🛡️ AuthShield

A production-ready, standalone authentication microservice — register, login, OAuth 2.0, TOTP 2FA, RBAC, session management, and Redis rate limiting. Deploy once. Plug into every future project.

Features • Quick Start • API Endpoints • Integration Guide • Docker • Tests

---

📖 Table of Contents

• Overview
• Features
• Tech Stack
• Live Demo
• Project Structure
• Getting Started
  • Prerequisites
  • Local Setup
  • Docker Setup
• Environment Variables
• Database Schema
• API Endpoints
• End-to-End Flow Testing
• Running Tests
• Plugging Into Your Project
• Security Design
• Deployment Checklist
• Contributing

---

🌟 Overview

AuthShield is a complete, standalone authentication microservice you build once and reuse across every project. It handles everything auth — registration, email verification, JWT token lifecycle, OAuth 2.0 social login, TOTP two-factor authentication, role-based access control, session management, and rate limiting — so your application services never have to implement any of it again.

Downstream services share one JWT_SECRET_KEY, validate JWTs locally with zero runtime calls to AuthShield per request, and store the user_id UUID from the token as a foreign key in their own databases.

Why AuthShield?

• ✅ Standalone — one deployed service handles auth for any number of projects
• ✅ Zero auth code in your apps — a 40-line auth.py is all your downstream service needs
• ✅ Production-hardened — bcrypt, token rotation with theft detection, sliding-window rate limits, security headers on every response
• ✅ 48 integration tests — real PostgreSQL and Redis, no infrastructure mocks
• ✅ Full OAuth 2.0 — Google and GitHub with CSRF protection and account linking
• ✅ TOTP 2FA — Google Authenticator / Authy compatible, QR code setup flow
• ✅ Complete session control — list and revoke individual sessions per device
• ✅ Structured logging — JSON logs ready for Datadog, CloudWatch, or Papertrail

---

✨ Features

🔐 Authentication & Tokens

• JWT access tokens (15-minute TTL) + opaque refresh tokens (7-day TTL)
• Refresh token rotation — every use issues a new pair and invalidates the old one
• Reuse detection — using a rotated token revokes the entire token family (theft signal — attacker and victim both logged out)
• Redis blacklist — POST /auth/logout takes effect on the very next request, not at natural JWT expiry
• Email verification required before first login, with resend endpoint

🌐 OAuth 2.0

• Google and GitHub sign-in via Authorization Code Flow
• CSRF protection — single-use state tokens stored in Redis; replayed callbacks rejected
• Account linking — OAuth login to an existing email/password account automatically merges them
• Auto-verified — OAuth users skip the email verification step entirely

🔑 Two-Factor Authentication (TOTP)

• QR code PNG + raw secret returned on setup — scan with any TOTP app
• Single-use temporary token bridges the login → TOTP verify step (5-minute TTL)
• Disabling 2FA requires a valid current TOTP code (prevents accidental lockout)
• ±30-second clock skew tolerated (valid_window=1 in pyotp)

👥 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

• Three built-in roles: user, moderator, admin
• Roles embedded in the JWT — your services check them with zero database calls
• Admin endpoints protected with a require_roles(["admin"]) dependency
• Admin cannot remove their own admin role (last-admin lockout prevention)

📱 Session Management

• Every login creates a tracked session recording IP address, device info, and timestamps
• List all active sessions — current session flagged with is_current: true
• Revoke any specific session — remote sessions kill the refresh token; revoking the current session immediately blacklists the access token
• Admin can revoke all sessions for any user (used on account deactivation)

🚦 Rate Limiting

• Redis sliding-window algorithm — no fixed-window boundary to exploit
• Per-IP limits on all sensitive endpoints
• Retry-After, X-RateLimit-Limit, and X-RateLimit-Window headers on every 429 response

🔒 Security Headers (every response)

• X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
• X-Frame-Options: DENY
• X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
• Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
• Strict-Transport-Security + Content-Security-Policy in production mode
• Server header stripped

🔑 Password Management

• bcrypt hashing (12 rounds, ~250 ms per hash — brute-force resistant)
• Forgot/reset flow — time-limited single-use tokens via Redis; successful reset revokes all sessions
• Change password — requires current password, rejects same-as-current
• Email enumeration prevention — /forgot-password always returns 200 regardless of whether the email exists

---

🛠️ Tech Stack

Backend

• FastAPI — async HTTP framework with automatic OpenAPI docs
• Uvicorn — ASGI server (4 workers in production)

