π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in browser URL handler#227
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in browser URL handler#227
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Added strong URL scheme validation using `net/url.Parse()` to `browser.OpenURL` and `openURLPlatformSpecific`. This ensures only `http` and `https` schemes are passed to `exec.Command`, preventing potential command injection and SSRF vulnerabilities via malicious local schemes (like `file://` or `javascript://`). Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Unvalidated URL parameters passed to
exec.Commandinbrowser.OpenURLcan lead to command injection or SSRF if malicious schemes (likefile://) are used.π― Impact: An attacker could potentially execute local files, access sensitive local resources, or manipulate the browser process through maliciously crafted URLs.
π§ Fix: Added strong URL validation using
net/url.Parse()to ensure onlyhttpandhttpsschemes are allowed before passing the URL to any OS commands or libraries. Renamedurlvariable torawurlto avoid shadowing thenet/urlpackage.β Verification: Run
go test ./... -shortto ensure no regressions and verifygo vet ./...passes.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6750862478014155570 started by @rschumann