π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass via unvalidated HTTP redirects in proxy_stream#76
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β¦ proxy_stream Co-authored-by: d3mocide <136547209+d3mocide@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
/radio/proxy/{stream_id}endpoint instantiated anhttpx.AsyncClientwithfollow_redirects=True. Although the initial URL is checked withvalidate_safe_url, if an external malicious server returns an HTTP 302 redirect pointing to an internal IP (like127.0.0.1or169.254.169.254),httpxautomatically follows it without triggering another SSRF check, bypassing the security control.π― Impact: An attacker could bypass SSRF protections and proxy requests to internal backend services by serving redirects.
π§ Fix: Added an
event_hooks={'request': [_validate_request_url]}callback to thehttpx.AsyncClientwhich intercepts and runsvalidate_safe_urlon every outgoing request during the client's lifecycle, fully blocking redirects to internal IPs.β Verification: Ran
python3 -m unittest discover backend/tests/to verify tests pass and ran manual testing to confirm redirects to127.0.0.1are successfully blocked byhttpx.PR created automatically by Jules for task 11510504226126764344 started by @d3mocide