feat(kotlin-sdk): wire-compatible encrypted txMetadata document create + decrypt-on-fetch#4186
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feat(kotlin-sdk): wire-compatible encrypted txMetadata document create + decrypt-on-fetch#4186bfoss765 wants to merge 20 commits into
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July 21, 2026 12:41
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🕓 Ready for review — 58 ahead in queue (commit 983154d) |
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Reviewed with focus on the crypto and wire-compat claims — this is done right: all wire-defining logic (derivation, AES-CBC envelope, keyIndex selection, fetch semantics) lives in shared Rust behind C-ABI exports iOS already links, keys are
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@coderabbitai full review |
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Additional findings after checking the existing txMetadata comments:
The existing size-limit comment is correct, with one boundary correction: the 4096-byte field limit and |
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All asks are done and pushed: typed size precheck before any derivation/network work, Your two second-pass items are implemented as stacked follow-up PRs rather than deferred: (1) |
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Adds the reviewer-requested independent check (dashpay#4186): decrypt a txMetadata blob produced by a REAL legacy dash-wallet 11.9 install, not one this repo generated. A designated-throwaway testnet wallet (DPNS name `yabba2`, identity ESR1nfF3bj4TR2ZkLmDuSeu6r7VzpTurYi47BV6XwsoP) running stock dash-wallet 11.9 registered a username, did a send + receive, saved metadata, and published one encrypted `txMetadata` document to Platform. It was fetched back off testnet and decrypted with the NEW Rust crypto. - `legacy_install_yabba2_wire_compat_vector` (network-free fixture in tx_metadata.rs): hard-codes the recovery phrase, the real captured blob hex (version 1/protobuf, keyIndex 2, encryptionKeyIndex 1), and the expected protobuf `TxMetadataBatch` plaintext (two items, memos "username"/"faucet", USD exchange rates), and asserts the new `derive_tx_metadata_key` + `open_tx_metadata` path decrypts it byte-for-byte via both the resident and resolver-master key sources. Doc-commented as the independent legacy-install vector, distinct from the self-generated dashj-core scratch vectors. - `capture_legacy_yabba2_txmetadata_blobs` (testnet-gated helper in tests/txmetadata_fetch.rs): resolves the DPNS name, runs the exact production query, derives from the phrase, and prints the capture used to build the fixture. - README: documents the new real-install vector alongside the JVM-generated ones. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The independent legacy check promised above is done. A stock dash-wallet 11.9 testnet install (DPNS name Pinned on this branch as |
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@coderabbitai full review |
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Consolidated re-verification (two independent passes). All round-1 asks are done and done well: the on-chain
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Addendum/correction: two tracker references survive in |
…e + decrypt-on-fetch Adds the wallet-contract encrypted-document surface the Android wallet needs to retire the legacy org.dashj.platform stack (closes dashpay#4086 create/update, closes The encryption ENVELOPE is byte-for-byte wire-compatible with the legacy BlockchainIdentity.publishTxMetaData / getTxMetaData so documents written by either stack decrypt with the other (migrated users keep their history): - AES-256 key = the raw 32-byte secp256k1 private scalar of a hardened HD child (mirrors KeyCrypterAESCBC.deriveKey(ECKey); no ECDH, no HKDF). - Path: identity-auth path of the identity's encryption key (its id = the document's keyIndex) extended by / 32769' / encryptionKeyIndex'. - Cipher: AES-256-CBC / PKCS7, random 16-byte IV. - encryptedMetadata blob = version(1) ‖ IV(16) ‖ AES-256-CBC(payload); the version byte is OUTSIDE the ciphertext (0 = CBOR, 1 = protobuf). The plaintext payload stays OPAQUE to the SDK — the app owns the protobuf TxMetadataBatch item schema and the batching policy, exactly as on the legacy stack. The SDK owns only the crypto envelope + the {keyIndex, encryptionKeyIndex, encryptedMetadata} document fields. Layers: - rs-platform-wallet: crypto/tx_metadata.rs (derive/seal/open + tests); network/encrypted_document.rs (create_encrypted_document_with_signer reusing the tested create path; fetch_encrypted_documents mirroring the contactInfo paginated decrypt loop). - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: platform_wallet_create_encrypted_document_with_signer, platform_wallet_fetch_encrypted_documents (JSON-out; payload as base64). - rs-unified-sdk-jni: documentCreateEncrypted / documentFetchEncrypted. - kotlin-sdk: DocumentTransactions.createEncryptedDocument / fetchEncryptedDocuments (additive; no existing signatures change). Tests: seal↔open round-trip, key-derivation determinism + index separation, wrong-key/ malformed-blob fail cleanly, and a NIST SP 800-38A CBC-AES256 cross-stack vector pinning the cipher core + blob framing. cc @QuantumExplorer Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d vector
The encrypted-txMetadata scheme claims byte-for-byte wire compatibility with
the legacy org.dashj.platform stack, but the mnemonic->AES-key HD derivation
prefix was previously only "sample-confirmed" (the module's NIST test pinned
the AES-CBC envelope but explicitly could NOT pin the derivation-path account
prefix). That gap is now closed by reconstructing the exact legacy recipe from
the shipped jars and running it under a JVM.
