Allow scoped native Antigravity file tools in headless reviewer runs

[wwind123]

Bug

Antigravity reviewer runs in headless --print mode can fail before producing a review when the model uses its native read_file or write_file tools.

The reviewer backend injects toolPermission: strict and replaces the permission allowlist with shell read commands such as git diff, rg, and sed. It also strips --dangerously-skip-permissions for reviewer and repair roles. As a result, native file-tool requests resolve to an interactive permission prompt, which headless mode cannot answer:

jetski: no output produced - a tool required the "read_file" permission that headless mode cannot prompt for, so it was auto-denied.

The same occurs for command and write_file requests. This has caused repeated Antigravity review failures in llm-dialectic#391.

Expected behavior

Reviewer and repair sessions should remain restricted and non-destructive, but native file inspection should work within the assigned checkout. A failed permission request should not silently become an empty review response.

Proposed fix

• Preserve the strict reviewer policy and continue denying writes outside the assigned checkout.
• Inject narrowly scoped read_file(<assigned-checkout>) rules for reviewer sessions.
• Add write_file(<assigned-checkout>) only for roles that are explicitly allowed to modify files, or keep it denied for reviewers and repairs as appropriate.
• Do not enable unrestricted --dangerously-skip-permissions for reviewer sessions by default.
• Emit a clear diagnostic when a native tool is denied in headless mode.

Acceptance criteria

• A headless Antigravity reviewer can inspect files using native read_file within its assigned checkout.
• Reviewer sessions cannot write files or execute commands outside their existing policy.
• Repair and reviewer permission policies remain distinct and tested.
• A denied native tool produces a categorized, actionable failure rather than an empty response.
• Tests cover permission injection, restoration of the user settings file, and concurrent agent-loop sessions.

-- Human Reviewer

[wwind123]

Plan

Allow Antigravity reviewers to use only the native read_file tool inside their assigned checkout, preserve the distinct no-tool repair policy and strict non-destructive controls, and report headless native-tool denials as actionable failures.

Plan steps

1. Refactor the reviewer-only Antigravity settings injection in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py so its allowlist is constructed for the resolved assigned checkout at run time, retaining toolPermission: strict and the existing narrowly read-only shell-command rules while adding only read_file() for reviewer sessions.
2. Keep role policies explicitly distinct: continue stripping --dangerously-skip-permissions for reviewer and repair roles; keep repair's empty native-tool allowlist and formatting-only temporary workdir; do not add write_file permission to reviewers or repairs, and leave coder behavior unchanged unless a separately authorized modifying role requires a scoped write rule.
3. Extend Antigravity/headless failure handling and the shared orchestrator classification/formatting path to recognize native-tool permission denials (including the auto-denied/no-output diagnostic), label them with a dedicated actionable category, preserve the CLI diagnostic/log path, and explain that the requested tool was denied rather than presenting it as an unexplained empty review.
4. Update focused Antigravity backend tests in tests/test_antigravity.py to capture the temporary settings during reviewer and repair runs, assert the dynamically scoped native read_file permission is present only for reviewers, assert native write_file and broader command access remain absent, and retain byte-for-byte restoration coverage for successful, exceptional, and injection-failure paths.
5. Add failure-classification and integration-style tests in the existing orchestrator/protocol test modules for a headless native read_file denial versus a successful scoped reviewer configuration, verifying the categorized actionable message, retry behavior where applicable, response-file diagnostics, and no false empty-response classification.
6. Exercise the existing settings/GEMINI.md locking concurrency tests (and add a reviewer/repair concurrency case if current coverage does not run their differing injections) to prove each concurrent agent-loop session sees its own scoped policy and the original user settings file is restored after all runs; run the focused Antigravity, protocol, orchestrator, and repair tests, then the full pytest suite.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — addressed: The plan scopes reviewer native read_file to the assigned checkout, preserves strict distinct reviewer/repair policies and denied writes, adds actionable denial classification, and covers restoration plus concurrent-session tests.

-- OpenAI Codex: gpt-5.6-terra

[wwind123]

Review verdict: Blocking

The plan correctly identifies the reviewer/repair injection sites in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py and keeps repair/reviewer policy distinct, but it commits to a specific settings.json mechanism (a permissions.allow entry of the form read_file()) whose directory-scoping semantics are unverified against the real Antigravity CLI, and it overlooks a separate, already-present workspace-trust mechanism in that same settings file that may be the actual intended control point.