Database

• PostgreSQL 15 — users, roles, sessions, tokens, login audit log
• SQLAlchemy 2.0 — async ORM with relationship loading
• Alembic — version-controlled schema migrations
• asyncpg — fastest async PostgreSQL driver for Python

Cache & State

• Redis 7 — token blacklist, rate limit windows, 2FA temp tokens, OAuth CSRF state, password reset tokens, email verification tokens

Authentication & Security

• PyJWT — JWT encode/decode (HS256)
• bcrypt — password hashing (12 rounds)
• pyotp — TOTP generation and verification
• qrcode + Pillow — QR code PNG generation for 2FA setup
• httpx — async HTTP for OAuth token exchange with Google/GitHub

Validation & Configuration

• Pydantic v2 — request/response schema validation, typed settings
• pydantic-settings — typed environment variable loading with .env support

Observability

• structlog — JSON-structured logs ready for production log aggregators

Testing

• pytest + pytest-asyncio — async test suite (48 tests)
• httpx — async test client via ASGITransport
• Real PostgreSQL and Redis — no infrastructure mocks; integration bugs that mocks hide are caught here

---

🌐 Live Demo

API Base URL

https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/docs

Interactive Documentation

• Swagger UI: https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/docs
• ReDoc: https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/redoc

Health Check

curl https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/api/v1/health
# {"status":"healthy","database":"ok","redis":"ok","version":"1.0.0"}

Quick Test

# Register
curl -X POST https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"test@example.com","password":"TestPass123!","full_name":"Jane Doe"}'

# Login (after verifying email)
curl -X POST https://authshield-31lz.onrender.com/api/v1/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"test@example.com","password":"TestPass123!"}'

---

📁 Project Structure

authshield/
├── app/
│   ├── main.py                         # App factory, middleware, exception handlers
│   ├── config.py                       # Typed settings via pydantic-settings
│   │
│   ├── api/v1/endpoints/               # Route handlers (thin — delegate to services)
│   │   ├── auth.py                     # Register, login, refresh, logout, verify-email
│   │   ├── oauth.py                    # Google + GitHub OAuth flows + callbacks
│   │   ├── two_factor.py               # 2FA enable, confirm, verify, disable
│   │   ├── sessions.py                 # List sessions, revoke session
│   │   ├── users.py                    # GET /users/me, PATCH /users/me
│   │   └── admin.py                    # Admin user listing, roles, status management
│   │
│   ├── core/
│   │   ├── security.py                 # JWT encode/decode, bcrypt hash/verify
│   │   ├── rate_limiter.py             # Redis sliding-window rate limiter
│   │   ├── exceptions.py               # Custom exception hierarchy + error codes
│   │   └── openapi.py                  # Custom OpenAPI schema (Swagger branding)
│   │
│   ├── db/
│   │   ├── session.py                  # SQLAlchemy async engine + get_db dependency
│   │   ├── redis.py                    # Redis connection pool + get_redis dependency
│   │   └── base.py                     # SQLAlchemy declarative base
│   │
│   ├── middleware/
│   │   └── security.py                 # Injects security headers on every response
│   │
│   ├── models/                         # SQLAlchemy ORM models
│   │   ├── user.py                     # User (email, password_hash, OAuth fields, 2FA secret)
│   │   ├── role.py                     # Role (name, description)
│   │   ├── user_role.py                # Many-to-many junction table
│   │   ├── refresh_token.py            # Token (hash, family_id, rotation chain)
│   │   ├── session.py                  # Session (IP, device, is_active)
│   │   └── login_history.py            # Immutable audit log (append-only)
│   │
│   ├── repositories/                   # DB query logic — no business logic here
│   │   ├── user_repository.py
│   │   ├── role_repository.py
│   │   ├── token_repository.py
│   │   └── session_repository.py
│   │
│   ├── schemas/                        # Pydantic request/response models
│   │   ├── auth.py                     # RegisterRequest, LoginRequest, TokenResponse
│   │   ├── user.py                     # UserResponse, UserUpdateRequest
│   │   ├── admin.py                    # AdminUserResponse, RoleUpdateRequest
│   │   ├── oauth.py                    # OAuthCallbackResponse
│   │   ├── two_factor.py               # TwoFactorSetupResponse, TwoFactorVerifyRequest
│   │   └── common.py                   # StandardResponse[T] wrapper
│   │
│   └── services/                       # Business logic layer
│       ├── auth_service.py             # Registration, login, logout, verification, refresh
│       ├── oauth_service.py            # Google + GitHub token exchange and user linking
│       ├── totp_service.py             # 2FA setup, confirmation, login verify, disable
│       ├── session_service.py          # Session listing and targeted revocation
│       ├── password_service.py         # Forgot/reset/change password flows
│       └── admin_service.py            # User listing, role updates, status management
│
├── alembic/                            # Database migrations
│   └── versions/                       # One file per schema change
│
├── tests/
│   ├── conftest.py                     # Fixtures: db (transaction rollback), client,
│   │                                   #           regular_user, admin_user, rate_limit_client
│   ├── test_auth.py                    # 18 tests — registration, verification, login, refresh, logout
│   ├── test_passwords.py               #  7 tests — forgot, reset, change password
│   ├── test_sessions.py                #  7 tests — listing, revocation, ownership checks
│   ├── test_admin.py                   #  9 tests — RBAC enforcement, user management
│   └── test_rate_limiting.py           #  3 tests — real rate limiter (bypassed in other tests)
│
├── nginx/
│   └── nginx.conf                      # HTTPS, TLS 1.3, OCSP stapling, proxy config
│
├── scripts/
│   └── seed_roles.py                   # Seeds user / moderator / admin roles
│
├── Dockerfile                          # Multi-stage build (~180 MB final image)
├── docker-compose.yml                  # authshield + postgres + redis, with health checks
├── .env.example                        # All environment variables documented
├── alembic.ini                         # Alembic configuration
├── pytest.ini                          # pytest + asyncio config
├── requirements.txt                    # Python dependencies
└── README.md                           # This file