Recovered legacy derivation (the wire-compat reference this crate mirrors):
AES-256-CBC key = raw private-key bytes of the ECKey at absolute HD path
m / 9' / coinType' / 5' / 0' / 0' / 0' / keyId' / 32769' / encryptionKeyIndex'
- account path 9'/coinType'/5'/0'/0'/0' is
DerivationPathFactory.blockchainIdentityECDSADerivationPath() (dashj-core
22.0.3), the path the BLOCKCHAIN_IDENTITY AuthenticationKeyChain is built
with (AuthenticationGroupExtension.getDefaultPath).
- keyId' / 32769' / encryptionKeyIndex' are appended by
BlockchainIdentity.privateKeyAtPath; keyId is the id of the identity's
ENCRYPTION/MEDIUM ECDSA key (id 2 in createIdentityPublicKeys), 32769' is
TxMetadataDocument.childNumber, encryptionKeyIndex is the app's per-document
counter (dash-sdk-kotlin 4.0.0-RC2).
- AES key bytes = KeyCrypterAESCBC.deriveKey(ecKey) = new KeyParameter(
ecKey.getPrivKeyBytes()) (raw scalar, no ECDH / no KDF); framing is
version(1) ‖ IV(16) ‖ AES-256-CBC/PKCS7(payload).
This is an exact match to Rust's identity_auth_derivation_path_for_type(ECDSA,
identity_index=0, key_index=keyId) extended by /32769'/encryptionKeyIndex': the
three legacy zeros correspond to [subfeature-auth, keytype=ECDSA=0,
identity_index=0]. No derivation-logic change is needed — verified by generating
the key AND a full encryptedMetadata blob with the real dashj stack for the
BIP-39 "abandon … about" mnemonic and asserting Rust reproduces the key and
decrypts the blob to the original plaintext.
- add legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector: dashj-generated (key, blob, plaintext)
vector with full provenance, so the derivation prefix + envelope are now
CI-enforced rather than device-sample-confirmed.
- retarget the NIST test's doc comment as the narrower cipher-conformance leg
and drop the now-obsolete "cannot be reconstructed from the jars" caveat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tnet docs + query diagnostics The on-device decrypt-proof reported `sdkFetched=0` with ZERO decrypt-skip warnings, i.e. the fetch query returned nothing while the legacy stack sees 2 encrypted `txMetadata` documents for the same owner. This isolates the FETCH half of `IdentityWallet::fetch_encrypted_documents` and pins it against the real documents so a wire-query regression is caught in CI, and adds an on-device breadcrumb to localize any future empty result to the query vs the decrypt stage. What this proves (executable evidence): the exact production query — `$ownerId == owner AND $updatedAt >= since_ms`, ordered `$updatedAt asc`, paginated — returns BOTH real testnet documents (owner 532rVHxLD6Z3MNiu5LZyNqn55Ybz4bydZozXU4cqqp1L, wallet-utils contract 7CSFGeF4WNzgDmx94zwvHkYaG3Dx4XEe5LFsFgJswLbm, type `txMetadata`, since_ms 0) fully materialized, with `keyIndex=2`, `encryptionKeyIndex=1`, `encryptedMetadata` 3585 bytes. This holds for the exact production shape (`&Identifier` owner value, `U64` since bound), with and without the range clause, across pinned platform versions 1..=12 and the default, and including the production `register_data_contract` step. The query construction, value encoding, contract resolution (7CSFGeF4… is the built-in wallet-utils system contract), and JNI param marshalling (`read_id32`, `sinceMs` jlong→u64) are therefore all wire-correct; the on-device empty result is not reproducible from the query and points outside it (e.g. a stale native lib). Changes: - extract the paginated wire query into `query_owned_encrypted_documents` (takes the `Sdk` + fetched contract, no resident wallet/identity), re-exported so the new testnet integration test drives the SAME code the FFI path runs. Query logic unchanged. - add `tests/txmetadata_fetch.rs` (`#[ignore]`, testnet): asserts the query returns the 2 documents and that each decodes `keyIndex`/`encryptionKeyIndex` (u32) + `encryptedMetadata` (bytes) — i.e. the pipeline reaches decrypt for both, without needing the owner mnemonic. - log `raw_count`/`materialized` at INFO before the decrypt loop, so the next `adb logcat` run during the probe pins an empty result to the query (raw_count=0), a proof-materialization gap (raw_count>0, materialized=0), or the decrypt/JSON stage (materialized>0) — no guessing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-document fetch path The dash-wallet decrypt probe reported sdkFetched=0 on-device with