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rfp: cross-chain DEX and synthetic-XMR design bundle (decision drafts) + 2 lambda prizes#57

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rfp: cross-chain DEX and synthetic-XMR design bundle (decision drafts) + 2 lambda prizes#57
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@fryorcraken fryorcraken commented May 21, 2026

Four RFP drafts plus three background appendices plus two lambda prize drafts. The bundle keeps RFPs where the solution shape is anchored in deployed prior art; the two open design questions (taker-spam protection for makers and taker reliability against maker misbehaviour) become competitive lambda prizes where the Logos team does not pre-judge the mechanism.

RFPs (each inspired by existing prior art documented in the appendices)

  • RFP-021 — Cross-Chain Privacy DEX (Federated Middle Layer) (not preferred standalone; complementary to atomic swaps). Inspired by Thorchain, Serai, Maya, Chainflip. AMM-style liquidity, TSS custody, LEZ privacy primitives layered on top. Honest XMR caveat: view-key-shared TSS custody leaks Monero deposit history to validators. Positioned as complementary to RFP-024 + RFP-026: the federated middle chain handles high-liquidity bulk trading where users accept federated custody for better UX, while the atomic-swap path covers the privacy-maximalist niche where cryptographic non-custody beats UX convenience. The two can coexist. See `appendix/cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md`.

  • RFP-024 — sXMR, CDP-Backed Synthetic (preferred sXMR design). Inspired by Synthetix CDP minting (SIP-302 Pools V3). Mint sXMR against stable collateral on LEZ at oracle price; burn to recover collateral. No atomic swap, no XMR custody. sXMR is a debt instrument against stable collateral, not a wrapped asset. Trade-off: no direct redemption to real XMR on Monero L1 within this RFP (use RFP-026 for that path).

  • RFP-025 — sXMR Backed by Real XMR in Trusted Multisig (not the preferred design). Inspired by sBTC (Stacks) and Secret Network's Secret Monero Bridge. 1:1 real-XMR backing held in a threshold-signer multisig on Monero (FROST-over-CLSAG per Serai's monero-oxide work). Documented for design-space comparability with an explicit "not preferred" callout in the Overview: custody risk and Monero deposit-history leak are real and material; RFP-024 wins on the bundle's positioning. The previous Option 2a (bonded LPs with redemption SLA) has been dropped because the slashable bond cannot be auto-slashed on a single failed swap without LP-0019's off-chain attribution.

  • RFP-026 — sXMR Atomic-Swap Redemption (extends RFP-024). Adds a peer-to-peer atomic-swap redemption module on top of RFP-024's CDP-backed sXMR. Holders post a redemption intent over Logos Delivery; any XMR holder (an open LP) can counterparty via an atomic swap using RFP-003's LEZ-XMR SDK. Open LP set, soft SLA, no protocol custody. Hard prerequisites: RFP-024 and RFP-003. LP-0018 and LP-0019 layerable but not preconditions.

Lambda prizes (staged in `lambda-prizes/`, to move to logos-co/lambda-prize when accepted)

The prizes could be open at a later stage once the frictions they aim to solve are actually experienced by users.

  • LP-0018 — Spam Protection for Atomic-Swap Makers. Frames the maker-side reliability problem (malicious takers spamming makers via initiate-and-abandon swaps). Scoped to XMR↔LEZ with two explicit sub-cases driven by the protocol-level locking-order constraint (LEZ-side party always locks first because Monero today provides no on-chain primitive supporting the locks-first role). References eigenwallet PR #675 as reference prior art without prescribing. Three-criterion success: proven spam reduction with hard stats or testimony; no reliability reduction for honest takers; no reliability reduction for honest makers.

  • LP-0019 — Taker Reliability for Atomic Swaps. The dual of LP-0018, framing the taker-side reliability problem (maker quote-and-walk, refusal to advance, selective serving, mid-swap disappearance). Design space deliberately open: on-chain attestation, off-chain proof bundles, slashable bonds, watchtower designs, reputation systems, or any combination. Same three-criterion success shape as LP-0018.

Appendices (bundle-agnostic surveys; no RFP-specific designs)

  • `appendix/atomic-swaps-primer.md` — HTLC and adaptor-signature constructions; canonical XMR-BTC flow with two Mermaid sequence diagrams (happy path + refund path); locking-order framed as a protocol-level constraint (Monero today provides no on-chain primitive supporting the locks-first role; vault-verified against Monero core's 2026-05-10 deprecating-unlock-time blog post, eigenwallet/protocol commit 6151734, and the FCMP++ hardfork deprecating the timelock primitive); canonical mainnet timelock values from `xmr-btc-swap` and `eigenwallet/core` source code; free-option problem with Han et al. 2019 framing tempered by eigenwallet's community-scale adoption signal; `σ × √T × notional` notation.

  • `appendix/cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md` — federated-signer middle chains (Thorchain, Serai, Maya, Chainflip; Wormhole as a related-but-distinct attestation pattern) vs atomic swaps (COMIT, eigenwallet, Samourai Wallet, Farcaster, AtomicDEX, Liquality). Adoption record: Thorchain $112.2B cumulative; Wormhole $58.95B; Liquality $35M lifetime; eigenwallet 3,000+ swaps via GUI in 2023, ~89k cumulative binary downloads, ~2 active mainnet makers (community-scale not unused); Samourai pre-seizure user base in the several hundred thousands.

  • `appendix/synthetics-design-space.md` — deployed-synthetics taxonomy: oracle-priced over-collateralised (Haven, Synthetix); redeem-to-underlying with custody (sBTC 15-signer federation noted as structurally similar to Thorchain's bonded-validator model, Secret Monero Bridge); redeem-to-underlying without custody (no deployed example). Includes the Two-unrelated-sXMR-products clarification (Synthetix sXMR ≠ Secret Network sXMR), the Haven Protocol shutdown (2024-12-12 after range-proof exploit), and the Secret Monero Bridge as the closest deployed prior art.

