π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in execSync usages#271
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Multiple uses of
execSyncacross the CLI commands (cli/commands/setup.mjs,cli/commands/score.mjs, etc) passed dynamically formatted strings to shell commands. This is highly susceptible to command injection if variables leak arbitrary shell metacharacters like;,&&, or|.π― Impact: An attacker or malicious configuration could manipulate internal logic executing those shell commands, achieving arbitrary command execution as the user running the CLI.
π§ Fix: Updated all
execSynccommands across the codebase (e.g.where/which,git rev-parse,git log, etc.) to useexecFileSyncinstead. Emulated shell behaviors natively in JavaScript where needed (e.g. replacinggit log ... | wc -lwith JS array splits and length checks; redirecting2>/dev/nullusing thestdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore']config).β Verification: Tests were run locally and all modules parse correctly.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 1086925295533869825 started by @raccioly