NO Rust breadcrumb in logcat — either the JNI call never reached Rust or platform-wallet INFO tracing is filtered from logcat. Make every stage of the fetch path provably visible at WARN: - rs-platform-wallet fetch_encrypted_documents: entry log (owner/contract b58, type, since_ms), warn on every early-return (contract fetch failure, contract-not-found, encryption-context resolution failure, query failure) and a final raw/decrypted count; query_owned_encrypted_documents gets an entry log and a fetch_many error log, and the raw_count/materialized breadcrumb is raised from info! to warn!. - rs-unified-sdk-jni documentFetchEncrypted: entry log (wallet_handle nonzero?, since_ms), parsed-args log (owner/contract hex, doc type), per-early-return warns, and a success log with the returned JSON size. - take_pwffi_error / throw_sdk_exception warn-log every native->Kotlin error conversion (raw + offset code, full message), so a contained exception still leaves a logcat trail. Diagnostic only — no behavior change; cargo check -p rs-unified-sdk-jni and clippy on both touched crates are clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…h log AND tracing so they reach Android logcat
The 2026-07 on-device forensic tap proved the two logging facades diverge on
Android: JNI_OnLoad installs android_logger as the global `log` logger
(logcat tag DashSDK), so the JNI layer's log::warn! lines were visible —
while the only tracing subscriber the Kotlin SDK installs
(dash_sdk_enable_logging, a tracing_subscriber::fmt layer) writes to STDOUT,
which Android discards. Every tracing::warn! breadcrumb in
fetch_encrypted_documents therefore never reached logcat, even at WARN.
Fix: a `breadcrumb()` helper in encrypted_document.rs emits each diagnostic
line through BOTH facades — `tracing` for host tests / desktop, `log` for
logcat — and every stage of the fetch path now uses it (entry, contract
fetch/not-found, encryption-context resolution, query entry, fetch_many
error, raw_count/materialized, per-document skips, final raw/decrypted
counts). The previously SILENT skip of a raw-but-unmaterialized document
(`let Some(doc) = maybe_doc else { continue }`) now leaves a trail too:
under proofs that shape is exactly what turns "2 documents exist" into an
empty result with no error.
Root-cause status of the on-device sdkFetched=0: NOT locally reproducible.
The device path was config-identical to the Mac repro (SdkBuilder::
new_testnet + TrustedHttpContextProvider::new(Testnet, None, 100), proofs on
by default, platform version auto, since_ms=0, contract registered with the
provider — the register step is now mirrored in tests/txmetadata_fetch.rs),
and that repro still returns raw_count=2 materialized=2 from this Mac. A
stale device lib is ruled out: the JNI warns visible in the tap were added
in d29d523, so the device ran current code. The next on-device tap will
pin the failing stage: query-empty (raw_count=0) vs materialization drop
(raw>0, NOT-materialized lines) vs decrypt skip (per-doc skip lines).
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib: 427 passed; testnet integration test
txmetadata_fetch passes with the production-parity register step; clippy
clean on platform-wallet + rs-unified-sdk-jni.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…olver for external-signable wallets
The on-device decrypt-proof breadcrumbs delivered the verdict: the query was
never broken (raw=3 materialized=3), but every document skipped with
"txMetadata key derivation failed ... External signable wallet has no private
key". The app's SDK wallet is EXTERNAL-SIGNABLE — no private keys in the Rust
wallet; every key derives on demand through the registered mnemonic resolver
(the app's security architecture) — while derive_tx_metadata_key derived from
in-wallet private keys, which exist in test fixtures but never on-device. The
CREATE path had the identical flaw.
Fix, following the identity_key_preview / discovery capability convention:
- rs-platform-wallet: new derive_tx_metadata_key_from_master (same path,
caller-supplied master xprv; path construction shared via
tx_metadata_derivation_path so the two sources can never drift) and a
TxMetadataKeySource {ResidentWallet, Master} selector on both
create_encrypted_document_with_signer and fetch_encrypted_documents;
key-derivation breadcrumbs now name the active source.