Sourcing

All factual claims trace to the research vault or to primary-source citations (Gugger 2020, Hoenisch and del Pino 2021, Han et al. 2019, Monero core deprecating-unlock-time 2026-05-10, eigenwallet/protocol repo, project documentation, Decred blog, Stacks docs, Haven closure announcement, Synthetix SIP-302, eigenwallet PR #675, DOJ Samourai sentencing release). The 11-claim vault sourcing pass and the subsequent vault material on XMR-first infeasibility (projects/xmr-first-atomic-swaps.md, projects/xmr-first-required-monero-features.md) ground the locking-order framing. The comment-by-comment resolution log lives in `proposals-review/pr-57-decisions.md`.

fryorcraken and others added 3 commits May 21, 2026 18:34
Five decision-stage RFP drafts plus two background appendices. Each
RFP captures one alternative in the cross-chain DEX design space so
the Logos team and the community can compare and pick before
specifying further. Scope of Work, FURPS hard requirements, team
profile, timeline, and contracting details are deliberately omitted
at this stage; the drafts focus on desired properties, high-level
flow, and consistent Pros/Cons/Risks so the trade-offs are
scan-comparable.

New RFPs:

- RFP-021: cross-chain privacy DEX (Serai-like federated middle
  layer). AMM-style liquidity, TSS custody, LEZ privacy primitives
  layered on top. Honest XMR caveat: view-key-shared TSS custody
  leaks Monero deposit history to validators.
- RFP-022: bonded atomic swaps with two explicit tiers. Tier 1
  (LEZ-BTC, LEZ-ETH): symmetric bonding via on-LEZ light-client
  inclusion proofs; full bilateral free-option mitigation. Tier 2
  (LEZ-XMR): asymmetric because Monero has no SPV-style proof
  primitive without view-key disclosure. Bob bonded; Alice
  reputation-gated only on pre-XMR-lock free option. Bondless-taker
  capped-entry mechanic for onboarding without LEZ assets.
- RFP-023: reputation as the bonding alternative. Maker reputation
  is publicly linkable. Taker reputation via either capped-pseudonym
  path or zk membership proofs (SMT of swap outcomes). Provides the
  reputation primitive consumed by RFP-022 and RFP-025.
- RFP-024: synthetic XMR (sXMR), pure non-custodial design. Goal 1
  from the sXMR design-space appendix. Oracle-priced, open LP set,
  soft peg, redemption via atomic swap to real XMR on Monero L1.
- RFP-025: synthetic XMR (sXMR) with redemption SLA. Goals 2a and
  2b together; applicants commit to one. Option 2a bonded LP set
  (consumes RFP-023 reputation for default attribution because
  atomic-swap state alone cannot adjudicate "LP defaulted"). Option
  2b protocol XMR reserve (structurally an oracle-priced sBTC).

New appendices:

- appendix/cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md: the federated-signers
  vs atomic-swaps trust analysis. Three mitigations for the
  atomic-swap free-option problem (same-asset bridge with the
  synthetic-token correction; bonded atomic swap with the two-tier
  framing for BTC/ETH vs XMR; reputation with the taker-linkability
  privacy tension). Bondless-taker capped-entry mechanic documented
  as cross-cutting. Primary sources only.
- appendix/sxmr-design-space.md: Goal 1 / 2a / 2b property matrix,
  decision tree, pre-spec validation list, bottom-line table.
  Adapted from research-synthetics/rfp/appendix/sxmr-atomic-redemption.md
  with no em dashes and Australian English.

Citation policy: primary sources only (Monero docs, FCMP++ research
notes, COMIT/Farcaster references, Serai/Thorchain whitepapers, BIP
references). No internal R&D documents cited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- RFP-021: replace the labels-only ASCII architecture sketch with a
  Mermaid flowchart that shows the validator set, the per-curve TSS
  vaults, and the LEZ execution layer (AMM plus privacy primitives)
  with proper connections.
- RFP-022: replace the Tier 1 ASCII swimlane with a Mermaid
  sequenceDiagram covering phases 0 through 5 (Quote, Commit,
  Lock-BTC, Lock-Logos, Reveal, Settle) with explicit slash-window
  notes.
- appendix/cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md line 53: fix the
  inline citation of the Hoenisch and del Pino BTC-XMR atomic-swap
  paper from "IACR 2021/441" to "IACR 2020/1126". The URL was
  already correct and the references block (line 208) and RFP-022
  (line 135) had the right identifier; only the inline mention was
  wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Findings consolidated from seven parallel fact-check agents (one per
new file). Fixes applied as a single follow-up commit.

Citation corrections:

- IACR ePrint 2020/1126 is "Bitcoin-Monero Cross-chain Atomic Swap"
  by Joel Gugger, not Hoenisch and del Pino. The Hoenisch/del Pino
  paper "Atomic Swaps between Bitcoin and Monero" is arXiv:2101.12332.
  The earlier "fix" commit (ba4adfd) swapped one wrong attribution
  (IACR 2021/441) for another (IACR 2020/1126 / Hoenisch and del
  Pino). Now cites both papers correctly: Gugger 2020/1126 and
  Hoenisch/del Pino arXiv:2101.12332. Affects RFP-022 line 135 and
  appendix line 53/References.
- Broken URLs replaced: getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/fcmp.html
  -> getmonero.org/2024/04/27/fcmps.html (the canonical FCMP++ post);
  citrea.xyz/learn/clementine -> docs.citrea.xyz/essentials/
  clementine-trust-minimized-bitcoin-bridge; LLFourn/one-time-vrf
  -> LLFourn/one-time-VES (correct repo); wormhole.com/docs/learn/
  security -> wormhole.com/docs/protocol/infrastructure/guardians
  (which actually contains "Security through reputation, not tokens");
  docs.stacks.co/concepts/sbtc -> docs.stacks.co/learn/sbtc
  (post-redirect canonical URL).
- Synthetix V3 docs link replaced with SIP-302, the primary source
  describing snxUSD-minting against collateral. The previously cited
  /v/v3/ page documents perps trading only.
- Inline Thorchain bond-to-pooled ratio (2:1 + 1:1) was cited via
  the Serai Validator Sets spec and the Thorchain CLP page, neither
  of which document that ratio. Cite docs.thorchain.org/understanding-
  thorchain/rune instead.
- Liquality "$35M lifetime volume" originally cited defiprime.com
  which does not state the figure. Reframed as widely-cited
  marketing copy without primary anchor.

