🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Broken Access Control in visit endpoint#25
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Broken Access Control in visit endpoint#25Ap-0007 wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
This commit addresses a critical Broken Access Control vulnerability in the `POST /api/visit` endpoint. The endpoint previously trusted the `visitorUsername` provided in the client's request body, allowing any user to spoof visits and attribute them to someone else. The fix removes the reliance on the request body for the visitor's identity and instead securely retrieves it from the server-side session via NextAuth (`await auth()`). This commit also updates the Sentinel journal with the learning.
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
|
The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.
|
|
You have reached your Codex usage limits for code reviews. You can see your limits in the Codex usage dashboard. |
1 participant
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The
POST /api/visitendpoint trusted thevisitorUsernameprovided in the JSON body, leading to a Broken Access Control vulnerability where anyone could spoof a visit from another user.🎯 Impact: A malicious user could send a request with an arbitrary
visitorUsernameand falsely manipulate the visit tracking/analytics for any developer.🔧 Fix: Modified
app/api/visit/route.tsto ignore the client-providedvisitorUsernameand instead rely on server-side session authentication (await auth()) to establish the identity.✅ Verification: Run
npm run build && npm run lint. Manually verify that the fileapp/api/visit/route.tsno longer readsvisitorUsernamefrom the body.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10187075606943161778 started by @Ap-0007