- rs-platform-wallet-ffi: both encrypted-document entry points take a
nullable mnemonic_resolver_handle. Capability check under a short guard
(never held across the host resolver callback), resolver consulted ONLY
for external-signable / watch-only wallets (resident wallets keep the
historical in-process derive and skip the Keystore read), master scalar
wiped (non_secure_erase) before the result crosses back — atomic
derive + use + zeroize.
- rs-unified-sdk-jni + kotlin-sdk: documentCreateEncrypted /
documentFetchEncrypted and DocumentTransactions.createEncryptedDocument /
fetchEncryptedDocuments thread mnemonicResolverHandle through (the app
passes PlatformWalletManager.mnemonicResolverHandle, as discoverIdentities
already does).
Regression tests (network-free):
- master_derivation_matches_resident_wallet_derivation — both key sources
agree at every probed (identity, key, encryptionKey) slot;
- external_signable_wallet_derives_via_resolver_master — the device shape:
in-wallet derive fails with the exact no-private-key error, the
resolver-master path (stubbed with the test mnemonic) round-trips
seal/open against a resident wallet in both directions;
- legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector now pins the resolver-master path to the
dashj-generated vector too (both sources hit the legacy key
byte-for-byte).
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib: 429 passed; -p platform-wallet-ffi
--lib: 145 passed; clippy clean on all three crates; kotlin-sdk
:sdk:compileDebugKotlin green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…off the await; redact plaintext Debug; quiet breadcrumbs Addresses the latest review on dashpay#4091. Wire-compat vector (BLOCKING): the existing legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector pinned identity_index=0, indistinguishable from KeyDerivationType::ECDSA=0 at the adjacent path slot, so it could not prove identity_index is wired correctly. Add legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector_nonzero_identity_index, generated by the REAL legacy stack (dashj-core 22.0.3 + blockchainIdentityECDSADerivationPath / KeyCrypterAESCBC, run under a JVM) at identity_index=1 (m/9'/1'/5'/0'/0'/1'/2'/32769'/1'). Its key (8cda…5196) is provably distinct from the index-0 key (4a2e…84d7); both the resident-wallet and resolver-master derivations are asserted to hit it. The reproducible generator (LegacyKeyN.java) and a README are checked in under tests/legacy_wire_compat/ so the vector's provenance is independently verifiable. Master-key exposure across await (document.rs create+fetch): the resolved master xprv previously lived across the network broadcast/pagination awaits and was wiped only afterwards (skipped on panic/early-return). Create now derives the AES key + seals the wire blob SYNCHRONOUSLY (new IdentityWallet:: prepare_encrypted_txmetadata_properties) and wipes the master before the async broadcast, so no key material crosses the await. Fetch cannot pre-derive (per-doc keyIndex/encryptionKeyIndex are discovered during pagination), so the master is wrapped in a WipingMaster Drop guard that scrubs on every exit path, with the tradeoff documented. FFI decision tests (decide_key_source) cover null-handle, external-signable dispatch, and resolver-required. Hygiene: manual Debug impls redacting the decrypted payload on DecryptedEncryptedDocument and OpenedTxMetadata; transactions.rs no longer logs the raw mnemonic_resolver_handle pointer (nonzero=bool only); per-poll informational breadcrumbs downgraded warn!->debug! (genuine error/skip paths stay warn!), with the android_logger Info-level visibility implication noted so identity-correlated data stops reaching logcat on every successful fetch now that the sdkFetched=0 root cause is fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…deep-cloning it Addresses review nitpick bbb24591b025 on dashpay#4091. fetch_encrypted_documents wrapped the fetched DataContract in one Arc for the context provider (Arc::new(contract.clone())) and then moved the original into a SECOND Arc — a redundant deep clone of the whole contract (document-type/index metadata) on every fetch. Wrap once and hand the provider a cheap Arc::clone of the same handle. Verified: cargo test -p platform-wallet green (430 lib + 9 integration). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…'t decode Addresses review findings 0dd9fc55de07 / CodeRabbit a783199f on dashpay#4091. createEncryptedDocument bounded `version` to 0..255, but only 0 (CBOR) and 1 (protobuf) are wire-meaningful: seal_tx_metadata writes the byte verbatim into the envelope and the legacy dashj decryptTxMetadata switches on exactly those two values. Accepting 2..255 would silently seal a document the legacy stack cannot decode, breaking the bidirectional wire-compat guarantee this PR exists to establish. Tighten to `require(version == 0 || version == 1)` with a message that names both wire versions. Adds DocumentTransactionsVersionValidationTest pinning the rejection of 2..255 and negative bytes (the `require` runs before the native call, so the rejection paths are exercised on the JVM). Full :sdk unit suite green (113). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ore + JNI, not just Kotlin The version-byte wire-compat guard previously landed only as a Kotlin `require` (DocumentTransactions.kt); the JNI entry point still accepted the stale 0..=255 range and `seal_tx_metadata` wrote the byte verbatim, so a caller reaching the FFI/JNI directly could still seal a document with a version (2..=255) the legacy dashj `decryptTxMetadata` can't decode — silently breaking wire-compat (dashpay#4091, findings 9c0ce58c3bb7 and 79595960d201). - seal_tx_metadata now returns Result and rejects any version != 0 (CBOR) / 1 (protobuf) at the one choke point every layer (JNI, FFI, resident wallet) funnels through; the FFI create path propagates the error. Added seal_rejects_non_wire_versions (asserts 0/1 seal, 2..=255 rejected). - The JNI create entry point replaces the `0..=255` check with `0..=1` and a message naming both wire versions, failing fast before the native call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…el nonzero vector as internal slot check (dashpay#4091) The reviewer was right on both threads. The legacy dashj createTxMetadata flow has NO identity-index component — it always derives against the primary identity via blockchainIdentityECDSADerivationPath() (index 0) — so legacy wire-compat is only defined at identity_index=0, and no legacy wallet ever wrote a document keyed at a nonzero index. Apply option (a) — vector VALUES unchanged, provenance corrected: 1. legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector (identity_index=0, 4a2e…84d7): document that the account prefix was verified against the REAL dashj DerivationPathFactory.blockchainIdentityECDSADerivationPath() (path m/9'/1'/5'/0'/0'/0'/keyId'/32769'/encryptionKeyIndex'), not mirrored back from Rust's own tx_metadata_derivation_path (finding dd246b5e17d0). 2. Rename legacy_dashj_wire_compat_vector_nonzero_identity_index -> nonzero_identity_index_derivation_slot_is_internally_consistent and rewrite its docs/asserts: the 8cda…5196 value is SELF-REFERENTIAL (LegacyKeyN.java hand-builds the same path Rust constructs; it does not call the real DerivationPathFactory), so it pins internal slot placement + resident/master agreement only — explicitly NOT a legacy wire-compat claim (finding 4c0754158cc6). 3. Add a doc note on derive_tx_metadata_key and the module header stating wire-compat holds only at identity_index=0. Correct LegacyKeyN.java's header/inline comments and the README to state the generator hand-builds the account path and that the nonzero vector is an internal consistency cross-check, not a legacy sample. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib: 431 passed / 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rifier Addresses blocker 989be307db0f on dashpay#4091 (its still-open core ask: "check in the actual JVM repro script/tool for independent verification"). b7319b5 corrected the vectors' provenance in prose (scoped wire-compat to identity_index=0; relabeled the nonzero vector as an internal slot check), but the "confirmed against the REAL dashj DerivationPathFactory" claim was still only asserted — LegacyKeyN.java hand-builds its account path and never drives the factory, so a maintainer could not reproduce the equality from checked-in code. Adds LegacyDerivationPathCheck.java: it drives the real org.bitcoinj.wallet.DerivationPathFactory (dashj-core 22.0.3, Testnet) and asserts its primary-identity path — blockchainIdentityECDSADerivationPath() (no-arg) = m/9'/1'/5'/0'/0'/0' — equals LegacyKeyN's hand-built account path at identity_index 0, printing WIRE_COMPAT_ANCHOR_OK = true (verified: true). It also prints the factory's INDEXED overload m/9'/1'/5'/0'/0'/0'/i' beside the hand-built nonzero path m/9'/1'/5'/0'/0'/i', making the shape difference visible so the nonzero vector is self-evidently NOT a factory-produced legacy sample (cross-refs dd246b5e17d0 / 4c0754158cc6). README: document the verifier + run command, and add the missing de.sfuhrm/saphir-hash-core/3.0.10 jar (TestNet3Params.get() needs X11 genesis-block hashing — the factory path fails with NoClassDefFoundError without it; LegacyKeyN alone never touches network params so it was omitted before). Verified end to end: LegacyDerivationPathCheck 0 -> WIRE_COMPAT_ANCHOR_OK=true; LegacyKeyN 0 2 1 -> 4a2e…84d7 and LegacyKeyN 1 2 1 -> 8cda…5196, both matching the hard-coded Rust vectors exactly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rdownGate
createEncryptedDocument and fetchEncryptedDocuments borrow the wallet /
mnemonic-resolver / signer handles but opened with plain
withContext(Dispatchers.IO), bypassing the TeardownGate: a concurrent wallet
shutdown could free the borrowed native handles mid-call (freed-handle UB) and
the source-scanning GateCoverageLintTest.everyHandleBorrowingSuspendFunIsGated
failed on both.