Substantive claim revisions:

- Tier 2 Monero cryptography text in RFP-022 line 21 tightened:
  "reveals either the per-tx private key or the recipient view key
  (plus the output blinding factor), each of which is sufficient to
  deanonymise the swap output". Reflects the distinction between
  OutProofV2 (tx_secret_key) and InProofV2 (view secret key). Cites
  Zero to Monero 2.0 inline.
- Wedge claim "the only synthetic in the published landscape" was
  overclaimed: Synthetix's historical sXMR paired with the Secret
  Network Monero Bridge already offers XMR-L1 redemption under
  signer-set custody; Haven Protocol's xAsset family offered
  privacy-chain synthetics (closed Dec 2024). Narrowed to "the only
  currently published, live synthetic whose redemption deposits real
  XMR on Monero L1 *non-custodially, via peer-to-peer atomic swap*".
  Affects RFP-024 and the sxmr-design-space appendix.
- "Reinvented sBTC with an oracle bolted on" framing in RFP-025
  option 2b corrected: sBTC is 1:1 redemption-backed, not oracle-
  priced. The structural overlap is the threshold-signer custody
  model; the peg semantics differ. Reworded throughout.
- Serai timeline in RFP-021 corrected: "roughly six years" -> "roughly
  five years" (Serai dev began 2021, not 2020). "post-audit as of
  2026-04" -> "post-cryptographic-audit by Cypher Stack in May 2025;
  mainnet not yet launched".
- Thorchain cumulative volume updated from $112B to >$120B per
  DefiLlama dashboard, with access date.
- Wormhole reputation analogy in RFP-023 and the appendix softened:
  Wormhole is 19 hand-picked PoA signers, not a permissionless
  reputation-accruing population. RFP-023 premise reframed as a
  design conjecture rather than a proven theorem.
- Wormhole Feb 2022 categorisation in RFP-025 fixed: was listed
  under "signer collusion / key compromise / signing-software bug";
  actually a per-chain bridge-contract bug (load_instruction_at)
  that bypassed the signer set entirely. Recategorised.
- Settlement-time claim "30 to 60 minutes per swap" repeated five
  times across the bundle without primary source. Hedged to
  "Monero-confirmation-bound; typically under an hour but with
  variance from network conditions". Applicants asked to measure
  against a recent client release rather than rely on the indicative
  range.
- "About five years (2017 proposal to 2021 implementation)" was four
  years. Corrected.
- COMIT xmr-btc-swap "archived as of 2024-11" -> "unmaintained since
  2024-11; archival pending per issue #1791" (the repo is not
  actually flagged as archived on GitHub).
- Thorchain TSS incident dated more precisely: "May 2026" ->
  "2026-05-15" where applicable. Wormhole "February 2022" ->
  "2022-02-02" where applicable.

Citation hygiene:

- Inline citation added for sBTC-redeems-to-BTC claim in RFP-024.
- Demand-asymmetry and adverse-selection claims in RFP-024 marked
  as predicted behaviour ("predicted demand asymmetry", "predicted
  adverse selection") rather than stated facts.
- "(accessed 2026-05-21)" added to all external citations across
  the seven new files, matching the inline-citation convention used
  by the sibling appendix lez-vs-dedicated-zone.md.
- Han et al. IACR 2019/896 added as the canonical "free option
  problem" reference in the sxmr-design-space appendix.

No changes to the Mermaid diagrams added in commit ba4adfd.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A well-sourced lesson from the research vault that should probably be captured explicitly in one of these RFPs (most likely RFP-022 or the trust-model appendix):

The Secret Monero Bridge (launched August 2021) tried to bridge XMR into a programmable privacy ecosystem and failed reputationally with the Monero community. The research documents three specific failure modes that are directly relevant to the bonded-atomic-swap and synthetic-XMR designs in this bundle:

  1. Trusted-operator model without economic security. The bridge used a multi-sig Monero wallet controlled by consensus node operators communicating over I2P. There was no bonded collateral, no slashing, and no cryptographic proof of correctness. Security relied entirely on social trust and network anonymisation. Monero users correctly identified this as weaker than Monero's native trust model. This supports the RFP-022 emphasis on bonded atomic swaps and the RFP-023 reputation primitive: if you cannot bond (as with XMR's asymmetric tier), you need a compensating mechanism.

  2. Privacy-hostile UX. The mainnet release required users to provide an email address and use Discord for support tickets. The Monero community viewed this as antithetical to privacy principles and widely refused to use the bridge. This is a concrete data point for the FURPS usability and privacy requirements: bridge onboarding must not introduce identity leaks.

  3. No product-market fit despite being first. The bridge never achieved meaningful adoption. As of 2025-2026 its operational status is unclear and the GitHub repository has limited recent activity. This suggests that simply building a bridge is insufficient; the trust model and UX must align with the source chain's privacy culture.

Sources (all primary or community-verified):

  • GitHub repository: maxkoda-cpu/Secret-Monero-Bridge
  • Devpost entry (Cosmos HackAtom RU winner, March 2021)
  • Bitcoin Insider mainnet launch announcement (August 2021)
  • Monero Observer: tutorial series and controversy coverage (August/December 2021)
  • Secret Network Forum: status discussion thread (2025)

The research vault note is at (Secret Monero Bridge section) and in .

Suggest adding a brief reference to the Secret Monero Bridge as a negative example in RFP-022's Risks section or in the trust-model appendix, to show what happens when a bridge tries to bring XMR into DeFi without bonding, without privacy-preserving UX, and without aligning with the source chain's trust assumptions.

