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Security: fadyphil/The-Vault

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy and Cryptographic Model

This document outlines the security architecture, cryptographic safeguards, threat model, and vulnerability reporting procedures for The Vault.

🛡️ Threat Model

The Vault assumes a zero-trust network architecture. We operate under the assumption that:

  1. The database storage layer can be compromised.
  2. Network traffic can be intercepted.
  3. Memory dumps may be attempted on application instances.

Mitigations

  • Compromised Storage: Plaintext secrets are never stored. Data is encrypted using AES-GCM (256-bit) with unique random nonces generated per secret. Compromising the database does not reveal secrets without the master key.
  • Network Interception: All endpoints must be served over HTTPS. JWT or strong Bearer tokens are required for all non-registration endpoints.
  • RAM Dump Mitigation: Plaintext secrets are cleared or overwritten in memory as soon as they are processed.

🔑 Key Management

The Vault uses a single Master Key to derive or directly encrypt data at rest.

  • The Master Key is injected at runtime via environment variables or a secure key store (e.g., AWS KMS, HashiCorp Vault).
  • It is never written to disk.
  • Key rotation policies should be run periodically to re-encrypt old ciphertexts.

🚨 Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security vulnerability within this project, please do not open a public issue. Instead, report it securely:

  1. Send an email to security@example.com (replace with your secure reporting channel).
  2. Include a detailed description of the vulnerability, steps to reproduce, and any proof of concept.
  3. We will acknowledge receipt of your report within 24 hours and coordinate a public release timeline with you.

There aren't any published security advisories