security(ci): pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs#801
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`uses: action@v1` style references resolve to whatever commit the tag currently points at. Tag ownership is shared with the action maintainer, so a compromise of their account (or a malicious maintainer move) can silently rewrite the tag to point at a hostile commit without any change to our workflow files. The industry-standard mitigation is to pin every non-trusted action to a full commit SHA and keep the semver as a trailing comment for humans. Pin the two third-party actions used in Craft's workflows: - pnpm/action-setup@b906aff # v4.3.0 (build.yml x3, docs-preview.yml x1, lint.yml x1) - rossjrw/pr-preview-action@ffa7509 # v1.8.1 (docs-preview.yml x1) Left unpinned by design: - actions/* (GitHub-owned; trust root). - getsentry/* (same org; separate trust boundary from third-party). - Local ./ and local reusable workflows (path-based, no tag drift). getsentry/action-enforce-license-compliance was already SHA-pinned.
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Summary
Pins every third-party GitHub Action used in Craft's own CI to a full commit SHA, with the semver retained as a trailing comment for human reviewers. Protects against tag-hijacking (compromised maintainer account, malicious force-push to a tag, or an intentional-turned-hostile maintainer) without losing the readability of "what version am I on?" at a glance.
Changes
Two third-party actions touched, 6 usages total across 3 workflow files:
pnpm/action-setup@v4@b906affcce14559ad1aafd4ab0e942779e9f58b1 # v4.3.0rossjrw/pr-preview-action@v1@ffa7509e91a3ec8dfc2e5536c4d5c1acdf7a6de9 # v1.8.1Files:
.github/workflows/build.yml,.github/workflows/docs-preview.yml,.github/workflows/lint.yml.Scope — what's not pinned and why
actions/*(checkout,setup-node,cache,upload-artifact,create-github-app-token): GitHub-owned, trust root, out of scope for this pass.getsentry/*(craft@v2, local reusable workflows, local./action): same-org, separate trust boundary, out of scope.getsentry/action-enforce-license-compliance: already SHA-pinned to4fae092d42cc91cdfa447eb5b0987cbecfdb07c6— no change needed.Verification
python3 -c "import yaml; ..."parses all 7 workflow files cleanly.greppost-change shows only SHA-pinned references for both third-party actions.git ls-remote <repo> 'v4^{}' 'v1^{}'(authoritative deref of annotated tag objects to the commits). Both match the current tip of the respectivev<N>floating tags.Tag-pointer drift from here on is visible in the diff when anyone bumps these references in a future PR.