Blocking plan issues

• Plan step 1 assumes permissions.allow entries such as read_file() grant recursive access to every file under that directory, but this is unverified and there is concrete evidence it may be wrong. I inspected the installed agy binary (/home/wwind123/.local/bin/agy) and this machine's real Antigravity CLI state: the live settings file at ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json already uses a separate workspace-trust mechanism -- trustedWorkspaces (an array of directory paths) and allowNonWorkspaceAccess (a boolean) -- alongside permissions.allow. The binary's embedded strings only show read_file permission templates for a literal single file path (read_file(%s), used to display an 'Active' per-file grant after a specific read) or the bare wildcard read_file(*)/read_file(/); nothing in the extracted strings demonstrates that a bare directory path (no glob, no trailing wildcard) matches every file underneath it. If permissions.allow only matches exact file paths or *, then read_file(<assigned-checkout>) as literally proposed will not do what the plan needs, and the correct fix may instead be to add the assigned checkout to trustedWorkspaces (with allowNonWorkspaceAccess: false to keep everything outside it denied), or to use a glob suffix the plan never specifies. This directly affects whether Requirement 1's acceptance criterion ('A headless Antigravity reviewer can inspect files using native read_file within its assigned checkout') can actually be met, not just whether unit tests pass. Concretely reproducing the current bug on this exact machine backs up the urgency: ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/log/cli-20260715_181840.log:168 shows a real, very recent reviewer run (identical shell-only allow-list to the current code, toolPermission=strict) where the model's native ReadFile call was soft-denied, and the CLI process shut down immediately afterward with no further output -- confirming a single denied native-tool call kills the whole headless turn outright (not merely producing empty text), so the very first production run of this fix needs the settings mechanism to be right.
• Because of the above, the plan's test strategy (steps 3-5) is insufficient as written: it only asserts, via FakeRunner mocks, that the code writes the JSON string the author intended (e.g. settings['permissions']['allow'] contains read_file(<checkout>)). None of the proposed tests exercise the real agy CLI (which is present and already authenticated in this dev environment) to confirm that the injected settings actually unblock a native read_file call for a file nested inside the checkout, as opposed to only the checkout root path itself. Please add a concrete verification step -- even a manually-run, documented smoke check against the real agy --print binary with the exact settings the code would inject -- confirming the chosen mechanism (permissions.allow entry vs. trustedWorkspaces entry vs. glob) actually grants recursive read access before finalizing the settings-injection format in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py, and record the confirmed syntax/mechanism in the plan so the automated tests are asserting something known to work against the real CLI, not just self-consistent mock JSON.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — blocked: The plan's mechanism for the requirement's core ask -- scoped native read_file access for reviewers -- is not concretely verified against the real Antigravity CLI. Live settings.json on this machine (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json) exposes a distinct trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess mechanism the plan never considers, and the agy binary's embedded permission-string templates only confirm exact-file-path or bare-wildcard forms of read_file(...), not directory-prefix matching. A live log on this box (cli-20260715_181840.log:168) reproduces the exact bug today, showing a denied ReadFile call terminates the whole headless turn immediately -- so an incorrect choice of settings field/syntax would silently fail to fix the reported issue while still passing the plan's proposed (fully mocked) tests. Addressing this requires the blocking-issue verification step above before this can be marked addressed.

-- Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5

[wwind123]

Review verdict: Blocking

Agent execution failed due to a permission error.

Blocking plan issues

• A tool required the "read_file" permission that headless mode cannot prompt for, so it was auto-denied. Add an allow-rule under permissions.allow in settings.json (e.g. read_file()). Alternatively, re-run with --dangerously-skip-permissions to auto-approve all tools.
• Requirement 1 is not satisfied because the review failed due to a permission error.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — blocked: Agent execution failed due to a permission error.

-- Google Antigravity: Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)

[wwind123]

Revised plan

Replace the unverified directory-shaped read_file allow rule with a verified, checkout-scoped Antigravity native-file-access mechanism; retain strict, distinct reviewer and repair policies; and convert headless native-tool denials into categorized actionable failures.

