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It was discovered that a permission middleware approval process, while NOT allowing transactions by an unauthorized signer, would however allow to BLOCK an authorized signer from execution. This PR introduces a new state variable on transaction account that whitelists all middleware programs that can approve middleware. Furthermore, this PR removes a legacy slot parameter.
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tbarri
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| pub approved_middleware: Option<Pubkey>, | ||
| /// The slot in which the transaction was proposed | ||
| /// This is used to prevent replay attacks | ||
| pub slot: u8, | ||
| /// The transaction state, to prevent replay attacks |
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Super minor comment, and for next time.
Furthermore, this PR removes a legacy slot parameter.
This minor change should be in a separate Git commit. We should maintain 1 idea = 1 commit.
If we wanted to rollback either the permission fix or the slot change, we can't because the changes are entangled. I'm certain we won't be doing this - but the point remains. Separate commits = easier code review + easier reverts. For next time! :-)
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Haha, yes and should I tell you something. It actually was a separate commit, but I applied the squashing to liberal :(. Should have paid a litte more attention.
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PERMISSIONLESS APPROVEEXECUTION INSTRUCTION ALLOWS ATTACKERS TO BLOCK ANOTHER USER'S EXECUTETRANSACTION INSTRUCTION
A permissionless instruction is when anyone on the Solana network can execute a transaction that interacts with the user’s programs. In some cases, permissionless instructions can be harmless depending on the logic of the program in question. In the case of Cryptid, the permissionless ApproveExecution instruction can have negative effects on the functionality of core operations, such as the ExecuteTransaction instruction.
This PR fixes the discovered issue.