security: add environment gate and tag validation to update-main-version (TeamPCP)#273
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Addresses Finding 1 from the TeamPCP/GitHub Actions security audit (March 2026): - Add `environment: tag-release` to require human approval before any force-push runs. Create this environment in Settings → Environments with required reviewers. - Add preflight validation step that rejects any `target` input that is not an existing named tag in refs/tags/. This closes the exact attack vector used in the Trivy compromise — an attacker cannot point v2 at an arbitrary commit SHA or branch ref.
Without a bump2version call, the CI "Create Release" step is silently skipped because version-check.sh finds the existing tag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bump version: 2.4.0 → 2.5.0
Bwvolleyball
approved these changes
Apr 2, 2026
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Summary
Addresses Finding 1 from the TeamPCP supply chain audit (March 2026), which identified
update-main-version.ymlas using the same force-push-to-mutable-tag pattern exploited in the Trivy compromise.Changes
1. Environment gate (
environment: tag-release)Blocks the job from running until a required reviewer approves it in the GitHub UI. Prevents a compromised or stolen credential from silently moving
v2to a malicious commit.2. Tag validation preflight step
Rejects any
targetinput that is not an existing named tag inrefs/tags/. This closes the exact TeamPCP attack vector — an attacker cannot pointv2at an arbitrary commit SHA or branch tip.Risk if not fixed
Every repo using
uses: stackhawk/hawkscan-action@v2resolves at runtime to whereverv2points. Without this gate, a single compromised workflow trigger could silently poison all customer CI pipelines.References