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Need to review whether the private middle chain (a la Thor) is really a USP Logos can offer.

Do not use "Waku" terminology: only "Logos Delivery"

Sounds like the appendix could be merged as I saw duplicate info

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fryorcraken and others added 8 commits May 22, 2026 16:26
Pure background appendix covering atomic-swap mechanics: HTLC, adaptor
signatures with cross-curve DLEQ, the canonical XMR-BTC flow (with
Mermaid sequence diagram), the locks-first rule (script-bearing side
locks first by construction of the adaptor-signature primitive), the
free-option problem, and the sigma*sqrt(T)*notional notation used to
size free-option premiums.

Survey scope only: deployed protocols and published literature. No
bundle-specific designs, no recommendations.

Part of the appendix/RFP-design split for PR #57. Following commits
will rewrite the trust-model-contrast and synthetics appendices to
pure survey form, then move the bundle's design content into the
relevant RFPs (022-025).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sequence diagram had "scalar s" at end-of-line, which Mermaid's
parser treated as a participant token rather than label text. Reworded
to "the scalar" / "the revealed scalar" so the diagram renders on
GitHub.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mermaid's sequenceDiagram parser treats semicolons in message labels
as statement separators, breaking the diagram. Replaced "Claim BTC;
broadcast reveals the scalar" with "Claim BTC, broadcasting the
scalar to Alice".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three changes:

1. atomic-swaps-primer.md: corrected Farcaster status (vault confirms
   still actively maintained as of 2026 with Lightning BTC support,
   not the v0.8.4-2023-01-16 stale claim). Removed bundle-specific
   "Generalisation to XMR-LEZ" section. Removed bundle references
   from notation and closing text. Sourcing for the protocol step
   diagram and lock-ordering rationale flagged in
   marclawclaw/research-cross-chain-dex/projects/PENDING-atomic-swap-protocol-details.md.

2. cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md: stripped Mitigations 1/2/3
   design content, Synthesis table, bondless-taker mechanic. All
   are bundle design choices that belong in the RFPs, not in a
   survey appendix. Kept the two-camps contrast and the adoption
   record. All numbers re-grounded against the research vault:
   Thorchain $112.201B cumulative (DefiLlama, not the $118B Messari
   claim that was not in vault); AtomicDEX Nomics $5,737 figure;
   Liquality $35M; Serai pre-mainnet with 2026-04-15 audit;
   Wormhole 19-of-13 attestation pattern. Every claim now traces
   to a citation in marclawclaw/research-cross-chain-dex/.

3. synthetics-design-space.md: replaces sxmr-design-space.md.
   Stripped Goal 1/2a/2b sub-designs (move to RFPs 024 and 025 in
   follow-up commits). Survey-only taxonomy: oracle-priced
   over-collateralised (Haven, Synthetix); redeem-to-underlying
   with custody (sBTC, Secret Monero Bridge); redeem-to-underlying
   without custody (no deployed example). Privacy-coin specific
   constraints documented. Secret Monero Bridge included as the
   closest deployed prior art with its documented launch reception.
   Three vault-uncertain claims explicitly flagged inline for
   verification (Haven shutdown date, SIP-302 citation, sBTC trust
   shape); see PENDING-atomic-swap-protocol-details.md.

Inbound links from RFP-024 and RFP-025 to the old sxmr-design-space
file will be updated by the follow-up commits that move the design
content into those RFPs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the appendix/RFP split started in the previous commit.

RFP-022 (Bonded Atomic Swaps):
- Reframe bonds as the *price of the free option* at each phase boundary
  (per the comment-7 walk-through). Bond is sized at or above
  sigma*sqrt(T)*notional; bond posts at Commit; refunds on honest
  completion or slashes on default.
- Drop the B_bob_slice slicing concept (comments 3, 5). Use full B_alice
  and B_bob bonds posted atomically at Commit.
- Drop the Bob-broadcasts-BTC hop (comment 4). Alice broadcasts the BTC
  lock directly; inclusion-proof submitter remains unauthenticated.
- Fix Phase 3 row to lock only trade_amount, not the bond (comment 5).
- Add an option-pricing audit subsection naming, per phase boundary,
  who is short the option, who is long, and which bond prices it.
- Add a direction-symmetry note (comment 6): for LEZ-XMR, the protocol-
  level asymmetry is direction-independent; XMR-side party always holds
  the unverifiable lock; roles flip across taker/maker.
- Add a Tier 2 option-pricing audit and explicitly mark the Phase 2
  boundary as non-bond-priceable (trigger event off-LEZ); reputation
  plus maker market competition only.
- Defer the off-chain verifiable maker reputation question to RFP-023
  with a one-paragraph pointer.
- Update appendix links to point at atomic-swaps-primer.md and
  cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md (the survey appendix).

RFP-023 (Reputation-Based Atomic Swaps):
- Add a Slashable-event matrix and reputation counter design section
  (comment 8): per-event matrix showing LEZ-observable / slashable /
  reputation-counter triples. "Zero slashes" is too crude for LEZ-XMR;
  registry must track completed_count, slashed_count,
  abandoned_pre_xmr_lock_count, and disputed_attestation_count
  separately. zk membership proofs claim against per-counter thresholds.
- Add Off-chain verifiable maker reputation section: open question
  about whether the non-slashable abandonment paths can be made
  third-party-verifiable via a proof bundle (signed quote + Monero
  lock + view-key material + LEZ no-show). Sub-questions: privacy
  cost, distribution, aggregation, spam resistance, defense, threshold.

RFP-024 (sXMR Pure):
- Rewrite the wedge paragraph to remove unverifiable claims
  (Synthetix-sXMR-paired-with-Secret-Monero-Bridge, Haven shutdown
  date, sBTC public-BTC-redemption specifics). Replaced with what
  is sourced in the vault: Secret Monero Bridge as deployed custodial
  prior art; Haven xAssets as a Monero-forked privacy-chain synth
  family without an xXMR product; sBTC and sETH-family synths as
  redeem-to-transparent-assets.
- Update appendix references; remove stale Farcaster v0.8.4 citation
  (already documented in research vault as misleading).
- Point references at atomic-swaps-primer.md, synthetics-design-space.md
  (renamed), and cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md.