---

📚 API Documentation

Base URL

http://localhost:8000/api/v1

Authentication

All protected endpoints require a JWT Bearer token in the Authorization header:

Authorization: Bearer <your_access_token>

Standard Response Format

Success:

{
  "status": "success",
  "message": "Operation successful",
  "data": { ... }
}

Error:

{
  "status": "error",
  "error_code": "AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS",
  "message": "Invalid email or password"
}

Rate Limit Headers

Header	Description
X-RateLimit-Limit	Max requests allowed in the window
X-RateLimit-Window	Window size in seconds
Retry-After	Seconds until the limit resets (on 429 only)

---

🔌 API Endpoints

🔐 Authentication (/auth)

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
POST	/auth/register	—	Register with email + password
POST	/auth/verify-email	—	Verify email with token from inbox
POST	/auth/resend-verification	—	Re-send verification email
POST	/auth/login	—	Login — returns access + refresh tokens
POST	/auth/refresh	—	Rotate refresh token — returns new pair
POST	/auth/logout	Bearer	Revoke current session
POST	/auth/logout-all	Bearer	Revoke all sessions on all devices

📋 Authentication Examples

Register:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "email": "user@example.com",
    "password": "StrongPass123!",
    "full_name": "Jane Doe"
  }'

{
  "status": "success",
  "message": "Registration successful. Please verify your email.",
  "data": {
    "user_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
    "email": "user@example.com"
  }
}

Login:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "user@example.com", "password": "StrongPass123!"}'

{
  "status": "success",
  "data": {
    "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...",
    "refresh_token": "rt_a1b2c3d4e5f6...",
    "token_type": "Bearer",
    "expires_in": 900
  }
}

Refresh Token:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/refresh \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"refresh_token": "rt_a1b2c3d4e5f6..."}'
# Old refresh_token is permanently invalidated — save the new pair

Logout:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/logout \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs..." \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"refresh_token": "rt_a1b2c3d4e5f6..."}'
# Access token immediately blacklisted — 401 on very next request

---

🔑 Password Management (/auth)

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
POST	/auth/forgot-password	—	Send reset email (always returns 200)
POST	/auth/reset-password	—	Reset password with emailed token
POST	/auth/change-password	Bearer	Change password while authenticated

📋 Password Examples

Forgot Password:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/forgot-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "user@example.com"}'
# Always returns 200 regardless of whether the email exists — prevents enumeration

Reset Password:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/reset-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "token-copied-from-email",
    "new_password": "NewStrongPass456!"
  }'
# All existing sessions are revoked on success

Change Password (authenticated):

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/change-password \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "current_password": "OldPass123!",
    "new_password": "NewPass456!"
  }'
# Returns 400 AUTH_SAME_PASSWORD if new == current

---

🌐 OAuth 2.0 (/auth/oauth)

