π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in auth management handlers#219
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in auth management handlers#219
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Replaced `strings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator))` with `strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\")` in the `UploadAuthFile` and `DeleteAuthFile` management endpoints to prevent path traversal on cross-platform systems. Appended a vulnerability learning entry to `.jules/sentinel.md`. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The
UploadAuthFileandDeleteAuthFilemanagement endpoints ininternal/api/handlers/management/auth_files.gowere usingstrings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator))to validate filename inputs. This is insufficient because it only checks the host OS separator, making the application vulnerable to cross-platform traversal bypassing (e.g. using\characters on Linux instances).π― Impact: An attacker could bypass path validation checks by using alternate path separators, allowing them to read, write, or delete arbitrary files outside of the authorized
AuthDirdirectory if the operating system or underlying Go path functions eventually normalize the path.π§ Fix: Replaced the vulnerable validation check with the Sentinel pattern
strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\"), explicitly denying both forward and backward slashes. Also documented the vulnerability and learning in.jules/sentinel.md.β Verification: Verified by checking code formatting, passing
go vet ./internal/api/handlers/management, and successfully runninggo test ./... -shortglobally andgo test ./internal/api/handlers/management -run TestDownloadAuthFile_PathTraversalspecifically.PR created automatically by Jules for task 7660994911729275407 started by @rschumann