chore: tighten type safety across commerce and adapters

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-  issue_comment:
-    types: [created]
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     if: github.event.sender.type != 'Bot'

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-  push:
-    branches: [main]
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-    branches: [main]
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 name: "CLA Assistant"
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-  issue_comment:
-    types: [created]
-  pull_request_target:
-    types: [opened, synchronize]
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.github/workflows/deploy-marketplace.yml

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.github/workflows/preview-releases.yml

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 name: Preview Releases
 
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.github/workflows/release.yml

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 name: Release
 
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+  workflow_dispatch:
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.gitignore

@@ -65,4 +65,10 @@ __screenshots__/
 .emdash-bundle-tmp
 
 # Downloaded test data (fetched on demand in CI)
-examples/wp-theme-unit-test/
+examples/wp-theme-unit-test/
+
+# Local WooCommerce source copy (reference only; not part of EmDash)
+woocommerce/
+
+# Archives (e.g. review bundles); keep local only
+*.zip

3rd-party-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Third-Party Review Checklist (One-Page)
+
+> This is the historical Option A hardening checklist.
+> For the current external reviewer flow, use:
+>
+> - `@THIRD_PARTY_REVIEW_PACKAGE.md`
+> - `external_review.md`
+> - `SHARE_WITH_REVIEWER.md`
+
+## Scope and review goal
+
+- Path reviewed: Option A finalize hardening for EmDash Commerce webhooks.
+- Primary objective: validate whether the implementation is correct enough for production rollout and identify the smallest safe improvements.
+- Owner roles:
+  - **RE** = Commerce plugin runtime engineer
+  - **SRE** = platform/storage operator
+  - **SEC** = security reviewer
+  - **QA** = QA/automation owner
+
+## Quick pass/fail criteria
+
+1. No finalize side effects occur without valid webhook signature.
+2. Duplicate webhook deliveries do not create duplicate inventory side effects.
+3. Preflight validation failures do not apply partial stock mutations.
+4. Deterministic payment-attempt selection is stable across retries.
+5. Remaining concurrency risk is explicitly accepted with an owner and follow-up ticket.
+
+## Issue-level checklist (severity + owner)
+
+### 1) Webhook signature gate is bypassable by malformed request
+
+- **Severity**: P1 (Integrity / Fraud)
+- **What to verify**
+  - `Stripe-Signature` is parsed and validated before finalize side effects.
+  - Missing/invalid/malformed signatures return `WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_INVALID`.
+  - `settings:stripeWebhookSecret` must be required in deployment paths that receive webhooks.
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Pass / `[ ]` Fail / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **SEC** (validation), **RE** (fallback/edge-case handling)
+- **Notes**
+  - Current implementation: implemented in `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.ts`.
+
+### 2) Replay safety on duplicate webhook events
+
+- **Severity**: P1 (Data integrity / Inventory)
+- **What to verify**
+  - Duplicate event IDs return replay/error semantics via existing receipt decision path.
+  - Deterministic movement IDs prevent second write from creating additional ledger rows.
+  - Duplicate deliveries do not produce negative stock totals.
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Pass / `[ ]` Fail / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **RE** (logic), **SRE** (runtime contention observations)
+
+### 3) Partial mutation risk during preflight failures
+
+- **Severity**: P1 (Inventory correctness)
+- **What to verify**
+  - Stock validation and normalization occur before stock/ledger writes.
+  - Preflight failures return conflict/invalid-stock errors and preserve current stock.
+  - Ledger has no row written when any validation fails.
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Pass / `[ ]` Fail / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **RE**
+
+### 4) Nondeterministic payment-attempt selection
+
+- **Severity**: P2 (State correctness)
+- **What to verify**
+  - Selection uses deterministic filter/sort (`orderId + providerId + status`, ordered by stable field).
+  - Tests cover multiple pending attempts and earliest selection.
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Pass / `[ ]` Fail / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **RE**
+
+### 5) Inventory movement index / replay model mismatch
+
+- **Severity**: P2 (Idempotency)
+- **What to verify**
+  - Unique index definition for movement identity exists in `storage.ts`.
+  - No migration gap for existing deployments where index is required for full guarantee.
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Pass / `[ ]` Fail / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **SRE** + **RE**
+
+### 6) Residual concurrent-race window under perfect simultaneity
+
+- **Severity**: P2 (Concurrency / Scaling)
+- **What to verify**
+  - Confirm if remaining race window is acceptable for current traffic profile.
+  - Confirm follow-up plan if stronger guarantees are required (CAS/claim primitive).
+- **Reviewer outcome**
+  - `[ ]` Accept as-is / `[ ]` Requires follow-up / `[ ]` N/A
+- **Ownership**: **RE** (design), **SRE** (capacity/risk)
+
+## Final recommendation block
+
+- **Recommended rollout readiness**: `[ ] Ready` / `[ ] Hold until fixes` / `[ ] Require follow-up`
+- **Owner**: `_____________________`
+- **Review comments summary**:
+  - ***
+  - ***
+  - ***