RFP-025 (sXMR with SLA):
- Update appendix references to point at synthetics-design-space.md
  and atomic-swaps-primer.md. The Option 2a (bonded LPs) and Option
  2b (protocol reserve) design content was already in this RFP and
  remains unchanged.
- Flag the sBTC trust-shape citation as pending vault verification.

Appendix touch-ups:
- atomic-swaps-primer.md: minor formatting from mdformat.
- cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md: mdformat reflow.
- synthetics-design-space.md: mdformat reflow.

All sourcing gaps are tracked in
marclawclaw/research-cross-chain-dex/projects/PENDING-atomic-swap-protocol-details.md
for a researcher pass; flagged annotations in the appendices will be
cleaned up once the pending claims are verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The vault deliverable atomic-swap-protocol-details.md (plus
stacks-sbtc.md, synthetix.md, updated haven.md) answered all 11
sourcing requests on 2026-05-22. Corrections applied:

Primer (appendix/atomic-swaps-primer.md):
- Drop the "step 0: signed quote" framing. Quote exchange is an
  implementation-layer maker convention (libp2p secure-channel auth),
  not a cryptographic protocol step. Gugger 2020 §2 explicitly says
  price agreement is off-protocol.
- Reframe BTC-locks-first as an economic constraint (draining-attack
  analysis, Hoenisch and del Pino 2021 §4), not a primitive constraint.
  Gugger 2020 has the reverse XMR-first variant; reversing the order
  requires CLSAG-based adaptor signatures (not deployed).
- Correct timelock framing: both timelocks are Bitcoin-side; Monero
  has no script-level timelock primitive (Gugger 2020 §3.1). Add
  canonical mainnet values from xmr-btc-swap and eigenwallet source
  code (eigenwallet: t_1=24, t_2=144; COMIT: 72/72).
- Soften Han 2019 claim: paper proves equivalence to premium-free
  American Call Option and quantifies premium at ~2% for crypto pairs;
  does not directly attribute volume scarcity to the free-option.
- Reframe the "4-year gap": Decred-Litecoin 2017-09-19 first on-chain
  HTLC to COMIT 2021-08-20 BTC-XMR mainnet is ~4 years bridging the
  script-vs-no-script chain gap. From Gugger 2020 formal protocol to
  COMIT mainnet is ~18 months. TierNolan's bitcointalk post is 2013,
  not 2017.
- Refine HTLC requirements: hashlocks plus relative timelocks plus
  transaction-malleability fix (Gugger 2020 §3.2).
- Bump eigenwallet to v4.6.4 (2026-05-21).
- Correct deployed-direction roles: Alice = XMR seller, Bob = BTC
  seller, BTC locks first.

Synthetics appendix (appendix/synthetics-design-space.md):
- Haven Protocol: confirmed shutdown 2024-12-12 after range-proof
  exploit; >94% of XHV supply controlled by attackers at closure.
  Closure announcement cited directly.
- Synthetix: SIP-302 V3 CDP-minting reference verified with direct
  quote from the SIP.
- sBTC (Stacks): 15-signer federation, 70% threshold (14 currently
  operating, 10-of-14 to sign); ~6-block (~1h) withdrawal latency;
  no protocol-level privacy on BTC-side destination.
- Two-unrelated-sXMR-products section: Synthetix sXMR (Ethereum L1,
  SNX-collateralised CDP oracle synth, Hadar release 2020-03-30) is
  unrelated to Secret Network sXMR (SNIP-20 wrapped real XMR via
  Secret Monero Bridge, 2021). The two share a ticker but were never
  paired.
- Remove all "flagged for vault verification" inline annotations.

RFP-024 (synthetic XMR pure):
- Rewrite the wedge paragraph: two distinct prior-art families
  (bridge-custodied real XMR via Secret Monero Bridge; CDP-collateralised
  oracle-priced synth via Synthetix sXMR) neither of which fills the
  non-custodial peer-to-peer-atomic-swap corner.
- Correct Haven characterisation: ran 2018-2024, closed 2024-12-12,
  never offered xXMR.
- Clean up references to remove the stale "pending vault verification"
  annotations.

RFP-025 (synthetic XMR SLA):
- Add the sBTC custody specifics (15-signer 70% threshold) to the
  references list; remove the "pending vault verification" annotation.

Decisions log (proposals-review/pr-57-decisions.md):
- Replace "Outstanding sourcing requests" with "Sourcing requests
  resolved 2026-05-22" listing each of the 11 claims with their
  resolution.

PR description updated to reflect the new three-appendix structure
and the verified-sourcing pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New RFP:
- RFP-026 (Fee-Burn Atomic Swaps): adapts the eigenwallet PR #675
  mechanism to LEZ-paired swaps. Non-refundable burn on the refund
  branch prices the free option without an on-LEZ bond. Maker-set
  fraction; burnt (not paid to counterparty) to avoid incentive skew;
  mercy path for honest refunds. The RFP explicitly addresses
  direction dependence: the fee-burn lives on the locks-first chain,
  so it prices the first-locker's option only; the second-locker's
  option needs a separate mechanism (or is left unpriced). For the
  reverse XMR-first variant (Hoenisch and del Pino 2021 §4), Monero
  has no refund-branch script and the mechanism is infeasible until
  FCMP++ or similar primitives ship.

Bond-system review (code-reviewer agent) findings applied:

- RFP-022 §Overview: replaced "Locking order is fixed by the
  cryptographic primitive" with the draining-attack economic framing
  (Hoenisch and del Pino 2021 §4), matching the corrected primer.
  Fixed broken anchor link to the primer.

