fix(security): resolve all 35 open code-scanning alerts#7
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Trivy (1): - CVE-2026-53550 (medium): bump js-yaml ^4.1.0 -> ^4.3.0 (DoS via crafted YAML merge keys; fixed in 4.2.0). Lockfile also self-syncs stale root metadata (version/engines) to match package.json. Semgrep (34) — two real hardening fixes, the rest justified suppressions per the workflow's sanctioned `// nosemgrep` path (SAST is report-only): detect-non-literal-regexp (14): - stack-snapshot.js, install.js: storyKey/key were interpolated UNESCAPED into `new RegExp` — now regex-escaped (latent correctness + hardening). - remainder: input already escaped (escapeRe/escapeRegex/inline), glob->regex compilers that escape metachars during translation, or an operator-supplied grep pattern by design — suppressed with rationale. contains-bidirectional-characters (12 -> 3 lines): - resolve-dag.js / sprint-plan.js sanitizer regexes intentionally contain bidi code points in order to strip/reject them. Suppressed. prototype-pollution-loop (8): - read-only path traversals (no write sink), already-UNSAFE_KEYS-guarded writes (state-shard), and a null-proto tree (config-merger). Suppressed. Verified: Semgrep (p/default,p/security-audit,p/secrets) reports 0 findings; biome clean; 2234 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| // Escape the key so a metacharacter in it can't alter the pattern. | ||
| const safeKey = storyKey.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'); | ||
| // nosemgrep: javascript.lang.security.audit.detect-non-literal-regexp.detect-non-literal-regexp -- pattern built from a regex-escaped, trusted story key | ||
| const re = new RegExp(`^\\s*${safeKey}:\\s*(\\w+)`, 'm'); |
| // Escape the key so a metacharacter in it can't alter the pattern. | ||
| const safeKey = key.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'); | ||
| // nosemgrep: javascript.lang.security.audit.detect-non-literal-regexp.detect-non-literal-regexp -- pattern built from a regex-escaped config key | ||
| const replaceRe = new RegExp(`^([ \\t]*)${safeKey}:[ \\t]*(\\S[^#\\n]*?)?([ \\t]*#.*)?$`, 'm'); |
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Closes all 35 open code-scanning alerts on this repo.
Summary
CVE-2026-53550(Trivy, medium)js-yaml ^4.1.0 → ^4.3.0(DoS via crafted YAML merge keys; fixed in 4.2.0)detect-non-literal-regexp(Semgrep)contains-bidirectional-characters(Semgrep)prototype-pollution-loop(Semgrep)Real hardening fixes
stack-snapshot.js/install.js: a story key / config key was interpolated unescaped intonew RegExp(...). Now regex-escaped so a metacharacter can't alter the pattern.js-yamlbumped past the DoS CVE; lockfile also self-syncs stale rootversion/enginesthat were out of step withpackage.json.Suppressions
Semgrep SAST is report-only in
security.yml; the workflow explicitly directs FP suppression via inline// nosemgrep. Each suppression carries a specific rationale (escaped input, glob→regex compiler, operator-supplied pattern by design,UNSAFE_KEYS-guarded write,Object.create(null)tree, read-only traversal).Verification
semgrep scan --config p/default --config p/security-audit --config p/secrets→ 0 findingsbiome check→ cleancd tests && npm test→ 2234 passed, 0 failuresThe Trivy CVE alert and Semgrep alerts will auto-close on the next FULL security scan after merge.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code