Method	Endpoint	Description
GET	/auth/oauth/google	Redirect browser to Google sign-in
GET	/auth/oauth/google/callback	Google redirect callback (handled internally)
GET	/auth/oauth/github	Redirect browser to GitHub sign-in
GET	/auth/oauth/github/callback	GitHub redirect callback (handled internally)

📋 OAuth Flow

Step 1 — Navigate the browser (full-page redirect, not a fetch call):

GET http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/oauth/google
→ 302 to Google consent screen

Step 2 — User approves → Google calls the callback:

GET /auth/oauth/google/callback?code=xxx&state=yyy

Step 3 — AuthShield returns tokens:

{
  "status": "success",
  "data": {
    "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...",
    "refresh_token": "rt_a1b2c3d4...",
    "token_type": "Bearer",
    "is_new_user": true
  }
}

Account linking: If the OAuth email already exists in the database from a password registration, it is linked automatically. The user can then sign in via either method.

New user: No email verification required — the OAuth provider already verified the email.

---

🔑 Two-Factor Authentication (/auth/2fa)

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
POST	/auth/2fa/enable	Bearer	Begin 2FA setup — returns QR code and secret
POST	/auth/2fa/confirm	Bearer	Confirm 2FA with the first code from the app
POST	/auth/2fa/verify	—	Complete the 2FA login step with temp token
POST	/auth/2fa/disable	Bearer	Disable 2FA (requires valid current TOTP code)

📋 2FA Flow

Step 1 — Enable:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/2fa/enable \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN"

{
  "data": {
    "secret": "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP",
    "qr_code": "...",
    "qr_uri": "otpauth://totp/AuthShield:user@example.com?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer=AuthShield"
  }
}

Step 2 — Scan QR code with Google Authenticator or Authy, then confirm:

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/2fa/confirm \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code": "123456"}'

Step 3 — Login flow once 2FA is active:

# POST /auth/login now returns 403 instead of tokens:
{
  "error_code": "AUTH_2FA_REQUIRED",
  "details": { "temp_token": "tmp_abc123..." }
}

# Complete login with the TOTP code:
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/2fa/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"temp_token": "tmp_abc123...", "code": "654321"}'
# Returns full access_token + refresh_token

---

👤 User Profile (/users)

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
GET	/users/me	Bearer	Get own profile, roles, and account status
PATCH	/users/me	Bearer	Update full name or email

📋 Profile Examples

Get Profile:

curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/users/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN"

{
  "data": {
    "user_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
    "email": "user@example.com",
    "full_name": "Jane Doe",
    "roles": ["user"],
    "is_verified": true,
    "is_active": true,
    "is_2fa_enabled": false,
    "oauth_provider": null,
    "avatar_url": null,
    "created_at": "2025-03-01T10:00:00Z",
    "updated_at": "2025-03-01T10:00:00Z"
  }
}

Update Profile:

curl -X PATCH http://localhost:8000/api/v1/users/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"full_name": "Jane Updated Doe"}'

---

📱 Sessions (/sessions)

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
GET	/sessions	Bearer	List all active sessions
DELETE	/sessions/{id}	Bearer	Revoke a specific session

📋 Session Examples

List Sessions:

curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/sessions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN"

{
  "data": {
    "sessions": [
      {
        "id": "aaa-111",
        "ip_address": "192.168.1.1",
        "device_info": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)...",
        "created_at": "2025-03-01T08:00:00Z",
        "last_used_at": "2025-03-01T10:30:00Z",
        "is_current": true
      },
      {
        "id": "bbb-222",
        "ip_address": "10.0.0.5",
        "device_info": "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_0)...",
        "created_at": "2025-02-28T20:00:00Z",
        "last_used_at": "2025-03-01T09:15:00Z",
        "is_current": false
      }
    ],
    "total": 2
  }
}

Revoke a Session:

curl -X DELETE http://localhost:8000/api/v1/sessions/bbb-222 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN"
# Remote session → refresh token killed
# Current session → access token immediately blacklisted in Redis

---

🔧 Admin (/admin) — requires admin role

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
GET	/admin/users	Admin	List all users (paginated + searchable)
GET	/admin/users/{id}	Admin	Get full user details
PATCH	/admin/users/{id}/roles	Admin	Replace user's entire role set
PATCH	/admin/users/{id}/status	Admin	Activate or deactivate an account
GET	/admin/users/{id}/sessions	Admin	View all sessions for a user
DELETE	/admin/users/{id}/sessions	Admin	Revoke all sessions for a user