Both now open with gate.op { } like their six sibling document methods (gate.op
already runs the body on Dispatchers.IO, so the bodies are unchanged). Dropped
the now-unused Dispatchers/withContext imports. GateCoverageLintTest green; full
:sdk:testDebugUnitTest suite green (174 tests, 0 failures).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tion/network
seal_tx_metadata had no client-side size check: a payload too large for the
encryptedMetadata field (maxItems 4096) derived the key and sealed only to be
rejected at broadcast with an opaque DPP schema error.
Add a typed PlatformWalletError::TxMetadataPayloadTooLarge { len, max } and a
shared ensure_tx_metadata_payload_fits() precheck. It runs FIRST in
prepare_encrypted_txmetadata_properties (before resolve/derive/broadcast) so an
over-large batch fails fast with the length + accepted max, and again inside
seal_tx_metadata as the choke-point last line of defense. The FFI maps the new
variant to ErrorInvalidParameter (already mirrored in Swift/Kotlin — no new
numeric code), so it surfaces sensibly across JNI/FFI with the typed Display.
True envelope math, derived from the code (not hardcoded): the blob is
version(1) + IV(16) + AES-256-CBC/PKCS7(plaintext). PKCS7 always adds a full
block when the plaintext is block-aligned, so ciphertext = 16*(L/16 + 1) and
blob = 17 + that. The largest ciphertext that fits 4096 is ((4096-17)/16)*16 =
254*16 = 4064, and since PKCS7 spends >=1 byte on padding the max plaintext is
one less -> MAX_TX_METADATA_PLAINTEXT_LEN = 4063. That plaintext frames to a
4081-byte blob (NOT 4096 as the review's arithmetic stated); 4064 jumps to 4097
and is the first rejected length. The 4063/4064 boundary itself matches the
reviewer; the "4063 -> 4096" envelope size does not (see the new boundary test,
which pins the real 4081-byte blob).
Boundary test seal_rejects_payload_above_size_limit: 4063 seals (blob == 4081,
round-trips), 4064 rejected as TxMetadataPayloadTooLarge, and the standalone
precheck agrees at the boundary.
Also strips the co-located "finding <hex>" tracker tokens from the comments in
these two files (rationale text kept); they move to the PR description.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…broadcast await platform_wallet_create_encrypted_document_with_signer copied the caller payload into a plain Vec<u8> that stayed live in the outer scope across the network broadcast .await — the native plaintext lingered in memory the whole time the document was being broadcast. Wrap the copy in Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> and make the with_item closure `move` so it OWNS the buffer, then drop(payload_vec) the instant the encrypted properties are prepared (right beside the existing master-key drop), before block_on_worker. The plaintext is now scrubbed and gone before any .await; only the sealed ciphertext properties cross into the async block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…gated check The txmetadata_fetch doc claimed the wire-query regression is "caught in CI (against testnet)", but the test is #[ignore = "hits testnet"] and nothing runs `--ignored`, so CI never executes it. Soften the wording: it is a MANUAL, testnet-gated check, run explicitly with `--ignored`, NOT part of the default `cargo test`/CI run and with no scheduled job running `--ignored` today — a local/pre-release regression gate. (Wiring a scheduled `--ignored` job is out of scope for this PR.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the "finding <hex>" / "blocker <hex>" internal tracking tokens from the remaining code comments and docs (the co-located tokens in tx_metadata.rs and encrypted_document.rs were stripped in the size-precheck commit). Rationale text and the dashpay#4091 issue reference are kept; the tracker refs belong in the PR description, not the source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tract schema Review round 2: the 4096 field limit was a local const silently duplicating the wallet-utils contract's encryptedMetadata maxItems; pin them together so a contract-side limit change fails a test instead of drifting past the size precheck. