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🛡️ Sentinel: Redact credentials from URLs in logs #160

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abhimehro wants to merge 1 commit into from
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🛡️ Sentinel: Redact credentials from URLs in logs #160

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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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## 2025-05-23 - URL Credential Leakage in Logs
**Vulnerability:** `sanitize_for_log` only redacted the API token but allowed URLs containing Basic Auth credentials (e.g. `https://user:pass@host`) to be logged in plain text.
**Learning:** Sanitization functions often focus on known secrets (like specific tokens) but miss pattern-based leaks like standard URI credentials.
**Prevention:** Always scrub user:password combinations from any URL before logging. Use regex or URL parsing libraries to identifying and redact the authority section.
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Copilot AI Feb 4, 2026

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Typo in the documentation: "identifying" should be "identify" to maintain parallel structure with "Use regex or URL parsing libraries to identify..."

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**Prevention:** Always scrub user:password combinations from any URL before logging. Use regex or URL parsing libraries to identifying and redact the authority section.
**Prevention:** Always scrub user:password combinations from any URL before logging. Use regex or URL parsing libraries to identify and redact the authority section.

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5 changes: 5 additions & 0 deletions main.py
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Expand Up @@ -151,6 +151,11 @@
s = str(text)
if TOKEN and TOKEN in s:
s = s.replace(TOKEN, "[REDACTED]")

# Redact credentials in URLs (e.g. https://user:pass@host)
# Pattern: scheme://user:pass@host -> scheme://[REDACTED]@host
s = re.sub(r"(https?://)[^/\s@]+@([^/\s]+)", r"\1[REDACTED]@\2", s)

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Code scanning / Pylintpython3 (reported by Codacy)

Variable name "s" doesn't conform to snake_case naming style Warning

Variable name "s" doesn't conform to snake_case naming style

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Code scanning / Pylint (reported by Codacy)

Variable name "s" doesn't conform to snake_case naming style Warning

Variable name "s" doesn't conform to snake_case naming style
Comment on lines +155 to +157
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@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist bot Feb 4, 2026

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medium

While the current regular expression effectively redacts credentials in many common URL formats, using urllib.parse (which is already imported) and urlunparse would provide a more robust and maintainable solution for handling URL components. urllib.parse is specifically designed for URL parsing and can better handle edge cases, such as complex netloc structures or future changes in URL standards, without the potential fragility of regex-based parsing. This approach would enhance the reliability of credential redaction.

Comment on lines +155 to +157
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Copilot AI Feb 4, 2026

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The new URL credential redaction functionality lacks test coverage. Consider adding a test to verify that URLs containing credentials (e.g., 'https://user:pass@host.com') are properly redacted to 'https://[REDACTED]@host.com' while URLs without credentials remain unchanged. This would follow the pattern established in tests/test_log_sanitization.py and tests/test_security.py.

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# repr() safely escapes control characters (e.g., \n -> \\n, \x1b -> \\x1b)
# This prevents log injection and terminal hijacking.
safe = repr(s)
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