📋 Admin Examples

List Users (with search):

curl "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/admin/users?search=jane&limit=20&skip=0" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN"

Update Roles:

curl -X PATCH http://localhost:8000/api/v1/admin/users/USER_ID/roles \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"roles": ["user", "moderator"]}'
# Admin cannot remove their own admin role → 400 ADMIN_CANNOT_REMOVE_OWN_ROLE

Deactivate Account:

curl -X PATCH http://localhost:8000/api/v1/admin/users/USER_ID/status \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"is_active": false}'
# Immediately revokes ALL sessions and tokens for that user

---

📊 Health

Method	Endpoint	Auth	Description
GET	/health	—	Live connectivity check for DB and Redis

curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health

{
  "status": "healthy",
  "database": "ok",
  "redis": "ok",
  "version": "1.0.0"
}

---

🚦 Rate Limits

Endpoint	Limit	Window
POST /auth/login	5 requests	60 s
POST /auth/register	3 requests	60 s
POST /auth/forgot-password	3 requests	5 min
POST /auth/2fa/verify	5 requests	60 s
POST /auth/resend-verification	3 requests	5 min

Algorithm: Redis sorted sets with a sliding window — unlike token-bucket or fixed-window implementations, there is no clock boundary to exploit. Keys expire automatically; no cleanup job needed.

---

🚀 Getting Started

Prerequisites

• Python 3.12+
• PostgreSQL 15+
• Redis 7+
• Git
• Docker

---

Local Setup

1️⃣ Clone the repository

git clone https://github.com/ravigupta97/authshield.git
cd authshield

2️⃣ Create virtual environment

Windows (PowerShell):

python -m venv venv
venv\Scripts\activate

macOS / Linux:

python3 -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate

3️⃣ Install dependencies

pip install -r requirements.txt

4️⃣ Configure environment

cp .env.example .env
# Open .env and fill in DATABASE_URL, REDIS_URL, JWT_SECRET_KEY, and SMTP credentials

Generate a secure JWT_SECRET_KEY:

# Windows PowerShell
python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"

# macOS / Linux
openssl rand -hex 32

5️⃣ Create the database and run migrations

# Create the database
createdb authshield_db

# Apply all migrations
alembic upgrade head

# Seed default roles: user, moderator, admin
python scripts/seed_roles.py

6️⃣ Start the development server

uvicorn app.main:app --reload --port 8000

Available at:

• Swagger UI: http://localhost:8000/docs — live endpoint testing with Bearer token auth button
• ReDoc: http://localhost:8000/redoc
• Health check: http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health

---

🐳 Docker & Production

1️⃣ Configure the environment file

cp .env.example .env
# Fill ALL values — especially JWT_SECRET_KEY, POSTGRES_PASSWORD, SMTP / OAuth credentials

Generate a secure JWT_SECRET_KEY:

python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"

2️⃣ Build and start all services

docker-compose up -d --build

This starts three containers on an isolated bridge network:

Container	Image	Role
authshield_api	Built from Dockerfile	FastAPI app (Uvicorn)
authshield_postgres	postgres:15-alpine	Database — data in named volume
authshield_redis	redis:7-alpine	Token blacklist, rate limiting, cache

3️⃣ Run migrations and seed roles

docker-compose exec authshield alembic upgrade head
docker-compose exec authshield python scripts/seed_roles.py

4️⃣ Verify the deployment

curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health
# {"status":"healthy","database":"ok","redis":"ok","version":"1.0.0"}

