refactor: Replace inline auth checks with named modifiers (gas optimisation)

[Muneerali199]

Summary

Replaces two ad-hoc inline if (...) revert ownership checks inside function bodies with dedicated named modifiers, reducing gas and improving code clarity.

Closes #231

---

Problem

Two contracts contained inline access-control checks embedded in function bodies instead of using modifiers:

Election.sol — ccipVote()

function ccipVote(...) external electionInactive {
    if (userVoted[user]) revert AlreadyVoted();
    ...
    if (msg.sender != factoryContract) revert OwnerPermissioned(); // ← buried in body
    ...
}

ElectionFactory.sol — deleteElection()

function deleteElection(uint _electionId) external {
    if (electionOwner[_electionId] != msg.sender) revert OnlyOwner(); // ← buried in body
    ...
}

Issues with this pattern:

1. Gas: The check runs after the function preamble and any preceding logic. Failing early at the modifier position is cheaper.
2. Readability: Access control intent is hidden inside the body; readers cannot see it from the function signature alone.

---

Fix

Election.sol — added onlyFactory modifier, applied to ccipVote():

modifier onlyFactory() {
    if (msg.sender != factoryContract) revert OwnerPermissioned();
    _;
}

function ccipVote(...) external electionInactive onlyFactory { ... }

ElectionFactory.sol — added parameterised onlyElectionOwner(uint) modifier, applied to deleteElection():

modifier onlyElectionOwner(uint _electionId) {
    if (electionOwner[_electionId] != msg.sender) revert OnlyOwner();
    _;
}

function deleteElection(uint _electionId) external onlyElectionOwner(_electionId) { ... }

Both patterns follow the conventions already established in their respective contracts (onlyOwner in Election.sol, onlyOwner in ElectionFactory.sol).

---

Files Changed

File	Change
blockchain/contracts/Election.sol	Added onlyFactory modifier; applied to ccipVote()
blockchain/contracts/ElectionFactory.sol	Added onlyElectionOwner(uint) modifier; applied to deleteElection()

---

Checklist

• No behaviour change — access control logic is identical, only position moves to modifier
• Both new modifiers follow naming and style conventions of existing modifiers in the same files
• ccipVote modifier order (electionInactive before onlyFactory) is intentional — time-gate first, then auth
• No unrelated changes included
• Branch created fresh from upstream/main

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between e4df55f and 64b4e14.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)

• blockchain/contracts/Election.sol
• blockchain/contracts/ElectionFactory.sol

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