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the reviewer-requested independent check (dashpay#4186): decrypt a txMetadata blob produced by a REAL legacy dash-wallet 11.9 install, not one this repo generated. A designated-throwaway testnet wallet (DPNS name `yabba2`, identity ESR1nfF3bj4TR2ZkLmDuSeu6r7VzpTurYi47BV6XwsoP) running stock dash-wallet 11.9 registered a username, did a send + receive, saved metadata, and published one encrypted `txMetadata` document to Platform. It was fetched back off testnet and decrypted with the NEW Rust crypto. - `legacy_install_yabba2_wire_compat_vector` (network-free fixture in tx_metadata.rs): hard-codes the recovery phrase, the real captured blob hex (version 1/protobuf, keyIndex 2, encryptionKeyIndex 1), and the expected protobuf `TxMetadataBatch` plaintext (two items, memos "username"/"faucet", USD exchange rates), and asserts the new `derive_tx_metadata_key` + `open_tx_metadata` path decrypts it byte-for-byte via both the resident and resolver-master key sources. Doc-commented as the independent legacy-install vector, distinct from the self-generated dashj-core scratch vectors. - `capture_legacy_yabba2_txmetadata_blobs` (testnet-gated helper in tests/txmetadata_fetch.rs): resolves the DPNS name, runs the exact production query, derives from the phrase, and prints the capture used to build the fixture. - README: documents the new real-install vector alongside the JVM-generated ones. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The JNI-owned `payload_bytes` in `documentCreateEncrypted` was a plain `Vec<u8>` held across the entire synchronous FFI call — including the network broadcast that runs inside it — and freed unscrubbed at end of scope. The inner FFI copy (`payload_vec` in rs-platform-wallet-ffi's document.rs) already got `Zeroizing` + an explicit pre-broadcast drop; mirror that discipline for the JNI copy so the plaintext-lifetime guarantee holds end-to-end. - Wrap `payload_bytes` in `zeroize::Zeroizing` so it is scrubbed on drop. - Drop it explicitly the instant the FFI call returns (the earliest point reachable from JNI, since the broadcast completes inside that call), before result/JSON handling. It is the only plaintext copy in the fn. Also strip the two surviving `dashpay#4091` tracker tokens from the version-guard and fetch-breadcrumb comments (rationale text kept). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…, not the host Follow-up to dashpay#4186 (shumkov review on the encrypted-documents port): the encryptionKeyIndex allocation policy was left in the Kotlin host, which told callers to supply the legacy `1 + countAllRequests()` counter. Concurrent callers/devices could pick the same index, and a caller-side key-index policy loop violates the Kotlin SDK host-thin rule. Move the policy into Rust; hosts now provide only the opaque payload. Rust core (rs-platform-wallet): - IdentityWallet::allocate_encryption_key_index counts the identity's existing txMetadata documents on Platform and returns `1 + count`, matching dash-wallet's retired `1 + countAllRequests()` (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM transaction_metadata_platform) semantics EXACTLY (count+1, not max+1; empty state -> 1). - Allocation is serialized through a shared per-wallet allocator mutex (EncryptionKeyIndexAllocator on IdentityWallet, an Arc<Mutex<HashMap>> shared across handle clones): two concurrent creates through the SAME process seed the in-process high-water once from Platform and then hand out monotonically increasing indices, so they can never pick the same index. - Cross-device uniqueness is best-effort only and is NOT data-loss: every document stores its own keyIndex/encryptionKeyIndex and the reader derives each document's key from its own stored indices, so two documents sharing an index each carry a fresh IV and both decrypt independently. - Unit tests: legacy 1+count math (incl. saturation), empty-state seed + increment, per-owner isolation, and a concurrent no-collision test. FFI (rs-platform-wallet-ffi): - Add ABI-additive sibling platform_wallet_create_encrypted_document_with_signer_auto_index (identical params minus encryption_key_index); the existing explicit-index export is unchanged and both share one impl taking Option<u32>. When None, the index is allocated from Platform state before any key material is resolved. JNI (rs-unified-sdk-jni): - documentCreateEncrypted treats encryptionKeyIndex == -1 as the "let Rust allocate" sentinel (routes to the auto-index export); a non-negative value routes to the explicit export; < -1 is rejected. Kotlin SDK: - DocumentTransactions.createEncryptedDocument takes encryptionKeyIndex: Int? = null (null -> allocate in Rust); removed the `1 + countAllRequests()` guidance and deprecated the caller-supplied counter in KDoc. Null maps to the -1 JNI sentinel. - Tests: explicit-negative rejection and no-index-path acceptance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ing encryptionKeyIndex Addresses shumkov's dashpay#4195 review: on the auto-index create path the network count / high-water reservation (`allocate_encryption_key_index` -> `reserve_next_index`) ran BEFORE the deterministic 4063-byte payload gate, so an oversized payload — which must fail — still consumed an index and left a gap. Run the size check first. It is a pure, network-free bound (`ensure_tx_metadata_payload_fits` / `MAX_TX_METADATA_PLAINTEXT_LEN`) and needs no key material: - new `reserve_next_index_checked(allocator, owner, payload_len, seed)` runs `ensure_tx_metadata_payload_fits(payload_len)?