Useful Docker Commands

# Follow live logs
docker-compose logs -f authshield

# Open a shell inside the container
docker-compose exec authshield bash

# Restart a single service
docker-compose restart authshield

# Stop everything (data is preserved in named volumes)
docker-compose down

# Stop and wipe all data volumes (destructive!)
docker-compose down -v

---

🔧 Environment Variables

Variable	Example	Notes
APP_ENV	production	development | staging | production — enables HSTS + CSP in production
JWT_SECRET_KEY	64-char hex string	python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))" — never commit
DATABASE_URL	postgresql+asyncpg://user:pw@postgres/db	In Docker, use service name postgres
REDIS_URL	redis://redis:6379/0	In Docker, use service name redis
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES	15	Keep short in production
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS	7	Balance security vs UX
BCRYPT_ROUNDS	12	Increase to 13–14 for extra security (~500 ms/hash)
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID	xxx.apps.googleusercontent.com	Google Cloud Console
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET	GOCSPX-xxx	Use secrets manager — never plain .env in git
GITHUB_CLIENT_ID	Iv1.xxx	GitHub Developer Settings
GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET	xxx	Use secrets manager
SMTP_HOST	smtp.sendgrid.net	Use SendGrid / SES / Postmark in production
SMTP_PORT	587
SMTP_USER	apikey	Provider-specific
SMTP_PASSWORD	SG.xxx	Use secrets manager
FRONTEND_URL	https://app.yourdomain.com	Used in email links and OAuth post-callback redirects
ALLOWED_ORIGINS	https://app.yourdomain.com	Comma-separated CORS origins

See .env.example for the complete annotated list.

---

🗄️ Database Schema

┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                  USERS                   │
├──────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ id              UUID (PK)                │
│ email           unique, indexed          │
│ password_hash   nullable (null=OAuth user)│
│ full_name       string                   │
│ is_active       bool  default true       │
│ is_verified     bool  default false      │
│ oauth_provider  nullable ("google"|"github")│
│ oauth_id        nullable                 │
│ avatar_url      nullable                 │
│ is_2fa_enabled  bool  default false      │
│ totp_secret     nullable (encrypted)     │
│ created_at      timestamp                │
│ updated_at      timestamp                │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
                   │ 1
        ┌──────────┼──────────────────────────────┐
        │ N        │ N                            │ N
┌───────▼──────┐ ┌─▼────────────────┐  ┌──────────▼──────────┐
│  USER_ROLES  │ │    SESSIONS      │  │   REFRESH_TOKENS    │
├──────────────┤ ├──────────────────┤  ├─────────────────────┤
│ user_id  FK  │ │ id   UUID (PK)   │  │ id        UUID (PK) │
│ role_id  FK  │ │ user_id       FK │  │ token_hash SHA-256  │
└──────┬───────┘ │ ip_address       │  │ user_id   FK        │
       │         │ device_info      │  │ session_id FK       │
       │ N       │ is_active  bool  │  │ family_id  UUID     │◄── rotation chain
┌──────▼──────┐  │ created_at       │  │ is_used    bool     │
│    ROLES    │  │ last_used_at     │  │ is_revoked bool     │
├─────────────┤  └──────────────────┘  │ expires_at          │
│ id  UUID    │                        └─────────────────────┘
│ name string │  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ description │  │             LOGIN_HISTORY                  │
└─────────────┘  ├────────────────────────────────────────────┤
                 │ id             UUID (PK)                   │
                 │ user_id        FK  (nullable)              │
                 │ ip_address     string                      │
                 │ status         success | failed            │
                 │ failure_reason nullable                    │
                 │ created_at     timestamp  (append-only)    │
                 └────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Key Design Decisions

Decision	Why
password_hash is nullable	OAuth users authenticate via provider — they have no password
token_hash stores SHA-256, not the raw token	DB breach exposes unusable hashes, not working tokens
family_id on refresh tokens	Groups a rotation chain — reuse of any token kills the entire family
login_history is append-only	Provides a tamper-evident audit trail — no updates, no deletes
No users table in your apps	Downstream services store user_id UUID as a FK — AuthShield owns user data

---

🧪 End-to-End Flow Testing

Full Registration → Login → Refresh Flow

# 1. Register
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"test@example.com","password":"TestPass123!","full_name":"Test User"}'

# 2. Check Mailtrap for the verification email — copy the token

# 3. Verify email
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/verify-email \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"token": "TOKEN_FROM_EMAIL"}'

# 4. Login — save both tokens
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"test@example.com","password":"TestPass123!"}'

# 5. Call a protected endpoint
curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/users/me \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ACCESS_TOKEN"

# 6. Rotate refresh token
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/v1/auth/refresh \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"refresh_token": "REFRESH_TOKEN"}'

# 7. Try the old refresh token — expect 401 AUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_REUSED
#    AND entire token family is revoked (token theft detection)

Edge Cases to Verify

# Login before email verification → 403 AUTH_EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED
# Duplicate email registration → 409 AUTH_EMAIL_ALREADY_REGISTERED
# Weak password (no uppercase/digit/special) → 422
# Wrong password → 401 AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS (same message as non-existent email)
# Tampered JWT signature → 401 AUTH_TOKEN_INVALID
# Expired access token → 401 AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED
# Logout then use old access token → 401 AUTH_TOKEN_REVOKED
# 6 POSTs to /auth/login → 429 SYS_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED + Retry-After header
# Invalid verification token → 400 AUTH_INVALID_VERIFICATION_TOKEN
# Verification token used twice → 400 on second attempt
# Reset to same password → 400 AUTH_SAME_PASSWORD
# Admin removing own admin role → 400 ADMIN_CANNOT_REMOVE_OWN_ROLE

