security: replace java.util.Random with SecureRandom (5 sites)#17
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QuickMythril merged 1 commit intoMay 28, 2026
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Five call sites used the non-cryptographic java.util.Random: Q4 - P2P request IDs (ArbitraryDataFileListManager x2, ArbitraryMetadataManager): Predictable IDs allow a malicious peer to preemptively spoof responses to in-flight QDN file-list and metadata requests. Q5 - Online account / block minting nonces (OnlineAccountsManager, Block): new Random() nonces are seeded from system time, making the 500 000- element nonce space partially predictable by an observer. Replace all five sites with SecureRandom. Add explicit java.security.SecureRandom imports where the wildcard java.util.* import did not cover it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Five call sites used non-cryptographic
java.util.Random(seeded from system time) in places where unpredictability matters.Q4 - P2P request IDs (3 sites)
ArbitraryDataFileListManager (x2) and ArbitraryMetadataManager (x1) generated request IDs with
new Random().nextInt(). These IDs are broadcast to all peers. A malicious peer who can observe network timing can predict upcoming IDs and preemptively send spoofed responses, causing the node to accept fabricated file-list or metadata replies.Q5 - Online account / block minting nonces (2 sites)
OnlineAccountsManager and Block generated MemPoW nonces with
new Random().nextInt(500000). Seeding from a predictable RNG reduces the effective entropy of the starting nonce.Changes
No functional behaviour changes - only the RNG source is upgraded.
u{1F916} Security fix identified and patched by Claude Code (https://claude.ai/claude-code)