Prior plan item dispositions

• [item-1] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 1: Plan step 1 assumes permissions.allow entries such as read_file() grant recurs... -> same-plan: The revised first step makes real-CLI validation of recursive checkout reads a prerequisite for selecting the settings field and syntax; it no longer assumes read_file() is recursive and evaluates trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess and any documented glob form.
• [item-2] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 1: Because of the above, the plan's test strategy (steps 3-5) is insufficient as written: it only as... -> same-plan: A documented, opt-in real-agy smoke check against a nested fixture file is now required before implementation finalizes the injection, while unit tests assert the mechanism that smoke check proves.
• [item-3] Blocking issue from Google Antigravity: Gemini 3.1 Pro (High), round 1: A tool required the "read_file" permission that headless mode cannot prompt for, so it was auto-d... -> same-plan: The plan provides a narrowly scoped native-read rule through the verified mechanism, explicitly rejects dangerous auto-approval for reviewer and repair roles, and preserves command restrictions.
• [item-4] Blocking issue from Google Antigravity: Gemini 3.1 Pro (High), round 1: Requirement 1 is not satisfied because the review failed due to a permission error. -> same-plan: The plan adds native-denial classification and successful nested-read verification so a denied headless tool cannot be misreported as an empty review.

Plan steps

1. Before changing production injection, run and document a real agy --print capability probe from the assigned checkout using a nested, read-only fixture and the exact temporary settings overlay that the backend will use. Keep the probe opt-in and isolated from the developer's live settings/profile (or obtain explicit authorization if the CLI cannot select an isolated profile). Test the candidate mechanisms separately: the existing permissions.allow syntax (only if a documented recursive form exists) and trustedWorkspaces: [<resolved assigned checkout>] with allowNonWorkspaceAccess: false. The prompt must require native read_file of the nested file, then attempt native reads outside the checkout and native write_file; record CLI version, selected JSON shape, successful in-checkout read evidence, and denied outside/write evidence in docs/local_agent_loop.md. Do not accept a shell-command-only result or an unauthenticated/interactive prompt as proof. If no mechanism passes, keep the issue blocked rather than shipping a guessed rule.
2. Refactor src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py so reviewer settings injection is built at run time from the resolved config.antigravity_dir using only the mechanism confirmed by that probe. Preserve toolPermission: strict, the existing explicit read-only shell-command allowlist, and the surrounding settings/GEMINI.md locking and byte-for-byte restoration behavior. Merge or replace only the settings keys whose semantics were verified, so unrelated user settings survive the temporary overlay; explicitly set non-workspace access false when workspace trust is the verified mechanism. Do not add write_file, broad read_file(*), unrestricted command permission, or --dangerously-skip-permissions to reviewer sessions.
3. Keep role=repair separate in the same backend: continue removing --dangerously-skip-permissions, retain its empty native-tool allowlist and isolated formatting-only workdir, and ensure it neither inherits reviewer workspace trust nor gains read/write access. Leave the coder path unchanged. Update the reviewer session instruction to permit native file inspection only within its assigned checkout and to state that a native-tool denial must be surfaced, not worked around with writes or bypass flags.
4. Extend src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py result handling and the shared failure classification/formatting path in src/coding_review_agent_loop/orchestrator.py (plus the existing protocol/error helpers they use) to detect Antigravity's headless native permission-denial signatures, including a tool required the "read_file" permission and auto-denied/no-output exits. Emit a dedicated non-empty actionable category that names the denied native tool, preserves the response/log diagnostic path, and is not collapsed into generic empty-response; retain current handling for genuine blank output and unrelated transient failures.
5. Update tests/test_antigravity.py to capture the live temporary settings for reviewer, repair, and coder runs. Assert the reviewer overlay contains the exact probe-verified recursive-scope configuration for that run's resolved checkout; assert a nested-path representation is covered where the selected syntax requires it; assert no broad wildcard, outside-checkout access, native write rule, or dangerous flag is present; and assert repair has no reviewer trust/read grant. Keep and extend exact restoration tests for normal completion, runner exceptions, and injection-write failure, including preservation of pre-existing workspace-trust/non-workspace settings.
6. Add focused classification tests in tests/test_antigravity.py and the existing orchestrator/protocol test modules for a headless read_file, write_file, and command denial. Verify the first is categorized with an actionable failure and log/response-file diagnostics instead of empty response, while unrelated blank output retains its existing category. Add concurrency coverage for simultaneous reviewer/reviewer and reviewer/repair sessions with different assigned checkouts, proving the settings lock prevents cross-session policy leakage and restores the original user settings bytes after both complete.
7. Verification order: run the documented real-CLI nested-read smoke check before selecting the production JSON shape; then run the focused Antigravity, repair, protocol, and orchestrator tests followed by python -m pytest. Record the selected CLI mechanism and version in the documentation/test fixture comments so future changes do not silently revert to an unverified directory permission assumption.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — addressed: The plan gates checkout-scoped native reads on a real nested-file CLI probe, keeps reviewer and repair policies distinct and non-destructive, adds actionable denied-tool reporting, and covers settings restoration plus concurrent-session isolation.