- RFP-022 §Cons: added "Bond can exceed spread in high-volatility
  regimes" with the σ=0.8 / 28h example yielding bond ≈ 4-5% of
  notional vs typical maker spread 1-2%. Applicants must address what
  happens when σ × √T > spread.

- RFP-022 §Relationship: added RFP-026 entry. Explicitly framed as
  a *substitute* for RFP-022's bond, not a complement. RFP-022 bond
  dominates Tier 1 (capital-efficient on honest completion); RFP-026
  fee-burn dominates Tier 2 (prices the off-LEZ option the bond can't).
  Layering both on the same option boundary is double-counting.

- RFP-024 §Overview: added "Trade-off accepted up front" paragraph
  moving the unpriced-free-option choice from Risks to the Overview.
  States explicitly that LPs bear the cost of the unpriced option;
  points readers to RFP-022, RFP-026, or RFP-025 if they want the
  option priced.

- RFP-025 §Option 2a: added paragraph distinguishing the per-swap
  RFP-022 bond from the persistent SLA-bond. Applicants must address
  whether the two are additive or one subsumes the other when
  layered; aggregate bond load matters for LP economics.

Deferred for follow-up review (real findings, not fixed in this
commit): bond sizing T-parameter inconsistency (1h indicative vs 28h
actual refund window); Phase 5 settlement clarification; bondless-
taker capped-entry interaction with both-bonds-at-Commit; Tier 2
bidirectional audit tables; Wormhole-as-closest-analog framing in
RFP-023; Thorchain aggregate-bond invariant accept/reject; bondless
cap math (US$100 ↔ option value). Captured in pr-57-decisions.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three RFPs removed; two lambda prizes added; remaining RFPs reframed
around existing-project prior art.

Removed RFPs:
- RFP-022 (Bonded Atomic Swaps)
- RFP-023 (Reputation-Based Atomic Swaps)
- RFP-026 (Fee-Burn Atomic Swaps)

These RFPs specified solutions to two open problems where the Logos team
would rather not pre-judge the design. They were prescriptive about the
mechanism (bonds, reputation primitives, fee-burns) when the more honest
posture is to frame the problem and let solvers compete.

New lambda prizes (staged in lambda-prizes/; to move to logos-co/lambda-prize
when accepted):
- LP-0018 (Anti-Spam Mechanism for Atomic Swaps): frames the taker-spam
  / free-option problem. References eigenwallet PR #675 as one example
  of reference prior art but does not prescribe the approach. Solvers
  may design bonds, fee-burns, reputation, deposits, slashing schemes,
  or any combination. Success criteria require non-custody preservation,
  incentive-compatibility argument, direction-coverage statement, and
  honest-refund handling.
- LP-0019 (Off-Chain Verifiable Reputation for Atomic-Swap Makers):
  frames the off-chain attribution / verifiable-complaint problem.
  Lists naive view-key disclosure, FCMP++-grade zk proofs, multi-party
  attestation, and watchtower designs as candidates without prescribing
  the answer. Success criteria require sybil resistance, spam
  resistance, third-party verifiability without trusting the
  complainant, and complainant-side privacy.

Reframed remaining RFPs around existing-project inspiration:
- RFP-021: already cited Thorchain/Serai/Maya/Chainflip. Relationship
  section updated to point at LP-0018 and LP-0019 instead of the
  deleted RFP-022/023.
- RFP-024: added "Inspired by existing prior art" paragraph naming
  Synthetix (CDP minting mechanic, SIP-302 Pools V3) and eigenwallet/
  COMIT (peer-to-peer atomic-swap redemption). The novelty is the
  combination, not either half. Updated all cross-references to the
  deleted RFPs.
- RFP-025: Option 2a now explicitly framed as inspired by Thorchain's
  bonded-validator model (operators post slashable stake against a
  defined performance contract); Option 2b explicitly framed as
  adopting sBTC's threshold-signer custody model with an oracle-priced
  peg layer. Both link to appendix-documented existing projects.
- All references to RFP-022/023/026 replaced with pointers to LP-0018
  or LP-0019 as appropriate.

Appendix coverage check: every project named in the remaining RFPs
(Thorchain, Serai, Maya, Chainflip, Wormhole, sBTC, Stacks, Synthetix,
eigenwallet, COMIT, Farcaster, Haven, Liquality, AtomicDEX, Komodo,
Secret Monero Bridge, Secret Network) is documented in at least one
appendix (atomic-swaps-primer.md, cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md,
or synthetics-design-space.md).

Decisions log (proposals-review/pr-57-decisions.md) appended with a
"Bundle restructure 2026-05-22 (afternoon)" section summarising the
shift. Deferred bond-system review findings (#3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8,
#12, #14) are no longer relevant since the bonded-atomic-swap design
they applied to has been removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fryorcraken fryorcraken changed the title rfp: cross-chain DEX and synthetic-XMR design bundle (decision drafts) rfp: cross-chain DEX and synthetic-XMR design bundle (decision drafts) + 2 lambda prizes May 22, 2026
Two cosmetic touch-ups from the fact-check agent's report (no critical
issues found):

- atomic-swaps-primer.md: Han 2019 premium framing tightened from
  "approximately 2%" to "2-3%", matching the paper's exact "2% ~ 3%"
  range for cryptocurrency pairs.

- cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md: replaced "four orders of
  magnitude" with "roughly three-to-four orders of magnitude" for
  the Thorchain vs Liquality cumulative volume gap. Thorchain $112.2B
  / Liquality $35M is ~3,200x, which is 3.5 orders of magnitude.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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RFP-24 and 25 make no sense.

the only two options we have, based on the research capted on teh appendix are:

  1. stable over-collaterizsed CDP back the synthetic
  2. real assets locked in trusted multi-sig

This is 2 RFPs we can have, with a preference for (1)

then, have another RFP, where we plug atomic swaps with (1).

