π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Command Injection in browser URL handler#242
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Command Injection in browser URL handler#242
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Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The OS-specific URL handler in
internal/browser/browser.gousedexec.Commanddirectly with the user-supplied URL without any validation, opening up a command injection or SSRF vulnerability if arbitrary or local file URLs were passed.π― Impact: An attacker could craft a malicious URL to execute commands on the host operating system or access local files.
π§ Fix: Introduced URL scheme validation using
net/url.Parseto ensure onlyhttpandhttpsschemes are allowed before passing to OS-specific open commands. Also renamedurltorawurlto avoid shadowing the package.β Verification: Verified by running unit tests (
go test ./... -short) and ensuringgosec ./...no longer reports an exploitable path, andgo vet ./internal/browser/...passes.PR created automatically by Jules for task 18337675449359256288 started by @rschumann