In plain English: SearchBox runs entirely on your own computer. It doesn't send your files or activity anywhere, has no ads or tracking, and works offline. Anything you put in the vault is encrypted with your password — strong enough that the files can't be read without it. During setup, you'll download a recovery key — save it somewhere safe. If you forget your password, the recovery key lets you reset it and keep accessing your vault. Without the recovery key, vault files cannot be recovered.

The rest of this page is the technical detail and how to report a security issue.

SearchBox runs entirely on the user's own machine. It opens no outbound network connections by default — Meilisearch runs as a local sidecar and Ollama is only contacted when the user explicitly enables it.

Both the app's web server and the Meilisearch sidecar bind to loopback (127.0.0.1) only, so neither the UI/API nor the full-text index (which holds the extracted text of every indexed file) is reachable from the local network. Set SEARCHBOX_HOST=0.0.0.0 to deliberately opt into LAN access. The Meilisearch master key is a private, per-install random value generated on first run — never a shared default.

• All processing happens on your infrastructure.
• No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home.

• Vault: AES-256-GCM with a per-file Data-Encryption Key (DEK), 12-byte random nonce, authenticated tag.
• Key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 600 000 iterations, random 16-byte salt stored once in vault_config.
• KEK lifecycle: derived from the admin password at login and held only in process memory, sealed under a per-process key that is regenerated on each start. Only the sealed form is written to the session store, so a copied data directory never yields a usable key. The vault re-locks on restart; Settings → Vault Security shows an Unlock prompt to re-derive the key from your password without logging out.
• DEK wrapping: each file's DEK is AES-256-GCM-wrapped under the KEK; the wrapped blob is stored in encrypted_files.

• Passwords hashed with argon2id via the argon2 crate.
• Login is rate-limited: repeated failures lock an account's logins (and the vault-unlock endpoint) for a cooldown that grows with each failure, slowing online guessing. A successful login clears it.
• Sessions managed by tower-sessions with the SQLite store.
• Cookies are HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax; flip with_secure(true) in src/main.rs when serving over HTTPS.
• qBittorrent password is encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM under a per-install key kept outside the database), so a leaked database alone can't reveal it.

• Parameterised SQLx queries everywhere — no raw string concatenation in SQL.
• url_for and file-serving paths are rooted at known directories; no path traversal entry points exposed.
• SSRF guard on Ollama URL configuration — only http:// / https:// schemes accepted.
• Meilisearch configuration validates the binary path (must be a file, basename must contain meilisearch).

State-changing endpoints require a CSRF token. A 32-byte random token is generated per session and surfaced to the browser via a <meta name="csrf-token"> tag and hidden form fields. Requests echo it back through the X-CSRFToken header (JSON/fetch routes) or a csrf_token form field (login/setup); the server compares it against the session token in constant time and rejects mismatches with 403. This sits on top of HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookies.

The opt-in in-app updater downloads the new MSI over TLS from GitHub Releases and verifies its SHA-256 against the published <msi>.sha256 sidecar before running the installer, refusing on mismatch. This is an integrity check — installers are intentionally unsigned (no paid certificate), so TLS plus the checksum, not a code signature, establish trust.

CI runs cargo audit against the RustSec advisory database on every push and pull request, failing on security vulnerabilities. Known-unreachable transitive advisories are documented and ignored in .cargo/audit.toml.

Do NOT open a public GitHub issue. Email security@sourcebox.dev with a description of the issue, reproduction steps, and potential impact. Include your preferred contact channel.

Expected timeline: 48-hour acknowledgement, 30-day target fix, 90-day maximum disclosure window. We credit reporters in the release notes unless asked not to.

• Denial-of-service attacks
• Social engineering
• Physical access
• Bugs in upstream dependencies (report those upstream)

• Rust crates: monitor rustsec.org advisories for axum, tokio, sqlx, tower-sessions, reqwest, argon2, aes-gcm, pdf-extract, scraper.
• Meilisearch: runs as a sidecar. Track its releases.
• Ollama (optional): only contacted when configured.

SearchBox binds 127.0.0.1 by default. Only set SEARCHBOX_HOST=0.0.0.0 if you intend to expose it on a network — and if you do, put it behind a reverse proxy that adds TLS. The Meilisearch master key is generated automatically (random, per-install); you don't need to set one.

Put SearchBox behind Caddy / nginx with Let's Encrypt. Don't serve port 8080 directly to the public internet.

In Docker, only mount the directories you want indexed, read-only:

volumes:
  - /home/me/Documents:/home/me/Documents:ro

• Choose a strong admin password — it's the only thing between an attacker with filesystem access and the vault contents.
• Save your recovery key. During setup, SearchBox generates a random 256-bit recovery key and wraps it under your password-derived key. Store this recovery key somewhere safe (password manager, encrypted USB, safe).
• Lost password + lost recovery key = lost vault. The recovery key is the only way to reset your password. Without it, vault files cannot be recovered.
• Recovery key lifecycle: The recovery key is generated once at setup. It can be regenerated at any time from Settings (which invalidates the old one). The recovery key is never stored on disk — only a version wrapped under your password-derived KEK.

Last updated: June 2026 (v0.3.17 — loopback binding, sealed in-memory KEK, login rate-limiting, encrypted qBittorrent password, update checksums, CI audit)