Prior plan review item dispositions

• [item-1] same-plan: A real-CLI capability probe now decides whether scoped access uses workspace trust or a documented recursive permission syntax; the plan no longer assumes a bare directory permission is recursive.
• [item-2] same-plan: The plan requires and documents a nested-file real-agy --print smoke check before unit tests encode the selected overlay.
• [item-3] same-plan: The reviewer receives only the probe-verified scoped native-read capability; bypass flags and unrestricted approval remain prohibited.
• [item-4] same-plan: Dedicated denied-native-tool classification and the smoke check address the failed review rather than treating it as empty output.

Human requirements

• Requirement 1: The revised plan verifies recursive in-checkout native reads before implementation, preserves strict no-write/no-bypass reviewer and repair policies, reports native denials actionably, and tests restoration and concurrent-session isolation.

-- OpenAI Codex: gpt-5.6-terra

[wwind123]

Review verdict: Blocking

The revision correctly replaces the unverified read_file() assumption with a mandatory real-CLI probe step that tests both a permissions.allow form and the trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess mechanism, refuses to guess if neither is confirmed, and adds classification, restoration, and concurrency test coverage. One residual gap: the probe's write_file check must explicitly target a path inside the assigned checkout/trusted workspace, not just outside it, because the CLI's own documented default sandbox behavior grants read/write access to the whole workspace -- so an unqualified 'write_file denied' check could pass trivially on the outside-checkout case while missing that the chosen mechanism silently grants writes inside the checkout, which would violate the requirement that reviewers cannot write files.

Same-plan follow-ups

• Step 1's real-CLI probe says to 'attempt native reads outside the checkout and native write_file' and record 'denied outside/write evidence,' but does not state that the write_file attempt must target a path inside the assigned checkout (the trusted workspace itself), not only outside it. This distinction matters because the CLI's own embedded documentation states Standard Sandbox Mode 'by default has read/write access to your workspace' -- so if the chosen mechanism ends up being trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess, an in-checkout write_file call could be auto-approved by the workspace-trust grant even while toolPermission stays strict and permissions.allow has no write_file entry. Please make explicit in step 1 (and the corresponding assertion in step 5/6) that the write_file probe and its test coverage specifically attempt a write inside the resolved assigned checkout and confirm it is still denied, not just a write to a path outside it. Without this, the plan could pass its own verification while shipping a mechanism that violates 'Reviewer sessions cannot write files.'

Prior unresolved plan item dispositions

• [item-1] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 1: Plan step 1 assumes permissions.allow entries such as read_file() grant recurs... -> resolved: Step 1 now requires an empirical, documented probe against the real agy CLI (testing both a documented recursive permissions.allow form and trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess) before any production settings shape is chosen, and explicitly refuses to ship a guessed rule if neither mechanism is confirmed -- this directly replaces the unverified read_file() assumption I flagged.
• [item-2] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 1: Because of the above, the plan's test strategy (steps 3-5) is insufficient as written: it only as... -> resolved: Steps 1 and 7 now require the real-CLI smoke check to run and be documented before the mocked unit tests in step 5 assert the settings shape, so the tests will be asserting a mechanism already proven against the real CLI rather than only self-consistent JSON.
• [item-3] Blocking issue from Google Antigravity: Gemini 3.1 Pro (High), round 1: A tool required the "read_file" permission that headless mode cannot prompt for, so it was auto-d... -> resolved: The plan injects a narrowly scoped native-read rule via whichever mechanism the probe verifies, keeps it distinct from repair/coder, and never falls back to --dangerously-skip-permissions or broad command access for reviewer/repair.
• [item-4] Blocking issue from Google Antigravity: Gemini 3.1 Pro (High), round 1: Requirement 1 is not satisfied because the review failed due to a permission error. -> resolved: Step 4 adds a dedicated actionable classification for headless native-tool permission denials so a denied read_file/write_file/command no longer surfaces as an empty or unexplained review response.

-- Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5

[wwind123]

Revised plan

Updated the Antigravity permission plan to require proof that native writes are denied both inside and outside the reviewer checkout, while retaining the real-CLI gate for recursive native reads.

Prior plan item dispositions

• [item-5] Same-plan follow-up from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 2: Step 1's real-CLI probe says to 'attempt native reads outside the checkout and native write_file'... -> resolved: The probe and its automated tests now explicitly attempt write_file against a new target inside the resolved assigned checkout and require a denial with no file mutation; an outside-checkout write denial remains a separate check.

Plan steps

1. Before changing production injection, add an opt-in, documented real agy --print capability probe run from the assigned checkout with an isolated temporary settings/profile overlay (or stop for explicit authorization if the CLI cannot isolate it). Against a nested read-only fixture, test each candidate separately: a documented recursive permissions.allow form, if one exists, and trustedWorkspaces: [<resolved assigned checkout>] with allowNonWorkspaceAccess: false. Require native read_file of that nested file; require denials for a native read outside the checkout, a native write_file targeting a fresh path inside the resolved checkout, and a native write_file outside it. Verify the inside target was not created or changed, record the CLI version, exact JSON shape, successful nested-read evidence, and each denied operation in docs/local_agent_loop.md, and do not ship a guessed mechanism if any required check is interactive, unauthenticated, shell-only, or fails.
2. Refactor src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py so reviewer settings injection is constructed at run time from resolved config.antigravity_dir and uses only the probe-verified mechanism. Preserve toolPermission: strict, the explicit read-only shell-command allowlist, locking, GEMINI.md handling, and byte-for-byte settings restoration. Overlay only verified keys and preserve unrelated user settings; if workspace trust is selected, explicitly set non-workspace access false. Do not add native write permission, broad read_file(*), broad command permission, or --dangerously-skip-permissions.
3. Keep the repair path distinct in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py: retain removal of --dangerously-skip-permissions, its empty native-tool allowlist, and isolated formatting-only workdir; do not inherit reviewer workspace trust or native read/write grants. Leave the coder path unchanged. Update reviewer instructions to allow native inspection only within the assigned checkout and require denials to be reported rather than bypassed with writes or permission flags.
4. Extend Antigravity result handling and the existing shared error/formatting path in src/coding_review_agent_loop/orchestrator.py and its protocol/error helpers to recognize headless native permission-denial output, including denied read_file, write_file, and command requests plus auto-denied/no-output exits. Produce a non-empty actionable category naming the denied native tool and retaining response/log diagnostic locations; do not collapse it into empty-response, while preserving current behavior for genuinely blank output and unrelated failures.
5. Update tests/test_antigravity.py to capture temporary settings for reviewer, repair, and coder sessions. Assert the reviewer overlay exactly matches the probe-verified checkout-scoped read configuration, has no wildcard/outside access/native write rule/dangerous flag, and that repair has neither reviewer trust nor native read/write grants. Model the inside-checkout write_file probe with a fresh path under the resolved checkout and assert denial plus unchanged/nonexistent target; separately assert outside-checkout write denial. Preserve and extend byte-for-byte restoration tests for normal completion, runner exceptions, and settings-write failures, including pre-existing workspace-trust and non-workspace settings.
6. Add focused tests/test_antigravity.py and existing orchestrator/protocol tests for read_file, write_file, and command denial signatures. Assert each produces the actionable denial category and diagnostics rather than an empty response, while an unrelated blank result retains its existing category. Add simultaneous reviewer/reviewer and reviewer/repair cases using different assigned checkouts to prove locking prevents policy leakage, each reviewer policy retains the in-checkout native-write denial, and original settings bytes are restored after both runs.
7. Verify in this order: complete and document the real-CLI smoke probe before finalizing production JSON; run focused Antigravity, repair, protocol, and orchestrator tests; then run python -m pytest. Record the selected mechanism and CLI version in documentation and fixture comments so future changes cannot silently replace the verified recursive-read and inside-checkout write-denial guarantees.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — addressed: The plan gates the settings mechanism on a real native nested-read probe, proves reviewer writes are denied inside its trusted checkout as well as outside it, keeps repair distinct, adds actionable denial handling, and tests restoration and concurrent runs.

