release 0.6.2 — report-the-passes for cookies (HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite)

AGENTS.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pass. Pure-Python, **stdlib only, zero runtime dependencies**; it shells out to
 | Command | Purpose |
 |---------|---------|
 | `pipx install --editable .` | Install the CLI from source (or `pip install -e .` in a 3.11+ venv) |
-| `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` | Run the suite (136 tests, stdlib only, no network) |
+| `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` | Run the suite (139 tests, stdlib only, no network) |
 | `websec run ./target` | Full pipeline → `FACTS.json` + `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` + `probes/` |
 | `websec doctor ./target` | Show which optional scanners are installed |
 | `websec proof` | Score recon coverage vs the vuln-app corpus (needs network on first clone) |
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ docguard diagnose              # guard → emit AI fix prompts
 
 1. **Before any work**: read `docs-canonical/` and run `docguard guard` to see the compliance state.
 2. **After changing code or docs**: re-run `docguard guard`; keep the numbers (16 extractors, 15 sink
-   classes, 136 tests, 10/10 proof) consistent across every doc — DocGuard's metrics-consistency
+   classes, 139 tests, 10/10 proof) consistent across every doc — DocGuard's metrics-consistency
    validator cross-checks them.
 3. **Update `CHANGELOG.md`** for any user-visible change.
 4. **Document drift**: if code must deviate from a canonical doc, add a `// DRIFT: reason` (or

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
 ### Removed
 
+## [0.6.2] — 2026-06-12
+
+### Added
+- **Report-the-passes for cookies (P3)** — `transport_security` now reports a cookie-hardening PASS
+  (`HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite` present → ✓, surfaced in the briefing's §3c "report-the-pass / gap"
+  line) and flags the gap as a new `insecure-cookie` finding (CWE-1004/614) when a flag is missing.
+  Saying "checked ✓" builds trust and turns the control into a regression assertion.
+
 ## [0.6.1] — 2026-06-12
 
 Precision fixes found by re-running 0.6.0 on the same Cloudflare Worker.

README.md

@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ upload, cross-tenant BOLA, role/authz gaps).
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 136 tests
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 139 tests
 ```
 
 ## Releasing (maintainer)

docs-canonical/ENVIRONMENT.md

@@ -96,6 +96,6 @@ Never point the dynamic phase at production.
 ```bash
 git clone https://github.com/raccioly/websec-validator && cd websec-validator
 pipx install --editable .                # or: pip install -e . in a 3.11+ venv
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # 136 tests, stdlib only
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # 139 tests, stdlib only
 docguard guard                           # validate the documentation (CDD)
 ```

docs-canonical/TEST-SPEC.md

@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@
 > Last updated: 2026-06-10
 
 The suite is **stdlib `unittest` only** — no third-party test runner, no network, no Noir, no running
-app. **136 tests** across three files run in ~3s and gate every release (the `publish.yml` workflow
+app. **139 tests** across three files run in ~3s and gate every release (the `publish.yml` workflow
 also installs the built wheel and smoke-runs `websec run`).
 