` before `reserve_next_index`, so an oversized payload returns the typed `TxMetadataPayloadTooLarge` without polling the seed — the high-water is never seeded or advanced (no consumed index, no gap). - `IdentityWallet::allocate_encryption_key_index` gains a `payload_len` param and routes through the checked variant; the FFI auto-index create path passes `payload_vec.len()`. Explicit-index path is unchanged (it never allocates). - new unit test `oversized_payload_does_not_advance_highwater`: asserts the typed error, that the owner is absent from the allocator map, and that the next well-sized reservation still seeds at 1 (no gap). cargo test (platform-wallet allocator 5/5, platform-wallet-ffi 204/204) + clippy green; Kotlin :sdk:compileDebugKotlin + :sdk:testDebugUnitTest green (JNI/Kotlin ABI unchanged — payload_len plumbing is internal to Rust). Note (source-breaking, positional Kotlin callers): the dashpay#4186 stack moved `SDK.Documents.createEncryptedDocument`'s `encryptionKeyIndex` to the last positional slot (`Int? = null`). Positional callers must drop the argument (let Rust allocate) or switch to a named argument; named callers are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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platform-wallet 505/505, ffi 204/204, both legacy wire-compat vectors pass. |
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Wire-compatible encrypted
txMetadatadocument create + decrypt-on-fetch: keys derived through the mnemonic-resolver path, wire version enforcement (0|1) in Rust with rejection of version bytes the legacy stack cannot parse, dashj-generated wire-compat pin vectors (including a nonzero-identity vector and a real-DerivationPathFactory provenance vector), a shared fetched-DataContract Arc, dual-emit encrypted-document breadcrumbs, and TeardownGate-gated create/fetch on the Kotlin side.Re-opens #4091 which was auto-closed when the #3999 base branch was deleted; rebased onto
v4.1-dev. All thirteen original commits replayed cleanly — no hunks needed to be dropped as already-absorbed (Cargo.lockadditions merged without conflict and are stable undercargo check).Verified:
cargo test -p platform-wallet -p platform-wallet-ffi -p rs-unified-sdk-jniall pass (630 / 241 / 10, including the legacy wire-compat suites);:sdk:assembleRelease+ 177 sdk unit tests pass.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Review-response summary (2026-07-21)
TxMetadataPayloadTooLarge { len, max }raised before any key derivation or network work, at bothprepare_encrypted_txmetadata_propertiesand insideseal_tx_metadata.MAX_TX_METADATA_PLAINTEXT_LENis derived from the field limit in code and a new test anchors the 4096 constant to the wallet-utils contract schema'smaxItemsso a contract-side change can't drift silently. One arithmetic correction from implementing this: the 4063/4064 boundary from review is confirmed, but a 4063-byte plaintext frames to a 4081-byte blob, not 4096 (PKCS7 only adds a full pad block on block-aligned input; 4064 → 4097, and 4082..4096 is unreachable). The boundary test asserts the real envelope and round-trips it.Zeroizing, owned by the prepare closure, and explicitly dropped the moment encrypted properties exist — before the broadcastawait, on success and error paths alike.--ignoredcheck rather than claiming CI coverage.v4.1-dev(post-fix(kotlin-sdk): harden identity-key Keystore recovery and reconcile parity docs #4172/feat(kotlin-sdk): transaction decoder JNI binding over key-wallet-ffi transaction_decode #4187); range-diff shows all feature commits identical (=patch-ids).encryptionKeyIndexallocation into Rust wallet state; an independent legacy-blob decrypt check from a real legacy install.Provenance notes (tracking tokens moved out of code comments)
Internal review-tracking tokens
9c0ce58c3bb7,79595960d201,dd246b5e17d0,4c0754158cc6,989be307db0fwere removed from 8 comment sites (seal/version-guard docs and wire-compat vector docs intx_metadata.rs,encrypted_document.rs,transactions.rs, and the legacy wire-compat harness README/Java header). They referenced findings resolved in earlier review rounds of the original PR line; the rationale text at each site is unchanged.Provenance (tracker refs moved from code comments per review)
rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/transactions.rscarried twodashpay/platform#4091review-tracking tokens (at the seal-version-guard and the external-signable-derive comments); removed from the comments with the rationale text kept.