[Aikido] Fix 41 security issues in picomatch, glob, js-yaml and 2 more#217
Closed
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
Closed
[Aikido] Fix 41 security issues in picomatch, glob, js-yaml and 2 more#217aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
Conversation
This was referenced Apr 23, 2026
Contributor
Author
|
Closed by Aikido: a new AutoFix has been created → #219 |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Upgrade dependencies to fix critical RCE vulnerabilities in prototype pollution, template injection, and protobuf code execution, plus SSRF via proxy bypass.
✅ No breaking changes for: picomatch, js-yaml
✅ 41 CVEs resolved by this upgrade, including 4 critical 🚨 CVEs
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
protofield, enabling prototype chain manipulation and unintended property injection across the application.parsePatchandapplyPatchmethods are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks when processing patches with specific line break characters (\r,\u2028,\u2029) in filename or patch headers, causing infinite loops and memory exhaustion or ReDoS attacks.arrayLimitenforcement whencomma: trueis enabled, allowing attackers to create arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter and cause denial-of-service through memory exhaustion.*()and+()) generate regexps with catastrophic backtracking, causing severe ReDoS denial-of-service attacks with minimal input patterns triggering multi-second hangs.