 ```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # 136 tests, stdlib only
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # 139 tests, stdlib only
 ```
 
 ---

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "websec-validator"
-version = "0.6.1"
+version = "0.6.2"
 description = "Local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent: facts + tailored probe scripts, code-in / artifacts-out. No LLM, no server, no running app."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

src/websec_validator/briefing.py

@@ -83,6 +83,15 @@ def render(facts: dict, scanners: dict, scan_results: list, probe_manifest: list
     pii_section = ("\n".join(f"- **{f.get('severity')}** {f.get('kind')} — `{f.get('file')}`" for f in pii_findings[:20])
                    if pii_findings else "_no obvious raw-PII responses / dead masking controls_")
     ws_line = (facts.get("client_integrity", {}) or {}).get("websocket_auth", "no websocket detected")
+    _cs = (facts.get("transport_security", {}) or {}).get("cookie_security")
+    if _cs:
+        if _cs.get("httponly") and _cs.get("secure") and _cs.get("samesite"):
+            cookie_line = "✓ HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite present (checked — verify against the live Set-Cookie)"
+        else:
+            _miss = [n for n, k in (("HttpOnly", "httponly"), ("Secure", "secure"), ("SameSite", "samesite")) if not _cs.get(k)]
+            cookie_line = f"⚠ cookie set WITHOUT {', '.join(_miss)} — an auth/session cookie should be HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite"
+    else:
+        cookie_line = "_no Set-Cookie detected_"
 
     gql = facts.get("graphql", {})
     if gql.get("present"):
@@ -205,6 +214,8 @@ def render(facts: dict, scanners: dict, scan_results: list, probe_manifest: list
 
 **WebSocket auth model (CSWSH determinant — is it an ambient cookie?):** {ws_line}
 
+**Cookie hardening (report-the-pass / gap):** {cookie_line}
+
 **File-upload security (#2b — sniff bytes, derive stored name, nosniff on serve):**
 {up_section}
 

src/websec_validator/extractors/transport_security.py

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@
 # applies even with no frontend framework. This is the gap that missed a Cloudflare Worker's CSP.
 HTML_CONTENT = re.compile(r"<!DOCTYPE\s+html|<html[\s>]|text/html|res\.send\(\s*[`'\"]\s*<|c\.html\(", re.I)
 FRONTEND_FW = {"react", "next", "nextjs", "vue", "nuxt", "svelte", "sveltekit", "angular", "astro", "remix", "solid"}
+# Cookie hardening — "report the PASS" (HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite ✓ builds trust + is a regression
+# assertion) and flag the gap. Flags are matched per cookie-setting file (lenient — a positive lead).
+SET_COOKIE = re.compile(r"set-?cookie|res\.cookie\(|cookies\.set\(|\.setCookie\(|c\.cookie\(", re.I)
+CK_HTTPONLY = re.compile(r"httponly", re.I)
+CK_SECURE = re.compile(r";\s*secure\b|\bsecure\s*[:=]\s*true|\bsecure\s*:\s*!", re.I)
+CK_SAMESITE = re.compile(r"samesite", re.I)
 
 
 class TransportSecurityExtractor(Extractor):
@@ -55,6 +61,7 @@ def extract(self, ctx: RepoContext, facts: dict) -> dict:
         hsts_present = hsts_sub = hsts_preload = False
         html_surface = bool(frameworks & FRONTEND_FW)
         inline_handlers = []
+        sets_cookie = ck_httponly = ck_secure = ck_samesite = False
         hsts_files, hsts_api_only, hsts_html = [], True, False
 
         # config manifests carry headers too (next.config, vercel.json, netlify.toml, _headers)
@@ -87,6 +94,11 @@ def extract(self, ctx: RepoContext, facts: dict) -> dict:
                     hsts_html = True
                 elif not API_SCOPED.search(rel):
                     hsts_api_only = False   # a non-API, non-HTML place (e.g. global edge middleware)
+            if SET_COOKIE.search(blob):
+                sets_cookie = True
+                ck_httponly = ck_httponly or bool(CK_HTTPONLY.search(blob))
+                ck_secure = ck_secure or bool(CK_SECURE.search(blob))
+                ck_samesite = ck_samesite or bool(CK_SAMESITE.search(blob))
 
         if CSP_ANY.search(manifests):
             csp_present = True
@@ -155,12 +167,28 @@ def extract(self, ctx: RepoContext, facts: dict) -> dict:
                                      "detail": f"HSTS is present but missing {', '.join(gaps)} — add where the domain "
                                                "model allows (don't preload a domain whose subdomains aren't all HTTPS)."})
 