Human requirements

• Requirement 1: The revised plan verifies native nested reads while explicitly proving that write_file is denied for a fresh path inside the assigned checkout (and separately outside it), preserves strict role-specific policy, reports denied native tools clearly, and tests restoration and concurrency.

-- OpenAI Codex: gpt-5.6-terra

[wwind123]

Review verdict: Blocking

Plan resolves item-5 by requiring the inside-checkout write_file probe/tests alongside the outside-checkout check, and Requirement 1 is concretely covered by the probe-gated mechanism selection, distinct repair/reviewer policies, and denial-diagnostic handling.

Blocking plan issues

• If the real-CLI probe in step 1 finds that neither a documented recursive permissions.allow form nor trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess grants checkout-scoped recursive reads, document the escalation path (e.g. return to human requirement discussion) rather than leaving that contingency implicit.

Prior unresolved plan item dispositions

• [item-5] Same-plan follow-up from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 2: Step 1's real-CLI probe says to 'attempt native reads outside the checkout and native write_file'... -> resolved: Step 1's probe now explicitly requires a native write_file attempt against a fresh path inside the resolved assigned checkout (in addition to outside), asserting denial and that the in-checkout target was not created/changed; step 5 mirrors this with an automated fixture-based test plus a separate outside-checkout write-denial assertion. This closes the gap where a workspace-trust grant could have silently allowed in-checkout writes.

-- Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5

[wwind123]

Revised plan

Updated the Antigravity permission plan with an explicit human-escalation path if no safe, documented checkout-scoped recursive-read mechanism is verified by the real CLI probe.

Prior plan item dispositions

• [item-6] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 3: If the real-CLI probe in step 1 finds that neither a documented recursive permissions.allow form... -> resolved: Step 1 now requires implementation to stop without changing production injection when neither candidate mechanism passes every real-CLI check, preserve the probe evidence, and return the incompatibility to the human requirement discussion for an approved alternative rather than guessing a permission rule.

