Reject signed non-authorizing receipt statuses#2
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Summary
statusis not one of the v1 authorization lifecycle statesrevokedclassified as expired/revoked, but fail closed for unknown/non-authorizing statusesstatus: DENIEDand verifies it is rejected despite a valid Ed25519 signatureWhy
The local verifier currently treats every signed, unexpired status except lowercase
revokedas authorization-valid. That means any signed receipt carrying a non-authorizing or legacy status such asDENIED,PENDING, orEXPIREDcan be accepted by downstream consumers that rely onpp verify/verifyReceiptexit code as the authorization decision. The test demonstrates the issue using a freshly valid Ed25519 signature overstatus: DENIED.Related to permission-protocol/deploy-gate#36 because this is a flaw in the signing/verification acceptance flow rather than a raw signature forgery.
Validation
npm cinpm test -- --runnpm run buildgit diff --check