---

🧪 Running Tests

# All 48 tests
pytest tests/ -v

# Specific test file
pytest tests/test_auth.py -v

# Specific test class
pytest tests/test_sessions.py::TestSessionRevocation -v

# Stop on first failure
pytest tests/ -v -x

# With captured stdout (useful for debugging)
pytest tests/ -v -s --tb=short

# Clear Redis rate-limit keys before a run (Windows PowerShell)
redis-cli --scan --pattern "rate:*" | ForEach-Object { redis-cli DEL $_ }

Test Results

tests/test_admin.py::TestRBACEnforcement::test_regular_user_cannot_access_admin    PASSED
tests/test_admin.py::TestRBACEnforcement::test_admin_can_list_users                PASSED
tests/test_admin.py::TestUserManagement::test_admin_can_deactivate_user            PASSED
tests/test_admin.py::TestUserManagement::test_admin_cannot_remove_own_admin_role   PASSED
tests/test_auth.py::TestRegistration::test_register_success                        PASSED
tests/test_auth.py::TestEmailVerification::test_verify_email_success               PASSED
tests/test_auth.py::TestLogin::test_login_success                                  PASSED
tests/test_auth.py::TestTokenRefresh::test_refresh_token_rotation                  PASSED
tests/test_auth.py::TestLogout::test_logout_success                                PASSED
tests/test_passwords.py::TestForgotPassword::test_forgot_password_always_returns_200 PASSED
tests/test_sessions.py::TestSessionRevocation::test_revoke_current_session         PASSED
tests/test_rate_limiting.py::TestLoginRateLimit::test_login_rate_limit_enforced    PASSED
... (36 more)

==================== 48 passed in 218.12s ====================

Testing Strategy

Concern	Approach
DB isolation	Each test wraps operations in a transaction that rolls back - no persistent test data
Rate limiting	Disabled via TESTING=true env var in all tests except test_rate_limiting.py
Rate limit tests	rate_limit_client fixture temporarily unsets TESTING to enable real rate limiting
Infrastructure	Real PostgreSQL and Redis - integration bugs that mocks hide are caught
Windows compat	WindowsSelectorEventLoopPolicy set in root conftest.py for Redis/asyncio compatibility

---

🔌 Plugging Into Your Project

AuthShield is a standalone service. Your downstream projects need exactly one file and one shared environment variable.

📖 Full integration guide with multi-framework examples (FastAPI, Flask, Django, Express) and a complete E-Commerce walkthrough: INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md

The Mental Model

Your Frontend
    │
    ├── auth requests ──────▶ AuthShield  :8000
    │   (login, register,      (issues + manages JWTs)
    │    OAuth, 2FA, logout)
    │
    └── business requests ──▶ Your API    :8001
        (tasks, orders, etc.)  (validates JWT locally — zero calls to AuthShield)

Step 1 — Copy auth.py into every new project

# your_project/auth.py  ← copy verbatim, never changes
import os, jwt
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials

SECRET_KEY = os.getenv("SECRET_KEY")   # same value as AuthShield
ALGORITHM  = "HS256"
bearer     = HTTPBearer()

def get_current_user(
    creds: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(bearer)
) -> dict:
    try:
        payload = jwt.decode(creds.credentials, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[ALGORITHM])
    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "Token expired")
    except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "Invalid token")
    if payload.get("type") != "access":
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "Not an access token")
    return payload  # {sub, email, roles, session_id, jti, exp}

def require_roles(roles: list[str]):
    """Factory: require at least one of the given roles."""
    def check(user: dict = Depends(get_current_user)) -> dict:
        if not any(r in user["roles"] for r in roles):
            raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Requires roles: {roles}")
        return user
    return check

Step 2 — Add one env var to your project

# your_project/.env
SECRET_KEY=same-value-as-authshield   # that's the only AuthShield config needed

Step 3 — Protect your endpoints

from auth import get_current_user, require_roles

# Any authenticated user
@app.get("/tasks")
def list_tasks(user = Depends(get_current_user), db = Depends(get_db)):
    return db.query(Task).filter_by(user_id=user["sub"]).all()
    #                                         ↑ UUID from JWT — FK in your DB