Comment thread appendix/atomic-swaps-primer.md
Comment thread appendix/atomic-swaps-primer.md Outdated
Comment thread appendix/atomic-swaps-primer.md
Comment thread appendix/cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md Outdated
Comment thread appendix/synthetics-design-space.md
Comment thread lambda-prizes/LP-0018-atomic-swap-anti-spam.md Outdated
Comment thread lambda-prizes/LP-0018-atomic-swap-anti-spam.md
Comment thread lambda-prizes/LP-0018-atomic-swap-anti-spam.md
Comment thread lambda-prizes/LP-0018-atomic-swap-anti-spam.md Outdated
Comment thread lambda-prizes/LP-0019-atomic-swap-maker-reputation.md Outdated
fryorcraken and others added 4 commits May 22, 2026 21:56
…rrection)

Primer (atomic-swaps-primer.md):
- C1: add refund-path Mermaid sequenceDiagram in Timelocks and refunds
  section showing TxLock → TxCancel → branch: TxRefund (Bob) or TxPunish
  (Alice after t_2).
- C2: accept text suggestion at line 112; drop "The quote is not
  cryptographically signed" clause.
- C3: add paragraph after Han 2019 citation noting eigenwallet runs a
  community-scale market (3,000+ swaps via GUI in 2023, ~89k cumulative
  binary downloads, single-digit active makers), demonstrating the
  free-option problem is a friction rather than absolute blocker.
- C3b (substantive): rewrite "Locking order" and "How locking order
  generalises across pairs" sections. BTC-first in BTC-XMR is now framed
  as a protocol-level constraint, not just economic. Monero today
  provides no on-chain primitive supporting the locks-first role in any
  published atomic-swap construction. Sources: Monero core team's
  2026-05-10 deprecating-unlock-time blog post ("no scheme has been
  specified" using Monero's existing timelock); eigenwallet/protocol
  commit 6151734 removing the XMR-first chapter; FCMP++ hardfork
  deprecating the timelock primitive. Economic draining-attack
  complements but does not replace the protocol constraint.

Trust-model contrast (cross-chain-trust-model-contrast.md):
- C4: add eigenwallet and Samourai Wallet (atomic-swap GUI) bullet
  entries to the atomic-swap representative protocols list. Includes
  vault-sourced adoption figures: eigenwallet 3,000+ swaps via GUI in
  2023, ~89,400 cumulative binary downloads, ~2 active mainnet makers,
  third-party +180% growth attribution; Samourai 2023-08 announcement,
  2024-01 beta, 2024-04 seizure, 5/4-year prison sentences in Nov 2025,
  several-hundred-thousand pre-seizure user base, no first-party swap-
  volume figure published. Softened the volume-gap prose to acknowledge
  community-scale adoption is real, not "unused".

Synthetics design space (synthetics-design-space.md):
- C5: add closing paragraph to sBTC bullet comparing it to Thorchain's
  bonded-validator model. Same trust class (federation of named or
  staked signers custodying the underlying asset); differences in size,
  threshold, and cryptographic construction documented.

Lambda prize LP-0018 (anti-spam → spam-protection-for-makers):
- C6, C7, C8, C9: retitle in-body to "Spam Protection for Atomic-Swap
  Makers" (filename unchanged per user). Introduce maker/taker
  architecture. State LEZ-side-locks-first as a protocol constraint
  for XMR↔LEZ. Add explicit two-sub-case direction analysis (A: LEZ-
  taker locks first; B: LEZ-maker locks first, DDoS-exposed). Scope to
  XMR↔LEZ. Single prize, two acceptable solution shapes. Replace FURPS
  subsections with three success criteria (proven spam reduction with
  stats/testimony; no reliability reduction for honest takers; no
  reliability reduction for honest makers). Move non-pass/fail items
  into a Design Constraints section. Clean Out-of-Scope: remove
  polished-UI and LEZ↔XMR-direction-symmetry exclusions.

Lambda prize LP-0019 (off-chain reputation → taker reliability):
- C10: retitle in-body to "Taker Reliability for Atomic Swaps". Strip
  the off-chain proof-bundle subsection entirely; replace with generic
  "design space is open" statement listing on-chain attestation,
  off-chain proof bundles, slashable bonds, watchtower designs,
  reputation systems, and hybrids as candidate approaches without
  prescribing. Mirror LP-0018 structure (maker/taker intro, XMR↔LEZ
  scope, two sub-cases, three success criteria, Design Constraints
  section).

Decisions log (proposals-review/pr-57-decisions.md):
- Append "Round 2 review resolutions 2026-05-22" section logging C1
  through C10 plus the C3b protocol-constraint correction.

Verification: 0 FURPS headers remain in prizes; both prizes mention
XMR↔LEZ six times each; primer has 2 Mermaid sequence diagrams (happy
path + refund); trust-model contrast lists eigenwallet and Samourai;
all 5 off-chain mentions in LP-0019 are listed as one option among
many rather than as the framing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous bundle conflated three distinct synthetic-XMR designs. The
research-vault material supports a clean three-way split, with the
team's preference for the CDP-backed design (RFP-024).

RFP-024 rewritten as CDP-backed synthetic only:
- Mint sXMR against stable collateral on LEZ at oracle price; burn to
  recover collateral. No atomic swap, no XMR custody, no redemption to
  Monero L1. Inspired by Synthetix CDP minting (SIP-302 Pools V3).
- The atomic-swap-redemption mechanic that was in the old RFP-024 has
  been extracted to RFP-026.
- This is the preferred sXMR design in the bundle.

RFP-025 rewritten as real-XMR multisig only:
- 1:1 backed by real XMR held in a threshold-signer multisig on Monero
  (FROST-over-CLSAG per Serai's monero-oxide work). Inspired by sBTC
  (Stacks) and Secret Network's Secret Monero Bridge.
- Overview explicitly flags this as not the team's preferred design,
  with custody risk and Monero deposit-history leak as the reasons.
- Option 2a (bonded LPs with redemption SLA) DROPPED. The slashable LP
  bond cannot be auto-slashed on a single failed swap because LEZ
  cannot adjudicate atomic-swap defaults from state alone; without
  LP-0019 the bond degrades to a gating deposit. The "two sub-designs"
  framing from the old RFP-025 is gone.

