We only provide security fixes for the latest 2.x release. Older versions (including all 1.x releases) are end-of-life and will not receive patches.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.x (latest) | ✅ |
| 1.x | ❌ |
| 0.x | ❌ |
If you are running a 1.x deployment, we strongly recommend upgrading to the latest 2.x release.
Please report security vulnerabilities through the GitHub Security Advisory "Report a Vulnerability" tab.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
- Acknowledgement: We aim to respond to all reports within 7 days.
- Fix: Confirmed vulnerabilities will be addressed within 30 days.
- Urgent issues: If you believe the vulnerability is critical and actively exploitable, you can reach out directly on Discord (
arvinxu) for faster coordination.
A good vulnerability report should include:
- A clear description of the issue and its potential impact
- The affected version (must be the latest 2.x release)
- Step-by-step reproduction instructions or a working PoC
- Any relevant logs, screenshots, or code references
- Security issues affecting the latest 2.x release of LobeHub
- Vulnerabilities in the server-side deployment (LobeHub Cloud or self-hosted server mode)
- Issues that can be exploited without requiring admin/owner access to the deployment
The following are considered by design or out of scope and will not be accepted as vulnerability reports:
Any issue that only affects 1.x or earlier versions. This includes but is not limited to the X-lobe-chat-auth header mechanism, webapi route authentication, and other 1.x-specific architectures that have been completely removed in 2.x.
The file proxy endpoint /f/:id uses randomly generated, non-enumerable IDs as capability URLs. This is a deliberate design choice, similar to how S3 presigned URLs or Google Docs sharing links work. Knowing the URL grants access — this is by design, not an authorization bypass.
Endpoints such as check-user that indicate whether an account exists are part of the standard login UX. This is a common and intentional pattern used by most modern authentication flows.
In self-hosted client-side mode, users configure their own API keys which are stored in the browser's local storage. This is the expected behavior for client-side deployments where the user is both the operator and the consumer.
Actions that require administrative access to the deployment (e.g., environment variable configuration, server-side settings) are not considered security vulnerabilities, as the admin is already a trusted party.
Reports based on theoretical attack scenarios without a working proof of concept against a realistic deployment, or issues that require unlikely preconditions (e.g., physical access to the server, pre-existing compromise of the host system).
- We follow coordinated vulnerability disclosure.
- We will credit reporters in the security advisory unless they prefer to remain anonymous.
- Please allow us reasonable time to address the issue before any public disclosure.
- Primary: GitHub Security Advisories
- Urgent: Discord —
arvinxu