it lacks determinacy because there is no -difference within it for any determinacy to be established. +(individuality) is a kind of difference that is “excluded” +(@hegel1991logic, 712) by the very concept of a `mechanical object`. Why is +that? To answer this question we need only to cast our minds back to the first +paragraph of Mechanism, where the `mechanical object` is explained to be an +“immediate identity” (@hegel1991logic, 711) such that it is a “universality that +pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality” +(@hegel1991logic, 711). In other words, it is incongruent with the concept of +the `mechanical object` to conceive of it as having the difference of anything +as the foundation for its being. What it is for it to be a `mechanical object` +to be is for it to be an immediate identity. What is an immediate identity? The +determinations of the `Concept` that constitute the `mechanical object`. One +cannot conceptually distinguish the universal moment from the individual moment +of the `mechanical object` because they are taken as identical to each other. +The first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 1 attests to this clearly: +“The object is therefore in the first instance _indeterminate_, in so far as it +has no determinate opposition in it; for it is the mediation that has collapsed +into immediate identity” (@hegel1991logic, 712). The fact that the +determinations of the `Concept` are immediately identical to each other and not +mediated means that the `mechanical object` is indeterminate. In other words, it +lacks determinacy because there is no difference within it for any determinacy +to be established. A natural question to arise from the above discussion that warns against any notion of difference within the `mechanical object` is the following: is it not @@ -63,38 +64,38 @@ Hegel writes: “Insofar as the _Notion is essentially determinate_, the object possesses determinateness as a _manifoldness_ which though complete is otherwise _indeterminate_, that is, _contains no relationships_, and which constitutes a totality that at first is similarly no further determined; _sides_ or _parts_ -that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection” (Hegel 1991, -712). Hegel is trying to square the circle of expressing the `mechanical object` -as an indeterminate, immediate identity, on the one hand, and on the other hand, -as being essentially a further development of the determinations of the -`Concept`, which requires us to think of the `mechanical object` as the unity of -the three determinations (`universality`, `particularity`, and `individuality`) -of the `Concept`. +that may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection” +(@hegel1991logic, 712). Hegel is trying to square the circle of expressing the +`mechanical object` as an indeterminate, immediate identity, on the one hand, +and on the other hand, as being essentially a further development of the +determinations of the `Concept`, which requires us to think of the +`mechanical object` as the unity of the three determinations (`universality`, +`particularity`, and `individuality`) of the `Concept`. Hegel achieves this geometric feat by grasping the `mechanical object` as an -“indeterminate difference” (Hegel 1991, 712). I think that we can treat -"indeterminate difference" (Hegel 1991, 712) as equivalent to "the immediate -identity" (Hegel 1991, 711) of the determinations of the Concept. Because it is -the three determinations of the `Concept` that express the difference, and their -immediate identity that expresses their indeterminacy. The reason why there can -be difference and indeterminacy in the same breath is because the difference -between the determinations of the `Concept` is a merely formal one. They are -different insofar as one is the `universal` and the other is the `particular` -but they are not different _in relation to each other_. This is what Hegel means -when he refers to the difference as “only that there are a _number_ of objects” -(Hegel 1991, 712). In other words, they are different insofar as there are three -different determinations of the `Concept`. Hegel goes on to write that each -object (each of the determinations of the `Concept`) “contains its -determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself -_outwards_” (Hegel 1991, 712). This is one of those tricky turns of phrase that -Hegel uses, and understanding it is crucial to understanding the logical -structure of the `mechanical object`. The first thing to clarify is what Hegel -means by "its determinateness" (Hegel 1991, 712). The moment of `universality` -is the core of the object's identity and that is a moment of self-relating -negativity. When the determination of `universality` was examined in the -beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept it was comprehended as being a -self-relating negativity . This negativity that remains within the `universal` -is the determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*] of the `universal`. +“indeterminate