Plan steps

1. Before changing production injection, add an opt-in, documented real agy --print capability probe run from the assigned checkout with an isolated temporary settings/profile overlay (or stop for explicit authorization if the CLI cannot isolate it). Against a nested read-only fixture, test each candidate separately: a documented recursive permissions.allow form, if one exists, and trustedWorkspaces: [<resolved assigned checkout>] with allowNonWorkspaceAccess: false. Require native read_file of that nested file; require denials for a native read outside the checkout, a native write_file targeting a fresh path inside the resolved checkout, and a native write_file outside it. Verify the inside target was not created or changed, and record the CLI version, exact JSON shape, successful nested-read evidence, and each denied operation in docs/local_agent_loop.md. If neither candidate grants the required recursive nested read while retaining every denial, do not modify or ship production settings injection: preserve the probe evidence in the documentation and return to the signed human requirement discussion for an approved Antigravity-supported alternative; do not infer a glob, trust setting, broad permission, or dangerous flag.
2. Refactor src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py so reviewer settings injection is constructed at run time from resolved config.antigravity_dir and uses only the probe-verified mechanism. Preserve toolPermission: strict, the explicit read-only shell-command allowlist, locking, GEMINI.md handling, and byte-for-byte settings restoration. Overlay only verified keys and preserve unrelated user settings; if workspace trust is selected, explicitly set non-workspace access false. Do not add native write permission, broad read_file(*), broad command permission, or --dangerously-skip-permissions.
3. Keep the repair path distinct in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py: retain removal of --dangerously-skip-permissions, its empty native-tool allowlist, and isolated formatting-only workdir; do not inherit reviewer workspace trust or native read/write grants. Leave the coder path unchanged. Update reviewer instructions to allow native inspection only within the assigned checkout and require denials to be reported rather than bypassed with writes or permission flags.
4. Extend Antigravity result handling and the existing shared error/formatting path in src/coding_review_agent_loop/orchestrator.py and its protocol/error helpers to recognize headless native permission-denial output, including denied read_file, write_file, and command requests plus auto-denied/no-output exits. Produce a non-empty actionable category naming the denied native tool and retaining response/log diagnostic locations; do not collapse it into empty-response, while preserving current behavior for genuinely blank output and unrelated failures.
5. Update tests/test_antigravity.py to capture temporary settings for reviewer, repair, and coder sessions. Assert the reviewer overlay exactly matches the probe-verified checkout-scoped read configuration, has no wildcard/outside access/native write rule/dangerous flag, and that repair has neither reviewer trust nor native read/write grants. Model the inside-checkout write_file probe with a fresh path under the resolved checkout and assert denial plus unchanged/nonexistent target; separately assert outside-checkout write denial. Preserve and extend byte-for-byte restoration tests for normal completion, runner exceptions, and settings-write failures, including pre-existing workspace-trust and non-workspace settings.
6. Add focused tests/test_antigravity.py and existing orchestrator/protocol tests for read_file, write_file, and command denial signatures. Assert each produces the actionable denial category and diagnostics rather than an empty response, while an unrelated blank result retains its existing category. Add simultaneous reviewer/reviewer and reviewer/repair cases using different assigned checkouts to prove locking prevents policy leakage, each reviewer policy retains the in-checkout native-write denial, and original settings bytes are restored after both runs.
7. Verify in this order: complete and document the real-CLI smoke probe before finalizing production JSON; run focused Antigravity, repair, protocol, and orchestrator tests; then run python -m pytest. Record the selected mechanism and CLI version in documentation and fixture comments so future changes cannot silently replace the verified recursive-read and inside-checkout write-denial guarantees. If the probe reaches the explicit escalation condition in step 1, stop before implementation/testing of a guessed policy and seek human direction.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — addressed: The plan gates production settings on a real nested native-read and in-/outside-checkout native-write denial probe; retains strict, non-destructive reviewer and distinct repair policies; adds actionable native-denial handling; restores settings byte-for-byte under concurrent runs; and explicitly escalates if no safe mechanism is supported.

Human requirements

• Requirement 1: The plan verifies the native read capability and in-/outside-checkout write denials with the real CLI before shipping, keeps reviewer and repair policies separate and restrictive, classifies headless native-tool denials, tests restoration and concurrent sessions, and escalates to the human requirement discussion if no supported safe mechanism exists.

-- OpenAI Codex: gpt-5.6-terra

[wwind123]

Review verdict: Approved

Plan resolves the prior escalation-path gap and remains consistent with existing settings-overlay, failure-categorization, and reviewer/repair-separation patterns in the codebase.

Prior unresolved plan item dispositions

• [item-6] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 3: If the real-CLI probe in step 1 finds that neither a documented recursive permissions.allow form... -> resolved: Step 1 now explicitly requires stopping without modifying production settings injection if neither candidate mechanism (recursive permissions.allow form or trustedWorkspaces/allowNonWorkspaceAccess) passes every real-CLI check, preserving probe evidence and returning to the signed human requirement discussion (the existing AGENT_CLARIFY escalation mechanism in protocol.py) rather than guessing a permission rule.

-- Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5

[wwind123]

Planning complete for issue #568.

Outcome: implement

Approved plan:

Updated the Antigravity permission plan with an explicit human-escalation path if no safe, documented checkout-scoped recursive-read mechanism is verified by the real CLI probe.

Prior plan item dispositions

• [item-6] Blocking issue from Anthropic Claude: claude-sonnet-5, round 3: If the real-CLI probe in step 1 finds that neither a documented recursive permissions.allow form... -> resolved: Step 1 now requires implementation to stop without changing production injection when neither candidate mechanism passes every real-CLI check, preserve the probe evidence, and return the incompatibility to the human requirement discussion for an approved alternative rather than guessing a permission rule.

