fix: remove unsafe exec() in consdiff.c#142
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Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
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Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in
src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.c.Vulnerability
V-002src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.c:876Description: Multiple memcpy calls in the consensus diff processing subsystem use length values (diff_cdline->len, cdline->len, a_size) derived directly from externally-supplied consensus diff documents without adequate bounds validation. At line 876, memcpy(diff_line, diff_cdline->s, diff_cdline->len) copies data where diff_cdline->len originates from parsing a network-supplied consensus diff. If the destination buffer diff_line was allocated based on a different size calculation, or if diff_cdline->len is not validated against the actual allocated size of diff_line, a heap buffer overflow occurs. Similarly at line 1328, cdline->len controls the copy size into 'out'. A malicious directory server can craft a consensus diff with mismatched length fields to trigger heap corruption, potentially enabling arbitrary code execution within the Tor daemon process.
Changes
src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.cVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security