🛡️ Sentinel: Secure unix socket directory in /tmp#102
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…y in /tmp The previous implementation for non-root users fell back to creating the socket file directly in `/tmp`. This was vulnerable to pre-creation attacks (DoS) and potential race conditions in shared environments. This commit: - Changes `getSocketPath` to use a UID-namespaced subdirectory (`/tmp/cc-agent-<uid>/`) for non-root users. - Implements `ensureSocketDir` to enforce strict ownership (UID match) and permissions (0700) on the socket directory before binding. - Adds platform-specific logic (skipping strict permission checks on Windows). - Adds unit tests to verify directory security and fallback logic. This change ensures that the agent's socket is protected from unauthorized access or interference by other local users. Co-authored-by: minibota <1483356+minibota@users.noreply.github.com>
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🔐 Issue: Non-root agents created socket files directly in
/tmpwhenXDG_RUNTIME_DIRwas missing. This exposed the agent to Denial of Service (pre-creation) and race conditions in the shared temporary directory.🧠 Risk: A local attacker could pre-create the socket file or directory to prevent the legitimate agent from starting, or potentially exploit race conditions to intercept connections (though
0660socket permissions mitigated direct access).🛠️ Fix:
getSocketPathto use a private subdirectory:/tmp/cc-agent-<uid>/cc-agent.sock.ensureSocketDirto strictly enforce directory existence, ownership (current user), and permissions (0700).🧪 Tests:
TestEnsureSocketDir_Creation,TestEnsureSocketDir_Existing,TestEnsureSocketDir_BadPermissions.TestGetSocketPath_Fallback.go test ./cmd/....📎 Notes: This change might affect users relying on the predictable
/tmp/cc-agent-$USER.sockpath, althoughcc-agent execautomatically resolves the correct new path.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5406643230361454756 started by @minibota