difference” (@hegel1991logic, 712). I think that we can treat +"indeterminate difference" (@hegel1991logic, 712) as equivalent to "the +immediate identity" (@hegel1991logic, 711) of the determinations of the Concept. +Because it is the three determinations of the `Concept` that express the +difference, and their immediate identity that expresses their indeterminacy. The +reason why there can be difference and indeterminacy in the same breath is +because the difference between the determinations of the `Concept` is a merely +formal one. They are different insofar as one is the `universal` and the other +is the `particular` but they are not different _in relation to each other_. This +is what Hegel means when he refers to the difference as “only that there are a +_number_ of objects” (@hegel1991logic, 712). In other words, they are different +insofar as there are three different determinations of the `Concept`. Hegel goes +on to write that each object (each of the determinations of the `Concept`) +“contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not +reflect itself _outwards_” (@hegel1991logic, 712). This is one of those tricky +turns of phrase that Hegel uses, and understanding it is crucial to +understanding the logical structure of the `mechanical object`. The first thing +to clarify is what Hegel means by "its determinateness" (@hegel1991logic, 712). +The moment of `universality` is the core of the object's identity and that is a +moment of self-relating negativity. When the determination of `universality` was +examined in the beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept it was comprehended as +being a self-relating negativity . This negativity that remains within the +`universal` is the determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*] of the `universal`. Next, we have to clarify what Hegel means by "its universality" (Hegel 1991, 712) because I have already stated that the `mechanical object` is not @@ -107,8 +108,8 @@ abstract determinations also refer to their moment of universality as the source of their identity. Thus, in the case of the `mechanical object`, when Hegel refers to "its universality" he is referring to its basic source of identity. Now that we have clarified what Hegel means by "its determinateness" and "its -universality" (Hegel 1991, 712), we are in a good position to understand the -rest of that sentence. The determinateness, i.e. the negativity, of the +universality" (@hegel1991logic, 712), we are in a good position to understand +the rest of that sentence. The determinateness, i.e. the negativity, of the `mechanical object` does not reflect outwards. In other words, it does not relate to anything that is outside of itself. Rather, it is reflected into its `universality`, i.e. it is reflected into its own source of identity. One @@ -124,15 +125,15 @@ self-relating it is, effectively, relating to itself as the immediate identity of the determinations of the `Concept`. It is for this reason that Hegel writes the following: “Because this indeterminate determinateness is essential to the object, the latter is within itself a _plurality_ of this kind, and must -therefore be regarded as a _composite_ or _aggregate_” (Hegel 1991, 712). What -it is for the `mechanical object` to be is for it to relate to itself as the -immediate identity of other objects (the determinations of the `Concept`). In -other words, what it is for it to be itself is for it to be itself through other -objects that are taken to be identical to itself. +therefore be regarded as a _composite_ or _aggregate_” (@hegel1991logic, 712). +What it is for the `mechanical object` to be is for it to relate to itself as +the immediate identity of other objects (the determinations of the `Concept`). +In other words, what it is for it to be itself is for it to be itself through +other objects that are taken to be identical to itself. In a somewhat throwaway remark at the end of this conceptual discussion, Hegel writes that the `mechanical object` “does not consist of _atoms_, for these are -not objects because they are not totalities” (Hegel 1991, 712). It is worth +not objects because they are not totalities” (@hegel1991logic, 712). It is worth musing on this brief remark because it reveals a lot about how Hegel conceptualises the wider significance of his account of the `mechanical object`. Hegel clearly has some mechanistic, in particular atomistic, worldviews in his @@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ writes: > determinations of its merely _implicit_ totality-lies _outside it_, and partly > also in that it is indifferent to the monad that it constitutes an object > _along with others_; it is thus in fact not _exclusive_ or _determined for -> itself_ (Hegel 1991, 712). +> itself_ (@hegel1991logic, 712). import { Stub } from "lib/components/ui/Stub"; diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-2.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-2.mdx index f60d2595..7fa36b2e 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-2.