3rdparty_share_index_4.md

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+# 3rd Party Share Index (v4)
+
+## Status
+
+This index is historical and refers to an earlier review zip layout.
+
+## Canonical review path
+
+- `external_review.md` (current canonical review packet)
+- `@THIRD_PARTY_REVIEW_PACKAGE.md` (authoritative entrypoint)
+- `SHARE_WITH_REVIEWER.md` (single-file handoff instructions)
+
+Use this file only for artifact history; current review work should follow the canonical packet chain above.

3rdpary_review-4.md

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# Third-Party Evaluation Brief — Commerce Finalize Hardening (Option A execution)
+
+> Historical review packet (Option A). Canonical current entrypoint is:
+>
+> - `@THIRD_PARTY_REVIEW_PACKAGE.md`
+> - `external_review.md`
+> - `SHARE_WITH_REVIEWER.md`
+
+## Executive summary
+
+This review package covers the Option A hardening pass for the EmDash Commerce plugin, focused on webhook-driven payment finalize integrity.  
+The current implementation improves reliability of the `stripe` webhook finalize path by making side effects deterministic, adding signature validation, and making inventory mutation behavior safer under duplicate/malformed flows.
+
+The guiding constraint is still your original brief:
+
+- keep changes narrow
+- avoid over-engineering
+- prioritize correctness over speculative features
+- remain review-friendly for external audit before moving to Stage 2
+
+## Ecosystem context (what this code lives in)
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce` is a plugin package in a pnpm monorepo.
+- Runtime writes are performed through EmDash plugin storage abstractions (`ctx.storage` + `StorageCollection`).
+- Public plugin routes are defined in `packages/plugins/commerce/src/index.ts`.
+- Route handlers are currently thin wrappers that call orchestration modules and throw API errors through existing error contracts.
+- Checkout and finalize flows intentionally stay isolated from storefront/catalog concerns and do not couple recommendation/agent read paths.
+
+## Why this pass was needed
+
+Three categories of risk were addressed:
+
+1. **Security/inbound trust**
+   - Webhook traffic was entering finalize logic without cryptographic proof, creating an integrity risk.
+2. **Correctness under duplicates and retries**
+   - `webhookReceipts` and deterministic identifiers reduce duplicate side effects but pre-existing write patterns could still expose partial mutation windows.
+3. **Determinism/state consistency**
+   - Payment attempt updates could vary based on storage ordering, and partial stock/ledger writes were possible during failures.
+
+## Files changed in this implementation pass
+
+### Core logic
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.ts`
+  - Added deterministic inventory preflight + normalization path:
+    - validate required stock rows and line-item consistency before writes.
+    - convert intended stock adjustments into deterministic movement plans.
+  - Added deterministic ledger IDs via `inventoryLedgerEntryId(...)`.
+  - Added idempotent replay-safe mutation path by skipping already-written movement IDs.
+  - Kept payment conflict/error mapping deterministic and explicit.
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.ts`
+  - Added webhook signature verification:
+    - parses `Stripe-Signature`
+    - validates timestamp tolerance
+    - validates HMAC (`whsec` style hex signature) using settings secret
+  - rejects invalid/missing signature before finalize execution.
+  - exposes helper exports for focused unit tests.
+
+### Guardrails / schema tightening
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/storage.ts`
+  - Added unique index for deterministic inventory movement replay safety:
+    - `inventoryLedger`: `["referenceType","referenceId","productId","variantId"]`
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/checkout.ts`
+  - Added stronger input checks to reject malformed line items (`quantity`, `inventoryVersion`, `unitPriceMinor`) before order creation.
+
+### Tests added/updated
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.test.ts`
+  - Added scenarios:
+    - earliest-pending provider attempt is chosen deterministically
+    - duplicate SKU merge still yields one ledger movement
+    - preflight failure leaves stock/ledger unchanged (partial-write prevention)
+  - In-memory storage mock now supports `orderBy` for deterministic pending-attempt behavior.
+
+- `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.test.ts` _(new)_