+        # 0.6.2: report the cookie-hardening PASS (✓ builds trust + is a regression assertion), or flag the gap.
+        passes, cookie_security = [], None
+        if sets_cookie:
+            cookie_security = {"httponly": ck_httponly, "secure": ck_secure, "samesite": ck_samesite}
+            if ck_httponly and ck_secure and ck_samesite:
+                passes.append("cookies set HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite (checked ✓)")
+            else:
+                miss = [n for n, ok in (("HttpOnly", ck_httponly), ("Secure", ck_secure),
+                                        ("SameSite", ck_samesite)) if not ok]
+                findings.append({"severity": "LOW", "kind": "cookie-flags", "attack_class": "insecure-cookie",
+                                 "detail": f"A cookie is set without {', '.join(miss)} — an auth/session cookie should be "
+                                           "HttpOnly (no JS read), Secure (HTTPS-only), and SameSite=Lax/Strict (CSRF). "
+                                           "Verify against the live Set-Cookie."})
+
         return {
             "web_surface": web_surface, "html_surface": html_surface,
             "csp_present": csp_present, "strict_csp": strict_csp, "csp_has_unsafe": csp_unsafe,
             "hsts_present": hsts_present, "hsts_includes_subdomains": hsts_sub, "hsts_preload": hsts_preload,
             "hsts_files": sorted(set(hsts_files))[:20],
             "inline_event_handlers": sorted(set(inline_handlers)),
+            "cookie_security": cookie_security,
+            "passes": passes,
             "findings": findings,
             "note": ("CSP/HSTS baseline audit — these are the enabling controls for the client trust boundary. "
                      "LOW/architectural: verify against the LIVE response headers (a static scan can't see the edge/CDN "

src/websec_validator/findings.py

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
                                  "ASVS V11.1.4", ["API4:2023 Unrestricted Resource Consumption",
                                                   "API6:2023 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows"]),
     "redundant-secret-fetch": (["CWE-200 Information Exposure"], "ASVS V2.10", ["API8:2023 Misconfiguration"]),
+    "insecure-cookie": (["CWE-1004 Sensitive Cookie Without HttpOnly", "CWE-614 Sensitive Cookie Without Secure"],
+                        "ASVS V3.4.1", ["API8:2023 Misconfiguration"]),
 }
 REMEDIATION = {
     "missing-auth": "Add an auth guard to the handler (e.g. requireAuth()/getServerSession()), or a "
@@ -152,6 +154,8 @@
     "redundant-secret-fetch": "Fetch each secret-manager key ONCE per request and reuse it; use the project's existing "
                               "secret-provider abstraction instead of a bespoke loader (smaller exposure window + "
                               "consistency).",
+    "insecure-cookie": "Set auth/session cookies `HttpOnly` (blocks JS/XSS theft) + `Secure` (HTTPS-only) + "
+                       "`SameSite=Lax`/`Strict` (CSRF). Verify against the live Set-Cookie header.",
 }
 _DEFAULT_REM = "Review and remediate per the cited standard."
 

tests/test_pentest_regressions.py

@@ -618,5 +618,24 @@ def test_named_provider_key_is_high_not_generic_via_gitleaks(self):
         self.assertIn("ROTATE", row["title"])
 
 
+class CookieReportPassTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """0.6.2 report-the-passes: cookie HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite → a PASS; a missing flag → a finding."""
+
+    def test_all_flags_is_a_pass_no_finding(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts":
+            "res.headers.set('Set-Cookie', 'sid=x; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax');\n"}), {})
+        self.assertTrue(any("HttpOnly" in p for p in out["passes"]))
+        self.assertFalse(any(f["kind"] == "cookie-flags" for f in out["findings"]))
+
+    def test_missing_flag_is_a_finding(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts": "res.cookie('sid', v, {httpOnly:true});\n"}), {})
+        self.assertTrue(any(f["attack_class"] == "insecure-cookie" for f in out["findings"]))
+
+    def test_no_cookie_no_noise(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts": "const x = 1;\n"}), {})
+        self.assertEqual(out["passes"], [])
+        self.assertIsNone(out["cookie_security"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()