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-2.mdx @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ found in the However, despite the indeterminacy of the `mechanical object`, again, owing to the lack of difference within or between the determinations of the `Concept`, there is the vaguest notion of determinateness. Determinateness remains as a -"manifoldness" (Hegel 1991, 712); in other words, there is determinateness +"manifoldness" (@hegel1991logic, 712); in other words, there is determinateness simply because there are the three determinations of the `Concept` that are immediately identical to each other. This is a formal, meagre, superficial determinateness. It is the kind of difference that exists between three rocks @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ have both determinateness and be indeterminate: > but the form that constitutes their difference and combines them into a unity > is an external, indifferent one; whether it be a mixture, or again an order, a > certain arrangement of parts and sides, all these are combinations that are -> indifferent to what is so related (Hegel 1991, 713). +> indifferent to what is so related (@hegel1991logic, 713). The determinateness of the `mechanical object`, then, is not constituted by something "inner". In other words, the `mechanical object` does not posit the @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ the next paragraph: > progression to infinity must indeed likewise be assumed and represented as a > totality, a world; but that world is nothing but the universality that is > confined within itself by indeterminate individuality, that is, a universe -> (Hegel 1991, 713). +> (@hegel1991logic, 713). Hegel conceptualises this infinite regression of successive external determinateness's as the “world”, in its universal form, and as the “universe”, @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ the indeterminate individuality of the `universe`. To grasp the move that Hegel makes here, from universal `world` to individual `universe`, we need to remind ourselves of a feature of Mechanism. The `mechanical object` is the “universality that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate -individuality" (Hegel 1991, 710); in other words, the universal `world` is +individuality" (@hegel1991logic, 710); in other words, the universal `world` is immediately the individual `universe`, because we are within the sphere of Mechanism where `universality` is immediately `individuality`. When we conceptualise the `universe`, for Hegel, we are folding into itself the `world` @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ external determinateness: > involves the progression to infinity; it can halt and be satisfied at any > point at will, because the object it has reached in its progress, being a > formal totality, is shut up within itself and indifferent to its being -> determined by another (Hegel 1991, 713). +> determined by another (@hegel1991logic, 713). It is interesting that Hegel connects the indeterminacy of determinism to the infinite regression of determinism because the infinite regress plays no role in @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ indifferent determination. As such, it is because of the indeterminacy of the infinite progression, and it explains why determinism doesn't offer a determinate explanation of things. Because what it offers by way of explanation is merely the same explanation for every single moment, which is what prompts -Hegel to call it an “empty word” (Hegel 1991, 714). +Hegel to call it an “empty word” (@hegel1991logic, 714). Crucially, the above is not a disproof of determinism or a criticism of it. It is Hegel's account of determinism. Determinism is part of the unfolding of the diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3.mdx index bd082d68..bebb581b 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3.mdx @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ half of Section 3: > from the objects which are indifferent to it no peculiar distinctiveness and > is therefore only identical, there is before us only _one_ determinateness; > and its being doubled expresses just this externality and nullity of a -> difference (Hegel 1991, 714). +> difference (@hegel1991logic, 714). For Hegel, the chain of external, indifferent, determinateness between `mechanical objects` is a mere tautology, which means that there is really only @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ remain different `mechanical objects`. Herein lies the contradiction of the > Here, then, we have the manifest _contradiction_ between the complete mutual > _indifference_ of the objects and the _identity_ of their _determinateness_, > or the contradiction of their complete _externality_ in the _identity_ of -> their determinateness (Hegel 1991, 713). +> their determinateness (@hegel1991logic, 713). To return to my example of the rock that splashes into the water. From a mechanistic perspective, it makes not a bit of difference whether it is a rock @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ grasped as the negative unity of the `mechanical objects`: > This contradiction is, therefore, the _negative unity_ of a number of objects > which, in that unity, simply repel one another: this is the _mechanical -> process_ (Hegel 1991, 713). +> process_ (@hegel1991logic, 713). The conclusion of the A. The Mechanical Object, then, is that these `mechanical objects` that were initially taken as immediately identical, diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process/section-one.