| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.4.x | ✅ |
| 1.3.x | ✅ |
| < 1.3 | ❌ |
kiroxy handles authentication credentials (Kiro refresh tokens, Builder ID auth, inbound API keys) on behalf of the operator. Vulnerabilities that could leak these credentials, allow unauthorized access to the proxy, or enable account compromise are taken seriously.
Please do NOT report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Email security@nopperabbo.dev (or open a private GitHub Security Advisory at https://github.com/nopperabbo/kiroxy/security/advisories/new) with:
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce (proof-of-concept where applicable)
- Affected version(s)
- Potential impact assessment
- Any suggested mitigation
- Acknowledgment within 72 hours
- Initial assessment within 7 days
- Coordinated disclosure timeline negotiated case-by-case (default: 90 days from acknowledgment)
- Public credit in the CHANGELOG and release notes (unless you prefer anonymous)
In scope:
- Authentication bypass (inbound API key validation, Kiro auth flow)
- Credential exposure (vault file leakage, log redaction failures, token in error responses)
- Authorization issues (cross-account leakage in multi-account pool)
- Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via upstream proxy chain
- Path traversal in dashboard / docs serving
- Cryptographic weaknesses in token storage (vault uses mode 0600, but report any structural flaws)
Out of scope:
- Issues requiring physical access to the operator's machine
- Social engineering against operators
- Vulnerabilities in third-party Kiro IDE / AWS Builder ID services (report those to AWS)
- DoS attacks against your own self-hosted instance (you control the deployment surface)
Even without specific CVEs, kiroxy operators should:
- Bind to loopback only by default (
-port 8787listens on127.0.0.1unless-bind 0.0.0.0is set) - Set a strong inbound API key via
-api-keyflag orKIROXY_API_KEYenv var - Keep
~/.kiroxy/tokens.dbmode 0600 (kiroxy enforces this on startup) - Audit the wire with
tcpdump -i lo0 port 8787if running on shared hardware - Run behind a reverse proxy with TLS if exposing publicly (Caddy / Traefik recommended)
- Rotate refresh tokens monthly via Kiro IDE re-authentication
- Pin the binary version rather than tracking
latestfor production deployments
No public CVEs as of v1.4.0.
Kiroxy follows supply chain hardening practices aligned with SLSA and OpenSSF:
- Signed releases: All binaries are signed with cosign via keyless signing (Sigstore OIDC)
- SBOM: Every release includes a Software Bill of Materials in SPDX format
- Pinned actions: All GitHub Actions are pinned to full SHA commit hashes
- Dependency review: PRs introducing vulnerable dependencies are automatically blocked
- OpenSSF Scorecard: Automated weekly scoring with results published to SARIF
- Container images: Published to
ghcr.io/nopperabbo/kiroxywith multi-arch support (amd64/arm64)
cosign verify-blob \
--certificate-identity-regexp="https://github.com/nopperabbo/kiroxy" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
--signature kiroxy_<version>_checksums.txt.sig \
--certificate kiroxy_<version>_checksums.txt.pem \
kiroxy_<version>_checksums.txt