π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix integer overflow in rate limiter refill#2
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Refactored `TokenBucketLimiter` to use `long` arithmetic for token calculations and added explicit capacity saturation checks. This prevents integer overflow when: 1. `periodsElapsed * refillTokens` exceeds `Long.MAX_VALUE` (handled by capacity check). 2. `current + tokensToAdd` exceeds `Integer.MAX_VALUE` (handled by `long` addition before clamping). This fixes a potential Denial of Service (DoS) where the limiter could stop refilling or corrupt its state after significant time jumps or with high-throughput configurations. Verified with `OverflowTest`.
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Integer overflow in token bucket refill logic.
π― Impact: Rate limiter could stop refilling or behave erratically (DoS) under specific conditions (high rates + time jump).
π§ Fix: Used safe
longarithmetic and explicit bounds checking against capacity.β Verification: Added
OverflowTestto simulate the overflow condition and verify correct refill behavior.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2345874656259823656 started by @SpaceLeam