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process/section-one.mdx index 62af5404..2ae126e0 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process/section-one.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process/section-one.mdx @@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ I will deal with the first section of (a) The Formal Mechanical Process. The section begins with the following: “The mechanical process is the positing of what is contained in the Notion of mechanism, and therefore, in the first -instance, of a _contradiction_” (Hegel 1991, 716). The “concept” of Mechanism is -the logical moment with which the section, A. The Mechanical Object finished. -The `mechanical object` is now a negative unity: the negativity of having the -identical determinateness to other mechanical objects whilst being indifferent -to them. This is the contradiction with which A. The Mechanical Object -concludes. This contradiction is now explored further in the (a) The Formal -Mechanical Process. +instance, of a _contradiction_” (@hegel1991logic, 716). The “concept” of +Mechanism is the logical moment with which the section, A. The Mechanical Object +finished. The `mechanical object` is now a negative unity: the negativity of +having the identical determinateness to other mechanical objects whilst being +indifferent to them. This is the contradiction with which A. The Mechanical +Object concludes. This contradiction is now explored further in the (a) The +Formal Mechanical Process. Above, Hegel writes that it is the “positing” of the contradiction in the `mechanical object` that gets the mechanical process started and it is worth @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ dwelling on this for a moment. Hegel explains that by “positing” he means, > takes the form of the _positing_ of the _identical_ relation of the objects. > This consists merely in giving to the determinateness that is determined, the > form of _universality_; this is _communication_, which does not involve -> transition into an opposite (Hegel 1991, 716). +> transition into an opposite (@hegel1991logic, 716). Thus, the “positing” is an expression of the logical interaction of objects that relate to each other as identical. But where has this logical interaction come @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Accordingly, because their identity is determined, their relation takes the form of a `universal` – there is nothing other than `mechanical objects` and these `mechanical objects` relate to each other as identical.[^1] Hegel calls this `communication` and, crucially, adds that it “does not involve transition into -an opposite” (Hegel 1991, 716). +an opposite” (@hegel1991logic, 716). The `communication` between `mechanical objects` is a movement of identical determinations, and so strictly speaking, there is no change from one thing to @@ -90,15 +90,15 @@ the logical determination of `communication`. He writes: > scent freely spreads in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in communication > between material objects, their determinateness _spreads_, so to speak, in a > similarly ideal manner; personality is an infinitely more intense -> _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess (Hegel 1991, 716). +> _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess (@hegel1991logic, 716). The above paragraph provides a series of concrete instances of `communication`. Crucially, the examples given are all of the kind of communication that occurs between objects; Hegel makes the point to distinguish the kind of communication between objects to something like personality, which “is an infinitely more -intense _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess” (Hegel 1991, 716). -This is an excellent opportunity to look closely at Hegel’s examples as they -provide a window into how he thinks about the real-world instances of the +intense _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess” (@hegel1991logic, +716). This is an excellent opportunity to look closely at Hegel’s examples as +they provide a window into how he thinks about the real-world instances of the logical development. If we spend a bit of time unpacking Hegel’s examples and scrutinising their validity, we will get a clearer understanding of communication its its technical sense and ontological status. @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ he expands on an important _logical_ dimension of this moment. He writes: > determinateness and hence is not a