π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Secure global reward training data endpoint#248
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Secure global reward training data endpoint#248dcplatforms wants to merge 1 commit into
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- Integrated jsonwebtoken for JWT authentication. - Implemented authenticateToken middleware with hardened JWT_SECRET check. - Secured GET /data/training/rewards by requiring authentication. - Enforced fleet_id restriction on global data export to limit access to system/admin tokens. - Resolved Git merge conflicts and standardized processBatchMint worker. - Added security_hardening.test.js to verify protection. Co-authored-by: dcplatforms <10982057+dcplatforms@users.noreply.github.com>
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π‘οΈ Sentinel Security Update: L10 Token Engine Hardening
This PR addresses a security vulnerability where global reward training data was exposed via an unauthenticated endpoint. It also resolves critical Git merge conflicts that were present in the Token Engine's core logic.
π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Unauthenticated Sensitive Endpoint & IDOR Risk
The
/data/training/rewardsendpoint allowed unauthenticated access to sensitive reward logs. Furthermore, even with authentication, it lacked authorization checks to prevent drivers (multi-tenant users) from exporting aggregate platform data.π― Impact
Unauthorized actors or standard users could enumerate and export global reward data, leading to PII exposure (if unmasked) and disclosure of platform-wide economic performance and driver behavior patterns.
π§ Fix
jsonwebtokenand implemented theauthenticateTokenmiddleware.JWT_SECRETis misconfigured, preventing fail-open scenarios./data/training/rewardsendpoint now explicitly rejects tokens containing afleet_id, ensuring only administrative or system-level tokens can access global data.index.jsand standardized theprocessBatchMintworker for robust reward processing.β Verification
services/10-token-engine/tests/security_hardening.test.jscovering authentication requirements, token validation, and thefleet_idrestriction.npm test).verify_l10_v4_3_6.js.PR created automatically by Jules for task 8742709084467363009 started by @dcplatforms