ci: harden publish workflow#5141
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Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #5141 +/- ##
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Coverage 88.54% 88.54%
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Files 303 303
Lines 2812 2812
Branches 816 816
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Hits 2490 2490
Misses 123 123
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chybisov
added a commit
to lifinance/widget
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this pull request
May 29, 2026
Adopt the two hardenings from wevm/wagmi#5141 that we didn't already have (the version-PR/publish split was already in place): - permissions: {} at the workflow top level — deny-by-default; every job declares only what it needs. This also fixes sdk, which had no top-level permissions block (it inherited the repo default token scope). Added explicit contents: read to the verify jobs that relied on the old top-level default (sdk, bigmi). - skip the pnpm store cache in privileged jobs (changesets / release / canary, plus explorer's deploy-prod) via a new cache input on the pnpm-install composite (default true). Prevents restoring a poisoned dependency cache into a context that holds publish (id-token) or write permissions. verify keeps the cache (read-only, runs on every push). Marginal under our write-access trust model, but it's the defense-in-depth best practice and matches wagmi. cancel-in-progress: false and per-job least-privilege were already in place.
chybisov
added a commit
to lifinance/sdk
that referenced
this pull request
May 29, 2026
Adopt the two hardenings from wevm/wagmi#5141 that we didn't already have (the version-PR/publish split was already in place): - permissions: {} at the workflow top level — deny-by-default; every job declares only what it needs. This also fixes sdk, which had no top-level permissions block (it inherited the repo default token scope). Added explicit contents: read to the verify jobs that relied on the old top-level default (sdk, bigmi). - skip the pnpm store cache in privileged jobs (changesets / release / canary, plus explorer's deploy-prod) via a new cache input on the pnpm-install composite (default true). Prevents restoring a poisoned dependency cache into a context that holds publish (id-token) or write permissions. verify keeps the cache (read-only, runs on every push). Marginal under our write-access trust model, but it's the defense-in-depth best practice and matches wagmi. cancel-in-progress: false and per-job least-privilege were already in place.
chybisov
added a commit
to lifinance/bigmi
that referenced
this pull request
May 29, 2026
Adopt the two hardenings from wevm/wagmi#5141 that we didn't already have (the version-PR/publish split was already in place): - permissions: {} at the workflow top level — deny-by-default; every job declares only what it needs. This also fixes sdk, which had no top-level permissions block (it inherited the repo default token scope). Added explicit contents: read to the verify jobs that relied on the old top-level default (sdk, bigmi). - skip the pnpm store cache in privileged jobs (changesets / release / canary, plus explorer's deploy-prod) via a new cache input on the pnpm-install composite (default true). Prevents restoring a poisoned dependency cache into a context that holds publish (id-token) or write permissions. verify keeps the cache (read-only, runs on every push). Marginal under our write-access trust model, but it's the defense-in-depth best practice and matches wagmi. cancel-in-progress: false and per-job least-privilege were already in place.
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