ci: hardened changesets release workflow (OIDC, no stored npm token)

.github/workflows/release.yml

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+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+# Automated changesets release. Adapted from the pattern in
+# thecodedrift/firebot-script-music-to-my-ears and hardened for npm publishing.
+#
+# Security model (why it is split into two jobs):
+#
+#   `version`  reads contributor-authored changesets (UNTRUSTED text) and opens
+#              the "Version Packages" PR. It has NO npm credential and NO OIDC
+#              identity, so a crafted changeset / PR body has nothing to steal
+#              or escape into. The changeset TEXT is fully consumed here (into
+#              the CHANGELOG + PR body) and never reaches the credentialed job.
+#
+#   `publish`  runs only when main's version is not yet on npm — i.e. right
+#              after the Version Packages PR merges. By then there are no
+#              changesets left, so this job sees no untrusted PR/changeset text;
+#              it builds from reviewed, merged source only. It authenticates to
+#              npm with a SHORT-LIVED token minted via GitHub OIDC (npm trusted
+#              publishing) — there is NO stored NPM_TOKEN anywhere to exfiltrate.
+#
+# Residual perimeter, stated honestly: the publish job builds merged repo code,
+# so "what can merge to main" is the real boundary. That is enforced by branch
+# protection (review required) on main. `--ignore-scripts` keeps dependency
+# lifecycle hooks from running while the OIDC identity is available; only our
+# own build runs. No `pull_request_target` and no `${{ }}` interpolation of
+# untrusted text into any `run:` — the two classic token-exfiltration footguns.
+#
+# Action refs are pinned to commit SHAs (supply-chain hardening); the trailing
+# comment records the human-readable tag.
+
+name: Release
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+# Serialize releases so two pushes can't race the version PR / publish.
+concurrency: release-${{ github.ref }}
+
+# No workflow-wide grants; each job requests exactly what it needs.
+permissions: {}
+
+jobs:
+  version:
+    name: Version Packages PR
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write # push the changeset-release/main branch
+      pull-requests: write # open/update the Version Packages PR
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@b906affcce14559ad1aafd4ab0e942779e9f58b1 # v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+          cache: pnpm
+      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
+
+      # `version: pnpm bump` runs `changeset version` AND `sync-skill-versions`,
+      # so the bumped version is propagated into skills/recipes in the same PR.
+      # No `publish:` input — this job can never publish.
+      - uses: changesets/action@a45c4d594aa4e2c509dc14a9f2b3b67ba3780d0d # v1
+        with:
+          version: pnpm bump
+          commit: "chore: version packages"
+          title: "chore: version packages"
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+  # Decides whether main's version needs publishing — with NO credential and NO
+  # OIDC identity. Runs on every push, but the credentialed publish job below
+  # only starts when this reports a new version, so ordinary non-release pushes
+  # never instantiate an OIDC-capable job or touch the npm-production environment.
+  check:
+    name: Check for a new version
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read # checkout + read package.json
+    outputs:
+      publish: ${{ steps.check.outputs.publish }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false # no git writes here; don't leave the token in git config
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+      # Publish only a version npm has never seen. On an ordinary feature merge
+      # the version is unchanged (already on npm) so this is false; it flips true
+      # only on the merge of the Version Packages PR. Reads package.json (repo
+      # source) via `node -p` — no untrusted interpolation into the shell.
+      - id: check
+        run: |
+          name=$(node -p "require('./packages/cli/package.json').name")
+          version=$(node -p "require('./packages/cli/package.json').version")
+          if npm view "$name@$version" version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            echo "publish=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "$name@$version already published — nothing to do."
+          else
+            echo "publish=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "Will publish $name@$version."
+          fi
+
+  publish:
+    name: Publish to npm
+    # Gate on the credential-free check: this job — and therefore the OIDC
+    # identity + npm-production environment — only exists for an actual release.
+    needs: check
+    if: needs.check.outputs.publish == 'true'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # Environment is the scoping/audit boundary for the release and where the
+    # npm trusted-publisher is bound. No required reviewers (fully automatic
+    # once the Version Packages PR merges), by design.
+    environment: npm-production
+    permissions:
+      contents: read # checkout only
+      id-token: write # OIDC → short-lived npm auth + build provenance
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false # publish authenticates via OIDC/npm, not git creds
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@b906affcce14559ad1aafd4ab0e942779e9f58b1 # v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+          cache: pnpm
+          registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org
+      - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
+
+      # OIDC trusted publishing + provenance need npm >= 11.5.1. Pin the version
+      # (not @latest) so the release is deterministic and a new npm release
+      # can't change publish behavior unreviewed; bump this intentionally.
+      # --ignore-scripts: no lifecycle code runs while the OIDC identity exists.
+      - run: npm install -g npm@12.0.1 --ignore-scripts
+
+      - run: pnpm --filter @taskless/cli build
+
+      # OIDC handshake happens here (id-token: write + registry-url + a
+      # registered trusted publisher). No token in env. `--provenance` attaches
+      # a signed build-provenance attestation.
+      - run: npm publish --provenance --access public
+        working-directory: packages/cli