+  - Added signature helper unit coverage:
+    - parse format
+    - valid v1 signature
+    - bad secret rejection
+    - missing timestamp rejection
+    - stale timestamp rejection
+
+## Known residual risk (explicit)
+
+- Storage currently lacks native CAS/conditional writes or transactional locking in the orchestration contract used here.
+- In a perfect simultaneous duplicate webhook delivery race, one delivery can still attempt overlapping writes before first-commit visibility.
+- The current design is replay-bounded and recoverable through receipt ledgering and deterministic IDs, but a true CAS/receipt-lock step remains the next hardening milestone if your volume/profile requires stronger isolation.
+
+## Third-party evaluator checklist
+
+### What to validate first
+
+1. Confirm environment configuration includes `settings:stripeWebhookSecret` in all production and staging runtime paths used by webhook ingestion.
+2. Verify raw request body consumption remains compatible with EmDash route pipeline in production workers.
+3. Confirm storage guarantees around `query` sorting and unique index enforcement on `inventoryLedger`.
+
+### What to validate during review
+
+1. Security
+   - invalid signatures cannot reach finalize side effects
+   - malformed / missing signatures fail safely
+2. Determinism
+   - one deterministic attempt is selected across multiple pending attempts
+   - duplicate SKU merge produces one stock movement row
+3. Integrity
+   - preflight failures produce no stock mutation
+   - inventory version mismatch and insufficient stock map to stable API errors
+4. Idempotency/replay behavior
+   - duplicate webhook deliveries of same event do not create duplicate stock side effects
+
+### Suggested production rollout checks
+
+1. Deploy to staging with production-like concurrency.
+2. Send duplicate/simultaneous webhook deliveries and verify:
+   - one success, one replay or controlled terminal conflict path
+   - no negative stock from partial writes
+3. Monitor for `commerce.finalize.inventory_failed` and `commerce.finalize.token_rejected` logs.
+
+### Clear review path for a 3rd-party evaluator
+
+1. **Start with context**
+   - `3rdpary_review-4.md` (this document)
+   - `COMMERCE_REVIEW_OPTION_A_PLAN.md`
+   - `COMMERCE_REVIEW_OPTION_A_EXECUTION_NOTES.md`
+2. **Inspect runtime contracts**
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/index.ts`
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.ts`
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.ts`
+3. **Inspect constraints and storage model**
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/storage.ts`
+4. **Validate test coverage**
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.test.ts`
+   - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.test.ts`
+5. **Validate behavior against this matrix**
+   - `WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_INVALID` on bad/missing signatures
+   - duplicate events produce replay or controlled terminal conflict semantics
+   - insufficient stock/version mismatch remains non-partial
+   - deterministic payment attempt selection
+   - no duplicate movement rows for duplicate SKUs
+6. **Finalize decision**
+   - Confirm residual concurrent-race risk is acceptable for current scale
+   - Decide whether a stronger CAS/lock path should be phase-2 scope
+
+## Artifacts this review package is optimized for
+
+- Implementation plan and status:
+  - `COMMERCE_REVIEW_OPTION_A_PLAN.md`
+  - `COMMERCE_REVIEW_OPTION_A_EXECUTION_NOTES.md`
+  - `3rdpary_review-4.md` (this document)
+- Core implementation/test bundle:
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.ts`
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.ts`
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/storage.ts`
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/checkout.ts`
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/orchestration/finalize-payment.test.ts`
+  - `packages/plugins/commerce/src/handlers/webhooks-stripe.test.ts`
+
+## Decision support for 3rd-party suggestions
+
+The current path intentionally avoids broad redesigns (no middleware/framework migration, no new plugin boundaries, no new schema surface area).  
+If reviewer confirms current delivery profile needs stronger concurrency guarantees, the recommended follow-up should be:
+
+1. introduce a storage-level claim primitive (or explicit lock emulation) for webhook receipts, then
+2. fold claim + mutation into one atomic boundary where backend storage allows it,
+3. keep current deterministic IDs as a second line of defense for replay safety.