self-determination, makes it > undistinguished from the other object and thus renders the interaction > primarily an unimpeded continuation of the determinateness of the one in the -> other (Hegel 1991, 716). +> other (@hegel1991logic, 716). `Communication` does not work simply because the determinateness between `mechanical objects` is identical but also because they are indifferent to @@ -211,13 +211,14 @@ continues exactly as it did from the beginning. Thus, not only does continues with that identity throughout the interaction. Hegel, then, concludes this section on `communication` with an analysis of how -it functions in the “spiritual sphere” (Hegel 1991, 716). By spiritual sphere, -Hegel has in mind the following: “Laws, morals, rational conceptions in general” -(Hegel 1991, 716). There are laws in a society, and these laws pervade (are -communicated) throughout society without any obstruction or alteration. The same -with morals, what a society takes to be right or wrong is immediately -communicated throughout the society and, again, there is no alteration of -morality (on a social level) as it goes from individual to individual.[^3] +it functions in the “spiritual sphere” (@hegel1991logic, 716). By spiritual +sphere, Hegel has in mind the following: “Laws, morals, rational conceptions in +general” (@hegel1991logic, 716). There are laws in a society, and these laws +pervade (are communicated) throughout society without any obstruction or +alteration. The same with morals, what a society takes to be right or wrong is +immediately communicated throughout the society and, again, there is no +alteration of morality (on a social level) as it goes from individual to +individual.[^3] [^3]: Of course, this is based on an understanding of individuals within a society @@ -239,16 +240,16 @@ understanding of what Hegel is going for: > not merely through the form but in and for itself, is the _objective_ as such, > both in the spiritual and in the material sphere; as against which the > individuality of outer objects as well as of persons is an unessential element -> that can offer it no resistance (Hegel 1991, 716). +> that can offer it no resistance (@hegel1991logic, 716). The paragraph begins with an example that does not fall within the purview of -`communication` because it is concerned with “intelligence” (Hegel 1991, 716). -Intelligence, then, does not fall within the logical remit of Mechanism. If we -just focus on the text, however, intelligence has the effect of giving the form -of universality to a content and thereby making it communicable. There are 2 -logical steps to clarify here: (1) intelligence takes on a manifold content and -gives it the form of universality – a capacity that intelligence has, and (2) -intelligence is able to communicate the content _because_ it has the form of +`communication` because it is concerned with “intelligence” (@hegel1991logic, +716). Intelligence, then, does not fall within the logical remit of Mechanism. +If we just focus on the text, however, intelligence has the effect of giving the +form of universality to a content and thereby making it communicable. There are +2 logical steps to clarify here: (1) intelligence takes on a manifold content +and gives it the form of universality – a capacity that intelligence has, and +(2) intelligence is able to communicate the content _because_ it has the form of universality, _i.e._ a communicated content, whether it be through the `formal mechanical process` or through intelligence, must be universalised in order to be communicated.[^4] diff --git a/content/hegel/reference/nothing/development.mdx b/content/hegel/reference/nothing/development.mdx index 7568ca1f..8205d93d 100644 --- a/content/hegel/reference/nothing/development.mdx +++ b/content/hegel/reference/nothing/development.mdx @@ -204,9 +204,9 @@ This sense of immediacy is further stressed through the self-equality of _immediately itself_. Houlgate additionally refers to §88 of Hegel's _Encyclopaedia Logic_, where, Hegel writes: "And similarly, but conversely, nothing, as this immediate [term] that is equal to itself, is the same as being" -(Hegel 1991, 141/§88). And so Houlgate concludes that, "just as pure being, by -virtue of its indeterminacy, vanishes into nothing, so pure nothing, by virtue -of its immediacy, vanishes into being" (Houlgate 2022, 143). +(@hegel1991logic, 141/§88). And so Houlgate concludes that, "just as pure being, +by virtue of its indeterminacy, vanishes into nothing, so pure nothing, by +virtue of its immediacy, vanishes into being" (Houlgate 2022, 143). Houlgate additionally notes that while Hegel may seem to suggest that pure nothing turns to being because, as Hegel's text shows, "nothing _is_ (exists) in diff --git a/scripts/prepyrus_runner/Cargo.toml b/scripts/prepyrus_runner/Cargo.toml index 12635610..a819865c 100644 --- a/scripts/prepyrus_runner/Cargo.toml +++ b/scripts/prepyrus_runner/Cargo.toml @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ version = "0.1.0" edition = "2021" [dependencies] -prepyrus = "0.3.1" +prepyrus = "0.4"