The Tiny UDP Cannon An Android VPN Bypass#2243
Open
carlospolop wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
Collaborator
Author
🔗 Additional ContextOriginal Blog Post: https://lowlevel.fun/posts/tiny-udp-cannon-android-vpn-bypass/ Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "Mobile Pentesting -> Android Applications Pentesting -> Android VPN / Network Policy Bypass, or a new subsection under Android Applications Pentesting about Binder/hidden API abuse and VPN lockdown bypasses". Repository Maintenance:
Review Notes:
Bot Version: HackTricks News Bot v1.0 |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
The post analyzes The Tiny UDP Cannon, an Android 16 VPN lockdown bypass where a regular Android application can leak the user’s real public IP even when Always-On VPN and Block connections without VPN are enabled. The attacker app does not directly send the bypass packet. Instead, it registers attacker-controlled UDP bytes and socket metadata through Android’s hidden QUIC graceful-close API, then exits. When the socket is destroyed,
sy...🔧 Technical DetailsConfused-deputy network send via privileged system services: If an unprivileged caller can give a privileged service both socket metadata and attacker-controlled bytes, and the service later recreates the socket as a privileged UID, it can bypass network policies that only apply to the original caller. In this case, Android’s
registerQuicConnectionClosePayload(pfd, payload)stores the original socket’snetId, source, destination, caller UID, and payload. OnSOCK_DESTROY,system_serverUID1000sends the payload withnetwork.bindSocket(socket). Because system UIDs receivePERMISSION_SYSTEM, they bypass VPN lockdown checks that would block the original app UID.Protocol-specific API becoming a generic payload cannon: Any API designed to send a specific protocol frame can become an arbitrary data exfiltration primitive if it accepts raw bytes and does not v...
🤖 Agent Actions
Done.
Updated:
src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/android-applications-basics.mdAdded:
IBinder.transact()bind()vsNetwork.bindSocket()metadata-shaping trickValidation:
## Referencesremains at the endThis PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.