RFP-026 created as atomic-swap-redemption module:
- Strictly extends RFP-024. RFP-024 and RFP-003 are hard prerequisites.
- Adds open-LP-set peer-to-peer atomic-swap redemption from sXMR to
  real XMR on Monero L1. Soft SLA; no protocol custody; no bonded LPs.
- LP-0018 and LP-0019 layerable but not preconditions.

RFP-021 slim trim:
- Stripped the "Desired properties" FURPS-shaped bullet list per
  user direction ("all RFPs should be slim but Pros/Cons/Risks stay
  because that is the critical decision content").
- Bundle-range note updated to "RFP-021, RFP-024, RFP-025, RFP-026".
- Relationship section updated to reflect the four-way split.

All RFPs (021/024/025/026):
- Bundle-range note updated to mention all four RFPs.
- "Desired properties" section removed in favour of letting Overview
  and High-level flow carry the design intent. Pros/Cons/Risks kept
  in full — those are the decision content.
- The note text explicitly says "FURPS detail" is among the omitted
  decision-stage content.

Lambda prizes:
- LP-0018 bundle-range mention updated to include RFP-026.
- LP-0019 unchanged (no stale bundle references).
- LP-0018 and LP-0019 explicitly noted in RFP-024 as not preconditions
  (the CDP design ships without atomic-swap-specific mitigations), and
  in RFP-026 as layerable but not preconditions.

Decisions log:
- Appended "Round 3 restructure 2026-05-22 (synthetics three-way split)"
  section documenting the design clarification and the new RFP mapping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…o atomic swaps

Add explicit "not preferred standalone, complementary to atomic swaps" framing
to RFP-021's top-of-file note and Overview. The federated-signer custody
model trades non-custody for AMM liquidity and one-step UX; the Logos team's
working preference is the non-custodial atomic-swap path (RFP-003 + RFP-024 +
RFP-026). RFP-021 stays in the bundle as a complementary design for users
who prefer the better UX over cryptographic non-custody.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The research vault `~/src/marclawclaw/research-cross-chain-dex/` lives
publicly at https://github.com/marclawclaw/research-cross-chain-dex.
Replaced two local-folder references with the matching GitHub URLs so
external readers can follow the citations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fryorcraken fryorcraken force-pushed the rfp/cross-chain-and-synthetics-bundle branch from 9438461 to 0b14248 Compare May 22, 2026 13:00
@fryorcraken
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Hard blocker across all RFP is lack of core module and GUI for lez wallet

@mart1n-xyz
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One idea worth investigating is to have the synthetic asset anchored as a separate lending market within the lending RFP product. This way, we wouldn't need to provide the CDP infrastructure.

Check out Maker's Direct deposit modules as slightly more centralized a reference.

@fryorcraken
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One idea worth investigating is to have the synthetic asset anchored as a separate lending market within the lending RFP product. This way, we wouldn't need to provide the CDP infrastructure.

Check out Maker's Direct deposit modules as slightly more centralized a reference.

We could make it a soft-requirement in the RFP. Enabling applicant to save dev effort and quote lower. WDYT?

@mart1n-xyz
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We could make it a soft-requirement in the RFP. Enabling applicant to save dev effort and quote lower. WDYT?

I think this makes sense. We do not know who will be running the lending market in the end. It might not be the same entity, after all.

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Changed my opinion based on this research below @fryorcraken We might need to have a specific CDP liquidation mechanism for this.

On liquidation mechanics for CDP-backed sXMR

Walking through the failure mode:

  • Borrower opens a CDP, deposits LGS, mints sXMR at oracle price.
  • XMR pumps. C-ratio breaches threshold at price P₁.
  • Liquidator needs to acquire sXMR on-market to repay the debt and claim the seized LGS at a discount.
  • By the time the liquidator sources sXMR, XMR has moved to P₂ > P₁. The sXMR they need to buy now costs more than the discount on the LGS they're seizing.
  • Liquidator doesn't show up. CDP goes deeper underwater. Protocol takes bad debt.

This is a structural ceiling on how much sXMR can be safely issued. In thin sXMR/LGS liquidity, the band where liquidation is profitable is narrow and gets narrower as the underlying moves faster. A volatile synthetic with shallow secondary markets has a liquidator-shortage problem that generic CDP design doesn't address.

This also means the liquidation layer can't ride on a generic lending-market substrate (Aave/Compound/Morpho Blue all assume the borrowed asset has a deep secondary market the liquidator can hit in one tx). The position accounting (isolated CDPs, c-ratios, oracle pricing) can be reused, but the liquidation absorption mechanism needs to be specific to sXMR.

Liquity-style stability pool as the proposed solution.

Depositors pre-fund a pool with sXMR. When a CDP breaches the liquidation threshold, the protocol atomically burns sXMR from the pool against the debt and distributes the seized LGS pro-rata to pool depositors. Liquidators don't need to scramble for sXMR. Pool depositors are effectively running a perpetual short-XMR / long-LGS strategy and earn the liquidation discount as yield.

Why this fits sXMR specifically:

  • No dependency on secondary-market sXMR depth — the burn-against-pool is atomic with the liquidation tx, so price slippage during execution is irrelevant.
  • Liquidator role collapses into "anyone who sees the trigger and calls the function"; the economic absorption is pre-funded.
  • Pool yield is denominated in seized LGS, which gives sXMR holders a defensible reason to lock supply into the pool rather than sell it.
  • Scales: the protocol can safely issue sXMR up to roughly the size of the stability pool's coverage capacity, which is observable on-chain rather than dependent on opaque off-chain market depth.

Recommended for RFP-024: specify the liquidation mechanism explicitly rather than punting to "standard CDP liquidation". A Liquity-style stability pool is the natural baseline given the synthetic-with-thin-secondary-market shape of sXMR at launch. Applicants can propose alternatives, but the RFP should call out the problem and the baseline answer rather than leaving it open.

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