# Admin only
@app.delete("/admin/tasks/{id}")
def delete_any_task(user = Depends(require_roles(["admin"]))):
    ...

Step 4 — Your database schema (no users table)

class Task(Base):
    __tablename__ = "tasks"
    id      = Column(UUID, primary_key=True, default=uuid4)
    user_id = Column(UUID, nullable=False, index=True)
    # ↑ This is user["sub"] from the JWT.
    # No FK constraint to a users table — AuthShield owns users entirely.
    title   = Column(String, nullable=False)

JWT Payload Reference

{
  "sub":        "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "email":      "user@example.com",
  "roles":      ["user"],
  "session_id": "abc-123",
  "jti":        "unique-token-id",
  "type":       "access",
  "iat":        1700000000,
  "exp":        1700000900
}

---

🔒 Security Design

Decision	Rationale
15-minute access token TTL	Stolen token window is ≤15 minutes
Refresh tokens stored as SHA-256 hash	DB breach exposes unusable hashes — not working tokens
Token family revocation on reuse	Reuse means possible theft — revoking the family kicks the attacker AND forces the victim to re-login, alerting them
Redis blacklist on logout	Immediate effect — no gap between logout and natural token expiry
bcrypt 12 rounds (~250 ms/hash)	Brute-forcing 10M passwords would take ~29 days on a 10-GPU rig
Single-use OAuth state tokens in Redis	Replayed OAuth callbacks are rejected (CSRF hardening)
Password reset revokes all sessions	If an attacker triggered the reset, they are kicked on completion
Forgot-password always returns 200	Prevents discovering which emails are registered
Admin cannot remove own admin role	Prevents last-admin lockout
Sliding-window rate limits	No fixed-window boundary to exploit
Security headers on every response	Mitigates clickjacking, MIME sniffing, XSS, and referrer leakage

---

✅ Deployment Checklist

Before First Deploy

• Generate SECRET_KEY — openssl rand -hex 32
• Set ENVIRONMENT=production
• Configure production SMTP (SendGrid / AWS SES / Postmark)
• Update Google and GitHub OAuth redirect URIs to your production domain
• Obtain SSL certificate (Let's Encrypt / Certbot — free)
• Set strong POSTGRES_PASSWORD and REDIS_PASSWORD

Deploy

• docker-compose up -d --build
• docker-compose exec api alembic upgrade head
• docker-compose exec api python scripts/seed_roles.py
• curl https://auth.yourdomain.com/api/v1/health → {"status":"healthy"}

Post-Deploy Smoke Tests

• GET /docs returns 404 (Swagger hidden in production)
• Security headers present on all responses
• 6th login attempt in 60 s returns 429 with Retry-After header
• Registration email arrives in inbox
• Full Google OAuth flow completes on production domain

Monitoring

• Ship JSON logs to Datadog / CloudWatch / Papertrail
• Alert on elevated AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS rate — brute-force signal
• Alert on AUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_REUSED — possible token theft
• Monitor Redis memory (rate-limit keys accumulate under sustained attack)
• Schedule login_history table cleanup (grows unbounded)

---

🤝 Contributing

Contributions are welcome! Please follow these steps:

1. Fork the repository
2. Create a feature branch:

git checkout -b feature/amazing-feature

3. Make your changes and commit:

git commit -m "feat: add amazing feature"

4. Push to your fork:

git push origin feature/amazing-feature

5. Open a Pull Request

Contribution Guidelines

• Follow PEP 8 style guide
• Add tests for all new features — maintain 48+ passing
• Keep commits atomic and descriptive (feat:, fix:, test:, docs:)
• Update this README if endpoints or env vars change

---

👨‍💻 Author

Ravi Gupta

• GitHub: @ravigupta97
• LinkedIn: Ravi Gupta
• Email: gupta_ravi@outlook.in

---

🙏 Acknowledgments

• FastAPI — outstanding async web framework
• SQLAlchemy — powerful async ORM
• Redis — the backbone of blacklisting, rate limiting, and OAuth state
• pyotp — clean, standards-compliant TOTP implementation
• structlog — JSON-structured logging done right

---

📞 Support

• 💬 Issues: GitHub Issues
• 📖 Swagger Docs: http://localhost:8000/docs

---

Built using FastAPI, PostgreSQL, and Redis

⬆ Back to Top