Plan steps

1. Before changing production injection, add an opt-in, documented real agy --print capability probe run from the assigned checkout with an isolated temporary settings/profile overlay (or stop for explicit authorization if the CLI cannot isolate it). Against a nested read-only fixture, test each candidate separately: a documented recursive permissions.allow form, if one exists, and trustedWorkspaces: [<resolved assigned checkout>] with allowNonWorkspaceAccess: false. Require native read_file of that nested file; require denials for a native read outside the checkout, a native write_file targeting a fresh path inside the resolved checkout, and a native write_file outside it. Verify the inside target was not created or changed, and record the CLI version, exact JSON shape, successful nested-read evidence, and each denied operation in docs/local_agent_loop.md. If neither candidate grants the required recursive nested read while retaining every denial, do not modify or ship production settings injection: preserve the probe evidence in the documentation and return to the signed human requirement discussion for an approved Antigravity-supported alternative; do not infer a glob, trust setting, broad permission, or dangerous flag.
2. Refactor src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py so reviewer settings injection is constructed at run time from resolved config.antigravity_dir and uses only the probe-verified mechanism. Preserve toolPermission: strict, the explicit read-only shell-command allowlist, locking, GEMINI.md handling, and byte-for-byte settings restoration. Overlay only verified keys and preserve unrelated user settings; if workspace trust is selected, explicitly set non-workspace access false. Do not add native write permission, broad read_file(*), broad command permission, or --dangerously-skip-permissions.
3. Keep the repair path distinct in src/coding_review_agent_loop/agents/antigravity.py: retain removal of --dangerously-skip-permissions, its empty native-tool allowlist, and isolated formatting-only workdir; do not inherit reviewer workspace trust or native read/write grants. Leave the coder path unchanged. Update reviewer instructions to allow native inspection only within the assigned checkout and require denials to be reported rather than bypassed with writes or permission flags.
4. Extend Antigravity result handling and the existing shared error/formatting path in src/coding_review_agent_loop/orchestrator.py and its protocol/error helpers to recognize headless native permission-denial output, including denied read_file, write_file, and command requests plus auto-denied/no-output exits. Produce a non-empty actionable category naming the denied native tool and retaining response/log diagnostic locations; do not collapse it into empty-response, while preserving current behavior for genuinely blank output and unrelated failures.
5. Update tests/test_antigravity.py to capture temporary settings for reviewer, repair, and coder sessions. Assert the reviewer overlay exactly matches the probe-verified checkout-scoped read configuration, has no wildcard/outside access/native write rule/dangerous flag, and that repair has neither reviewer trust nor native read/write grants. Model the inside-checkout write_file probe with a fresh path under the resolved checkout and assert denial plus unchanged/nonexistent target; separately assert outside-checkout write denial. Preserve and extend byte-for-byte restoration tests for normal completion, runner exceptions, and settings-write failures, including pre-existing workspace-trust and non-workspace settings.
6. Add focused tests/test_antigravity.py and existing orchestrator/protocol tests for read_file, write_file, and command denial signatures. Assert each produces the actionable denial category and diagnostics rather than an empty response, while an unrelated blank result retains its existing category. Add simultaneous reviewer/reviewer and reviewer/repair cases using different assigned checkouts to prove locking prevents policy leakage, each reviewer policy retains the in-checkout native-write denial, and original settings bytes are restored after both runs.
7. Verify in this order: complete and document the real-CLI smoke probe before finalizing production JSON; run focused Antigravity, repair, protocol, and orchestrator tests; then run python -m pytest. Record the selected mechanism and CLI version in documentation and fixture comments so future changes cannot silently replace the verified recursive-read and inside-checkout write-denial guarantees. If the probe reaches the explicit escalation condition in step 1, stop before implementation/testing of a guessed policy and seek human direction.

Human requirement dispositions

• Requirement 1 — addressed: The plan gates production settings on a real nested native-read and in-/outside-checkout native-write denial probe; retains strict, non-destructive reviewer and distinct repair policies; adds actionable native-denial handling; restores settings byte-for-byte under concurrent runs; and explicitly escalates if no safe mechanism is supported.

-- coding-review-agent-loop

[wwind123]

Approved plan for issue #568 handed off to PR #569 for one-shot implementation.

Mode: implement-one-shot
Plan hash: bc57f72a27d2df22
Plan subject: bc57f72a27d2df22a1b9951448972298fdc7443e3cfcf87f2615180a7dee2176

Parent reruns will resume the PR review loop for this PR instead of re-implementing.

-- coding-review-agent-loop